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SUMMARY
From the early years of the Twentieth Century the 
theoretical understanding of unemployment steadily 
progressed up until the Second World War, and over 
the same period, with some short exceptions during the 
inter-war depression, the State accepted a growing 
responsibility for the unemployed. The Keynesian revolu­
tion in economic thought, coupled with the War, forged 
a new era. Full employment reached in War was realised 
in peace by new forms of Government intervention and 
economic management. Since 1966, however, the consensus 
which surrounded post-war economic policy has been 
inrreasingly undermined. The numbers out of work have 
grown and the political commitment to maintain full 
employment has been steadily traded off for other 
benefits, principally lower inflation. The experience 
of the full employment era is still reflected in public 
attitudes and policies relating to the unenployed and 
its legacy is a source of many constraints on developing 
responses relevant to the unemployed in the present 
crisis.
High levels of unemployment and the problems it 
creates seem likely to continue for some time to come.
At present the burden of unemployment falls very unequally 
across the community, affecting in the main its weaker 
members and often causing severe financial hardship for 
unemployed individuals and their families. Although the 
exact statistical relationships are not always clear, 
evidence also points to an association between unemployment, 
mental and physical ill health and numerous other indices 
of social stress. In addition a large financial cost is 
borne by the whole community as a result of high unemploy­
ment.
( iv)
Despite the abandonment of traditional policies to 
maintain high levels of employment by managing the 
economy on a national scale, the stresses and strains 
associated with having a large section of the working 
population excluded from the formal economy have forced 
Government, and others, to devise alternative measures 
with which to respond to the problem. Since the late 
1970s a new tradition of economic and enployment policies 
and other services for the jobless have emerged. These 
have been focussed on a variety of local scales ranging 
from the city to the neighbourhood or community level.
While Central Government and agencies allied to it are 
heavily involved, organisations for whom a direct role 
in local economic policy is a new one, such as local 
authorities, corporate bodies, trade unions and community 
and voluntary groups, are also re-examining their estab­
lished roles and values in the light of high unemployment 
and are actively involved in local economic initiatives.
As a result, a complex pattern of economic and employment 
policies is emerging at an urban scale. Local authorities 
and other agencies are undergoing administrative restruc­
turing and developing new styles of working to enable 
them to intervene in the workings of local economies.
Major changes are taking place in the organisation and 
delivery of a number of social services as public 
bureaucracies adopt more decentralised, area-based 
approaches to economic development. And traditional 
barriers between public and private and formal and informal 
sectors of the economy are breaking down as the participation 
of private sector organisations in the promotion of 
economic and social welfare increases and as unconventional 
forms of economic activity - such as community businesses - 
which do not conform to traditional market or business 
principles emerge.
(v)
The development of local economic initiatives is a 
fast growing area of activity and systematic evaluative 
research is required to assess the effects and possibilities 
of action at this scale. A dominant theme of major 
public sector regeneration policy during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s has been that by incurring heavy investment 
in providing serviced sites and premises for small enterprise 
in depressed local economies the collapse of large scale 
manufacturing employment in these areas can be replaced 
by a dynamic small firm sector with a strong potential 
for employment growth. However, the results of research 
into the local employment impact of firms occupying new 
public sector premises in the Clydeside conurbation 
suggests that policies of this sort have only a modest 
impact on the emergence of genuinely new firms and jobs, 
will be unable to compensate for the scale of job loss, 
and are particularly ineffective as measures to reduce 
local unemployment rates and provide jobs for the long 
term unemployed. Other evaluative work on the employment 
impact of economic self-help and community initiatives - 
an area which has received fewer resources and political 
commitment than the promotion of traditional small firms - 
suggests that unconventional forms of economic activity 
potentially offer more effective ways of generating work 
and incomes for marginal groups in the labour market 
living in deprived communities if resources and support 
more suited to their requirements were forthcoming.
Although the potential of locally based action is 
inevitably limited in that many of the problems faced 
have their roots in the fluctuations of national and 
international economies, the prospect of developing 
more effective approaches to economic and social regeneration 
at thé local scale would be enhanced by a more favourable 
economic, political and policy climate geared to widening
( vi )
the scope for initiatives relevant to people and 
communities excluded from work and the benefits of many 
contemporary policies. The social security system, 
manpower policy and economic strategies in general 
could become more supportive and facilitative of wealth 
generating activity outside full time employment and the 
formal economy, attitudes to public expenditure could be 
rethought to allow resources to be used in new ways to 
create enterprise and employment in depressed localities, 
and the institutions of higher education could develop 
a valuable role in evaluating new policies and providing 
the trained manpower necessary to staff agencies working 
at the local level in new and challenging ways. Those 
operating at an urban scale could develop more effective 
policy responses if they were able to use the current 
disparate range of economic and employment programmes 
more flexibly and develop integrated economic strategies 
by co-ordinating the resources available for local action.
These could be used in part to stimulate new and unconventional 
forms of productive activity which combine both'economic 
and social benefits and which are tailored specifically 
with the unemployed and depressed communities in mind.
SECTION I
THE RISE AND FALL OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 
***********
1.
CHAPTER ONE
TOWARDS DEPRESSION, THE RISE OF MASS UNEMPLOYMENT
The lot of man is ceaseless labour.
Or ceaseless idleness, which is still harder. 
Or irregular labour which is not pleasant.
T.S. Eliot
Choruses from 'The Rock'
1. Introduction
With the rapid escalation in the numbers out of work in 
recent years unemployment has become the main political issue 
of the day. It would be wrong, however, to regard 
unemployment as a recent phenomenon. From the beginning 
of this century we can witness a plethora of e^q^lanations and 
policies as society has struggled to understand and respond 
to the problem of unemployment. Indeed it has only been 
since the Second World War that the economy has shown itself 
capable of operating under peace-time conditions with the 
great majority of the labour force in work and only a tiny 
proportion unemployed. This state, generally termed full 
employment, has now collapsed. Much of the present debate 
is taken up with the possibility of returning to it and the 
role the central state should play in this process. These 
issues, along with society’s current attitudes and assuirptions 
concerning unemployment and its treatment of the unemployed, 
cannot be fully appreciated without first reviewing unemploy­
ment in its historical context which provides important 
reference points for any consideration of unenployment and 
related issues in a contenporary context. This is the task 
of the first two chapters of the thesis which trace the 
experience of unemployment since the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century, the level of theoretical understanding 
reached, and the State’s responses to it up until the period
known as the full employment era. Chapter One will now 
carry the story to the years preceeding the Second World 
War where the levels of unemployment then e3q>erienced is 
often cited in comparative terms with the current crisis,
2. The Nineteenth Century Legacy
The second half of the Nineteenth Century witnessed the 
zenith of Britain’s industrialisation and growth. The 
country’s position as ’workshop of the world’ was secure and 
few would have predicted, or accepted, the erosion of the 
nation’s industrial supremacy and the slide into cyclical and 
structural decline and mass unenployment of the next century. 
Notions that the economy was guided and determined by a set 
of natural laws had a long history dating from the Middle 
Ages. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries saw these 
cumulate into a broad school of economic thought which has 
been variously termed ’classical’, ’laissez-faire’ or 
’naturalistic*. The principal tenet of classical Nineteenth 
Century economic thought was that in a coipetitive free 
market economy self balancing mechanisms operated to create a 
state of equilibrium between the supply of and the demand 
for labour. A natural process of adjustment was ensured by 
the flexibility of wages, prices and interest rates. Where, 
for example, an excess of supply of goods, labour or money 
existed, this would be corrected by a corresponding fall in 
their market prices, thereby ensuring a return to an equality 
of demand and supply. To classical economists there was, 
therefore, to borrow a more modern phrase, an automatic 
tendency towards full employment. Although a periodic crisis 
in the economy was recognised as a possibility, a situation 
of general over-production and a large and lasting excess 
in the supply of labour over demand was given little 
consideration.
Despite the introduction of alternative explanations 
of unenployment and the economy by socialist writers such
3.
Marx and Hobson, the century turned with the natural order 
school and its assumptions largely intact. The classical 
interpretation of how the economy operated determined both 
the way that unemployment was perceived and the unemployed 
themselves treated. As unemployment was not generally 
recognised to be the result of forces outwith the individual 
worker’s control, to suffer poverty through unemployment in 
the Nineteenth Century was considered a manifestation of 
personal failure or inadequacy. The problem was seen as an 
individual one and society’s response was to stimulate self- 
help through public relief and private charity.
The state’s principal institution in the treatment of 
the unemployed at the turn of the century was the new Poor 
Law which had operated since its constitution in 1834. This 
had been designed to deal with the workshy, demoralised and 
unemployed rural labour, and to restrain and reduce the rising 
burden of poor rates. Another motive, and one which has 
proved of fundamental and lasting significance, was to 
establish industrial discipline by drawing a clear distinc­
tion between those in work, whom their employers should 
support, and those out of work who were the responsibility 
of the state.
Poor Law relief was administered locally by local Poor
Law Guardians and could take various forms. A very large
proportion was given in outdoor relief to the destitute
although in some cases those in receipt could be compelled
to perform a labour test or, worse still, have to enter the
hated workhouse. Where an unemployed individual was ’able
bodied’ public relief was provided on the principle that his
situation "on the whole shall not be made really or apparently
as eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of
1the lowest class." It is worth quoting the justification 
given by the Poor Law Commissioners for the principle of 
’less eligibility’. It reminds one, rather ominously, of
4.
contemporary arguments of a similar type which favour restoring 
work incentives by reducing the level of. benefits paid to the 
unemployed. In 1834 the Commissioners argued,
" in proportion as the condition of any pauper class 
is elevated above the condition of independent labourers, 
the condition of the independent class is depressed: 
their industry is impaired, their employment becomes 
unsteady, and its remuaeration in wages is diminished.
Such persons, therefore, are under the strongest 
inducements to quit the less eligible class of 
labourers and enter the more eligible class of paupers.
The converse is the effect when the pauper class is 
placed in its proper position, below the condition of 
the independent labourer. Every penny bestowed, that 
tends to render the condition of the pauper more eligible 
than that of the independent labourer, is a bounty on 
indolence and vice..."2
In the late Nineteenth Century and the early years of 
the Twentieth the Poor Law found itself operating in the 
great urban centres of Britain where cyclical fluctuations 
in the economy were throwing thousands of people out of work 
and for longer periods than before. In the absence of any 
'acceptable* new explanations about unemployment, the Poor 
Law continued unchanged and carried with it its basic 
philosophy and assumptions about the poor and destitute 
derived in an earlier and very different period of history.
Its operation in the context where a growing number of workers 
and their families were suffering poverty as a result of 
economic change and through no fault of their own meant, 
that in respect to their treatment, the able bodied unemployed 
were placed alongside the pauper and the workshy with the 
associated stigma and humiliation.
In addition to the Poor Law, the unemployed could turn 
to the local authorities in search of work in times of 
distress. In 1896, in what has been popularly termed * the 
Chamberlain Circular*, the local Government Board recommended 
that in districts where exceptional distress prevailed, the 
Poor Law Guardians should confer with the local authorities 
and endeavour to arrange for the execution of works on which
5.
unskilled labour could be immediately employed. The 
initiative was one of the first attempts to provide relief to 
the unemployed outside the stigma of the Poor Law. It was 
a move away from the long established notion that unemploy­
ment was a reflection of personal failure and a tacit recog­
nition of unemployment induced by economic trends. The 
intention was to help those affected by economic depression 
by providing temporary relief work for those dislocated 
from their jobs until they secured full time employment again.
The reality, however, was different. Those undertaking 
relief work were those on the fringe of the labour market 
who knew little of regular employment. They formed part 
of a reserve of labour occasioned either by fluctuations 
in the size of labour force required or by seasonal 
variation. This unintentional characteristic of the scheme 
hinted that a section of the labour force was 'under­
employed* and in great distress; a fact soon to be exposed 
as widespread and with massive implications for social 
policy and the treatment of the unemployed.
The relief work scheme was, nevertheless, a significant 
development during a period when perceptions about unemploy­
ment were changing fundamentally. The British middle classes 
were becoming increasingly aware that poverty had not 
vanished in the wake of industrial progress and that unemploy­
ment was more than merely a problem of the individual but 
might be associated with complex social and economic factors.
The implication was that an emphasis on charity and individual 
self-help was increasingly less relevant; a mere palliative - a 
hot water bottle on the tip of the iceberg. New perceptions of 
the economy and unemployment were endorsed by changes in trade 
and the performance of the economy. The economic boom of 1890 had 
severely weakened the argument that surplus unskilled labourers 
were those most incompetent or unwilling to work. During 
that year less that 2% of the British workforce were unemployed 
compared with 13% four years earlier. The cause of unemploy-
ment began to be linked with cyclical economic factors. It 
was becoming increasingly obvious that many workers were 
being turned off during a decline in their employers* trade 
and could expect a prolonged delay in finding new work and 
experience great hardship in the process. The recognition 
that the Poor Law was an inappropriate way to deal with these 
unwilling victims of economic fluctuations was to be a 
prominent feature of the welfare developments under the 
Liberal Government between 1905 and the First World War,
3. New Explanations and Responses
The first major statutory recognition that distress 
through unemployment could not be left to general relief under 
the Poor Law but demanded treatment as a national problem 
was the Unemployed Workers Act of 1905. This attenpted to 
separate workers unemployed because of business recessions 
from less deserving types. For every Municipal Borough and 
Urban District with populations not less than 50,000 a 
Distress Committee was to be formed, composed of councillors. 
Poor Law Guardians, and "persons experienced in the relief 
of distress," These committees were to acquaint themselves 
with the conditions of labour in their area and had power to 
receive, inquire into and discriminate between any applica­
tions made to them by unemployed people. Where they consid­
ered the Poor Law to be inappropriate, they could endeavour 
to obtain work for the applicant, or undertake themselves 
to assist him by either aiding emigration or removal to another 
area, or provide or contribute towards providing temporary 
work designed to improve the recipient * s prospects of 
obtaining regular work for himself. Although initially 
relying on funding from voluntary sources, and the rates, 
the provisions of the legislation were strengthened in 1906 
with the addition of Treasury resources.
A fundamental assumption behind the 1905 Act was that
7.
unemployment represented essentially a temporary interrup­
tion in the lives of working people. The Distress Committees 
were therefore expected to provide employment on the basis 
of tiding the unemployed over until they returned to a 
normal state of employment, while at the same time increasing 
their employability and future chance of a job. Both these 
premises, however, were exposed as fallacious four years 
later by Beveridge. He argued that the Distress Committees 
in effect acted not as employers but as relief authorities 
and did not get, or expect to get, standard output from the 
men for whom they provided work. In many cases the total 
cost of the work undertaken had far exceeded the value of 
work done. Furthermore, given the considerable incidence of 
re-applications among men having already received help, the 
desired effect of increased eirployability was very small
3
indeed.
In its operation the 1905 Act revealed the great difficulty 
of putting into practice the notion of * tiding over*. It 
demonstrated that, in the main, those who took advantage of 
the help offered were not those normally in employment but 
temporarily out of work but the ubiquitous under-employed 
and irregularly employed who had fewer skills and no trade 
union to fall back on. In the first year of the Distress 
Committees, for example, over half the 111,000 applicants 
were general labourers. Despite its fundamental weaknesses 
the Unemployed Workers Act marked a turning point in national 
policy. It recognised the right of a man to expect work even 
though it did little to provide it. To Lloyd George it 
constituted "the germs of a revolution" and could never be
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reversed.
A new explanation about the cause of unemployment and 
a prescriptive outline of the direction new policy should 
take was provided in 1909 by Beveridge in his suitably 
titled work, 'Unemployment - A Problem of Industry*. Charting
the extent of unemployment over time, Beveridge demonstrated 
that unenployment was subject to both cyclical and seasonal 
fluctuation. Unemployment appeared to flJLrt, in the main,  ^
between 2% and 1% over a cycle of several years while also 
being prone to a marked seasonal fluctuation within each 
year, ( T a b l e  1.1). These figures were based on
trade union data and certainly understate the extent of the 
problem as the brunt of unemployment was borne by the unskilled 
who were less likely to belong to unions. A principal 
'cause* of this fluctuating unemployment, argued Beveridge, 
was disorganisation in the labour market. Beveridge reasoned 
that unemployment was not a phenomenon of the scale of 
industry, but of its organisation and its changing and 
fluctuating demand for labour. Unemployment was seen to be 
the direct result of these fluctuations in demand, arising 
through the difficulty of workers dislodged in getting re­
absorbed into the labour market. Unemployment was, therefore, 
a temporary idleness enforced on sections of the workforce 
by cyclical, seasonal and casual fluctuations. It therefore 
followed that a solution to the problem should consist of: 
.partly smoothing industrial transitions, partly diminishing 
the extent of the reserves of labour power required for 
fluctuation or their intervals of idelness, and partly 
ensuring that the mass of the * reserve army* of the unemployed 
were properly maintained both in action and out of it. The 
approach proposed was one of 'business organisation'; of 
devising methods which would ameliorate distress caused by 
the inescapable and inevitable fluctuations of industry in 
capitalist society. Unemployment, in some degree, was 
necessary. It was part of the price society had to pay for 
industrial capitalism and a free market.
The parameters of Beveridge's theoretical perception 
of unemployment and his conception of a solution within the 
contemporary economic system are evident in the following 
quote.
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Table 1.1: Seasonal Unemployment 1894-1908
Year Mean 
For Year
Year Mean 
For Year
1894 6.9 1902 4.4
1895 5.8 1903 5.1
1896 3.4 1904 6.5
1897 3.5 1905 5.4
1898 3.0 1906 4.1
1899 2.4 1907 4.2
1900 2.9 1908 “*• —
1901 3.8
Source: Adapted from Beveridge (1909),
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"Unemployment is not to be identified as a problem of 
general over-population. There is no reason to suppose 
that the industrial system has lost permanently anything 
of its former power to absorb the growing supply of 
labour. There is no reason to suppose that any new 
stimulus to the expansion of industry is required.
There is conclusive reason for holding that no such 
stimulus can make any lasting impression upon the 
causes of unemployment... Unemployment arises because, 
while the supply of labour grows steadily, the demand 
for labour, in growing, varies incessantly in volume, 
distribution and charactero"5
As some measure of unemployment was a necessary part of 
the economic system, Beveridge’s key concern was to keep this 
reserve of industrial labour at its ’irreducible minimum*.
The creation of this industrial reserve army was illustrated 
in the following terms,
"... in an industry ... for work requiring ... at most 98 
men, there will actually be 30 in regular employment and 
80 in irregular employment? there will be 100 in all, 
so at times 2 at least are out of work."6
This formula was argued to be of "the greatest generality,"
The independent actions of separate employers, by seeking 
to maintain a following of labour close to the maximum of 
their own demand, created thousands of separate pools of 
labour each clustered round a single establishment, each 
slightly larger than the maximum ever employed. Therefore, 
as many men never know at what hour or in what number they 
would be required, it was commonplace for small groups of 
men to congregate at the factory gate of establishments 
where a few extra men might be engaged.
The discovery and exposure of *under-employment* or 
•casual employment* exacerbated by poor organisation in the 
labour market added an important new perspective on unemploy­
ment. Workers subject to under-employment were quite separate 
from those in full time, steady employment, being essentially 
an integral part of the reserve of labour. They were people
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who could neither be classed as in work or out of work.
They pieced together a meagre survival on a succession of 
brief casual jobs, some of only a few hours duration, but 
never enough to guarantee their family’s livelihood for more 
than a few weeks ahead. Wharf and dock labourers, market 
and warehouse porters and innumerable other kinds of casual 
workers were typical occupations where chronic under-employ- 
ment prevailed. The scale of the problem was demonstrated 
when Beveridge pointed out that the actual leakage of 
labour power through irregularity of employment was more 
than that involved in the fluctuation of industry as a whole. 
Inefficiency caused through disorganisation in the labour 
market was considered the result of the natural tendency for 
industries to accumulate about themselves reserves of labour. 
It was realised that the number of men drawn into a trade 
by the scattered demand of a multiplicity of employers was 
in excess of what would be the maximum requirements of the 
trade, if its activity, assuming that it remained unchanged 
in amount and fluctuation, were concentrated at one place in 
the hands of a single firm.
4. Organisation and Insurance: 
the Dual R e s p o n s e ______
The essence of Beveridge's argument was that unemployment 
and under-employment were the twin evils of the industrial 
scene. However, whereas unemployment was a variable if 
recurrent phenomenon, under-employment was a permanent 
feature. The experience of the previous fifty years showed 
that cyclical business troughs occurred with curious 
regularity every seven to ten years bringing with them 
associated spells of unemployment. Protection was needed 
for those men, used to regular work, who found themselves 
temporarily unemployed. Clearly, as they could not 
adequately provide for themselves alone, collective cover 
was required. And, since protection provided by the trade
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unions covered only a minority of the labour force, it was 
for the State to take a leading role in the field. Related 
to ’protective* measures, steps were also necessary to 
eradicate much of the inefficiency, waste of labour potential 
and suffering caused by under-employment and frictional 
distortions in the labour market.
In the light of the new theoretical perspective and a 
deeper understanding of unemployment, policy makers in Britain 
developed a two-pronged strategy to tackle unemployment: 
organisation and insurance. The idea for insurance drew 
much of its inspiration from a contemporary debate in Germany 
about the feasibility of extending the existing inperial 
system of sickness and accident insurance to cover unemploy­
ment. In Britain the principle of insurance already operated 
in some trade unions, where a number of workmen set aside 
something of their wages when earning in order to obtain an 
allowance which would tide them over in case of unemployment. 
Consideration was therefore turned to giving this practice 
wider application in the labour market. An indispensable 
counterpart to protection against unemployment by financial 
insurance was the need to organise the labour market to reduce 
frictional unemployment and under-employment. To counter the 
strong tendency in certain industries to keep excessive reserves 
of labour characterised by infrequent and irregular employ­
ment, and abolish the prevalent and disorganised method of 
labour recruitment, the establishment of a series of Labour 
Exchanges was proposed. The Labour Exchange would be the 
key institution in the better organisation of the labour 
market. There employers and workers alike could register 
their needs. The unemployed would be required to * sign on* 
each day, as they were required to do by some unions, as 
proof of need until work was done. The Exchange themselves 
would be an effective test both of need and willingness 
to work. For, without their provision, the fact that a man 
was unemployed could not be known, nor could the man himself
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know of openings available to him.
Both Beveridge and the Majority and Minority Reports of 
the Royal Commission on the Poor Law (1905-1909) recommended 
the establishment of a national system of Labour or 
Employment Exchanges as their main proposal and the corner­
stone of their policies for dealing with the unemployed.
In complement, recognising that some unemployment was 
unavoidable, they also stressed the importance of preventing 
distress by an extension of the insurance system operated 
by trade unions. The purposes of these twin strategies were 
closely interrelated in the industrial process. As Beveridge 
outlined,
"The Labour Exchange is required to reduce to a minimum 
the intervals between successive jobs. Insurance is 
required to tidy over the intervals that will still 
remain. The Labour Exchange realises the reserves of 
labour for fluctuations and hastens re-absorption 
after changes in industrial structure. Insurance is 
needed to provide for the maintenance of the reserves 
while waiting for re-absorption."7
The Liberal Government of the day reacted quickly to 
these new ideas and the policy lobby based on them. Although 
originally intended as two great parts to the one great 
Bill, provisions dealing with Labour Exchanges and Insurance 
emerged in separate legislative form. In 1909 the National 
Labour Exchange Act established a network of Exchanges 
throughout the country. Two years later the National Insurance 
Act of 1911 introduced under Part II of the Act the first 
scheme for compulsory unemployment insurance in the world.
It began as an experimental provision in July 1912, covering 
2^ million people and restricted to a small group of trades 
with low wages and subject to serious fluctuations in 
employment, such as engineering, shipbuilding, construction 
of vehicles, and building and construction of works. An 
important feature of national insurance as it began and 
developed in Britain and which set it apart from the German 
model was its emphasis on dealing with poverty rather than
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replacing a proportion of an unemployed worker's previous 
earnings. Benefits paid were flat rate rather than grad­
uated and part of the cost was met by the state out of 
general revenues.
5. The Swamping of Insurance and the Emergence 
of the Dole
During the Great War of 1914 to 1918, profound changes 
had been taking place both in the national and world economies. 
Export markets had altered and foreign customers were 
finding other sources of supplies. As a result, a solid 
residue of permanent unemployment began to appear in the 
nation’s main export industries such as coal, shipbuilding, 
tin, wool and cotton and steel. Following a short post-war 
boom, the post-war depression threw 2 million out of work in 
1921. Throughout the 1920s unemployment in Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland remained steadily higher than pre-war 
levels, averaging 12%, and in only one year falling below 10%, 
(Table 1.2).
The experience of war profoundly affected Government 
attitudes to unemployment and set the precedent for a greater 
state role in the economy. The near total mobilisation of 
the country’s resources demanded by the war effort meant 
a greater degree of state intervention and control than 
before; ’War Socialism* as the Manchester Guardian called 
it. Following the great collective efforts and successes 
of the war experience, it was no longer possible to maintain 
that the country had neither the resources nor the ability 
to do something about unemployment if it set its mind to it.
As the Webbs pointed out, there was no such thing as a 
"surplus population for which neither occupation nor wages 
could be found.
A major effect of the war was to accelerate the evolu­
tion of public social services, not only in unemployment 
and health insurance but in education and housing also. In
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Table 1.2: General Unemployment Rate, 1921-1938
Percentage Unemployed Percentage Unemployed
Year
Great 
Britain 
Great and Northern 
Britain Ireland Year
Great 
Britain 
Great and Northern 
Britain Ireland
1921 16.6 17.0 1930 15.8 16.1
1922 14.1 14.3 1931 21.1 21.3
1923 11.6 11.7 1932 21.9 22.1
19 24 10.2 10. 3 1933 19.8 19.9
1925 11.0 11.3 1934 16.6 16.7
1926 12.3 12.5 1935 15-3 15.5
1927 9.6 9.7 1936 12.9 13.1
1928 10.7 10.8 1937 10.6 10.8
1929 10.3 10.4 1938 12.6 12.9
Source; Beveridge (1944) 
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each of the inter-war years, for example, the proportion of 
GNP spent on social services totalled at least 1/12 whereas 
before the war the corresponding figure had been 4%?
Against the background of rising post war unemployment, a 
large part of this expenditure went on new measures to 
develop and update existing policies to deal with the 
jobless.
In 1915 an 'out of work donation* had been introduced 
to cover any period of immediate unemployment suffered by 
ex-servicemen. This payment was extended in 1918 to all 
workers covered by health insurance and a grant for depend­
ents was included. This provision had created a precedent 
of far reaching significance. By being both non-contributory 
and set at subsistence level, it established the principal 
that central government had a commitment to relieve and 
maintain the unemployed. The scheme's extension to cover all 
workers was in fact the first direct national relief programme 
in British history. The next step was to expand and make 
unemployment insurance universal. This came two years 
later in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 which 
extended unemployment insurance to cover all workers with the 
exception of those in agriculture, domestic service and lower 
paid non-manual occupations. Largely as a result of these 
developments, by 1920 expenditure on unemployment and 
health insurance and other forms of cash transfer assistance
were accounting for more than half of all social service
10expenditure by the state.
No sooner had insurance gone universal than the system 
was swamped by rising unemployment. The concept of unemploy­
ment insurance had been developed to deal with the problem 
of fluctuating and temporary unemployment, and post-war 
plans had been drawn up on the basis of pre-war experience, 
envisaging an unemployment rate of no more that 4%. The 
reality of the inter-war period was far removed from what
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had gone before; unemployment descended in a flood.
The insurance fund, comprising Government, but in the larger 
part employer and employee contributions, was quickly 
exhausted and benefit periods of those in receipt expired. 
Although it appeared the bell had tolled for insurance, the 
Government, by responding in a totally ad hoc and unplanned 
fashion, preserved its fiction and continued existence. In 
short, the State’s response was to devise expedients as the 
need arose. 'Need* rather than benefits earned became the 
criterion for receiving 'insurance*; the cost of payments 
being met out of general revenues.
Rising and persistent unemployment threatened to 
dislocate thousands of jobless from the security of insurance, 
leaving them only the Poor Law to fall back on. In an
attempt to keep the unemployed off the Poor Law the Government
extended the insurance scheme and introduced a new kind of 
payment; *uncovenanted* or 'extended* benefit. This was 
a quite separate device from the 'standard* insurance benefit 
secured by contributions made when in employment. The new 
benefit existed as a privilege, not as a right, and was not
subject to a means test as was relief under the Poor Law.
The 'dole*, as it came to be known, was in effect a new and 
slightly less humiliating form of outdoor relief. Ideally 
this was intended as a temporary stop-gap which would be 
recouped through renewed insurance contributions when 
conditions improved. But when this confident expectation 
was threatened by persistent unemployment, the Government 
responded by devising a further extension of this temporary 
benefit.
The system of dole introduced with uncovenanted benefit 
existed ambiguously with the original ’standard* benefit and 
debased the whole principal of insurance. For those normally 
in work, but experiencing unemployment for only a temporary
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period, the insurance system functioned as intended. But for 
those faced with long term unemployment caused by irrevers­
ible trade depression in certain industries, the dole was 
destitution relief only marginally removed from the Poor 
Law. These problems were addressed by the Blanesburgh 
Committee 1925-1927. In its recommendations the Committee 
rejected an essential requirement of the 1911 insurance 
scheme; that the length of benefit be proportional to the 
amount of contributions. It argued for the merging of the 
existing "standard* and *uncovenanted* benefit into a new 
'transitional benefit* which would be earned by a minimum 
of contributions but unlimited in its duration. This 
recommendation was based on the notion that so long as a 
man had contributed something by way of an insurance premium 
he was entitled to draw benefits according to his need.
This suggestion was essentially a further compromise of 
the insurance principal as originally conceived. It continued 
to recognise the fiction of insurance in the hope that 
"uncovenanted* payments would be recouped when the recipient 
returned to work, and reinforced the tendency for the 
maintenance of the unemployed to become increasingly the 
responsibility of the nation at large and the central 
exchequer.
The recommended extension of those qualifying for 
benefit under insurance was brought in by the 1927 
Unemployment Insurance Act with the introduction of Trans­
itional Benefit. In another piece of legislation three 
years later, in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1930, the 
Government moved the financial responsibility of maintaining 
the unemployed further under the auspices of the insurance 
scheme by making it easier for people with only a minimum of 
insured employment behind them to qualify for transitional 
benefit. In addition, the long resented requirement that 
benefits should only be paid to those 'genuinely seeking 
work* was abolished and the onus placed on officials to 
prove clients were not seeking work. These legislative
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changes brought a massive rise in the numbers claiming 
transitional benefit and the demands on public expend­
iture. In England and Wales, for example, in the first 
year of the 1930 Act's operation claimants more than 
doubled from 140,000 to 300,000, the rise costing the 
Treasury £19 million.
This shift in responsibility for the unemployed towards 
insurance and away from the Poor Law greatly eased the 
intense pressures from unemployment which had built up 
since the war and had posed a problem beyond the capability 
of the Poor Law to relieve. In England and Wales, for 
example, the number of Poor Law claimants had risen five­
fold between 1914 and 1926 from \ million to 2^s million and 
had stretched the financial resources of the local Boards 
of Guardians to their limits. The greater proportion of 
the unemployed taken on board by the insurance system was 
complemented by a stricter administration of Poor Law 
relief and a recovery from the economic crisis of 1926, 
and all served to bring a decrease in the total numbers 
relying on the Poor Law in the later years of the decade.
By 1931 those receiving Poor Law relief in England and Wales 
had fallen to 60,000, half of whom were also drawing 
unemployment benefit.
Another important development which recognised 
unemployment was a national problem and which also held 
widespread implications for the Poor Law was the Local 
Government Act of 1929. This legislation reorganised local 
government boundaries, created fewer but larger authorities 
and concentrated major services under County Councils and 
County Boroughs. After 95 years the Boards of Guardians 
disappeared and their powers and duties handed over to the 
local authorities who were required to establish special 
committees to deal with them. This measure meant it was 
possible to spread the cost of relief over much wider
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areas and provide more efficient services by using 
scattered institutions to the best advantage. At the 
same time the Poor Law service was renamed Public Assis­
tance and the new Committees termed Public Assistance 
Committees.
6. Economising on Unemployment
A financial and political crisis descended on Britain
in 1931. The country found itself in a very tenuous position
in terms of international trade and finance. Confidence
was further shaken and alarm aroused by the escalating cost
of unemployment benefit. Unemployment soared to levels
touching the 3 million mark with the jobless being out of
work for much longer periods than ever before. Payments to
the unemployed had risen from £51 million in 1929 to £125
million in 1931, with only £30 million a year coming from
employer's and employee's contributions. The Labour
Government had spent itself into budget deficit in response
to unemployment. The resultant financial crisis and
intricate political controversy witnessed a turning point
in the handling of the unemployment problem. In a bid to
survive the Government bowed to the demands of economic
conservatism which insisted that the national budget should
be 'balanced* by expenditure reductions and introduced cuts
in transitional benefits. The 'dole* was cut by 10% from
17s to 15s 3d although the hardship this caused was slightly
offset by the fact that prices were falling and had been 
11since 1924. Throughout the summer of 1931 strong pressure 
was exerted on the Government to economise by the Royal 
Commission on Unemployment (1930-1932) and the May Committee 
appointed to advise on national economies. Counter pressures 
emerged from within Labour's own left wing, who had long 
been pressing for stronger measures on behalf of the 
unemployed. The Government and Prime Minister McDonald 
were unable to survive the political crisis and resigned in 
August.
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A new National Government was formed in October, and, 
inspired by what was emerging from the Royal Commission on 
Unemployment, it embarked on a drive to economise on 
unemployment benefits. In two National Economic Orders 
the Government did three things. It increased unemployment 
insurance contributions while reducing benefits, limited the 
period of receipt of normal benefit, and most significantly 
of all, replaced transitional benefits with transitional 
payments, making these subject to a means test and payable 
through the Public Assistance Committees.
The implications of these changes were profound. The 
new system upheld the insurance principal while relief 
outside insurance, although still assessed by local 
committees, was made a national responsibility. A result 
of these provisions was to divide the unemployed into 
two distinct groups. There were those in receipt of normal 
insurance benefit while another large group were pushed back 
onto relief akin to the Poor Law; their benefits means 
tested and payable through the organs of the Poor Law, 
the Public Assistance Committees.
The immediate effect of these measures was the transfer 
of over 1 million people onto transitional payments, the 
refusal of further aid to ^ million hitherto receiving 
transitional benefit and the reduction of payments to ^ 
million people. The intended result was forthcoming. 
Unemployment payments of all kinds fell from £llO million 
in 1931-32 to £104 million in 1932-33, and, despite a 
highest ever unemployment rate of 3 million, the cost of 
normal unemployment benefit fell from £80 million to 
£54 million.
The economy measures and the association of the new 
system with the Poor Law caused great hardship and bitter 
resentment throughout the country. Being exercised by local 
authority committees, the economies made in assistance were 
carried out very unequally. Furthermore, the inquisi-
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torial tone of the means test and its disqualification of
many from benefit produced resentment among applicants
and their families. The Minister of Labour reported to the
House of Commons in February 1932 that over a period of
approximately nine weeks, between 12th November 1931 and
23rd January 1932, there had been cut off from benefit at
the Labour Exchanges, by application of the means test,
12193,542 men and 77,995 women.
The Royal Commission on Unemployment, reporting in 
1932, was motivated by the need to draw a distinction between 
insurance and relief and endorsed the trends of contemporary 
legislation. Its main recommendation was that unemployment 
insurance should be continued and extended to include 
suitable occupations hitherto excluded from its operation. 
However, as insurance was essentially a system of limited 
liability with benefits restricted in time, the Commission 
recognised that those whose right to benefit had been 
exhausted would require special assistance outside insurance 
which should be provided and based on ascertained need.
It hinted tentatively that assistance should be subject to 
some form of central control, and, at the same time recom­
mended that special Unemployment Assistance Committees 
should be set up by local authorities, separate from and 
removing the unpopular association with the Poor Law. The 
Report was weak on what to do about getting those stranded 
on relief and with little prospect of finding employment 
back into work. It did, nevertheless, recommend training 
schemes for young people in order to preserve their industrial 
quality.*
7. The Means Test Years
The first definitive restatement of policy emerged 
with the Unemployment Act of 1934 which placed unemployment 
insurance, for so long at the mercy of economic conditions
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and emergency legislation, on a firmer basis. Part I of 
the Act dealt with Unemployment Insurance, placing its 
operation in the care of a semi-independent body, the 
Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee. This was 
charged with supervising the working of insurance, ensuring 
its solvency, reviewing its finances and recommending to 
the Ministry of Labour such alterations deemed necessary 
under changing conditions. As an attempt to make National 
Insurance self-supporting and maintain flexibility the 
change was successful. Owing largely to a steady decline 
in unemployment between 1934 and 1937 of almost 1 million, 
the Committee was able to amass a reserve fund of more than 
£60 million before unemployment rose again in 1938. The 
1931 cuts in benefit were restored, dependents* allowances 
increased in 1935 and contributions reduced the following 
year. By 1936 unemployment insurance covered 14,500,000 
people, the chief groups still omitted being domestic 
servants, nurses, civil servants and railwayman.
Those who had exhausted their 26 week benefit period 
were dealt with under Part II of the Act. This established 
the Unemployment Assistance Board, (UAB), which, due to 
wrangles over the level of benefits it would pay, did not 
begin operating until 1936. This measure closed yet another 
chapter in Poor Law history and built upon the principal of 
national responsibility for the unemployed. It recognised 
that the ground made by insurance schemes in eroding the 
numbers of able-bodied falling onto the Poor Law had been 
thoroughly negated by mass unemployment. The heavy and long­
term unemployment of the mid-l930s meant that many older 
workers in the depressed areas were unlikely ever to recover 
their industrial potential to the full. Clearly, a locally 
raised Poor Law was unacceptable as the only source of 
available relief. By setting up the UAB, the Act removed 
responsibility from the local level laying down in its place 
a common national level of aid.
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In 1936 the UAB's benefit rates were 24s for a married 
couple with varying amounts for children and a small allow­
ance for rent. Payments were based on a houshold Means 
Test which differed from the Poor Law in two main ways.
The Test took into account the financial means of other 
members of the family staying in the household in the 
following way. All those living in the home underwent an 
assessment based on the amount of money coming into the 
house if all members were unemployed, without any other means 
of assistance and in receipt of a UAB allowance. The actual 
items of family income were then inquired into. Of the 
earnings of the wife, husband, father or mother, everything 
over half or 5s, whatever was the lesser, was taken into 
account. This meant that only 5s of an individual's wages 
was recognised as belonging to him or her personally, the rest 
had to go towards maintaining the unemployed members of the 
family, A similar calculation, only slightly less harsh, 
was carried out with the earnings of other relatives such as 
sons, daughters, brothers, sisters and so on. The second 
difference with the procedure was that instead of being 
conducted publically before a Poor Law Committee the test 
took place in the home by an officer of the UAB, known 
unpopularly as the 'means test man*.
Despite these differences from previous means tested 
relief the 'household* version still carried with it the 
stigma of personal failure and humiliation for the tens of 
thousands unfortunate enough to depend on this form of 
unemployment relief and created widespread hardship, bitter­
ness and resentment among the working class during the 
inter-war period. Compelling individual members of a 
family already living on very slim resources to contribute 
to the support of others in the family caused not only 
hardship within the home but encouraged the break-up of 
families and a dishonesty and evasiveness towards public 
relief and its administrators. A kind of 'beat the state*
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mentality developed with practices like young people either 
moving from home or fabricating a false address to ensure 
their independence from the family and guarantee their 
full rate of assistance. The elderly too were separated 
from their families. In his book, "The Road to Wigan 
Pier", George Orwell tells us that
"Old people, sometimes bedridden, are driven out of 
their homes by it. An old age pensioner, if a 
widower, would normally live with one or other of 
his children. Under the Means Test, however, he 
counts as a ’lodger* and if he stays, his children’s 
dole will be docked. So, perhaps at seventy or 
seventy-five, he has to turn out into lodgings, 
handing his pension over to the lodging house 
keeper and existing on the edge of starvation."
The financial maintenance of the unemployed and the
poor during the recession years did reduce the level of
relative deprivation which would have been suffered had
laissez-faire been allowed to operate untrammelled. As
such it probably defused the possibilities of widespread
social unrest which could have broken out under conditions
12of more intense suffering. Nevertheless, the amount of 
assistance paid to those out of work was pitched at a 
level which afforded the unemployed a lifestyle little 
beyond a subsistence existence. To convey more vividly 
popular feelings about unemployment and what it meant in 
human terms it helps to refer to some more writings of 
the time. Walter Greenwood’s novel, ’Love on the Dole* 
tells of how a young couple’s love and hopes are ground 
down by unemployment and poverty into bitterness, resent­
ment and demoralising drudgery. In a similar vein, the 
way the potentials in human relationships can be repressed 
and crushed by poverty and feelings of hopelessness are 
covered in these verses from C. Day Lewis’s poem, ’A 
Time to Dance * :
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Come, live with me and by my love. 
And we will all the pleasures prove 
Of peace and plenty, bed and board. 
That chance employment may afford.
1*11 handle dainties on the docks 
And thou shalt read of summer frocks; 
And at evening by the sour canals 
We’ll hope to see some madrigals-
Care on thy maiden brow shall put 
A wreath of wrinkles, and thy foot 
Be shod with pain: not silken dress
But toil shall tire thy loveliness.
Hunger shall make thy modest zone 
And cheat fond death of all but bone 
If these delights thy mind may move. 
Then live with me and be my love.
The jobless were well aware of the divisiveness within the 
working class created by mass unemployment, reflected in 
feelings of isolation and worthlessness. The middle class 
were also increasingly exposed to this knowledge. The 
voices of the unemployed in the 1930s are echoed in 
T.S. Eliot’s Choruses from 'The Rock':
And some say: ’How can we love our neighbour?
For love must be made real in act, as desire 
unites with desired; we have only our labour to 
live and our labour is not required.
We wait on corners, with nothing to bring but the 
songs we can sing which nobody wants to hear 
sung;
Waiting to be flung in the end, on a heap less 
useful than dung'
8. Unemployed Protest and Trade Union Responses
Throughout the inter-war period the clients of 
unemployment policy were not passive recipients of fluct­
uating benefit levels. Protest and demonstration was 
persistent and at one stage reached a pitch and intensity 
sufficient to influence a change in Government policy. A 
good first hand account is provided by Wal Hannington, a
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communist grassroots activist who wrote of his experiences
13among the unemployed between 1919 and 1936. He tells 
us of the resistance, petitions, marches and demonstrations 
which took place in the early 1930s against the Economy 
Measures, the Means Test and the cuts in benefits.
Numerous hunger marches against widespread poverty conditions 
cuim.ma.ted early in 1934 with a massive demonstration in 
London’s Hyde Park where around 100,000 Londoners welcomed 
contingents of marchers from all over Britain. Faced with 
this mass mobilisation among the unemployed the Government 
capitulated and in its April Budget of 1934 restored the 
10% cut in benefit made in 1931.
As prices had started to rise again after 1932 organ­
ised protest had played an important role in improving 
the living standards of the jobless. This instance of 
successful protest by the unemployed was, however, more
the exception than the rule. In his review of the period,
Runciman (1966) talks more about the disposition of the 
working class and the unemployed to ’grin and bear* their 
hardship.Militant discontent was never widespread and 
despite some outbreaks of violence between demonstrators 
and police - a greater part of the blame being attached to 
the latter by Wal Hannington, leader of the unemployed - 
the jobless did not pose a serious threat to the political 
stability of Britain. Although the communist-tainted 
National Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM) took a leading 
role in organising demonstrations and hunger marches 
there was no mass movement among the unemployed. Even by 
Hannington*s own account the membership of the NUWM at no 
time approached even 10% of the vast masses of the unemployed. 
Nor did the unemployed flock in any significant numbers 
towards the Communist or Fascist parties. In 1932-33, for 
example, when unemployment totalled almost 3 million, the 
membership of the Communist Party amounted to only 15,000^^ 
The demands of the organised unemployed were not for
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revolution or the overthrow of the Government, There 
were morale boosting and slightly provocative slogans, 
but essentially their requests, expressed in a humble 
way, were for improved financial support, relief from 
poverty and hunger, an end to the Means Test and better 
housing.
Little effective collaboration took place between 
the trade unions and the militant unemployed. There 
seems to be several reasons for this. First, the NUWM* s 
communist affiliation made it anathema to trade unions 
and cut it off from the bulk of organised labour. Second, 
although the unions were concerned with the fate of the 
jobless, their first loyalty remained with their own 
members; those already organised and in work. Similar 
dilemmas are being experienced by the labour movement 
today and are discussed in a later chapter. Finally, the 
stand made by trade unions against reduced benefits and 
their support for Government relief and contributory 
unemployment insurance may have had strong self-interest 
motives. Dole relief, paid through taxation, in effect 
freed unions from responsibility to support discharged 
members out of the Insurance Fund. It also reduced 
competition for jobs, which could have further depressed 
wages.
Neither the trade unions nor the unemployed were 
able to come forward with constructive policies to solve 
unemployment during the depression years. The essentially 
self protective policies favoured by the unions, and 
supported also by the NUWM were for keeping young people 
on longer at school and introducing earlier retirement. In 
addition, the unions also pushed for measures to force 
women out of the labour market, repatriate foreign workers 
and promote the purchase of home produced goods.
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9. Conclusion
The early years of the Twentieth Century witnessed 
a number of noteable breakthroughs in the understanding 
and treatment of unemployment. Fundamental to these 
was that unemployment for many was involuntary and could 
bring great hardship. Once realised, this meant that 
established Nineteenth Century methods of dealing with 
the poor and destitute could be challenged and new notions 
like the State's obligation to the unemployed and the need 
for action on a broad front could germinate. It also 
demanded new notions about the cause of unemployment.
When these were soon provided with the exposure of under­
employment which laid a large part of the blame with poor 
industrial organisation solutions appeared possible. A 
new tradition of policy concerned with unemployment insurance 
and organising the labour market emerged based on the 
twin concepts of keeping unemployment at the irreducible 
minimum possible while at the same time making tolerable 
the inevitable, but temporary, spells of unemployment.
The theoretical posture adopted did not challenge the 
supposed natural tendency for supply and demand for labour 
to adjust towards a situation of ultimate equilibrium. 
Analysis of unemployment was restricted to phenomena which 
appeared to frustrate the natural workings of the labour 
market and, therefore, by implication, full employment.
The limitations of this approach and the policies based on 
it emerged as the inter-war years moved towards massive 
long term unemployment; phenomena which 'acceptable* 
contemporary theory could neither accommodate nor explain.
The sheer extent of unemployment swamped existing 
programmes and left the state floundering with conventional 
responses in the face of a situation racing out of control. 
Between 1920 and 1934, for example, twenty-one Acts of 
Parliament dealing with unemployment were passed, their
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provisions representing an almost annual juggling of 
contribution and benefit levels and grafting onto the 
insurance scheme what in reality was a conflicting system 
of thinly disguised outdoor relief.
The social welfare measures of the inter-war period,
although initiated and organised by central government,
essentially concerned the working class and the unemployed
with the jobless maintained in the main by the insurance
contributions of their working colleagues. Although at
times of particularly high unemployment there was a net
redistribution of national wealth towards the insurance
and assistance schemes the bulk of the cost of supporting
the unemployed remained with working class people who
had jobs. In 1935, for instance, when unemployment totalled
well over 2 million, it has been estimated that the working
class were still paying around four-fifths of the cost of
16the services from which its members benefitted.
Despite its non-revolutionary complexion, from the 
beginning of this century and particularly following the 
Great War, the direction of social policy was concerned 
with improving the lot of the unemployed and the poor. 
However, in the late 1920s when Britain was sinking into 
an industrial and economic crisis, and when the political 
strength of feeling for ex-servicemen and the anxieties 
about the threat of revolution in the aftermath of Russia's 
in 1917 had faded, the climate of opinion which earlier 
had made it impossible to neglect and repress the unemployed 
changed. Progressive tendencies within social policy slowed 
down and for a short time actually regressed. During the 
high points in unemployment in the late 1920s and early 
19 30s, when the state was devoid of satisfactory explana­
tion or realistic solution, treatment of the unemployed 
moved back towards the Poor Law in its attitudes and 
practices. Administration of relief became harsher and
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stigmatised, and benefit levels became highly volatile 
in the face of domestic and international financial 
difficulties. In short, the depression years witnessed a 
declining priority for the plight of the unemployed, and 
their cause was traded off in favour of bolstering the 
national economy.
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CHAPTER TWO
FULL EMPLOYMENT
Where the bricks are fallen
We will build with new stone
Where the beams are rotten
We will build with new timbers
Where the word is unspoken we will build
with new speech
There is work together 
A Church for all 
And a job for each 
Every man to his work.
T.S. Eliot
Choruses from "The Rock*
1. Introduction
By the latter 1930s, although the crisis of three 
million unemployed had passed, the long years of depression 
had demoralised society into a belief that the economy 
would not return to the levels of employment experienced 
during the first two decades of the century. Ten years 
later the situation and the mood of the people had changed 
fundamentally. Unemployment was at its lowest-ever peace 
time level and seemed likely to stay that way, and a 
welfare state had been established to erase poverty and 
suffering by providing benefits and services for the whole 
community. The explanation of this amazing turnaround 
lies in the combined influences of war, major breakthroughs 
in economic theory, a new determination within government 
to control the economy, and a strong commitment towards 
progressive social legislation. This Chapter discusses 
these factors and the great advances in British social 
policy they inspired. It ends by reflecting on some of 
the critical questions which have since arisen about the 
particular way social services developed and have performed
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and the type of assumptions they were based on,
2, The Keynesian Message
In 1936 a largely new understanding of how the
capitalist system functioned was offered by John Maynard
Keynes in his seminal work 'The General Theory of Employ-
1
ment. Interest and Money.' Posing a profound challenge 
to contemporary classical theory he argued that frictional 
and voluntary categories only partly explained the 
phenomenon of unemployment. A vital missing category was 
the 'involuntary® unemployed; a new construct which 
stood in direct defiance of the classical assumption 
identified in Say's law that 'supply tends to create 
its own demand®. Keynes' analysis focussed on the 
determinants of aggregate demand and postulated that as 
employment and income increased, consumption also increased, 
though not as much as income. The gap between consumption 
and income was caused by a person's 'propensity to save', 
a variable which increased with increasing income. Given 
this falling marginal propensity to consume, if employment 
was to be maintained it meant that current investment 
demand had to be sufficient to absorb the excess of total 
output over what the community chose to consume. Keynes 
argued that the level of current investment depended upon 
the inducement to invest, which, in turn, was determined 
by the relationship between the marginal efficiency of 
capital and rates of interest. The equilibrium level of 
employment was therefore fixed by the current propensity 
to consume and the rate of interest.
Although a state of full employment was a theoretical 
possibility, Keynes considered it a special case and an 
unlikely one if entrepreneurs were left to their own devices. 
He postulated that in a closed economy the two main compo­
nents of aggregate demand would behave very differently.
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Assuming a falling long run marginal propensity to 
consume, Keynes considered the level of consumption demand 
in the short run to be relatively stable, while the 
level of investment demand was highly volatile. This 
volatility arose because of changes in the rate of 
interest and fluctuating entrepreneurial expectations 
about likely future levels of economic activity which 
cannot be ascertained with certainly. Furthermore, as 
decisions to invest needed to equal decisions to save, 
these being made generally by two separate groups of 
individuals, decisions concerning income and consumption 
were therefore largely independent of one another and 
could not be expected to match automatically. The identity 
between aggregate savings and investment in Keynesian 
theory was, therefore, achieved by adjustments of employ­
ment and income through a multiplier process. This gave 
rise to deficient aggregate demand and involuntary unem­
ployment. Keynes* perspective rejected the classical 
assumption that the rate of interest was the appropriate 
mechanism for reconciling decisions about savings and 
investment. He argued the rate of interest fails in 
this respect because of a possible liquidity trap where 
liquidity preferences could in a deep depression become 
highly interest-elastic, whilst investor^ demand for 
money is likely to be highly interest-inelastic. The 
operation of monetary policy during depression was, 
therefore, unlikely to create recovery. In the pursuit 
of full employment, Keynes therefore rejected monetary 
policy in favour of direct government intervention in 
the economy to increase the level of effective aggregate 
demand by stimulating both consumption and investment 
demand.
Apart from his new theoretical contribution, Keynes* 
impact on public attitudes to unemployment extended to a 
broader philosophical level. His approach compelled
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everyone concerned with unemployment, poverty and similar 
social issues to think about the whole population and the 
consumption and general living standards of the average 
citizen. The war, for other reasons, was to make similar 
demands as the nation's leaders became aware that the 
survival of Britain depended on the loyalty and self- 
sacrifice of millions of ordinary people.
Acceptance of Keynes' argument that deficient 
aggregate demand could cause large scale involuntary 
unemployment was, however, far from immediate or comprehen­
sive and did not result in any major policy changes in 
the closing years of the 1930s. The General Theory was 
quite a difficult book to understand and it took several 
years before a considerable number of people were aware 
of what he was saying. Text book simplifications which
helped disseminate Keynes* message came around a decade 
2later. His ideas also met with strong resistance from 
eminent contemporary economists closer to the classical 
school, and, to many politicians and their advisors, the 
prescriptive notion that the State should spend massively 
to erase deficient demand and accept an imbalanced budget 
as the price of full employment was anathema. Despite 
these drawbacks the new ideas were germinating. Their 
acceptance was slow and tentative, although no doubt 
fanned by the great hardships experienced during the 
depression and a growing disillusionment with the failure 
of established policies to solve unemployment.
3. War, Beveridge, and Full Employment
The great watershed for Keynesian economic theory 
came in 19 39 with the outset of the Second World War. The 
war effort meant that, paradoxically, the Governments of 
the industrial nations had no choice but to operate under 
conditions of budget deficits, heavy public investments 
and low interest rates. The numbers out of work fell
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steadily during the war although it still took three 
years before unemployment was really abolished. In 1941, 
for example, there were still almost 400,000 people jobless. 
By the Summer of 1943, however, it was as low as 110,000, 
(Table 2.1). By then the Keynesian strategy, by virtue of 
the unprecedented levels of State intervention in the 
economy and the community, was seen to be an effective way 
of 'managing* the economy towards full employment. The 
great post-war issue was, therefore, how to achieve this 
under conditions of peace without the infringements of 
liberty and sacrifices of freedom demanded in war.
Participation in total war demanded a universal effort 
from the nation. Bombing, rationing and other sufferings 
were commonly experienced, and the more remote parts of 
the country previously ignorant of the ills of urban 
living were exposed to them by large scale evacuation 
from the great urban centres. All combined to affect 
profound changes in the State's approach to social policy 
in general. As Titmus pointed out, the popular mood was 
that just as risks were shared resources should be too, 
and these became the guiding principles of social legislation. 
As with the Great War, the 1939-45 conflict saw a greater 
proportion of the nation's resources shift under the State's 
control. The growth of social services had been an integral 
part of the war effort and perceptively widened the State's 
area of responsibility for the welfare of the community.
In 1950, for example, around one-sixth of GNP was going on 
expenditure on social services, around double what it had 
been during the interwar years,^ Armed with the new explan­
ations and prescriptions provided by Keynes the country 
turned to the task of social and economic reconstruction at 
a time when both work and maintenance had become fixed 
expectations of the working class as opposed to mere aspira­
tions as during the long depression years.
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TABLE 2.1 Average Unemployment, 1928-1944
Average numbers of unemployed persons on the registers 
of employment exchanges in Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 1928-44,
Year Unemployed* Year Unemployed*
1928 1,254,904 1936 1,821,700
1929 1,248,588 1937 1,557,001
1930 1,974,501 1938 1,881,357
1931 2,697,868 1939 1,589,801
1932 2,813,042 1940 1,034,672
1933 2,588,358 1941 391,521
1934 2,221,063 1942 165,374**
1935 2,106,121 1943 (Jan.) 143,826**
(Apr.) 118,160**
(Jul.) 110,505**
(Oct.) 106,504**
1944 (Jan. ) 116,273**
*i.e. wholly unemployed, temporarily stopped, and 
unemployed casual workers.
**These figures include persons who were classified by 
interviewing panels as unsuitable for ordinary enploy- 
ment.
Source: derived from Beveridge (1944) 
in a Free Society*.
'Full Employment
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1940 marked the beginning of a new era in social 
policy. The introduction of supplementary pensions and 
free school milk, and the many further welfare measures 
which followed, demonstrated the State's growing accept- 
ance of responsibility for all its citizens, and in 
particular, weaker members in distress. The following 
year saw legislation of historical note. The Determina­
tion of Needs Act, 1941, is credited with abolishing the 
household Means Test; that object of long and bitter 
resentment. It was replaced by a softer form of test, 
which, instead of the inquisitorial prying into the 
income of non-dependent members of the family, assumed 
a contribution from them in the calculation of assistance 
payments.
I
The beginnings of a thorough revamping of the 
Insurance system began with Beveridge's report on Social 
Insurance and Allied services 1942, although it took a 
further four years before its vision of a comprehensive 
universal system of unemployment insurance took legisla­
tion form. Beveridge was strongly against a support 
scheme for the unemployed based on a system of doles, 
arguing that
"the place for direct expenditure and organisation 
by the State is in maintaining employment of the 
labour and other productive resources of the 
country, and in preventing and combatting disease,  ^
not in patching an incomplete system of insurance»"
Î;
The new scheme was presented as a co-operation between 
State and citizen to provide a comprehensive strategy 
against poverty. In maintaining the unemployed it 
rejected the possibility of graduating benefits by relating 
them to previous income as had been followed in other 
countries such as Germany and the USA. Instead, flat rate 
benefits would be received as of right in return for flat
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rate contributions. In return for a single weekly 
contribution a cradle-to-the-grave provision of benefits 
was envisaged. In addition to unemployment the other benef­
its included were sickness, medical, widows', orphans', old 
age, maternity, industrial injury and funeral. There 
would be no differentiation between different groups. 
Benefits would be selective only in that people had to 
belong to broadly defined categories like the unemployed, 
sick, elderly and so on,
Beveridge's plan was based on a unified pooling of 
risks, founded firmly on insurance and removing all taint 
of the Poor Law and greatly reducing the use of Means 
Tests while ensuring adequate support in time of need. It 
was designed to keep the unemployed out of poverty by 
providing insurance benefits up to a minimum subsistence 
level. The plans took care to avoid stifling personal 
initiative and allow people the freedom to build up to 
their desired requirements. As the Report outlined, 
the scheme was:
"not one for giving to everybody something for
nothing ....  or something that will free the
recipients for ever thereafter from personal
responsibilities ....  leaves room and
encouragement to all individuals to win for themselves 
something above the national minimum, to find and
to satisfy ....  new and higher needs than bare
physical needs."6
The insurance scheme was not intended to deal with 
the problems of the working poor who tended to be families 
who, because of the burden of children, were below the 
poverty level. To complement the workings of insurance 
and lift these people out of poverty, Beveridge recommended 
establishing a system of family allowances. He also 
argued that effective insurance would depend on developing 
a national health service and avoiding mass unemployment.
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The irreducible rate of unemployment which the insurance 
scheme was designed to work with was 8%%. Although this 
was later lowered to 3%, the first, and much higher level, 
shows that people had not developed a full confidence in 
Keynesian policies at that time. It may also have been 
inspired partly at the insistence of a cautious Treasury, 
determined not to inflate Government commitments for 
social insurance.
With reference to employment, Beveridge's scheme for 
social security was considered beneficial in helping 
towards the maintenance of employment by 'expanding and 
maintaining private consumption'. The complementary task 
of avoiding mass unemployment was taken up in his next 
work, 'Full Employment in a Free Society' in 1944. This 
marked Beveridge's conversion as a Keynesian and set out 
proposals for achieving and sustaining a state of full 
employment, by then considered a realisable goal and 
defined as
"having always more vacant jobs than_unemployed
men, not slightly fewer j o b s  that the
normal lag between losing one's job and finding 
another will be very short."7
Full Enployment did not mean that at any point in time 
there would be absolutely no unemployment. There would 
always be some small amount caused by industrial friction, 
and under a ceiling of full employment a rate of 3% was 
postulated.
Based on the moral principle that the greatest 
suffering arising from unemployment fell upon the individ­
ual, Beveridge argued that the labour market should be a 
'sellers' rather than a 'buyers' market. Given that the 
prime cause of unemployment was 'deficiency of total
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demand*, the number of available jobs therefore depended on 
the volume of spending. The achievement of full employment 
depended on ensuring that total outlay was sufficient, a 
task that only the State could fulfill. This new respons­
ibility of taking up the slack when private investment proved 
inadequate was, therefore, placed on the State. Previous 
notions about the sanctity of balanced budgets were seen 
as erroneous. It was advocated that Government should be 
prepared to overspend in order to realise labour and other 
productive resources which would otherwise be wasted by 
unemployment. A new type of budget, a 'human budget*, would 
be the main instrument in a policy for full employment. 
Furthermore, as a policy of cheap money was considered 
integral to the overall strategy, it was argued that interest 
rates should be kept as low as possible.
In the same year as 'Full Employment' was published, 
the coalition Government released its White Paper on Employ­
ment Policy, 1944. Although this fell a little short of 
a total endorsement of Keynes' General Theory, it accepted 
a new approach and a new responsibility for the State in 
'the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment*. 
This, along with the acceptance of the employment creating 
potential of fiscal policy, made the White Paper a major 
breakthrough. It advocated low interest rates, large scale 
public works projects, and other techniques designed "to 
prevent total expenditure from falling away."  ^ Although 
the Government had conceded that, even at a time when the 
state of trade was poor, it need no longer regard a balanced 
budget as a central feature of its economic policy, some 
influence of the old orthodoxy remained. The Government was 
reluctant to deliberately plan for a future deficit, insisting, 
rather, that a balance be sustained in the long term. The 
White Paper was, nevertheless, a document of great signif­
icance. It marked the widespread acceptance of Keynesian 
theory among thé economics profession, a new government
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responsibility for the level of economic activity and 
employment, and a degree of intervention that was unthink­
able in the inter-war context. Furthermore, as the Times 
later reported,
"almost for the first time in a State document ....
Zit/ set forth the vital importance to the economy
of maintaining a high standard of purchasing power 
among the masses of the people."10
Coping with Remaining Unemployment - 
Insurance and Assistance
A further White Paper, dealing with Social Insurance, 
was released in 1944, a delay of two years since Beveridge’s 
original work. Despite some small amendments - for example 
it rejected the case for an overall Ministry of Social 
Security - it accepted most of Beveridge’s earlier 
recommendations concerning family allowances, health services 
and unemployment. The White Paper argued in support of the 
concept of ’universality*, justifying the approach on three 
grounds. Firstly, that all citizens should stand together 
without exclusion for reason of differing status, function 
or wealth. Secondly, many people whose needs for benefit 
were as great as many of the insured population were 
currently outside the scope of national insurance. And, 
thirdly, without the principle of universality, it would 
be impossible to adequately maintain the cover needed during 
various normal changes from insurance class to class.
The arguments set out in the document formed the basis for 
a major watershed in social policy, the National Insurance 
Act of 1946,
During the interim period between the White Paper and 
the resultant Act, two pieces of legislation, typical of 
the new policy tradition, had emerged. One was the Family 
Allowances Act, 1945 which established a 5s child allowance 
financed from the exchequer for second and subsequent
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children. The other was the National Insurance (Industrial 
Injuries) Act, 1946 which recognised that accidents at work 
were the responsibility of the whole of society, and used 
the insurance principle of pooling risk to provide four 
types of benefit cover: injury, disablement, supplementary
(e.g. hardship allowances) and death.
Returning to the National Insurance Act, it was
introduced as "a Bill designed to deal with assistance
11and allied questions on a national scale." The Minister 
of National Insurance described the legislation as
" the culmination of half a century's development
of our British Social Services"12
"Parliament after Parliament passed a series of measures 
and so a system has grown up in a haphazard, piece­
meal, way much like a patchwork quilt For a long
time it has been apparent that what was needed was 
a co-ordinated plan for weaving all these together 
in a unified, comprehensive scheme covering the whole 
nation."13
The Act, therefore, consolidated into one the existing 
schemes of insurance against sickness, unemployment, and 
old age. Enacting the concept of universality, it was 
designed to ensure that every person over school leaving 
age and under pensionable age would be insured and remain 
so throughout life.
The actual rates of benefit payments were guided by 
two main principles. Firstly, leading rates were to be 
fixed at figures broadly justifiable in relation to the 
'cost of living*. Secondly, review of the rates should 
take place at periodic intervals, suggested as being every 
five years. The latter concept introduced a new criterion; 
the principle of a 'national minimum standard*. The 
leading rates suggested were:
"26s for a single adult; 42s for a couple living
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together; 26s for the unemployed, widows, the sick and >
the retired; 16s for an adult depentent; and 7s 6d for 
a child's allowance for the first in the family."
j
Provisions for unemployment benefit were based on the f
assumption that full enployment would be maintained. The 
following extract from a speech by the Minister for National 
Insurance makes it clear that large scale long term unemploy­
ment was thought to be a thing of the past:
"If we were - God forbid that we should - to allow 
ourselves to drift back to the mass unemployment of 
the inter-war years, this scheme would be sunk. The 
Government are resolutely determined to secure full 
employment."14
For any small amount of long term unemployment remaining or 
if the unforeseeable disaster of mass unemployment returned, 
it was still accepted that the State would undertake 
responsibility to maintain the unemployed, though not within 
the insurance system.
Important new principles were evident in the legis­
lation. It endorsed the notion outlined in the 1944 White 
Paper on Employment Policy that having a large proportion 
of the workforce inactive whether through unemployment or 
ill health was an economic loss to the country because 
these people were ineffective as consumers. It was 
necessary, therefore, to achieve and maintain a proper 
distribution of purchasing power throughout the whole 
community. Another fundamental principal of the new 
social security system under construction was a sound 
economic foundation; the scheme had to be paid for. The 
'insurance equation* meant that the sum total of the goods 
produced and services rendered by the whole community had 
to be sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for 
all the people at all times. Its success depended, therefore.
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on increasing and maintaining higher levels of production 
by the national workforce. Also integral to a successful 
scheme was the need to maintain high levels of employment. 
To realise this, the nation had to ensure it utilised to 
the full its resources of labour and materials, skill and 
scientific inventiveness, and power of organisation.
Although not specifically catered for under the insur­
ance legislation, the Government had now accepted full 
responsibility for the long term unemployed, the cost of 
their maintenance borne by the Treasury. Those who had not 
earned or who had exhausted their entitlement to benefit 
were dealt with under the National Assistance Act of 1948, 
presented as:
"the coping stone on the structure of the social 
services of Great Britain"»15
Despite the great progress made on national insurance, health 
and child benefits, a small residual of the population 
remained dependent on the Poor Law; 400,000 persons were on 
outdoor relief and 50,000 were in institutions.^^ National 
Assistance was designed to meet the needs of groups like 
these who had slipped through the net of the recently 
constructed social security system, and to assist people 
with inadequate resources to meet their requirements. As 
Aneurin Bevan, then Minister of Health, pointed out 
when introducing the legislation to Parliament,
"There will be a number of persons who will not be 
eligible for insurance benefit. There will be some who 
will not be eligible for unemployment benefit, and 
there will be persons who will be the subject of 
sudden affliction, like fires and floods and circum­
stances of that kind, who will need more help from 
some special organisation."17
There was, therefore, seen to be a need for a 'safety net'
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to stand behind the existing social services and provide
for groups in need excluded from their care. The National
Assistance Act filled this vacuum and specifically repealed
the existing poor law legislation by categorically stating
18that "the existing Poor Law shall cease to have effect»"
Cash payments previously made by Poor Law authorities 
as outdoor relief were transferred to a new national auth­
ority, the National Assistance Board (NAB), thus spreading 
the local burden of relief over the whole nation.
What at the time seemed to be a commitment of the new 
legislation to break completely with the last remnants 
of the Poor Law is probably most evident in its provisions 
for the elderly. Here a major departure from the past was 
the scrapping of the 'workhouse* and its replacement by 
'residential hotels' for the old. The Act sought to remove 
the stigma of State charity in dealing with the elderly 
by scrapping the distinction between the financially independ­
ent and those in receipt of means tested social assistance.
In operation the NAB would put money into the possession 
of the individual old age pensioner who would then pay the 
hotel charges in a respectable and dignified way. Further­
more, the change in principle to weighing up people's 
'needs' rather than their 'means' in the calculation of 
NAB assistance levels demonstrated the move into a new era. 
With a National Assistance scheme which was expected to 
dwindle in scope, the British social service network was 
thought to be complete.
5. The 'Butskellite' Consensus
The immediate post-war economic boom released by the 
pent up demand for consumer goods and post-war reconstruc­
tion exerted intense pressure on industry and the workforce. 
The main concern was not with finding jobs for the unemployed, 
but with expanding the size of the workforce in order to
48
satisfy an acute shortage of labour, particularly in
the export industries. There was great concern about this
in 1947, The Government appealed to married women to rejoin
the labour force and even considered banning the Pools so
the women they employed could be steered into more produc- 
19tive work. There was also talk about the selective
immigration of foreign workers and attempts were made to
clamp down on work dodgers, especially the * spivs* who were
20idle but sharp black marketeers.
Unemployment in Britain during the post-war Labour 
administration of 1945 to 1951 rarely exceeded 2%. By the 
early 1950s the nation was secure in the belief that such 
employment levels could be sustainable under normal 
conditions of peace. In 1951 the Labour Chancellor, Mr. 
Gaitskell, indicated that Britain had adopted a 'full 
employment standard' of 3%, this being the figure above 
which the Government would not allow unemployment to rise.
The incoming Conservative administration of 1951
accorded equal priority to full employment as did its Labour
predecessor. The policies of its Chancellor, Mr, Butler,
were so similar to those of Labour's Gaitskell, that
The Economist created the famous character of Mr. Butskell
in recognition of the apparent consensus in economic policy
21existing between the two main parties. The central feature 
of Butskellism, generally seen as having lasted from 1948 
to 1966, was the priority given to maintaining full employ­
ment and a determination that Britain would not return to 
the bleak days of the 1930s. During these two decades of 
political consensus about many features of the management of 
the economy, unemployment averaged 1.7%, with long term 
unemployment negligible for the largest part of the period. 
Full employment was adopted as the main objective of policy 
by both Labour and Conservative Parties. Successive 
governments operated their economic policies on the neo-
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Keynesian belief that the exercise of demand management 
would ensure the maintenance of full employment and economic 
growth.
The emotionally charged concern over unemployment,
stemming from the inter-war depression, survived until the
mid-1960s. The rate of unemployment was a key electoral
issue throughout and Governments were loath to let this
go beyond 2%. When it did they responded quickly with an
expansionary budget. Several commentators have pointed to
the very significant influence unemployment exerted during
this period upon the popularity of the governing party and
the perceived performance of that Government's handling 
22of the economy. The low levels of unemployment experienced 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s had marked implications 
for public attitudes to the unemployed and their mainten­
ance. Only a small proportion of people were out of work 
for long periods and surveys by the NAB in the late 1950s 
showed that only around one-third of these, most of whom
were handicapped in some way, were considered 'not keen*
23or 'workshy*. As Deacon (1980) points out, it is hardly 
surprising that there was little attention paid to allega­
tions of malingering or scrounging or that virtually no
24pressure existed to reduce the benefits for the unemployed. 
Indeed, there was actually a positive lobby from certain 
quarters to raise the payments made to the unemployed. In 
1963, for example. The Economist proposed that basic national 
insurance benefits be doubled, which, in increasing the 
purchasing power of the unemployed, was a suggestion consis­
tent with the contemporary philosophy of demand management.
Amidst the optimism of full employment, economists 
became concerned with 'economic indicators'; information 
thought necessary for the effective monitoring and manage­
ment of the economy. By closely examining a country's
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GNP, trade balance, money supply, price levels, unemploy­
ment and other statistics, economists claimed to be capable 
of controlling severe fluctuations in the economy, whether 
by way of recession or boom. They needed finer drawn 
classification and categorisation of the unemployed. The 
collection of monthly survey data was a welcome advance and 
allowed the unemployed to be grouped, for example, according 
to age, sex, education and reason for not working. The 
more comprehensive statistical breakdowns also served to 
highlight a number of social and economic problems. It 
could be observed that unemployment rates tended to be 
higher among certain social groups, for example the young, 
the uneducated and disadvantaged minorities. Furthermore, 
particular areas of the Country appeared to be relatively 
worse off than others; areas such as Clydeside, Merseyside 
and Northern Ireland having persistently higher unemployment 
rates than the South East and the Midlands.
The widespread faith in Keynesian macro economic theory 
to provide mixed capitalist economies with the ability to 
maintain full employment during the two post-war decades 
was not, however, unqualified. In the UK, as in the USA, 
cyclical unemployment was still evident albeit in a very 
mild and damped form compared to the inter war era. 
Nevertheless, economic policy failed to reconcile full 
employment with price stability. Contrary to Keynes* 
reasoning in the 'General Theory* that price inflation 
reflected an excess of demand over the supply of goods and 
services, and that this excess demand would cause an increase 
in production and thus reduce unemployment, an anomalous 
situation existed where inflation co-existed with substan­
tial numbers unemployed. Some people attributed this to 
the distorting influence of large corporations and trade 
unions on wage rates, arguing that giant oligopolistic 
companies could choose to grant large wage increases to 
powerful unions rather than risk the potentially damaging
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consequences of strike action. In industries where price 
competition was minimal, higher costs could, therefore, be 
passed on to the consumer relatively easily thus pushing 
inflation upwards. Another explanation was provided by 
A.W. Phillips who discovered a close relationship between 
the level of unemployment and the rate of change of money 
wages in the British economy between 1862 and 1958,^^ He 
showed that wage rates were 'sticky*, being difficult to 
reduce in the face of falling economic activity while at the 
top of an economic boom they tended to rise despite a 
falling productivity of the labour employed. The implication 
was that to maintain full employment a certain amount of 
inflation was inevitable and that inflation itself could 
only be cured by incurring an increase in unemployment. 
Governments, therefore, would have to choose between some 
mixture of inflation and unemployment which could be 
represented in the form of curve and economists and politi­
cians had a basis to argue that higher rates of unemployment 
should be accepted in return for lower inflation. Indeed, 
as later work has shown, the tolerable rate of unemployment 
gradually crept higher throughout the 1960s, the level of 
unemployment which acted as a trigger for government 
reflation of the economy increasing from 2,2% in 1959 to 
2.5% in 1963, and to 3.9% in 1972.
6. Some Reflections on Post-War Social Policy
The war and the years following it were a period when 
many of the social and economic ideas we have taken for 
granted since were either forged or endorsed. Employment 
from leaving school until retirement was the expectation of 
all wishing to follow the course of a normal working life. 
Overwhelmingly, this meant full time work in the formal 
economy in return for a wage packet from an employer and 
was the domain of the adult male. Hand in hand with the
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male's position as the breadwinning head of the household
went an equally rigid definition for the female as mother,
housewife and full time domestic unpaid worker. In 1931,
for example, only one in eight women were recorded as hold-
28ing employment outside the home. Women were not expected 
to work, and this was reflected in the social attitudes of 
the inter-war years and the legislative advances of the 1940s 
As Beveridge wrote,
"On marriage a woman gains a legal right to mainten­
ance by her husband as a first line of defense against 
risks which fall directly on the solitary woman."29
"The attitude of the housewife to gainful employment 
outside the home is not and should not be the same as 
that of the single woman. She has other duties,"30
The vital unpaid service rendered by the housewife in the 
home was recognised with the introduction of Family Allow­
ances in 1945 which paid benefits directly to her as of 
right out of Treasury funds without requiring insurance 
contributions. As later chapters will show, these, and 
other, assumptions about the allocation of work, the nature 
of employment and so on, have been progressively undermined 
since the mid 1960s.
In retrospect some commentators feel Britain should
have adopted an alternative approach to social policy in
the 1940s. Even at the time. Labour's ambitious programme
to expand the social services and make them available
to all was criticised by the Conservatives who would have
preferred a more cautious and less expensive approach.
Nevertheless, it was the view of Richard Titmus, the official
historian of social policy over the war period, that the
new provisions were successful precisely because they were
provided on a universal basis and "were free of the discrim-
31ination and indignities of the Poor Law".
53.
The great post-war advances in social welfare were 
widely believed to be concerned with equity and redistrib­
ution in their nature and designed to benefit the less 
prosperous sections of the community. The reality, however 
has not lived up to these expectations. Net benefits 
accruing to the individual from the Exchequer in matters 
of welfare have tended to be higher among groups with 
higher incomes and the more educated have proved better at 
taking up the benefits which have been universally available 
while the poor have been less well equipped to do so. As 
recently as the late 1970s, for example, it was estimated 
that substantial sums of money were being lost to the poor 
through the failure of around one million of the four million 
people believed to be entitled to supplementary benefit to
op
claim the money which was due to them as of right. Indeed, 
the very basis of national insurance can be seen as unfair. 
Being paid for, by contributions which are levied in very 
simple, flat rate ways, it has placed a greater burden on 
the poorer people contributing and represents, in effect, 
a system of regressive taxation.
These inequities have been seized upon by those 
favouring a more piecemeal and selective approach to the 
provision of social services. The case against a comprehen­
sive flat rate scheme of the Beveridge type is based on the 
observation, as one commentator has put it, that
"to offer equal services or benefits to people in 
unequal situations is not to offer equality but merely 
to underwrite their existing relative inequality; 
that is to counter inequality one must act unequally - 
that the poor need more than, the rich less than, equal 
shares."33
A universal system certainly involves a larger volume of 
resources than does providing benefits selectively or on 
a means tested basis, and much of the resources go to
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those who are not in real need. The central argument in 
favour of greater selective provisions is that more can 
be done to attack poverty and raise the living standards 
of the poor. A related point is that, given we have 
returned to a situation where large numbers have once again 
come to depend on means tested assistance, we should accept 
the fact and concentrate not on abolishing it but making 
the provision more efficient.
A strong case can, therefore, be made for adopting a 
more selective approach to social policy on the grounds 
that anti-poverty measures can be made more effective. Its 
appeal should, however, be tempered by recognising that 
selective provisions targetted specifically at the poor run 
the risk of becoming poor services. Although there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with providing services to 
special groups on a selective and means tested basis, 
a major problem can be the loss of self-respect and dignity 
experienced by the clients of those services. Emotions 
like these are largely socially imposed, arising from antag­
onistic attitudes towards the unemployed from among the 
working public at large. In a context of rising unemploy­
ment, the cost of maintaining the jobless demands more and 
more resources. If at the same time public expenditure is 
seen as a millstone around the nation's neck, as it has 
been widely regarded in recent years, then those in receipt 
of the special services are more likely to become the objects 
of social criticism and risk the amount of public resources 
flowing to them in maintenance being cut back to the bare 
minimum.
The notion that selective services provide the most 
effective anti-poverty strategy must also be seriously 
challenged. The level of benefits paid to the unemployed 
depends, politically speaking, on the incomes of low paid 
workers with two or three children to support. These set
55
the ceiling for benefits which the public is prepared to 
accept. Hence, a country like Britain with low and inad­
equately enforced minimum wages and low family allowances 
will have a low level of benefits. Furthermore, those in 
poverty tend more to be working families of around this 
size and less so those officially in receipt of low 
incomes who tend to be single and are often female. 
Therefore-, a very effective way both of dealing with the 
working poor and improving the scope for higher levels of 
assistance to the unemployed is through the provision of 
higher child benefits - itself a universal service.
7. Conclusion
The Keynesian revolution in economics and the emerg­
ence of the Second World War were separate phenomena 
which together, in complement, revolutionised our whole 
perception and handling of unemployment and shaped the 
development of Britain's post-war social services. The 
experience of total war for the second time during the 
century again fired the State to take on a greater respons­
ibility for the welfare of the community and ensure the 
individual would be protected from poverty and suffering 
whether in or out of work. A major difference from the 
aftermath of the Great War, however, was the belief that 
unemployment could be solved by Governments' management 
and control of the economy and mass unemployment abolished 
forever. Despite the emergence of a few doubts about the 
performance of Keynesian demand management and the 
controlability of unemployment, confidence and consensus 
about many issues of social policy persisted through 
fully two post-war decades.
The developments in social policy which began in 
war time culmiaated in the establishment of what is 
commonly hailed as the welfare state. The main assumption
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underpinning the new comprehensive scheme for National 
Insurance was that any interruption in a person's working 
life would only be temporary and, whatever the cause, 
adequate protection would be provided by insurance. In 
the few cases of people not protected by insurance benefit 
they would be dealt with by National Assistance, although 
it was expected those numbers would be very small. In 
their operation these, and other principal services 
of the welfare state, have differed significantly from 
expectations prevalent when they were introduced. The 
social services have generally operated with a good deal 
of inequity, and the insurance and assistance systems 
have been undermined, as the next chapters will show, by 
a steady collapse of full employment since 1966. There 
may well, therefore, be growing political pressure to 
change to less expensive schemes targetted at those most, 
in need. Although selective and means tested provisions 
probably have a role to play, to avoid our social services 
becoming a low quality welfare safety net, it would seem 
essential to maintain a safety net of universal services 
which raise the living standards of all those in poverty 
and which those in need are encouraged to use to the full.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE COLLAPSE OF FULL EMPLOYMENT
"Let him that hath understanding count the 
number of the beast: for it is the number
of a m a n  "
Revelation 18
1. Introduction
In the early 1980s Britain was again swamped by large 
scale unemployment with a larger proportion of its labour 
force out of work than in the depression of the 1930s.
Yet, for many years after the Second World War it was 
believed this would never happen again. More precisely, 
it was not expected that Government could allow it to 
happen and survive. Both assumptions have since been 
overthrown. This Chapter considers why this has happened, 
and reviews the collapse of full employment by tracing the 
growth and extent of unemployment and political attitudes 
to it. It concludes by speculating on what the future 
may hold,
2. Recent Unemployment Trends
Unemployment in Britain reached the staggering figure 
of 2 million in August 1980, by December of the same year 
the jobless total topped 2,244,000 - higher than the bleak 
spring of 1933 - and one month later, the national unemploy­
ment rate rose above 10% of the working population. No let 
up was envisaged in the underlying jobless rise (around
100,000 a month) in the short term, and according to the 
Sunday Times, by the summer of 1981, even the Treasury had, 
albeit privately, abandoned its expectation of a quick
recovery and expected unemployment to reach 3 million by
11982 and continue rising thereafter. Total unemployment 
reached 2.8 million in August 1982, and, despite hovering 
around this figure for the rest of the year, after allowing
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for seasonal adjustment the underlying trend continued to 
rise each month. From January 1983 unemployment in the UK 
bobbed below and above the three million mark. The GB 
figure, however, because it excluded Northern Ireland, the 
region with traditionally the highest unemployment in the 
UK, took until July to exceed 3 million for the first time. 
The steady rise in the underlying trend in unemployment 
finally slowed in September 1983 after 44 months of steadily 
rising unemployment over which the total number jobless in 
the UK had soared from 52.% in December 1979 to 13.3% in 
September 1983.
3. The Real Extent of Unemployment
The basic source of statistical information on unemploy­
ment and the official count of the unemployed in Great 
Britain and the UK is based on Department of Employment (DE) 
data, collected and published monthly in the Department of 
Employment Gazette (DEG). In recent years the calculation 
has included only those unemployed in search of work and 
registered as such at their local employment offices. It 
excludes people who may be looking for work but are unregis­
tered, students over the age of 18 years registered unemployed 
during their vacation, and others who, although not working, 
are considered to have jobs, such as workers on holiday, 
temporarily stopped or on short time working, or on Manpower 
Services Commission (MSC) Schemes.
Assessing the extent of unemployment on the current 
system of administrative returns, raises the possibility 
of underestimating unemployment. People may be genuinely 
unemployed and in search of work but will not be accounted 
for as they are not registered. This situation can arise 
for a number of reasons. The actual extent of unregistered 
or "hidden* unemployment is difficult to assess precisely.
Some evidence of its scale can be obtained from the
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General Household Survey (GHS). From GHS data the DE 
suggests approximately 90,000 and 100,000 unemployed 
males were unregistered in 1972 and 1973 respectively.
The corresponding figures for women were 175,000 in 
1972 and 160,000 in 1973-^ In 1979, if the unregistered 
unemployed uncovered by the GHS were added to official 
figures it would have almost doubled the number of married 
women out of work, increased non-married women by one
3
third and men by one eighth.
More recent information was compiled by the Govern­
ment's official Labour Force Survey in the second quarter 
of 1981. This found a pool of 447,000 hidden unemployed 
which, if taken account of in the official estimate, gave 
an unemployment rate of 16% as opposed to 13.2%, Almost 
67% of those not appearing in the official statistics 
were women who, probably not having paid a full national 
insurance stamp, were not eligible for benefit and had, 
therefore, no incentive to register.^ Although married 
women have tended to account for at least half of the 
hidden unemployed, this dominance is probably changing 
due to the phasing out of their option to pay reduced 
national insurance contributions. All married women who 
joined the labour market after April 1979 have had to 
pay the full contribution entitling them to full unemploy­
ment benefit for which they must register as unemployed.
The existence of hidden unemployment is also suggested 
by the observed shortfall between a decline in enployment 
and a subsequent rise in unemployment. A distinction 
can be drawn between those who define themselves as 
'inactive* at times of high unemployment yet register for 
work when unemployment falls, and the normal or more 
conventional unemployed. The former make up a 'silent 
reserve* of unemployed, who emerge when job prospects 
improve, thereby creating the anomalous situation where
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an increase of a certain amount of new jobs in an economy 
fails to correspond with a requisite fall in unemployment. 
Alternatively, as has been the case in Britain, despite 
a growth in the number of people of working age and a 
fall in employment, there has not been a corresponding 
increase in unemployment. Between June 1979 and October 
1982, for example, although employment fell by around 
2.3 million, the rise in unemployment was significantly 
lower at 1,9 million. Thus, nearly three quarters of 
a million people who had lost their jobs since the begin­
ning of the slump had failed to register as unemployed. 
This was probably caused mainly by the withdrawal of 
married women from the labour force and the retirement, 
particularly of older men, when the demand for labour 
fell.
In addition to the unregistered unemployed some 
agencies involved in estimating the extent of unemploy­
ment take account of other factors. Principally these 
include people temporarily lifted out of the labour market 
by the special employment measures of the MSC and those 
on short time working. When unemployment stood at 
2 million, for example, the Trade Union Congress (TUG) 
argued the real total was 3.5 million,^ In August 
1982 when the official jobless total had risen to almost 
2.9 million one of the large trades unions calculated 
the true figure to be 4.3 million or more.^ By the end 
of the year with DE statistics showing a jobless rate 
above 3 million, the Labour Research Department, a body 
financed mainly from trade union subscriptions, suggested 
the real level of unemployment was around 5 million; 
double the official estimate for women and half as much
7
again for men.
In November 1982 another factor emerged which meant 
subsequent official estimates of unemployment would
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further underestimate the true number of people looking 
for work. The DE introduced a new system of collecting 
jobless statistics. The previous method of making 
clerical counts at Job Centres and Careers Offices was 
replaced by a computer count of those registering for 
unemployment benefit at benefit offices. Although the 
change was presented as an improvement to the efficiency 
of the employment and benefit services, a direct effect 
has been to exclude people actively looking for work but 
who choose not to register, presumably because they 
would not qualify for any unemployment benefit. At first 
the Government thought the effect would create a short­
fall of around 50,000 a month from estimates made by the 
old system.^ This, however, was a gross underestimate.
It was soon realised that the new count showed a
jobless total of between 170,000 and 190,000 a month
9fewer than the old method, these being excluded by 
the new count are mainly women. In its first month of 
operation the jobless figures resulting from the new count 
would have had to be raised by 13.4% for women and 
4.1% for men to equal what unemployment would have tallied 
under the previous method of calculation.
4. International Comparisons
Britain is not alone in being confronted with a 
major unemployment problem. Most other industrial countries 
have also experienced worrying rises in the number out 
of work. Although Britain has had the highest and 
fastest rising rate during the current recession among 
the major developed countries, unemployment has also 
reached post war highs in the United States, Canada,
France, West Germany and the Netherlands. In Italy 
unemployment in 1982 was the highest since 1959, and in 
Japan and Sweden, although substantially lower than other
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countries, it was higher than the levels normally
11experienced over the previous two decades. Table 3.1 
shows unemployment trends in ten selected countries 
since 1974. The data has been adjusted so it is 
compatible with the way unemployment is calculated in 
the United States thus allowing more accurate comparisons 
between the countries. If the rate of unemployment 
as published by each country separately is used, distor­
tions in the comparative picture can emerge because two 
different systems are used to measure unemployment. The 
United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Italy, and 
Sweden depend on periodic - usually monthly - labour 
force sample surveys, whereas France, Germany and Great 
Britain rely on monthly counts of registrants at employ­
ment exchanges. Britain's method, in the main, has 
served to underestimate the extent of its unemployment 
in comparison with other countries. Throughout the 1970s 
the shortfall between Britain's official unemployment and 
that adjusted to approximate US concepts ranged between
100,000 and 600,000 people.
When comparing international unemployment rates one 
needs to take into account the different economic, 
demographic, social and institutional differences between 
countries. The relatively high levels of North American 
jobless rates in comparison with those in Western 
Europe and Japan until around 1974 were attributable 
primarily to large differences in rates of economic growth 
and labour force increase. Furthermore, because of laws 
and attitudes restricting employers in Europe and Japan 
from laying off workers, worker mobility has been much 
lower in these countries than in North America. As a 
consequence, frictional unemployment due to job changing 
in North America, and in particular the US, has been 
higher than elsewhere. This along with the relatively 
high rate of job creation in the US suggests that, despite 
high uneirployment rates, the labour market situation in
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Table 3.1;
International Unemployment Rates 1974-81 
(approximating US concepts)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
United States 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.8 7.1 7.6
Canada 5.3 6.9 7.1 8.1 8.4 7.5 7.5 7.6
Australia 2.7 4.9 4.8 5.6 6.3 6.2 6.1 5.8
Japan 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.3 2,1 2.0 2.2
France 2.9 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.4 6.1 6.5 7.7
West Germany 1.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.0 4.2
Great Britain 3.1 4.6 6.0 6.4 6.3 5.7 7.3 11.3
Italy 2.8 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.2
Netherlands 3.8 5.2 5.4 5,1 5.2 5.3 6.1 8.9
Sweden 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.5
Source; Monthly Labor Review, November 1982
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the US has been healthier for several years than that in 
Britain, where lower rates of job creation and higher 
rates of long term unemployment have been the norm.^^
Some countries have their labour force swollen by foreign 
labour migrations. Such is the case in West Germany 
with its tradition of 'guest workers', migrant Turks and 
Yugoslavians. In Sweden, for example, state intervention 
has been used on a large scale to hold unemployment down 
by funding massive labour market and job creation 
programmes. Though rising, the Swedish unemployment rate 
in June 1982 was only 3.1%.
Since around 1974 the international situation has 
changed noticeably. In addition to generally higher 
unemployment in the industrialised nations, individual 
rates have tended to convergeThis has been particularly 
marked among higher unemployment countries such as the US, 
Canada, UK and France, the UK breaking the pattern from 
mid-1980 when its jobless total soared above all three.
Two principal factors appear to explain the general 
pattern. First, the wide differences which have character­
ised the growth rates of the various countries from 
1950s until the early 1970s changed dramatically in the 
second half of the last decade. Growth in the American 
economy caught up with and outpaced Europe after 1974. 
Britain, with traditionally the slowest growth rate in 
the post war era, performed more like its European 
counterparts. And Japan, whose post-war growth rate was 
the fastest of all, now has a rate of growth slower 
than it once was. Second, the baby boom of the 1960s 
was a general phenomenon. As a consequence, most 
countries will experience a rapid growth in their 
population of working age and the rise in the number of
young people joining their labour force will continue
15well into the 1980s. This, set against the background 
of slower economic growth, will not only make unemployment
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problems more difficult to handle; it will also confront 
many countries with difficult problems surrounding the 
young and youth unenployment.
The reasons why Britain has fared so badly in terms
of unemployment compared to other countries can be traced
to poor economic performance and recent monetary policies.
The country's growth in manufacturing industry since the
the war has been slow. Before the recent collapse in
output in 1979, manufacturing production was only 5%
above its level at the beginning of the decade whereas
industrial production in competing European countries
was at least 25% more and those in the US and Japan 40%
m o r e . O v e r  the first two years of the current recession
the 15% fall in Britain’s manufacturing output was
higher than that suffered during the inter-war depression
17and more than any other industrialised country. The 
restrictive monetary policies adopted by the Conservative 
Government and the gross overvaluation of the exchange 
rate can be seen as major causes behind this recent 
contraction of the UK market. Together they have pushed 
down expenditure on investment and prompted heavy 
destocking by undermining manufacturers' and distributors' 
confidence in future sales. Most other Western govern­
ments have pursued less restrictive policies and therefore 
avoided the scale of market exposure experienced in 
Britain.
5. Unemployment Changes since 1966
To British society in the 1960s, steeped in the opt­
imism of the post war years and the subsequent confidence 
and security built up through two decades of full employ­
ment, the prospect of finding itself once again ravaged 
by mass unemployment in the early 1980s would have been 
an astonishing one. It would be wrong, however, to assume
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that the tide turned on full employment only over the past 
four years or so. Full employment did not drown in the 
flood of rising unemployment since 1979, but has steadily 
crumbled since the mid 1960s. The best date for the point 
when the bell tolled for full employment would be 1966. 
Between 1948 and then, total registered unemployment in 
the UK averaged 1.7%, the highest level for any one year 
being 2.3% in 1963 and the lowest 1,1% in 1955, Figure 3.1.
Not only did 1966 mark the beginning of a mild upturn
in unemployment, significant changes in the economy and
economic policy took place at the same time. From the
early 1960s structural weaknesses in the economy had
caused the government increasing concern, and attention
turned to economic planning. The new Labour Government
of 1964 committed itself to improving the growth rate and
restructuring the nation’s industrial base by comprehensive
economic planning on a national scale. Deflationary
measures were introduced in 1966 and unemployment
correspondingly rose form 1.1% in July to 2.3% in November.
The underlying assumption of policy was based on the notion
that a trade-off existed between unemployment and inflation.
It has been suggested that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
had accepted what has been termed the * Paish thesis’,
that by allowing unemployment to rise to between 2% and
2.5% inflation would be curbed and the need for dévalua­
is
tion avoided. Nevertheless, soon after, in November
1967, the pound was devalued yet unemployment remained
above 2%. This was shortly followed by a further squeeze
20on the economy in order to make devaluation work. These 
measures marked the abandonment of a strategy which, since 
the war, had been considered a prerequisite to the mainten­
ance of full employment. Holding unemployment down was 
no longer the principal objective of central fiscal policy. 
It took second place to growth and restructuring, and 
higher unemployment levels were accepted as the sacrifice
69.
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for improving the nation’s balance of payments position.
The rise in unemployment following 1966, Figure 3.2, 
might have been less acceptable and subject to greater 
criticism had it not been for the way unemployment was 
perceived. At this time it was certainly not accepted 
that full employment was in danger. The task of Government 
was popularly seen as guaranteeing its future preservation 
by ensuring a faster rate of economic growth and by ’shaking 
out* unproductive labour from service industries into 
manufacturing, thereby creating new opportunities for a 
breakthrough in industrial production.
Unemployment resulting largely from industrial 
restructuring was not defined as such. The descriptive 
term attached to the rise in the jobless, and popularised 
by Prime Minister Wilson, was ’redeployment*? a phenomenon 
thought integral and necessary to the process of progressive 
industrial change. These ’redeployed unemployed* were not 
considered to be in danger of any real hardship as a result 
of their dislocation. Spells of unemployment were expected 
to be short and of a job-changing nature. Furthermore, 
to ease these transitions, the Government had introduced 
redundancy payments in 1965 and an earnings related payment 
as a supplement to national insurance benefits. Another 
factor which possibly held down reaction to rising unemploy­
ment was its replacement by the balance of payments as 
the major political issue of the day. Prime Minister
Wilson virtually invited the country to judge his Government
21on its ability to overcome the nation’s trade deficit.
Government attitudes to economic policy and unemploy­
ment were summed up by the Prime Minister when he told the 
Labour Party Conference in October 1966 that "industrial 
change without labour redeployment is a meaningless concept." 
He later added that his Government’s policies were a "once
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and for all opportunity to break out of the miserable
cycle we inherited" which "by creating the opportunity
for a new industrial breakthrough in export production
  holds out the surest guarantee we have of full employ-
22ment for a generation."
The slow gradual rise in unemployment after 1966 came
to a halt in 1972. The jobless rate turned down from a
high of 3.4% in April of that year and continued falling
until the end of 1973. Despite this being a boom year for
the economy, unemployment still stood 0.6% higher than in
1966. A common explanation for this is that 1966 marked a
fundamental change in the nature of unemployment. Comparing
vacancies and male unemployment, for example, a stable
relationship between the two is evident during the two full
employment decades. In boom years such as 1951, 1955 or
1965, unemployment was low and vacancies were high.
Correspondingly, in the slump years of 1958 and 1963,
unemployment was relatively high and vacancies low. After
1966 the nature of this relationship seems to have changed.
Unemployment rose without vacancies falling to the same
level as they had been, and over the period 1972 to 1974
a rise of between 300,000 and 350,000 registered uneirployed,
about 1.4% of the workforce, was noticeable for a given
level of vacancies. It is argued that only around half
this amount can be attributed to an increase in frictional
unemployment, leaving the rest to be explained by an
23increase in structural unemployment. Put simply, struc­
tural unemployment results from a mis-match between the 
available labour force and the productive structure of 
the economy. It can be caused, for example, by some regions 
having too much labour while others are short, a lack of 
certain skills required by industry, a change in the 
structure of industrial investment which means that less 
labour is required in the productive process, and so on.
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It is also possible that when the Conservatives took 
office in June 1970, the Government anticipated that some 
rise in unemployment would have a beneficial effect in 
dampening down wage claims. However, when the emotive 
figure of 1 million unemployed was reached during the 
winter of 1972, the Government effected a turn-around in 
its economic policy. It was feared that jobless levels of 
1 million would be seen as electorally disastrous and an 
obstacle to securing trade union acceptance of changes in 
industrial relations. In a bid to reduce unemployment the 
Government made substantial cuts in personal taxation as 
part of a programme of demand expansion that was intended 
to achieve a growth in output of 5% per annum. This 
began the ®dash for growth*. In June 1973, the economy 
moved to a floating exchange rate and an incomes policy was 
introduced in November. Initial signs were encouraging 
and optimistic predictions about recovery were common 
during the first two-thirds of 1973. Unemployment in the 
UK had begun to fall down 3.7% in September 1972. By 
December of the same year it stood at 3.3% and continued 
to drop throughout 1973 to 2.2% in December.
By September 1973, however, serious problems were 
developing to undermine the Government's success on 
unemployment. A balance of payments deficit was evident 
and a shortage of labour and materials had arisen. Soon 
after came the oil crisis of October and the miners* 
overtime ban in November and their declaration of a three 
day week a month later. As a consequence of these combined 
crises, the expansionist aspirations of the Conservative 
Government were, over a period of about six months, 
swamped by a mounting trade deficit, rising inflation and 
industrial conflict. The decision of the miners to 
strike in February 1974 forced the Government into a 
General Election. The Conservatives lost and a new Labour 
Government was returned but without an overall majority.
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The period 1966 to 1974 was one of •dynamic dis-
24equilibrium* of the British economy. Despite the brief 
improvement in unemployment in 1972 and 1973, over these 
years structural unemployment was growing and inflation 
accelerating. Fundamental changes in the movement of 
the economy and the associated rate of unemployment had 
become evident during the 1970s. Where in 1971/72 the econ­
omy experienced a trough in the trade cycle, much more 
severe than any since the 1930s, the peak that followed it 
in 1973/74 involved a relatively inadequate recovery in 
the level of unemployment. In 1975 unemployment rose 
again. The seasonally adjusted figure increased from 3% 
in June to 4.4% in December, well above the relatively 
low levels of 1971/72 and without there being the strong 
check to the rate of inflation that had always previously 
been expected in such a situation. The Government, 
therefore, found itself fighting unemployment and inflation 
simultaneously.
Important changes were also taking place in the way 
unemployment was perceived. In 1955 when cyclical and 
structural unemployment was considered zero, the jobless 
rate totalled 1.1%. In fact 1955 can be considered as 
possibly the purest example of full employment, the rate 
of unemployment during this year constituting the ‘irreduc­
ible minimum* possible under conditions of peace, the 
numbers made up wholly of persons frictionally unemployed. 
Since 1966, and more so the early 1970s, the concept of 
the ‘irreducible minimum* has been pushed gradually 
upwards, both influencing and being affected by political 
perceptions of unemployment. It is estimated that by 
1973 an unemployment rate of between 2% and 3% would have 
corresponded to full employment as it was understood before 
1966, this figure rising to just below 4% in 1977.^^
Various reasons have been given to explain this rise
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in irreducible minimum. A popular position among some 
commentators in the 1970s was that voluntary unemployment 
had risen because redundancy payments and the Earnings 
Related Supplement raised the relative value of unemploy­
ment benefits compared to employment income, thus creating 
a disincentive to work. Although this case was widely 
argued it has been undermined by critical analysis.
Research suggests it was not those in receipt of 
Earnings Related Supplement who were most likely to 
remain unemployed for longer p e r i o d s , n o r  could any 
real association between the size of redundancy payments
and the consequent time people spent out of work be un- 
27covered. Another set of reasons argued that higher 
unemployment could be partly explained by industrial 
friction in the labour market caused by various aspects 
of intervention and legislative provision which interfered 
with the normal market forces in the supply and demand for 
labour. The monopoly position of trades unions and their 
strength to push up minimum wage offers, the reduction in 
wages flexibility consequent with incomes policies, and 
the impediment in the free flow of labour as a result of 
local authority rigidities in the allocation of council 
houses are some of the explanations given. It is difficult 
to sustain a case for these having a major influence.
No doubt they have had some effect, although exactly how 
much is difficult to quantify.
Political toleration of unemployment was also rising
in the 1970s. By the time Labour formed a new Government
in February 1974 uneitployment had begun to rise again
after the mild boom of the previous two years. In March
1974, when unemployment had reached 590,000, fears were
expressed that there was a risk that politicians would
discover they could run the country with one million
28unemployed without committing electoral suicide. This
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speculation was realised with rapid speed. Sixteen months 
later unemployment breached one million under a Labour 
Government which continued to serve out its remaining two 
and a half years of office.
The Labour Government of 1974 to 1979 presided over 
almost four full years of recession which saw unemployment 
in Britain escalate at a rate and to a level unprecedented 
in the post-war era. The seasonally adjusted jobless rate 
had risen from 2.1% in December 1973 to 6.3% in January 
1978. Whereas before such levels of unemployment might have 
aroused public and political furore severe enough to 
bring down the presiding Government such a reaction failed 
to materialise. Partly this may have been because of the 
increasing plateau of the 'irreducible minimum*. However, 
more important was the phenomenon which stood traditional 
economic nostrums on their head - 'stagflation* - the 
co-existence of high and rising unemployment along with 
escalating inflation. When the jobless total reached 
one million in the summer of 1975 inflation was rampant 
at 25%.
Political attitudes to unemployment changed profoundly 
over this period. Attention switched from unemployment to 
rising inflation with a concern similar to that in which 
mass unemployment had been held in the years following 
the Second World War. The rationale for this switch came 
from the view that unemployment arose from excessive wage 
rises forced through by the monopoly power of trade unions 
which reduced the demand for labour and created unemployment, 
In this context a Government obsessed with returning to 
full employment and adopting reflationary policies to reduce 
the jobless level would only create more inflation which in 
turn would spark off higher wage demands. More workers 
would, therefore, be pricing themselves out of a job, and 
the consequent rise in unemployment met again by a new
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expansion of demand by Government, This scenario of a 
viscious cycle of runaway inflation and escalating 
unemployment was widely seen as inevitable should Govern­
ment persist with its pursuit of full employment in a 
traditional way. Indeed some commentators began to
speculate that democracy in Britain was under threat as 
29a result. The widespread concern surrounding inflation
and the popular view of its causes created a climate of
hostility to wage and price increases within which
advocates of reflation and full employment could gain
little hearing. It meant that unemployment, despite
rising, was seen as the lesser of the two evils. The
last Labour Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, told his Party
Conference in 1976 that "the cosy world ....  where full
employment could be guaranteed by a stroke of the
Chancellor's pen was gone=" The cause of unemployment
was "paying ourselves more than the value of what we
produce." The option of spending "your way out of
recession ....  no longer exists, and that insofar as it
ever did exist it only worked on each occasion since the
war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the 
II30economy.
While there was a slight improvement in unemployment 
between January 1978 and September 1979, public and 
political concern remained focussed on inflation. The 
monetarist strategy upon which the Conservatives won the 
1979 General Election promised to curb inflation not 
unemployment. Indeed the new Government made no secret 
that it expected unemployment to rise in the short term. 
The Conservative's position has been that excessive wages, 
trade unions' restrictive practices, weak management and 
high public spending are the principal causes of Britain's 
poor industrial performance. However challengeable these 
assumptions, the remedy pursued has been to inject a new 
industrial discipline by exposing both sides of industry
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to market forces and to attempt substantial cuts in 
public expenditure. Inevitably, in a context of world 
economic recession coupled with the comparatively weak 
position of British manufacturing industry, the consequence 
has been massive job loss. Although it is unlikely that 
many foresaw unemployment doubling over the following 
two years, there was, initially, a strong unity among 
Conservatives that some unemployment had to be suffered 
in the interim if full employment was ever again to be 
realised on the basis of a healthy economy.
By the close of the 1970s the country had come full 
circle from the public perceptions and economic doctrines 
of the full employment decades. Inflation had overthrown 
unemployment as the principal political issue and policies 
traditionally held to be necessary to ensure full employ­
ment were now regarded as having helped create the problem 
and utterly inappropriate in the context of 'stagflation*. 
Previous employment generating measures such as large 
scale reflation of the economy and expanding consumer demand 
were abandoned in favour of monetarist policies designed to 
restrict the money supply in a bid to starve inflation 
out of the economy.
Although monetarism remains the dominant economic 
ideology within the present Conservative administration as 
it proceeds with its second term of office, the phenomenal 
rise in the jobless total since 1979 is pushing the 
pendulum of political and public concern back towards 
unemployment. The fear for democracy, associated a few 
years ago with hyper-inflation has been replaced by a 
fear of social unrest and turbulence linked largely with 
high unemployment among young people. Concern about the 
persistence of large scale long term unemployment and the 
damaging human and social consequences it brings - issues
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covered in later chapters - is also growing. More 
generally, people are increasingly asking how much longer 
unemployment can be tolerated before dramatic action is 
taken to reduce it. Indeed, demands for alternative 
policies to bring the jobless rate down are no longer 
restricted to opposition parties and the trades unions.
The Government's economic policy has been subject to 
strong criticism from some Conservative MPs who are advoca­
ting a return to more traditional policies to reduce unem­
ployment. In his book 'Britain can Work' - an attack 
upon the conventional political wisdom within his Party -
Sir Ian Gilmore begins by quoting a remark by Sir Robert
31Peel: "I see no dignity in persevering in error."
Despite these growing concerns and the limited out­
breaks of violence which have taken place in Britain's 
cities the country has probably remained much calmer 
under conditions of large scale unemployment than many 
politicians and administrators might have expected. It 
is worth giving some brief reasons - the basis for which 
will be elaborated on in later chapters - why this has 
probably been so.
One reason why people have accepted the growth of 
unemployment so docilely can be explained by the type of 
people who become unemployed. In the main they tend to be 
the weaker groups in society - the young, the old, the sick, 
the unskilled, immigrants, and so on - for whom being 
unemployed often brings increasing isolation from each 
other and other members of the community. These are 
very diverse groups of people and not those which can be 
easily mobilised into a collective political force. The 
scope for this is further undermined by the fact that most 
of the jobless find a job and leave the register - if 
only rather briefly - and may therefore, not think of 
themselves as members of the unemployed. Thus, despite
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the enormous rise in the numbers out of work, the reserve 
army of the unemployed is one which people are reluctant 
members of and is one which is constantly changing.
Another reason why public reaction to high unemploy­
ment has been so tolerant may be because those in work 
often do reasonably well. The level of real incomes for 
those who have jobs - still the great bulk of the workforce - 
have recently been rising quite strongly while unemploy­
ment has been growing too.
6. Prospects for the Future
The massive rise in the jobless total during the 
early 1980s was largely unexpected and took place over 
a very short time. For those people affected, and individ­
uals and organisations who must respond to the crisis, 
it is important to consider what future levels of 
unemployment are likely to be. Predicting future prospects 
is fraught with difficulty and depends on making a number 
of assumptions and predictions about economic policy, 
wider economic changes, the future size of the labour force, 
and so on. Several predictions have already been made by 
experts. These can vary significantly even over the short 
to medium term and can disagree fundamentally when looking 
forward over longer periods-
The projections of seven forecasting agencies were 
reported in the MSC's Manpower Review of 1982 (Fig. 3.3 ). Only 
four of these projections extended beyond the end of 1983, One 
of these, by the Liverpool Research Group in Macro-economics, 
has proved ludicrously wrong since its outset and predicted 
unenployment to fall to two million by the second quarter 
of 1984. None of the other three agencies foresaw unemploy­
ment falling much below three million over the period of 
their forecast. Since making its prediction in April l98l
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the Cambridge Economic Policy Group has proved ominously 
correct in forecasting the general trend of steadily rising 
unemployment and expects the numbers out of work to go on 
rising until late 1985 when they predict unemployment will 
total 4.2 million. Only the Warwick Institute for Employ­
ment Research forecasts further ahead than this and expects 
unemployment to fluctuate below the three million mark 
until late 1986. Much the same level of unemployment 
is projected by the Independent Treasury Economic Model 
which forecasts up to the second quarter of 1985.
Certain specific factors add to the pessimism sur­
rounding unemployment trends over the next few years. The 
size of the labour force is likely to grow, although by
what amount will depend on changes in the demographic base
and on certain qualifying factors such as the numbers of 
young people remaining in full time education, trends in 
retirement and the numbers of married women remaining in 
the labour force. The DE, after making assumptions about 
future levels of unemployment and activity rates by sex
and age, suggests that over the period 1981 to 1986 the
32national labour force will grow by 700,000. It predicts 
that the 4% growth of 16 to 24 year olds, experienced
between 1977 and 1981 will continue at the smaller rate of
3% up to 1986, with the population aged 16 to 19 peaking 
in 1982 while those aged 20 to 24 will grow until 1986.
For men, a reversal of the gentle decline in activity rates 
experienced in the 1970s was expected in 1982, although this 
was thought dependant on an improvement in the economy which 
did not materialise during that year. Activity rates for 
older men have been falling in recent years, the retirement 
rate in the 60 to 64 age group doubling to 16% between 
1975 and 1979, An even sharper fall is expected between 
1977 and 1986, activity rates predicted to decline by 18%. 
Non married women are expected to be subject to similar 
influences as those affecting men, including the trend
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towards earlier retirement and a fall in participation 
because of low labour demand. Activity rates among married 
women between the ages of 24 to 34 will decline, reflecting, 
in part, a projected increase in the birth rate. Activity 
rates among women aged 35 to 55 will increase, albeit 
slightly, and among older women, regardless of marital 
status, activity rates will fall.
The working assumption behind these labour force 
forecasts was that unemployment would peak at around 2^ 
million in 1982 and thereafter decline to around 2 million 
in 1986, This did not happen. Unemployment is currently 
much higher than expected, and, as a consequence, a lower 
rate of growth in the labour force can be expected. This 
inverse relationship between growth in the labour force 
and unemployment relates only to official unemployment. As 
was discussed earlier, high or rising unemployment can 
either cause people to withdraw from the labour market 
entirely or discourage people from registering as unemployed 
even if they are still actively seeking work, thereby 
boosting the ranks of the hidden jobless.
Even with the onset of economic revival, improvements
in enployment might be limited and delayed. The tendency
for productivity to rise and increase faster in the context
of a stronger growth in output bites into the scope for
improved enployment prospects. In the light of this, for
revival to improve enployment prospects, the recovery in
the economy would have to be substantial. Projections from
most forecasting models inply that, though the slackening
of inflation should also aid competitiveness and so help
stimulate increased output and employment, activity will
not revive sufficiently to bring a very substantial fall
33in unemployment. The potential employment effects of 
any increased demand could be diluted or negated by reduc­
tions in short-time working, the réintroduction of overtime
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and the lengthening of order books before additional rec­
ruitment was considered. Furthermore, many employment 
opportunities have been destroyed by large plant closures. 
The emergence of new opportunities would have to wait 
until this 'job vacuum* is filled by new investment and 
training programmes. Economists from the Cambridge 
Economic Policy Group, for example, concede that recent 
Government policies may bring an inprovement in the 
performance of British industry but conclude that to 
reduce unemployment even by one million over the remainder 
of the 1980s would require manufacturing industry to grow 
by around 5% a year, which is far in excess of anything 
ever achieved for longer than a year or two at a time.
The rate at which new technologies are introduced
is also dependent on overall economic performance. To
date this has been slow, and manpower reductions as a
consequence have been tiny in comparison with those induced 
35by recession. This is only to be expected. When output 
is constrained or reduced by recession the potential 
productivity and employment gains from new technology may 
not be achieved and, moreover, the incentive to invest in 
it may be lacking. The situation will probably be different 
under conditions of a sustained economic upturn when new 
technologies are more likely to be introduced to boost 
efficiency and productivity with resulting labour displace­
ment.
Prospects for the longer term are even less clear 
than those for the remainder of the decade. Settled 
conclusions on the likely effect technological change will 
have on employment are difficult to arrive at. Where, 
how quickly, and to what extent jobs will disappear and 
what the replacement rate will be are uncertain. Amongst 
other things the outcome will depend on overall economic 
fortunes, the job displacing and creating potential of new
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technologies, the rate at which technological change is 
allowed to happen and structural changes within industry 
and the workforce. The views of contemporary writers do 
not form a consensus. Both pessimistic and optimistic 
scenarios of the future are adopted, although it is generally 
recognised that the outcome will depend largely on whatever 
political-economic strategy is followed.
Many consider that contemporary developments in 
science and technology hold new and very different implic­
ations for the nature and structure of employment compared 
to the impact technological progress has had previously 
in history. The onset of micro-processor technology has 
been heralded as the 'third industrial revolution'. Some 
predict that the microchip will fundamentally alter the 
traditional manufacturing process by enabling certain 
stages within this process to be integrated into one or 
more silicone chips thus eliminating the jobs they provided. 36
A pending watershed in technical progress which will 
bring a new sort of technical change can also be envisaged 
in another way. In the past, the nature of technical advance 
in the manufacturing process can be seen as introducing 
'specific' machinery either for potentiating workers or 
for replacing particular contributions made by a worker 
in the production of a particular good. Technical change 
in the future may switch from being specific to being 
generalised. For the motorcar industry, for example, the 
spread of automation is likely to result in the growth of 
industrial robots which will be designed not to carry out 
particular tasks but rather to learn to carry out any 
task just as a human worker does. As one commentator 
concludes, this amounts to a "generalised technology for 
replacing the process worker in manufacturing production»
An employment destroying role for new technologies has been
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predicted from yet another perspective. If one accepts 
that capitalism has advanced to a stage when, under 
conditions of low or non-growth, decision makers will plan 
to use new technologies primarily to save labour costs and 
not to increase output, then productivity increases but 
output does not. Thus, so long as total demand shows no 
evidence of increasing, once long term planning of this 
kind develops, it is very difficult to alter a trend
38towards lower levels of employment in productive industry.
Those offering gloomy scenarios tend to agree that 
what has become known as full employment since the second 
world war will remain a thing of the past. If, therefore, 
capitalism is seen as shifting permantly to a different 
plane leaving massive sections of the workforce discarded 
and redundant in its wake, a major task of the future must 
be how to plan for a society with unprecedently high and 
permanent levels of unemployment. In this context it is 
attractive to see Britain as faced with two options. One 
is to go timid on technological advancement in order to 
restrain the growth of unemployment. This would probably 
mean accepting low profits, low productivity and low incomes, 
and a chronically declining position in the world economy.
The alternative, and seemingly more acceptable option, is 
to accept 'technological unemployment', high growth, high 
profits, and the maintenance of a highly competitive 
manufacturing and service base with high incomes for the 
dwindling numbers in work. Many believe that it will only 
be by embracing new technologies, incurring the resulting 
large scale unemployment, but pursuing high economic growth 
that society will be able to generate adequate wealth 
from which resources can be drawn to fund constructive 
social policies, avoid poverty and ensure that the future 
leisure society is a good place to be.
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Other commentators refute that pessimistic eirployment 
prospects and the choices they throw up are inevitable and 
claim it is alarmist to predict permanent large scale 
unemployment as a result of new technologies. They seem 
to have a good case. Japan, for example, a model country
for high technology, has the lowest unemployment rate among
.
the developed market economies. Towns in Britain with 
larger relative proportions of high technology industry, 
such as Bradford, Cambridge and Luton, have had much 
smaller proportions of their labour force becoming unemployed 
than other places. More generally, since 1979 the rate of 
introduction of new technologies in Britain has been low, 
research and development has lagged behind competing
nations and industrial training has fallen, yet unemploy-
*
ment has increased faster than in any other major OECD 
country.
Some writers feel, therefore, that Britain will even­
tually get back to full employment and that labour displaced 
as a result of industrial change will be reabsorbed into 
the productive process in other activities so long as
Government ensures that adequate demand for labour is 
39maintained.
7. Conclusions
For fully two post-war decades it was widely assumed 
that, given a commitment by central government to certain 
economic policies, full employment was the norm we could 
rely on permanently. Since the mid 1960s, however, 
growing political pressure was exerted on Government to 
give less than wholehearted commitment to maintaining full 
employment and more to solving other economic problems, 
particularly rising inflation. Higher levels of unemploy­
ment as a result were essentially seen as a temporary
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expedient necessary for the restoration of a healthy 
economy. Even with the emergence of mass unertployment since 
1979, full employment is still assumed by many to be the 
norm when the recession ends. Others, however, challenge 
this hypothesis. Some people think a more fundamental 
change is occuring in the economy which will leave large 
numbers permanently out of work and that what is happening 
cannot properly be described as a recession in a traditional 
sense at all. Although this raises an interesting question 
about the future of work, the answer is not terribly 
important for practical purposes. The evidence assembled 
about the extent of unemployment and its future prospects 
strongly suggests that large scale unemployment is unlikely 
to disappear soon. Hence, a lot of people are going to 
be effectively excluded from work for a long while whatever 
happens. To understand what unemployment means for those 
affected and for society in general, and to set the 
context for a review of recent responses to it later in 
the thesis, we must consider first the characteristics and 
consequences of high unemployment more fully. This will 
be the task of the remaining four chapters if' Aosvt section 
of the thesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHARACTERISTICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
"Two nations: between whom there is no
intercourse and no sympathy: who are as
ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts 
and feelings, as if they were dwellers 
in different zones, or inhabitants of 
different planets: who are formed by a
different breeding, are fed by a 
different food, are ordered by different 
manners, and are not governed by the 
same laws."
Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil, 1845 
book ii, chapter 5
1. Introduction
The problems associated with having unprecedented 
numbers of people out of work are widely regarded as 
national in scale. Although many people are aware of 
them, evidence from a closer examination of the 
characteristics of unemployment shows that its impact is 
highly unequal, both geographically and in the type of 
people it affects. Whereas the previous Chapter was 
about 'how much* unemployment. Chapter Four considers 
the 'where* and the 'who* of the problem. Disaggregating 
unemployment by considering in turn its different character­
istics is necessary to present a clearer picture of what 
it means in spatial and human terms-
2. Geography of Unemployment
Although unemployment is now undeniably a problem 
affecting the whole country it has not always been seen
9 2 .
as such. In the 1930s wide gulfs existed in the experience 
of different regions and the jobless from the depressed 
areas had to take to the streets to educate the nation 
of their plight. In 1936, for example, unenployment rates 
in Scotland, the North East and the North West were about 
three times the rate in London and the South East, while 
in Wales it was nearly five times the London rate. In 
the post war period inter-regional differences, although 
persisting, have been slowly diminished by a gradual 
diversification in the economies of the relatively 
depressed regions. Since 1973, all regions have been 
subject to rising unemployment and the general pattern 
has been for regional rates to move in unison. Despite 
this, there has been little change in the geographical 
incidence of unemployment. The regions of historically 
high unemployment still tend to bear the heaviest rates. 
Northern Ireland has been the worst hit of these in the 
post war era, for years experiencing jobless rates three 
to four times the national average. Rising unemployment 
has reduced this differential. Although still the worst 
hit region. Northern Ireland's jobless rates are now 
less than twice the UK average and over the first year of 
the current recession the rate of jobless growth was 
the second lowest regional rate in the UK.
Over the last decade some other notable changes 
have taken place in the geography of unemployment which 
breaks with the established pattern. The employment 
performance of the West Midlands and the North West, for 
example, have been subject to a greater relative deter­
ioration since the mid-1970s. In recent years the West 
Midlands in particular, secure for around two and a half 
post war decades on its prosperous manufacturing industries, 
has suffered massive job loss particularly in engineering. 
Between March 1979 and March 1983 employment in the region
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fell by 16% while unemployment more than trebled to 
total over 16%, (Table43). Next to the West Midlands the 
regions which have done relatively poorly over the recent 
recession have been the North, Wales and the North 
West, whose unemployment rates in March 1983 totalled 
17.5%, 16.7% and 15.8% respectively.
Regional differences in employment loss nevertheless 
still reflect the historical tendency for regions with 
traditionally lower unemployment to do relatively better 
under recession. The better off regions -- the East 
Midlands, East Anglia, South East and South West - have 
for the greater part of the recession experienced lower 
rates of unemployment growth than the national average.
In the South East and South West, for example, this can 
be partly explained by the larger share of the service 
sector in these regions, though job loss in the manufac­
turing sector has also been lower than the national average, 
The percentage decline in the South East should not, 
however, be allowed to mask the scale of that decline.
About one third of Great Britain's employment is in the 
South East and between 1979 and 1983 accounted for over 
23% of net employment decline in Great Britain (Table 4.1).
In the regions of higher unemployment the average 
time spent out of work tends to be longer than in regions 
with lower unemployment. Moreover, long term unemployment 
among men aged between 24 and 54, many of whom are likely 
to be married with dependent children, is even further 
above the average for all men in the most depressed areas. 
In Northern Ireland for example, 55% of men in this group 
had been out of work for at least six months in November 
1980.^ The particularly impoverishing effects of unemploy- 
ment on a region where jobless rates have traditionally
94,
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been high are, therefore, obscured by referring to the 
situation at any one particular time or over a short 
period. The problems created by high and prolonged 
unemployment are very different from those arising from 
high levels of unemployment of only short duration. Some 
areas of the country, particularly Northern Ireland, 
have lived with long term unemployment well before the 
current recession could work its way through and lengthen 
unemployment durations.
Two studies of the unemployed in North Shields, 
Tyneside, demonstrate how the reality of unemployment for 
many workers may be very different from what appears to 
be the case when analysing contemporary levels or durations 
of unemployment. At the time of the first survey in 
1963-64 North Shields had an unemployment rate just below 
the national average and an apparently small amount of 
prolonged unemployment. Nevertheless, when all spells 
of uneirployment had been added up, the jobless interviewed 
had still spent one quarter of the previous five years 
"signing on*. Over the following twelve years unemploy­
ment in the town rose at a faster level than the regional 
average, reaching around 15% when the second survey was 
carried out in 1975-76. The second survey found that 
over half of the men of labour force age were likely to 
have experienced some unemployment in their recent past,
while one in eight were likely to have had patterns of
2frequent, predominant or continuous unemployment. The 
two studies indicate the problems of repeated and prolonged 
uneirpl oyment in a depressed economy. Whereas less than 
one in ten of the original sanple of workers had been 
previously or continuously unemployed before they were 
interviewed the figure had risen to one in three by the 
second study.
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With high unemployment having crept to cover all 
regions of the country, a phenomenon being given increas­
ing attention is pronounced local differences in jobless 
rates, Uneirpl oyment blackspots exist within all regions. 
In the South East, the region with one of the lowest 
unemployment rates - 9.5% in October 1983, in Margate and 
Sheerness unemployment was around 20% while corresponding 
figures for Guildford, Crawley and Alton were well below 
6%. In the region of highest unemployment - Northern 
Ireland - where 21.5% were out of work in October 1983, 
unemployment ranged from slightly more than 17% in Belfast 
to over 36% in Cookstown and over 40% in Strabane. These 
wide disparities between towns and cities with the same 
region suggests that the problem of regional unemployment 
could perhaps be conceptualised as the summation of a 
number of local situations which may vary widely.
The discovery that structural imbalances can exist
at an intra-regional as well as at an inter-regional level
is not new. The 'problem of the inner cities' has been
a popular perspective and research topic for a number of
years and has been associated with the particular problems
faced by old, decaying communities in the central areas
of the large cities and conurbations. Many commentators
have pointed to the strong tendency for employment decline
to be more intense in these areas than in the wider
conurbations. To a large extent this has been the result
of an uneven distribution and movement of people and jobs.
As one commentator has pointed out,
"there is clear evidence that population and employ­
ment movements are resulting in a disproportionate 
number of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers 
living in the inner cores of the conurbations.
In 1971, for example, 23% of the economically active 
population of England and Wales was accounted for by 
unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers. In the
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"inner areas of Birmingham, Clydeside, Liverpool 
and Manchester however, the corresponding figure 
ranged between 35% and 40%."3
An important causal influence in this pattern was 
the tendency for the new and mobile industries of the 
1960s and 1970s to demand higher skills and a more favour­
able ratio of floor-space to workers than their more 
traditional counterparts. Space and skilled workers 
being crucial locational factors, sites on the periphery 
of the urban areas, where these factors have been 
relatively abundant,have been preferred to inner city 
locations. The demands and decisions of new industry 
have, therefore, served to compound the problems of the 
lower skilled and less fotunate inner area residents, 
abandoning them to localities where much of the remaining 
industry is old and possibly declining. As a consequence, 
unemployment in certain urban localities is startlingly 
high and can be masked by overall city or regional totals.
In the case of Liverpool, for example, in 1981 unemploy­
ment in one inner city planning district was 37%, in another 
31% and in one large housing estate it totalled 4 0 %.^
At this time the jobless total for the city was almost
19% and approximately I4%(s.a.) for the North West region 
as a whole.
Unemployment as a defineable geographical pattern 
also exists at a much smaller level than that of a 
district of city sector scale. Large variations also 
frequently exist within an area of this size. Map 1 shows 
male unemployment in the city of Glasgow at the 1981 
Census plotted at the scale of 500 metre squares which 
in terms of population size corresponds to a mean figure 
of 1,229 people or around 600 households. Evidently 
very high levels of unemployment of over 30% can exist
Map 4.1; Small Area Unemployment in Glasgow
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side by side with very low rates. In some instances this can 
reflect, for example, a particularly high concentration 
of unemployment in a small number of streets within a 
particular district which may itself as a whole be 
generally regarded as deprived. This exists in the east 
end of the city. In other cases it can reflect the juxta­
position of a well-to-do private sector housing area next 
to a poorer council housing estate with relatively higher 
levels of deprivation and unemployment. An example of 
this is in the north western part of the urban area where 
affluent Bearsden is located next to the peripheral 
housing estate of Drumchapel,
The severity of economic decline in the recent rece­
ssion has changed the nature and scale of unenployment 
at the local level. Although the problems faced by many 
of the older urban areas have intensified, the inner city 
scenario has become less relevant as a tool with which to 
analyse areas of economic decline. The issue is not simply 
one of a particular type of locality, such as the inner 
cities, losing out to another, like the new towns.
Indeed, in West Central Scotland over the past few years 
the rate of employment decline in the New Towns in the 
periphery of the conurbation has been higher than that 
experienced in many of the older urban areas. With unem­
ployment being less discriminating than it once was, the 
problem has spread well beyond the boundaries of the 
inner cities. Whole settlements, whether being part of 
large conurbations or relatively free-standing townships, 
have been devastated by the closure of a main local industry, 
sometimes the economic 'raison d'etre* for the settlement. 
Clydebank, Corby, Linwood and Invergordon are only a few 
in a long list of such places.
In seeking to understand the causes for employment 
decline in particular localities it is useful to consider
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the different reasons behind industrial change resulting
in job loss. Doreen Massey and Richard Meegan have
identified three distinct processes which help in this 
5respect. They a 
caused by either:
rgue that de-industrialisation can be
(a) intensification; which involves changing work 
practices to increase productivity by making 
people work harder and can represent a shift 
in industrial power away from labour and to­
wards capital;
(b) rationalisation; where actual disinvestment and 
the scrapping of industrial capacity takes 
place; and
(c) investment and technical change; where major 
changes in an industry's production techniques, 
like automation, are introduced.
The authors attribute much of the decline in manufacturing 
employment in the early 1970s to technical change as 
Britain attempted to modernise its industry and its 
productive capacity. The emphasis has since changed, 
particularly since 1979, when in the context of widespread 
recession throughout the industrial world the concern with 
modernisation and technological renewal has been replaced 
by the rationalisation of industry and an intensification 
in industrial processes. It is for these reasons, therefore, 
that large scale job loss or complete industrial closure 
have been suffered by many different types of community 
throughout the country where local industries have been 
subjected to these changes.
The geographical distribution of unemployment has 
changed markedly over the last decade. Previously unemploy-
loi
ment used to be seen as a problem of declining regions 
concentrating where declining industries were located.
In recent years, in an economy suffering from causes of 
unenployment which are more pervasive and complex than 
hitherto, unemployment is increasingly a problem of 
smaller neighbourhoods concentrating where the people 
most exposed to it are likely to live. As later chapters 
will show, the policy responses of central and local 
government have - in part - recognised these changing 
spatial and social characteristics. What began in the 
latter part of the 1970s as a policy concerned essentially 
with economic regeneration of the inner cities has 
developed into a new tradition of area based approaches 
to economic and community development. Within this, 
policies may operate in a variety of ways and at different 
spatial scales but they share the basic characteristic 
of either dealing with decline or promoting growth in a 
relatively tightly defined locality.
3. Unequal Burden
Since 1980 marked the beginning of a long period of 
steeply rising unemployment, the indignant cries of 
politicians and others critical of Government economic 
policy that the jobless situation is intolerable and 
unacceptable have been continuous and are now almost 
cliches. Over the same period, defenders of the ruling 
Conservative line on economic policy, while continuing 
to e3p>ress their deep concern for the jobless have 
maintained that unemployment is the price we must pay for 
recovery and future stability. Generally speaking, however, 
it is not politicians, trade unionists or academics who 
have to pay the price of uneirpl oyment or suffer the 
material hardship it brings. Unemployment is a burden 
which falls most unequally across society. If it was the 
case that unemployment was distributed equally across the
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whole labour force, then we might all expect to be out 
of work for 7^ weeks each year. Alternatively, an equal 
share would mean one spell of a year at regular six year 
intervals which amounts to around eight spells a lifetime 
for a man leaving school at sixteen,^ Obviously this 
does not happen. The distribution of unemployment is 
highly inequitable and recent years have demonstrated 
that around 3% of the labour force bear 70% of the weeks
7
of unemployment in any one year.
Among what groups then does unemployment fall? The 
harsh reality is that it strikes at the poorer and least 
powerful in society. As the remainder of this chapter 
will show, evidence indicates that the jobless are more 
likely to have come from low paying and insecure jobs, 
from among the disabled and the handicapped, to be the 
younger and older sections of the workforce, from ethnic 
and racial minorities and to be those with relatively 
less skills living in the more depressed areas of the 
country.
4. Characteristics of the Unemployed Flow
The results of the monthly unemployment count are 
presented to the public usually as a comparison with the 
previous month's total or with a point in time earlier 
than that. Over most of the last few years the trend in 
unemployment has been seen to be one of a rise of many 
thousands taking place in the jobless total every month. 
This form of presenting the statistics may, however, 
give the impression that the unemployed constitute an 
identifiable group in the community which expands at 
regular intervals with the addition of a certain number 
of jobless people. Such a view would be a misconception, 
caused largely by a failure to distinguish between the
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stock and flow of unemployed people. The stock of the 
unemployed refers to people who are out of work at any 
one particular point in time. Flow relates to the coming 
and going of people on and off the unemployed register.
A main reason why some may fail to make this distinction 
stems from the fact that the majority of existing 
information concerning the unemployed in Britain relates 
to the stock. The particular level of the unemployed 
stock, for example the monthly official count, is a 
consequence of how long it takes the registered jobless 
to find new employment rather than a consequence of how 
many actually lose their jobs. This can be demonstrated 
by comparing monthly rises in unemployment in two very 
different years. In 1973, the lowest unemployment year 
in the 1970s, an average of 284,000 people joined the 
register each month. In the much changed context of 1980, 
total unemployment having more than quadrupled, this figure 
had increased by only 11%, an average of 316,000 joining 
the register each month.^ What had changed significantly 
therefore, was not the number of new unemployed registrants, 
but the length of time people were spending on the 
register.
Attempts to piece together a comprehensive picture
of trends and characteristics of the unemployed flow are
frustrated by lack of empirical information. The only
regular information at hand is the monthly DE count. The
most recent figures on flow published by the DE relate to
the period 1967-70. They show that nearly half those
joining the register left it two weeks later.^ Unenployment
was much lower during these years and did not exceed 2.5%.
Nevertheless, a decade later when unemployment was more
than double this figure, evidence suggests that, perhaps
contrary to the opinion of many, the length of time it
took people to find another job was still relatively
short, the majority leaving the register after about one 
Inmonth.
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More recent published evidence on the unemployed flow
is provided by a DHSS cohort study of men registering
unemployed in late autumn 1978, when unemployment stood
at 7%, The study took a sample of the jobless inflow
and followed their experiences for a year. Generally the
earnings of the men, immediately before becoming unemployed,
were below the national average for their age group and
below the national average for their occupation. Around
half fell into the bottom fifth of the national earnings
distribution. Before they lost their jobs few of the
unemployed had earnings in the top fifth bracket and many
without earnings in the previous year had not worked
because of ill health. There was strong evidence of
"repeated unemployment*. Over half had been out of work
once in the previous year and three-quarters once in the
previous five years. Over two-fifths had been unemployed
at least twice before and one quarter at least three times.
One in eight had been off sick within the previous 
11twelve months. In respect to the duration of unemploy­
ment, although one third had found full time work within
four to five months, a half were still out of work after 
12that time. This amounts to substantially higher
durations of unemployment than seems to have been the case
under lower levels of unemployment. For those who had
found work, despite considerable changes having taken
place in the new choices of occupation, little improvements
had been achieved in pay. Nearly half returned to earnings
at the same level as they previously drew, which after
allowing for inflation meant that around one-third had
suffered a cut in the real value of their wages. This
tendency was most marked among individuals who previously
13had been low earners.
Recent longitudinal surveys of the unemployed flow 
confirm the tendency for unemployment durations to lengthen 
in recession. In 1980 it was taking around three to four
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months before half of those joining the register were 
back in work. Those becoming unemployed tended to be 
the young, the less skilled, the low paid and employees 
of small firms. One study found that, of its sample,
36% of the men registering as unemployed in May 1980 
were aged between 18 and 24 while only 15% of the male 
working population was in that age group, and that 40% 
were unskilled or semi-skilled while only 27% of the male 
population fell within these categories. One quarter 
of the men had most recently worked at establishments 
with ten or less employees with slightly over two-fifths
coming from establishments employing twenty five or
14less.
A remaining source of hard data on the unemployed 
flow is provided by several studies of people made redun­
dant, who lost their jobs through the large scale closure 
or contraction of major industries during the 1950s,
1960s and early 19 70s. Apart from being confined to 
periods when unemployment rates were much lower than 
today, there is the further problem with this information 
in that individuals affected by redundancy are not 
necessarily representative of all those becoming unemployed 
The redundant account for only a small minority of those 
becoming unemployed, even at current levels' they amount 
to only around one-third. Indeed, not all those
falling subject to redundancy actually become unemployed.
A substantial minority find new jobs before they leave 
their old and therefore never show on the official jobless 
count. Furthermore, there is a stronger tendency for 
older members of the redundant to enter unemployment 
because a greater proportion of those who find jobs without 
becoming unemployed are among younger age groups.
Despite their limitations, surveys of the redundant 
offer a useful source of information about the unemployed
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15flow. They show that large proportions of those displaced 
find other work relatively quickly, around half moving 
into new employment within two and four weeks. Priority is 
given to getting back to work as quickly as possible, 
then searching for a more suitable job, if so desired, 
from the securer position of employment. This is reflected 
in the high rate of job changing in the year following 
redundancy. A study of redundant workers in Woolwich in 
1972 showed that over one-third reported having actively 
continued their job search after becoming re-employed 
and 38% changed their jobs within a year.^^ By far the 
most dominant factor influencing post redundancy experience 
was age, this being far more significant than skill levels 
or local unemployment rates. The length of time it took 
to find a job, and the likelihood that when found it would 
be inferior in terms of skill and earnings, both rose 
with age.
It appears that the relative ease with which many of 
the redundant found new employment was won at the 
expense of other job seekers in the labour market. This 
is suggested by the fact that in areas where major redund­
ancies have taken place, the level of unemployment has 
risen for longer than might have been expected when 
considering the time spent out of work by most of the 
redundant. It seems that the redundant job seekers 
successfully skip the queue for work and, as a consequence, 
existing and more marginal job seekers in the labour 
market take longer to find jobs than they would have done.
As one researcher concludes, "the costs of major 
redundancies tend to be experienced less by those
workers directly affected and more by less favoured workers
17in the local labour market»"
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5. Characteristics of the Unemployed Stock
The most popular source of information on the 
unemployed stock is provided on a periodical basis by the 
DE; disaggregated by age, sex, duration, region, 
occupation and so on and published monthly in the Department 
of Employment Gazette. Limitations of this information 
source have already been noted in the previous chapter.
Other sources of data we can draw on include the General 
Household Survey, which from 1971 has collected information 
on unregistered unemployed job seekers, ad hoc sample 
surveys by the DE of people on the register which give some 
scope for disaggregated analysis of changing characteristics 
of the stock over time, and large independent sample surveys, 
which allow fully disaggregated analysis of durations of 
unemployment in relation to a wide range of occupational, 
demographic, psychological and economic characteristics.
(i) ^
Age emerges from all studies of the jobless as the 
most powerful influence on the experiences of the 
unemployed. Although the established tendency for younger 
and older workers to face a relatively higher risk of 
unemployment than middle age groups still holds, some 
notable changes have been taking place within this pattern. 
Between 1975 and 1978, for example, unemployment among 
older workers aged 60 years and over averaged 9.5% and 
tagged along closely behind the rates for those between 
the ages 18 and 24 which averaged 10%. In recent years 
this relationship between old and young seems to have 
diverged. Total unemployment in January 1977, near the 
peak of the previous recession, stood at 7.3%. By January 
1982 it was about 74% higher at 12,7%. Comparing percent­
age change by age group over this period, unemployment 
among 60 year olds and over had increased by 4.7%, less
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than the national rise, whereas the under IBs, the IBs 
to 19s, and the 20 to 24 age groups had experienced jobless 
rises of 9.6%, 12% and 8.7% respectively. This has not 
altered the established distribution of unemployment accord­
ing to age which continues to show a significant bulge 
in the younger and older age groups (Table 4.2).
( ii ) Youncf People
A growth in the number of young people out of work 
has been the most marked long term trend in the composition 
of the unemployed stock over the last decade. The reason 
seems to be that during economic recession young people 
are hit particularly hard. Evidence suggests that although 
changes in youth unemployment are closely linked to fluc­
tuations in overall unemployment, they move with greater 
amplitude. It has been argued that for every rise of 1% 
in the male unemployment rate the rate of increase for
males under 20 years, excluding school leavers, will be
181.7%. Although the inverse would also hold for falling 
unemployment, there has been only one brief interlude in 
the trend of rising unemployment since 1974, the conse­
quence being for rises in unemployment amongst the young 
to be disproportionately high.
It is useful to distinguish between school 
leavers who fail to find work immediately after 
leaving full time education and young adults unemployed 
between the ages of 18 and 24. Unemployment 
among school leavers is largely a consequence of 
recession, the falling number of employment opportunities 
limiting and restricting their chances of a first job. 
Unemployment among young adults is deepened by recession, 
but is also a long term trend independent of cyclical 
fluctuations. For example, changes in employment legis­
lation which, by requiring employers to pay adult wages
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Table 4.2: Estimated Unemployment Rates by age group, 
_______ 1981 and 1982 (q.6.) ___________
Age Group
Percentage Rate 
J anuary J anuary 
1981 1982
Change in Unemployment 
(Percentage Points)
Under 18 19.2 22.6 +3.5
18-19 17.2 22.9 +5.7
20-24 15.0 18.8 +3.0
25-34 9.7 12.5 +2.8
35-44 6.6 8.6 +2.0
45-54 6.2 8.0 +1.8
55-59 7.2 9.7 +2.5
60 and over 12.2 15.0 + 2.8
All Ages 10.0 12.7
Source: Adapted from MSG Annual Report 1982
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at earlier ages, have decreased the short term profit­
ability of young workers and increased the preferences 
of many employers to recruit prime age workers in prefer­
ence to younger groups. Some interpret this to mean that 
young people are pricing themselves out of jobs and 
advocate a solution to youth unemployment by lowering the 
wages paid to the young. This is very much the ideology 
of recent Government manpower policy, discussed in a later 
chapter, which has introduced schemes designed to increase 
the attractiveness of young people to employers by cutting 
the cost of their labour.
A comprehensive picture of the characteristics of
youth unemployment in the 1970s is provided by two large
scale sample surveys of the unemployed carried out during 
19that decade. The first study, published in 1974, found 
that the young had tended to work for only very short 
periods in their previous job and had given up this employ­
ment due to some aspect they did not like. In their 
previous employment a third had worked for less than 
three months and a half for less than six months. The 
young unemployed, particularly young adults, were 
generally less concerned about being jobless than any 
other age group except those nearing retirement. This was 
largely due to their personal circumstances. More often 
than not they were living in their parent's or another's 
household, free of dependents and 'breadwinner* responsi­
bilities. Despite being less concerned about their jobless 
state, they were also more fortunate than others when 
seeking new employment and found jobs more quickly than 
any other age group. There was, however, a small group 
of young adults whose experience of unemployment was 
particularly unfavourable. 13% of young men had not 
worked for over a year and 8% had been jobless for over 
two years.
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A follow up study in 1976, after having traced the 
experience of the original sample over three years of 
recession, uncovered a similar pattern of short periods 
in work, voluntary quitting, a relative lack of concern 
over being jobless, and relative ease in finding new 
jobs. A quarter of young adults had had three or more 
different jobs in the three years between interviews - 
eleven per cent had five or more - and these had freq­
uently been punctuated by periods of unemployment.
The authors suggested that
"the high numbers of young adults unemployed on 
the register was a reflection more of relatively 
short but frequent periods of unemployment rather 
than the inability of young adults to find any 
kind of work."20
A strong tendency of stabilisation in the types of jobs 
the young held was also found. These jobs tended to have 
been upgraded since the original survey and there was 
clear evidence of a return to normal types of work.
Earnings among the young had risen by more than any other 
age group. Evidence from the two studies suggested that 
young adults between 18 and 24 had fared better than any 
other age group over the period 1973-1976.
The exposure of this evidence supported commentators 
who argued that less attention should be paid to the young 
unemployed and more to adult and long term unemployed 
where suffering was more harsh. The authors concluded 
that as it was men with dependents in the middle age 
ranges who suffered most as a consequence of being out of 
work
"there was little to imply that the young adult 
unemployed warrant greater public concern or 
resources than any other section of the unemployed."21
Despite this more still seems to be being done for youngsters
although they suffer less. Why this is so probably
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reflects the fact that public concern about unemployment 
is often based on fears of being mugged, burgled, disturbed 
by riots and so on - widely felt to be perpetrated by the 
disillusioned young - rather than genuine concern for the 
hardships of the unemployed.
Evidence from the labour market in the early 1980s 
pointed to one particularly important change in the nature 
of youth unemployment. Although it still holds that 
durations of unemployment generally lengthen with age, the 
length of time spent unemployed by the under 25s 
worsened relative to any other age group. The percentage 
of young adults leaving the register within three months 
fell between April 1980 and April 1981 from 48% to 34%, 
a fall of 14% while the corresponding drop for the 25 to 44 
and over 45 age groups was 12% and 6% respectively. It 
means that long term unemployment, previously only a 
widespread problem in older groups, was spreading to the 
young. Whereas the 1976 study found only 13% of young 
adults to be out of work for more than one year, by July 
1983 26% or around 300,000 of those under 25 were in this 
category. According to the MSC late in 1982 the quickest 
growth in long term unemployment was taking place among the 
18 to 25 age group.
(iii) The Long Term Unemployed
Although the actual numbers of people becoming 
unemployed has not varied much in recent years, the stock - 
the numbers remaining out of work - has risen dramatically 
with an enormous growth taking place over the recent 
recession. During the two low unemployment decades after 
the war the number of people out of work for over a year 
ranged approximately between 20,000 and 55,000 or little 
more than one in ten of the unemployed. During that period 
a large proportion of long term unemployment was attributed
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to the personal characteristics of the jobless themselves.
A survey by the Ministry of Labour in 1964, for example,
considered that 60% of the long term unemployed would be
difficult to place in work, on personal grounds, mainly
because of their age, physical or mental condition, and
2 2that a further 10% had a poor attitude to work.
Much has changed both in the extent and nature of 
long term unemployment since. The numbers out of work for 
over twelve months have risen fairly steadily since the 
mid 1960s (Table 4.3), and by October 1980 totalled 400,000 
or one in five of the unemployed. After three years of 
recession the situation deteriorated much further.
Long term unemployment officially exceeded one million - 
corresponding to around one third of the unemployed - in 
August 1982, and by July 1983 almost 1.1 million people 
had been continuously claiming benefit as unemployed for 
over one year. Of these nearly half - 0.5 million - 
had been unemployed for over two years and 0.2 million 
for over three years (Table 4.4). Giving the current 
situation an historical comparison, long term unemployment 
today is approximately three times the average total 
unemployment experienced between 1954 and 1966.
The growth of long term unemployment among the young 
puts the problem of youth unemployment into a different 
perspective and raises a whole new set of issues. No 
longer can high official youth unemployment rates be 
dismissed largely as a phenomenon of high flows on and 
off the register with relatively short durations spent 
out of work. We are now confronted with a situation where 
the school system endows teenagers with aspirations for 
further training and employment in a society where the 
work ethic still dominates and then releases them into a 
world where real jobs are increasingly hard to find
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Table 4.3: The Duration of Unemployment - 1950 to 1980
October
Numbers Unemployed 
for over 52 weeks 
(thousands)
Percentage of 
total 
unemployed
Total 
unemployment 
(thousands)
1950* 35.9 13.1 273.9
1955* 21.9 12.1 180.9
1960* 55.3 18.9 292.2
1965 51.5 16.8 305.7
1970 101,7 17.7 574.0
1971 129.2 15.8 815.2
1972 177.6 22.0 806.8
1973 142.6 27.6 516,3
1974 127.7 20.5 622.6
1975 161.2 14.7 1,098.6
1976 264.6 20.0 1,320.9
1977 324.3 22.3 1,456.6
1978 333.1 24.4 1,364.9
1979 337.0 25.9 1,302.8
1980 378.6 19.2 1,973.0
Source: Department of Employment
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Table 4.4: Unemployment by age and duration:
_________  Great Britain July 1983_________
Thousands
Aae Group Total
of which 
over 
1 Year
of which 
over 
2 Years
of which 
over 
3 Years
Under 18 180 10
18-24 970 290 100 40
25-54 1,400 590 290 150
55 and over 350 160 90 50
All ages 2,900 1,050 490 230
SOURCE: Department of Employment
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and in which growing numbers of young people are moving 
into the ranks of the long term unemployed.
The headmaster of a Birmingham comprehensive school has
illustrated how dire the situation had become even at the start
of the recession. The local careers service had been telling his
fifth year leavers that they have four options: to stay at schooJ•
to go into further education; to look for a government training
place; or to become unemployed. Work was not even
mentioned as an option. It was thought that if even 10% of
2 3the leavers found jobs they would be lucky. Considering
the position of school leavers in the wider context of labour
force trends, prospects do not improve. It has been
estimated that one million additional jobs would be
required over the current decade to provide employment for
the extra numbers of young people who will join the 
24labour market.
As a decline in the demand for labour takes about a 
year to manifest in a steep rise in long term unemployment, a 
further worsening of the problem can be expected. The MSC 
predict that, even with some little recovery, durations of 
unemployment are likely to lengthen for a few years after 
1983, especially in regions characterised by declining 
industries. It expects that although the actual numbers of 
long term unemployed might not go much above a million 
owing to the tendency of many to withdraw from the labour 
force, they would represent nearly two-fifths of total 
unemployment during the mid-1980s.
There are a number of ways that officially recorded 
figures understate the extent of long term unenployment and, 
as a result, the hardship and suffering it brings. Official 
statistics indicate only how long somebody has been 
registered unemployed in one uninterrupted period. If a
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person becomes ill and claims sickness benefit for more 
than a few days, he will be taken off the unemployed 
register. If he becomes unemployed after that, his 
offi^i^-l duration of unemployment will commence again at 
the date when he re-registers.
The problem of being out of work for long durations is 
further concealed by the classification of long term 
unemployment. Up until around a decade ago it was generally 
accepted that long term unemployed meant being jobless for 
six months or more. Its subsequent redefinition as being 
over twelve months substantially reduced official figures and, 
possibly, political sensitivity to the issue. However, 
there is a good case for regarding six months as a more 
appropriate definition of long term unemployment. A period 
of unemployment of more than this length can no longer be 
described as seasonal or due to bad weather conditions. It 
has also been a better guide as to when resources began 
to get tight for the unemployed. It was, for example, the 
time threshold when those in receipt of earnings related 
supplement - abolished in April 1982 - dropped to a lower 
level of benefit. If the six months classification were to 
be re-adopted, in October 1983 it would have meant that over 
46% of the unemployed would have been in the long term 
category. The official extent of long term unemployment 
has been further reduced by certain changes to the 
regulations concerning unemployment benefit introduced by 
the DE in 1983. Had these changes not been made the DE 
estimated that in July of that year the official figure 
would have been some 151,000 higher at around 1.2 million.25
With the growth of long term unemployment research 
interest has turned to this group in the labour market.
118.
Work commissioned by the MSC during 1979 provides a 
comprehensive picture of the characteristics of the long 
term unemployed in that year.^^ They were predominantly 
male, well over half were married and more than a third 
had dependent children. Age was a significant factor 
with 65% being 35 years or older. Around three-quarters 
had previously been manual workers, the majority having 
held semi-skilled or unskilled jobs. Most had left school 
at the minimum leaving age and over three quarters of those 
covered had no formal qualifications whatsoever. The long 
term unemployed lived mainly in areas with high unemployment, 
the North and North West having the highest proportions. 
Previous employment before losing their job - many through 
redundancy - had been in industries which had suffered 
large cutbacks in employment and where job prospects were 
poor. A disproportionate number, for example, had come 
from construction, manufacturing and the basic industries.
A substantial proportion were in ill health, particularly 
the older workers, more than one-third had some handicap or 
illness which affected their ability to work and 13% were 
registered disabled. The majority of those surveyed had 
held stable employment in the past, their current spell of 
unemployment generally being their first. Being out of 
work was found to have adversely affected their self- 
confidence and disrupted thier relationships with family 
and friends.
Since this work was carried out, as well as more than 
trebling, long term unemployment has changed in its nature. 
The particularly high levels amongst the young and prime 
age workers is a particularly worrying phenomenon. Whereas 
in April 1979 slightly over a third of the long term 
unemployed were under 35 years old, by January 1982 the 
proportion had risen to almost half. Many of these people 
are those most likely to be married with young children.
More analytical work carried out by Michael White within
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the Policy Studies Institute in 1980 and 1981 indicated
that long term unemployment was increasingly striking at
parts of the labour force which, under better economic
conditions, could be considered secure and in many respects
27representative of the labour force as a whole. For 
example, strong evidence was found of occupational down­
grading - often into completely different types of work - 
among workers before they became unemployed. Two-thirds 
of the men sampled had been in skilled manual occupations 
before moving down into semi-skilled or unskilled work.
Further evidence of normality in the working history of 
the long term unemployed was that over two-thirds had come 
from jobs in large or medium sized firms in the private 
sector or from nationalised industries or the public 
service.
As a further corrective to dated notions that 
long term unemployment falls mainly on those with certain 
personal defects it is worth quoting Michael White's 
comments regarding some other aspects of his study:
"The findings concerning educational attainments, and 
disability and ill-health, lend only limited support 
to the notion that long term unemployment is a reflection 
of personal disadvantages, which, so to speak, impair 
the market value of individuals both in work and 
seeking work. Although there clearly are sections of 
the long term unemployed who have such disadvantages 
as a whole they do not seem to be sufficiently 
distinguished from the working population in terms of 
either education or health, to be regarded as a specially 
'low quality' group" 28
(iv) Women and Unemployment
Whereas male employment has been falling almost steadily 
since 1965, female employment has turned down steeply only 
with the onset of the current recession (Figure 4,1). This 
largely reflects the marked difference in performance 
between manufacturing and services over the past two decades
Figure 4.1:
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Employees in Employment (Male and 
Female) 1960-1981________________
(GB seasonally adjusted)
THOUSANDS
23000
22500
22000
TOTAL
21500
21000
20500
20000
14500
14000
13500
MALES
13000
12500
12000
9500
9000
FEMALES8500
8000
7500
7000
8168 7660
SOURCE: Department of Employment
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The favourable employment climate which existed in service
industries brought about a dramatic increase in female
participation rates. More than three-quarters of the
increase in new service jobs over the last twenty years
was taken up by women largely because of the explosion of
29part-time employment in that sector.
Women's employment opportunities have deteriorated 
severely in the climate of recession ardpublic expenditure 
cutbacks. The service sector, which provides around 80% 
of women's jobs, has declined since mid-1979. Expenditure 
cutbacks in the social services in particular have resulted 
in a loss of both full time and part time jobs in which 
women have been concentrated. Many jobs lost have also 
been in the low cost private sectors of clothing, footwear 
and textile industries where women have traditionally 
been concentrated.
During the 1970s it would appear that British women 
were more adversely affected by recession than men, with 
unemployment among females rising faster than among males. 
Between 19 74 and 1980, for example, whereas male unemploy­
ment roughly doubled, registered female unemployment rose 
fivefold. Since 1979 differences have been much less 
marked. Between September 1979 and September 1983 total 
unemployment among females in the UK rose from 3.9% to 9.8%
and among men from 6.3% to 15.7%. Over the four year
period this corresponded to a rise in unemployment of
approximately 245% in both sexes. The main reason why males
have been faring coirparatively much worse than in the 1970s 
is that the heaviest concentrations of job loss have been 
in manufacturing where nearly three quarters of the workers 
are men.
The inadequacy of statistics and research masks the 
extent and problem of female unemployment. Real unemploy-
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ment is certainly much higher than official figures. The 
GHS in 1979 found that almost 48% of married women and one 
quarter of non-married females who were unemployed had not 
registered as such. Assuming that a similar proportion of 
hidden unemployment persists, this would have given a 
‘real* level of unemployment among females in September 1983 
of almost 1,425,000, or 462,000 higher than the official 
figure. This, however, is probably an overestimate as 
hidden unemployment will have been reduced with all recent 
female additions to the labour force now having to pay full 
national insurance contribution and, therefore, greater 
numbers registering unemployed to qualify for benefit 
when out of work.
Prospects for the future are unlikely to improve.
Automation and the microchip are expected to eat into
women's employment. Research for the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development has exposed this
threat to women's jobs, predicting that by 1990 170,000
typing and secretarial jobs, 17% of the 1980 total, will 
30have gone. The report also provides evidence that 
automation is bringing a permanent shift in white collar 
work from the low-paid, semi-skilled jobs to more senior 
posts requiring higher educational and professional quali­
fications. At present more men than women are acquiring 
these qualifications. Furthermore, many expect the job 
creation effect due to the introduction and use of new 
technology will be minimal and contribute little to the 
replacement of employment lost. Although some will contest 
this and argue that employment will be created by new 
technology, even if these more optimistic predictions 
prove correct the new jobs may not come in the places or 
among the people affected by job loss.
These trends in female unemployment have massive 
implications for family finances when viewed within the
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context of rising unemployment generally. The earnings
of married women are becoming an increasingly crucial part
of household income, no more so than when the male is
unemployed. In 1975 it was estimated that had it not been
for the wife's earnings, four times as many families
31would have been living below the poverty line. Unemploy­
ment in the 1980s has further increased the importance of 
working wives. In many families while the male suffers 
prolonged unemployment women are the only breadwinners for 
the household. Unemployment has, therefore, placed 
traditional distinctions between women, men and employment 
under tension. Traditional roles, such as those discussed 
briefly in Chapter 2, have become increasingly blurred.
The need for a household to piece together a liveable 
income from whatever source has meant the swapping of 
traditional duties and the emergence of household work 
roles and patterns of many different combinations.
However fashionable it may be to envisage the response 
of families facing material hardship through the unemploy­
ment of the head of household as being one of clubbing 
together, sharing responsibilities and raising household 
income in new ways, in reality these practices may be less 
widespread than assumed. An important research finding 
in this respect is that in households where the male is 
unemployed and the importance of the female as the poten­
tial breadwinner therefore increased, wives are more likely 
to be unemployed than is generally the case, thus compound­
ing further the unequal burden of unemployment. In a 
DESS study of the unemployed only one third of the wives
of men sampled were actually in work compared with 56% of 
, 32wives in general.
(v) Occupational Unemployment
Unemployment has, traditionally, fallen Very unevenly
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across the occupational spectrum affecting, in particular, 
the lower skilled. The greater abundance of unskilled 
labour was a factor observed as early as 1908 by Beveridge 
when he pointed to the notorious glut of labour in the 
unskilled and unorganised occupations:
"Has there ever, in the big towns at least, been 
a time when employers could not get practically 
at a moments notice all the labour they required."33
An early occupational class analysis of unemployment 
in 1966 demonstrated that unskilled manual and personal 
service workers experienced the heaviest unemployment, 
with respective rates of 6,8% and 4.9%, Foremen and 
supervisors and professionals experienced the least - 
1.3% and 0.8% respectively.^^ These inequalities 
in the occupational distribution of unemployment 
still hold true today. The results of a DHSS study 
published in 1980, pointed to the fact that while employers, 
managers and professionals made up around 23% of the working 
population, only 8% of these groups had been out of full 
time work in the previous year. The opposite was the case 
for those in semi-skilled and unskilled manual jobs.
While accounting for around 19% of the labour force, 
about 40% of these workers had experienced unemployment 
in the previous twelve months.
Looking at the occupational distribution of the 
unemployed in the current recession there seem to be 
slight but noticeable changes in the traditional pattern 
(Table 4.5). As a percentage of total unemployed, the rates 
for general labourers and clerical workers are falling 
whereas others, particularly managerial and professional 
and craft occupations, are increasing. This is not to 
say that the lot of the lower skilled is improving, but 
the severity of the recession has clearly carried higher
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rates of unemployment into occupational categories which
have previously been relatively immune. For example, it
was disclosed in a Commons written reply that 1,418
medical doctors were registered unemployed in September
1982, compared with 1,020 a year before and 493 two years
h I 
37
36before. Six months later the Britis Medical Association
claimed the figure had risen to 2,000.
(vi) Racial Minority Unemployment
The absence from British statistics of any data on activity
rates by race creates major difficulties in analysing
differences between minority unemployment and general
unemployment. The general trend has been one of a greater
cyclical vulnerability among immigrant groups, the level
of unemployment rising but at a higher rate than that of
general unemployment under recession. Between 1973 and
1977, the rate of increase in minority unen^ployment was
almost twice as great as that for unemployment generally,
with an almost six-fold rise compared with just over a
38three-fold rise in total unemployment. Their plight 
has worsened since 1979, Over the two years up to August 
1981, unenployment more than doubled among the ethnic
minorities to 120,000 or 4.2% of all those registered
■ 39jobless.
Certain factors can be isolated which e3<plain the 
particular vulnerability of minority workers in recession 
and their relatively more serious job loss since the 
1970s. Minority groups, with the possible exception of 
those from India, are disproportionately concentrated 
in unskilled and semi-skilled manual work, occupations 
which are generally over-represented amongst the unemployed. 
In addition to this occupational effect, there may also 
be an industry effect upon minority unemployment with it
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being generally the case that they are over-represented 
in declining manufacturing industries. The age structure 
of racial minorities may also have an adverse effect on 
unemployment. The age profile of New Commonwealth born 
immigrants is a particularly youthful one, and, with the 
under 25s generally bearing relatively high unemployment, 
this contributes to the rapid increase in minority unemploy­
ment.
The regional distribution of coloured minorities is 
also relevant in explaining their disadvantage in the labour 
market. Although immigrants from the black New Common­
wealth have tended to live in regions with traditionally 
low unemployment, principally the South East and the West 
Midlands, work done using the 1971 Census data indicates 
that the particular urban localities within these regions 
in which they resided tended to be those subject to economic 
decline or low growth. Furthermore, as unemployment in 
these regions has risen disproportionately in the current 
recession the problems of unemployment among ethnic minority 
workers will have been further compounded.
These occupational, industrial, regional and
demographic factors, however, account only partly for the
disproportionate jobless rise among racial minorities. As
Brian Showier points out,
"the sheer size of the increase in unemployment since
1974 would ....  suggest that these factors cannot
provide a complete explanation, and that the exist­
ence of discriminatory practices on the labour market 
clearly makes a substantial contribution" 41
6. Conclusions
Unemployment in the 1980s is far removed from what 
existed a decade ago not only in its extent but in many
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of its other characteristics also. In the past, to those 
unaffected, it was a distant phenomenon restricted to old 
industrial areas like the Clyde and the Tyne. Even in the 
1970s when unemployment reached one million the prosperous 
South East remained relatively immune. The characteristics 
of today's unemployment are very different. The problem 
is much less discriminating than it once was. No longer is 
high unemployment confined to the peripheral areas of Britain, 
Across most of the country at least one in ten of the 
economically active are without work and in many areas the 
proportion is much higher. Likewise, the type of people 
affected has spread beyond small groups in the working 
population who, traditionally, have been typical victims 
of uneirployment. The jobs of skilled prime age workers, 
public servants, professionals and so on have also been 
disappearing which suggests that the secure sectors of the 
national workforce have been shrinking in recent years.
Although the growth of unemployment has increasingly 
affected all classes and regions it is still, nevertheless, 
concentrated heavily on the young and the old, 
the least skilled, ethnic minorities, and people in 
peripheral housing schemes. These make up a varied range 
of people who, despite their unemployment, are difficult to 
organise effectively into a distinctive movement with 
political clout. Compared with pensioners, the disabled, 
blacks, one-parent families and so on the unemployed do not 
have a long term or permanent status to give them stronger 
common interests. The prospect of a greater sustained 
loyalty to the interests of the unemployed emerging is 
further damped down by the fact that - despite the concen­
tration of high unemployment among particular groups and 
neighbourhoods - many of those out of work do get short 
term jobs from time to time. As a consequence they are less 
likely to consider themselves as members of the unemployed 
but rather as temporarily out of work for a short while 
between jobs.
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The human characteristics and geography of unemploy­
ment suggest that society is likely to become increasingly 
deeply divided both socially and at localities of often a 
very small scale. An important consequence is that public 
authorities and others responding to the needs of the 
jobless who are responsible for communities with high
and lasting unemployment will have acutely difficult tasks 
which, nevertheless, will have an important bearing on the 
future shape of British society. The resources which 
public sector responses will be able to call on will be 
severely restricted not least by the fact that, whatever 
political party is in power, large amounts of people will 
remain unproductive for some time to come. How different 
agencies operate, which is the focus of later chapters, is 
therefore a crucial question on which the fortunes of the 
disadvantaged and their communities and more generally the 
survival of a reasonably orderly and stable society may 
depend.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNITY
1. Introduction
It is frequently asserted, especially by the present 
Conservative Government and its supporters, that the current 
level of unemployment is the price the nation has to pay for 
the repair of past economic mismanagement and the stimula­
tion of future economic growth. The implication here is that 
real and tangible benefits will accrue from accepting mass 
unemployment during the interim period of recovery. However, 
before we are in a position to judge whether high unemployment 
is worth the precarious hopes invested in it, consideration 
must be given to the costs and consequences associated with 
unemployment which, as the next three chapters will show, 
reverberate through the whole community. This Chapter will 
consider primarily what the financial costs of rising unemploy­
ment are to government in Britain, both central and local, 
and also, more briefly, the costs to the wider society in 
financial terms.
2. Costs to Central Government and the
Economy___________ _______ ________ _
There are two principal components in the financial 
cost to Central Government of sustaining a particular level 
of unemployment. First, there are the various transfer 
payments and their attendant administrative costs. In 
addition to unemployment and supplementary benefit this 
expenditure can include redundancy payments where the Govern-
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ment is the employer, special employment measures, and 
additional means-tested benefits such as centrally funded 
rent and rate rebates. Second, there is the loss of revenue 
occasioned by the non-payment of income tax, national 
insurance contributions by employers and employees national 
insurance contributions, and - with the unemployed having 
less money to spend than when previously in work - reduced 
receipts from expenditure taxes such as VAT. Calculating 
this component is the more complex task and depends on making 
a number of assumptions about likely earnings levels and income 
tax and national insurance contributions of the jobless if 
they were in work in order to determine the revenue loss 
involved in unemployment.
Secondary financial costs to Central Government also 
arise from the extra pressure exerted on local authority 
services, the health service and possibly on the police 
and prison services as a result of rising unemployment.
However, perhaps the greatest cost to the community as a 
whole, and one not accounted for in the Government's own 
costings of unemployment, is the costs of lost production 
from having such a large section of the national workforce 
lying idle. As a consequence. Government revenue from 
corporation tax and debt repayments from nationalised 
industries and other sources are also reduced.
The first attempt at a complete financial costing of 
unemployment to the community appears to have been made 
by Louie Burges and Frank Field in 1977. In addition to 
social security payments and the loss of revenue, they 
included an estimate of the fall in national income 
resulting from unemployment. In the calculation of benefit 
payments to the jobless, certain assumptions were made 
about the characteristics of the unemployed. It was 
taken that all those unemployed were married with two
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children and previously in receipt of average male earnings -
an assumption which was not representative of the unemployed
as a whole and which probably served to overstate the
financial cost of benefit maintenance. Over the three
years 1974 to 1976 Burges and Field calculated that
rising unemployment resulted in a £15 billion loss in 
1
national output which amounted to about 4.8% of actual 
total GDP over the period. Adding to this figure the 
fall in tax revenue and contributions to the national 
insurance fund as well as the payment of social security 
benefits and claims on the redundancy payments fund they 
estimated the total cost to the community of running the 
economy at a significantly higher level of unemployment 
than 1974 at £20 billion^ or over 6.4% of total GDP over 
the three year period.
A comparison of total transfer costs to the unemployed 
in 1973 and 1978 is provided by Brian Showier using 
figures from the Government's Central Statistical Office. 
Although unemployment more than doubled over this period 
transfer payments to the unemployed and related expenditure 
multiplied by abput four-fold representing an increase 
in total public expenditure from 3.1% in 1973 to 5.2% in 
1978 (Table 5,1). After taking account of the presumed 
level of previous earnings of the unemployed and their 
spending patterns. Showier estimates the total tax expend­
iture cost of unemployment to the Government in 1978 at 
£5,128 million or 7.6% of the total public expenditure 
budget. He does not suggest, however, that the whole of 
this figure would have been saved directly by a return to 
full employment as some unemployment would have remained, 
but concludes that had the level of unemployment in 1978 
been halved this would have yielded public expenditure 
savings of at least £2,000 million^ - a saving amounting 
to around 1.2% of actual GDP in that year.
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Table 5. h Government Transfer Payments to the 
Unemployed and Related Costs in 1973 
and 1978
1973
£m
1978
£m
Benefits:
National insurance unemployment benefit 
Supplementary benefit(a)
160
218
667
650
Administrative costs (b)
National insurance unemployment benefit 
Supplementary benefit
32
37
76
130
Redundancy payments(c) 52 182
Employment services
Current expenditure
Subsidies
Grants
107
8
90
536
262
295
TOTAL 704 2,798
Total as a percentage of total central 
government current account expenditure: 3.1% 5.2%
(a) 31 per cent of total supplementary benefits payments,
i.e. the percentage attributable to the unemployed in 
December 1975 (see DHSS, 1978a, A Statistical Note).
(b) Estimated as 20 per cent of total national insurance 
administrative costs, and 34 per cent of supplementary 
benefit administrative costs (DHSS, 1978a, A Statistical 
Note).
(c) Calculated assuming that the government paid out net 
an equivalent amount to employer contributions to the 
Redundancy Fund.
Source: Central Statistical Office (1979), also quoted in 
Showier B. and Sinfield A. (1981), p.50
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Estimates of the financial cost of unemployment to 
the Government under the current recession have been made 
by Carl James,^ (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). During 1980-81 
when the jobless total - excluding school leavers - averaged 
1,880,000, Central Government directly paid out a total 
of £3,848 million to deal with unemployment. In addition, 
an estimated £4,095 million potential revenue was lost 
to the Government as a result of unemployment giving a 
combined total in direct expenditure and in lost revenue 
of around £8,000 million.^ Assuming that registered 
unemployment would have reached three million before the 
end of 1981, James predicted that the total cost to 
the Government as a result in the year 1981-82 would be
7
around £12,300 million. This cost to the public purse of 
£8,000 million in 1980-81 and the projected £12,000 million 
in 1981-82 amounts to around £6 per week and £9 a week 
respectively for every working person.^
Various estimates of the cost of unemployment have 
also been made from within Government circles, A House 
of Commons Library Research Note in 1979, for example, 
included an estimate of the loss of VAT and other indirect 
taxes derived from a simulation using the Treasury Model.
The resulting loss from 300,000 unemployed in indirect tax 
totalled £202 million at 1979 prices. The estimate was, 
however, felt to be subject to considerable error and an 
updating of the price basis has not been considered
9
worthwhile.
In February 1981 - registered unemployment in the UK 
having risen to 2,463,000 - the Treasury formulated an 
estimate of the combined expenditure and revenue cost of 
an increase of 100,000 in unemployment in the private 
sector. The direct cost to the Government was estimated
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Table 5.2: Government Expenditure on Unemployment
1980-81  
£ million
Unemployment benefit 1,176
Supplementary benefit 1,235
Redundancy payments 242
Special employment measures 850
Rent and rate rebates 95
Administration 250
Total cost to the government 3,848
*******************************************************
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Table 5.3: Lost Government Revenue because of
_________ Unemployment in 1980-81 (£? s million)
Registered
Unemployed
Non-registered
unemployed
Short-
time
Total
Income tax 1,465 280 130 1,875
National insurance
contributions and 1,540 245 75 1,860
surcharge
Indirect taxes 265 75 20 360
TOTAL 3,270 600 225 4,095
Source; James C. (1981) in Burges L, and Lister (eds)
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at £340 million or £3,400 per unemployed person per annum 
(Table 5 , 4 ) , This calculation considered only direct 
costs. Changes in debt interest payments, changes in 
corporation tax receipts and nationalised industries' 
surpluses and the loss of indirect tax were excluded.
Although a useful statistic, it would be incorrect - 
for a number of reasons - to assume that by 'grossing up* 
the above Treasury estimate a true assessment of the total 
cost of unemployment at that time could be reached. First, 
the estimate is restricted to private sector unemployment 
only. Second, the characteristics of the unemployed flow 
upon which the calculation is based differ from the 'stock* 
of those currently out of work. Third, the calculation 
refers only to the first year cost. In the past, because 
benefit levels tended to fall for the longer term unemployed, 
costs in subsequent years have been less - the unemployed 
having to pay the difference. Fourth, the nature of 
unemployment in the future may be different from that in 
the past. It may, for example, include more people from 
the public sector.
Whereas early in 1981 each additional 100,000 unemployed 
was costing the Government an estimated £340 million per 
annum, the reciprocal that the Government could have 
employed 100,000 jobless at that cost does not hold. In 
a House of Commons debate in February 1981 the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer was asked to detail the additional net 
costs which would be incurred if the Government employed 
unemployed individuals at the same level of earnings as 
the average £3,400 Exchequer cost per unemployed person.
The reply was that the additional net cost would include 
the administrative, supervisory and material costs involved 
in any public sector employment programme, and the employers* 
national insurance contributions and surcharge. Based on 
similar assumptions about the unemployed as in the original
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Table 5,4: Direct Exchequer Costs of an Increase of 
100,000 in Registered Unemployment 
(Excluding School Leaver^ in 1980-81
At 1980-81 outturn prices
Exchequer costs 
for 1980-81 
(£m)
Current Receipts
Income Tax (1) 115
National Insurance Contributions (2) 75
National Insurance Surcharge 15
Total Current Receipts 205
Current Expenditure (3)
National Insurance Benefits (including
earnings related supplement) 65
Other Social Security Benefits 55
Rent and Rate Rebates 5
Administrative Costs 10
Total Current Expenditure 135
EXCHEQUER COST 340
(1) The fall in income tax is assumed to be 23 per cent of 
the fall in wages and salaries. A six-week accruals 
lag has been allowed for.
(2) Employee and employer contributions, including payments 
to the National Health Service, Redundancy, and 
Maternity Pay Funds. The fall in accruals of national 
insurance contributions before allowing for employees 
who would be contracted out is £lOQ million at unchanged 
contribution rates. The estimate given here allows for 
an accruals adjustment and assumes that 30 per cent of 
the employees would have been contracted out of the 
state pension scheme.
(3) Totals are the rounded sum of unrounded components.
Source: Treasury Economic Progress Report, February 1981.
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11Treasury estimate the net cost was given at £2,500. 
According to the Government, therefore, the total cost of 
employing an unemployed individual and paying him £3,400 
would have been £5,900, or 42% higher than the cost of 
keeping him unemployed. This, however, takes no account 
of the value to the community of whatever the previously 
unemployed workers could produce.
The annual cost of maintaining each unemployed person
has risen since the above Treasury estimate. Late in 1981,
for example, the MSG calculated the average cost per person
at £4,400 while the Institute of Fiscal Studies put the
figure slightly higher at £4,500. In February 1982,
Treasury and Department of Enployment officials in an
unpublished report to the Prime Minister estimated that each
additional person unemployed cost the government £5,000
12per annum or £96 per week. This report appears to be an 
update of the Treasury's February 1981 report, and reputedly 
shows that each extra 100,000 unemployed in 1981-82 would 
cost the Government £500 million; an increase of 50% on 
the estimate for the previous year. The Times claimed that 
publication of this report was suppressed by Ministers from 
the Treasury and the Department of Employment. Later in 
the same year, however, the estimate was endorsed by the 
All-Party Select Committee to the House of Lords who also 
concluded that the annual cost of unemployment to the 
Exchequer in lost taxes and the payment of supplementary 
benefit was indeed around £5,000 per person or more than
I3£15 billion in total - nearly half as much again as the 
£10.5 billion public sector borrowing requirement for
1981-82.
Another and more detailed breakdown on the cost of
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maintaining each unemployed individual is provided by 
the answer to another Parliamentary question. In November 
1980 Lord Kilmarnock asked the Government to estimate 
under a number of expenditure and revenue items the 
average monthly cost to the Exchequer when an adult male 
worker on average weekly earnings becomes unemployed, 
showing this separately for (a) single men, and (b) for 
a married man with two children, one aged under 5 and the 
other between 5 and 10. The total cost in the twelve 
months December 1979 to November 1980 was £6,006 for the 
married man and £5,236 for the single man (Table 5,5) - 
figures substantially above the average estimate ira de 
at around that time by the Treasury. They indicate that 
the cost of each unemployed person can be subject to 
wide variation, being markedly higher for people who 
have dependent children.
As variations will also exist among people from 
different income backgrounds the financial burden of 
unemployment may be intensifying beyond that which we 
might expect when considering only total rises in the 
numbers out of work. It may be the case that more and 
more people are becoming jobless who in the past would 
have been considered to be in secure jobs and relatively 
immune from unemployment. As these groups probably 
enjoyed higher wages and paid higher taxes than groups 
more used to unemployment then the average cost of 
unemployment is probably rising as a result.
143
Table 5.5: The Micro Cost of Unemployment
Married man with Single man 
two children on on average
Loss of Revenue average wage wage
Income Tax 1,328 1,547
Indirect Tax 400 531
Employee NI Contributions 434 434
Employer's NI Contributions 887 887
TOTAL REVENUE LOSS 3,049 3,399
Cost of Benefits
Plate Rate Unemployment Benefit 1,734 960
Other Benefits* 1,223 1,336
TOTAL COST OF BENEFITS 2,957 1,837
TOTAL FINANCIAL COST 6,006 5,236
*Earnings related supplement**, 
income tax rebate, rent rebate 
meals, free welfare milk.
supplementary benefits,
, rate rebate, free school
Source: House of Lords Hansard, November 12 1980
,U '
Written answer to Lord Kilmarnock Col 1454
"I-
**since abolished
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Perhaps a more tangible impression of the scale of the 
cost of unemployment can be gotten by comparing it with 
other significant items of revenue and expenditure. In 
1980-81, for example, it was estimated that in the payments 
of benefits to the unemployed and in lost taxes and insurance 
contributions the cost to the Government was around three 
times the combined losses of British Steel, British Ship­
builders and British Leyland, or about three times the
15entire borrowing limits of all the nationalised industries.
In 1983 it has been argued that the cost of unemployment 
since the Conservatives took office far exceeded the total 
revenues Britain had earned from North Sea Oil^^ and that 
the expenditure and lost revenue surrounding unemployment 
would more than 
Health Service.
cover the entire costs of the National 
17
3. Costs to Local Government - some evidence 
from Strathclyde__________ _______________
Assessing the financial consequences of unemployment 
for local goyernment is a more difficult task than that 
for central government. Departments operate within fixed 
budgets and the impact of unemployment is reflected, in 
addition to financial costs and losses, in different 
priorities for work or in reduced services in other spheres 
Rising unemployment has direct financial consequences, 
for example in additional costs to social work departments, 
a loss of rate income caused by industrial closures, and a 
loss of revenue from public transport services caused by 
declining patronage. The iirpact is also felt in less 
quantifyable areas such as a deskilling of the workforce, 
falling standards in health, the fear of social disorder 
and the spread of drug addiction, resulting in increased 
policing.
Strathclyde Regional Council has attempted to assess 
the costs and impacts of unenployment and cover - quite
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comprehensively - a wide range of financial consequences
resulting from unemployment in a Region with particularly
high numbers out of work . I n d u s t r i a l  decline has hit the
authority particularly hard through the direct loss of rate
income from industrial premises and the income acquired
through annually metered industrial water usage. By 1981
the recent closure of twenty eight firms meant that the
combined financial loss from both these factors totalled
19around £3,000 million. Not included among these firms, the 
closure of the Talbot factory in Linwood alone cost the 
authority £1,141,162 a year in lost rates and water income. 
Some companies which go into liquidation hold local authority 
contracts and when they close the authority may be forced 
to incur additional costs by employing other contractors 
to complete the work. Between 1975 and 1981 seventy companies 
in receipt of contracts of over £5,000 went into liquidation. 
One of these - a building contractor - left the Regional 
Council with 13 outstanding contracts, the Council having
to incur an additional cost of £370,000 to complete the, 20 work.
In addition to direct costs like those above, industrial
decline also brings about a general deskilling of an
area's workforce. Again in Strathclyde, between December
1978 and December 1980 the proportionately largest increase
in unemployment took place among 'craftsmen and other skilled
occupations* with a 104% rise in the numbers out of work 
21in this group. Industrial training also suffers,
through a reduction in the number of people taking day
release courses in further education and a decline in the
apprenticeship opportunities open to young people. In
Clydebank, for example, over 1979 and 1980 apprenticeships
available in the engineering and construction trades declined
o o
by over 83% and in Lanark they fell by about 50%.
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Rising unemployment exerts an increasing demand on
social services deployed by a Local Authority, certain
of these being provided or increased only at the expense
of other types of service delivery. In Strathclyde the
Regional Council claim that pressures on the family arising
from unemployment have directed social work priorities
towards statutory work for children and families at the
expense of other client groups such as the elderly and the
mentally handicapped. Recent research in the Region
points to a variety of complex social and financial
consequences. Of all children of two parent families
subject to child abuse, 54% have an unemployed father. Of
all children received into care, 70% are from families where
the head of household is unemployed- The total estimated
cost of this service in 1981-82 was almost £15.5 million.
Social Work Area Teams feel that rising unemployment is
directly affecting the nature of their workload. The
incidence of families in financial difficulties, for
example with fuel and rent arrears, is growing. Marital
instability and family violence are on the increase. The
pressure of court and childrens' panel reports has been
sustained and youth unemployment and truancy are considered
particularly responsible. Drink related problems are on
the increase and the payment of benefits on a fortnightly
basis is felt to be having serious consequences for
managing the household income in families where drink is 
23a problem.
Financial consequences of unemployment are also felt 
in a local authority's Education service. The number of 
free school meals provided by Strathclyde Region to children 
of low income families or those in receipt of Family 
Incomes Supplement or Supplementary Benefit, for example, 
rose ten percentage points between 1977 and 1980 to total 
41% of all school meals. The total cost of this service 
in 1980-81 was over £10 million. An additional financial
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burden stems from the responsibility placed on Education 
authorities to ensure that children are suitably clothed 
to take advantage of the educational opportunities 
provided. Strathclyde Region estimated that over the 
financial year 1981-82 total expenditure - including the 
additional administration costs - of providing free school 
clothing and footwear was between £2 million and £2.5 
million.
The fall in incomes consequent on unemployment has 
also increased the amount spent on bursaries to schools 
and further education colleges in Strathclyde which the 
authority determine on the basis of the applicant's 
parental income. Over the five years preceeding 1980-81 
expenditure on bursaries rose by approximately £4 million 
to £5.5 million. Many young people do not continue in 
formal education beyond the minimum leaving age but join 
the labour market in the often vain hope of finding work. 
The increasing numbers of young people jobless in recent 
years has exerted great pressures on the Careers Service 
which, in Strathclyde, in addition to providing informa­
tion on employment and training opportunities, has taken 
an active role in co-ordinating the provision of the 
growing number of opportunities for unemployed young 
people under the MSG. The authority also sponsors a 
number of Training Workshops and meets certain costs - 
such as transport and tooling - and underwrites financial 
losses for which over £75,000 was budgeted in 1980-81.^^
High unemployment can also be an important factor in 
the declining usage of public transport - the loss of jobs 
directly reducing the number of work trips made and the 
drop in household income reducing the number of trips made 
by other members of the family. Strathclyde Region 
recorded in 1981 that the annual patronage of its public 
transport services was falling by 20 million trips a year, 
which amounted to around a £5 million loss in revenue. The
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authority recognised that other factors such as car 
ownership and pricing policy were important in a more 
systematic consideration of changes in patronage but, 
nevertheless, felt that high unemployment had been a 
major factor in the loss of revenue.
It is generally accepted that social and environmental 
problems in a locality are associated - in part - with 
unemployment, and that where these problems are exacerbated 
an increased demand on police and security services will 
arise. The financial consequences of rising unemployment 
for policing are, however, difficult to quantify. Neverthe­
less, evidence suggests that it is more arduous and 
expensive for regional authorities to police communities, 
especially in urban areas, where unemployment is a serious 
problem. In Strathclyde, for example, unemployment is 
one of a number of factors which cause deprivation, and 
deprivation is itself seen to be associated with juvenile
delinquency and certain categories of crime such as
27theft, assault and vandalism,
4. Conclusions
The financial cost of unemployment to the state has 
risen dramatically in recent years along with the growth 
in the jobless total. The total cost to the community is 
difficult to determine precisely and estimates vary, largely 
because they depend on which factors are taken into account 
and the assumptions which are made about what the jobless 
would earn were they in work. What cannot be disputed, 
however, is that rising unemployment is a massive waste of 
the productive resources of the country and exerts intense 
financial pressure on the central Exchequer and, more 
locally, on the work and resources of local authorities - 
particularly those whose responsibility covers areas of
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acute industrial decline and high unenployment.
An inportant political and financial consequence of 
the huge increase in the costs of supporting the unemployed 
means that money for new programmes of other kinds for 
helping the jobless will probably be scarce unless it can 
be convincingly shown that this expenditure will reduce 
unemployment significantly while, at the same time, be 
cost effective in some politically acceptable sense. In 
this respect it is not only the current cost of keeping 
people out of work but the nature of current unemployment 
which is inportant. Assuming, for example, that high 
unemployment is going to continue for some time and that a 
large section of the national workforce will be excluded 
from normal employment - as the long term unemployed 
currently are - then it seems reasonable to regard the cost 
to the Government in unemployment maintenance and lost 
taxes and insurance contributions as a likely fixed drain 
on central funds for a considerable period ahead. There 
may, therefore, be a good case to include at least a large 
part of the £5,000 or so which reputable sources estimate 
it costs the state for each unemployed person as a saving 
to the public purse when considering programmes which help 
the unemployed, and in particular the more disadvantaged, 
return to socially useful and productive economic activity. 
I will elaborate on this point in a later chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
FINANCIAL COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT TO 
THE JOBLESS
"The unemployed are the innocent casualties of 
the battle against inflation, and the least 
well-off people in the country are having to 
bear the brunt of the Government's policies. 
Yet nothing is being done to ease their lot; 
rather the reverse."
Sir Ian Gilmore 
'Britain Can Work'
1. Introduction
The financial costs of unemployment are not 
confined to the Government and the wider economy. The 
loss of paid employment and the subsequent reliance on 
the state for support generally brings a substantial! fall 
in the incomes of the unemployed and their families.
This Chapter examines to what extent the unemployed them­
selves are affected in financial terms. It begins by 
looking at how the social security system and recent 
Government policy have coped with the pressures of rising 
unemployment. What it means in material terms to be 
unemployed is then considered with particular reference 
made to the assumptions upon which Governments' treatment 
of the unemployed is based. The final section discusses 
the relationship between unemployment and poverty, not only 
in terms of the living standards of the jobless, but how 
these compare with other employed groups on low incomes, 
with some brief concluding comments on what consequences 
this may hold for anti-poverty strategies.
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2. The Social Security System and the Jobless
In recent years perhaps the most striking feature of 
the state's maintenance of its unemployed members has been 
the failure of National Insurance to operate as its original 
legislation intended - as the principal pillar of security 
for those out of work, providing adequate financial support 
without recourse to means tested benefits. In reality 
unemployment insurance benefit (UIB) is not the main 
income for most of the unemployed. Large numbers of the 
jobless rely, in whole or part, on means tested supplementary 
benefit (SB) for their income. At the end of 1980, for 
example, of all the unemployed less than half were 
receiving any UIB, over a third were totally dependent 
on SB and just over 15% were not receiving any benefit 
at all.^
As the Social Security Advisory Committee have 
reported, rising unemployment between 1979-80 and 1982-83 
has meant not only a rapid increase in the share of 
social security resources going to unemployed people but 
an intensification of the dependency of the unemployed on 
SB. Between February 1981 and Novermber 1982, for example,
the proportion of unemployed people wholly or partly
2dependent on SB rose from 44% to 59%. This drift from 
national insurance to means tested assistance for the 
unemployed is not merely a phenomenon of the current 
recession but has been evident for well over a decade 
prior to it. In 1966 - the year SB replaced National 
Assistance - less than three out of every ten people 
jobless were receiving this payment. By May 1979, however, 
over half of the males registered unemployed received SB, 
a sixth of these in addition to their UIB.^
A principal reason why the system of national 
insurance fails to cover the majority of those out of work
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is that after one year of unemployment the jobless exhaust 
their entitlement to benefit - a particularly frequent 
occurrence in the context of rising long-term unemployment.
The exhaustion of UIB need not, however, occur only after 
one long continuous spell of unemployment. A complex process 
of linking-up separate spells means that if one spell is 
followed by another within six weeks then these periods are 
linked. As a result many of the unemployed find that they 
have exhausted the year's benefit well before their current 
spell reaches twelve months - a problem particularly common 
among people subject to repeated unemployment. Failure to 
qualify for UIB can also arise because of a person's previous 
employment record. Some of the unemployed, for example young 
people who have never worked since leaving school, are 
disqualified on the grounds that they have not paid sufficient 
national insurance contributions when in work to entitle 
them to UIB.
The levels of social security benefits - reviewed annually 
by Government - represent the actual incomes of most of the 
unemployed, (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). In November 1983 it was 
announced that for the year 1983-84 a single person and a 
married couple would receive £27.05 and £43.75 respectively 
in UIB. With the corresponding SB rates set slightly lower 
at £26.80 and £43.50. Families with children, however, 
receive significantly less in UIB than they do under SB.
For example, a married couple with two dependent children, 
one aged five the other ten, would receive £11.30 less in 
UIB than on SB in 1983-84. This shortfall between the two 
types of benefit exposes a major inadequacy of UIB and yet 
another reason why national insurance fails to adequately 
provide for the unemployed. Under UIB children's allowances 
are not as generous as they are for SB and as a result many 
unemployed families have to take recourse to means tested 
SB benefit to supplement their income.
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Table 6.1: National Insurance Unenployment Benefit Levels 
From 21st November 1983 ______________________
£ Weekly Rate
Single Person 27.05
Married Couple 43.75
Child 0.15
*Child Benefit 6.50
Paid whether employed or unemployed
*********************
Table 6.2: Supplementary Benefit Rate Scales 
________  From 21st November 1983__________
£ Long Term Weekly 
£ Weekly Rate__________ Rate________
Husband and Wife 43.50 54.55
Single Householder 26.80 34,10
Any other Person Aged;
18+ 21.45
16-17 16.50
11-15 13.70
0-10 9.15
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In addition to social security benefits, some of the
jobless receive redundancy payments, though these are perhaps
better regarded not as maintenance in unemployment but as a
once and for all compensatory payment for losing one's
previous job. The actual numbers receiving redundancy
and the level of payments made have been prone to exaggeration,
In 1974 it was reported that only 7% of the unemployed had
4received any redundancy payment under the Act. It is 
likely that the proportion will have declined further, as 
many losing their jobs will not have served the two years in 
continuous employment necessary for qualification under the 
Government * s scheme.
Significant changes have taken place in the scale and 
type of welfare benefits available since the Conservatives 
took office in 1979, In November 1980, although all benefits 
were increased, the real value of unemployment and sickness 
benefit was cut, going up by around 5% less than the rate 
of inflation and behind SB's. The cuts were presented by 
the Government as interim measures in lieu of taxing UIB, 
but it meant that the historical link between national 
insurance and prices had been severed. Child support for 
families on UIB was also increased by less than the inflation 
rate - and has been cut further in subsequent upratings - and 
the real value of Earnings Related Supplement (ERS) was 
reduced in anticipation of its complete abolition in 1982.
These cuts in the real value of short term benefits 
inevitably meant reductions in the incomes of the unemployed. 
During 1981-82 a single person was receiving £l a week less 
in UIB than he would have done had benefits been upgraded 
according to the same criteria as in previous years. The 
corresponding shortfall in income for a married couple was 
£1.65 and for those with children £1.20 a week per child.
It meant that a family with two children was losing £4.05 
each week or £210.60 in the year.^ Calculating what the
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November 1982 benefit uprates meant to the jobless, the 
Child Poverty Action Group estimated that had no cuts been 
made in benefit levels since 1979 a married couple with two 
children would have been receiving £288.60 more in UIB over 
the year 1982-83.
The abolition of ERS (1980-82) brought a further income 
loss for the unemployed and destroyed the only innovation 
designed to lift the great majority of the unemployed off 
means tested benefits. Around 445,000 jobless claimants 
were receiving ERS in November 1980 of which the average 
weekly payment was around £8.80 and the maximum possible 
£17.67.^ The loss of this payment, therefore, amounted to 
a considerable drop in income for those groups among the 
unemployed who had come to expect receipt of this benefit 
during their first six months of unemployment.
Some of the cuts in social security benefits introduced 
by the Conservatives have since been restored. Although 
coming some time after the taxing of UIB in the normal way - 
introduced in July 1982 - the 5% abatement of UIB made in 
1980 was restored in November 1983. Nevertheless, the 
overall effect of recent social security policy in a context 
of rising levels and durations of unenployment has been to 
reverse the historical longer term aim of social legislation 
of floating people off means tested benefits by giving 
them higher insurance payments. As a result of the November 
1980 changes in short term benefits and invalidity pensions, 
the Government calculated that 30,000 people would be pushed 
onto supplementary benefit, with a further 100,000 following
7
when the abolition of ERS was corrplete in 1982. And the 
Raynor team, scrutinising the payment of benefits to the 
unemployed, estimated that once the new policy changes had 
become fully effective, around 66% of all unemployed claimants
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would be receiving supplementary allowances.^ At the
same time the value of unemployment benefits has fallen.
From November 1983, for example, a married man with two
children, drawing unemployment benefit, will lose £3.40 per
week in addition to any Earnings Related Supplement to which
he would have been entitled, as a result of benefit cuts
9implemented since 1980.
Problems concerning incomes for the unemployed are
further complicated by the failure of many to claim the SB
to which they are entitled. Not all those excluded from U3B
can claim SB. Some may be disentitled, for example, because
their savings or redundancy payments exceed £2,000, they
have working wives or are married women. Nevertheless, the
non take-up of SB is substantial. In 1977 around 20% of
the unemployed entitled to SB failed to exercise their
statutory right to it, the average amount going unclaimed 
Inbeing £10.10 Between then and 1981 it has been officially 
reported that further reductions in the take-up of SB have 
taken place although the extent of these may not be very
4-  11gre at.
Failure to claim means that huge amounts of SB are lost
each year. In 1983 the figure estimated was £500 million
although not all of this is accounted for by the unemployed.
However, despite this loss of valuable income for the jobless,
the Government have possibly been more concerned to clamp
down on social security fraud than encourage the take-up of
unclaimed benefits. In June 1981 the Social Services
Secretary boasted that £40 million - more than half of which
came in unemployment benefit - had been saved through the
12Government's campaign against welfare fraud. No such 
similar boasts seem to have been made in respect of the uptake 
of social security benefits although the amounts being saved 
by the avoidance of fraud are small in comparison to those 
lost to the poor in unclaimed SB - much of which could
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probably be realised in increased incomes if more committed 
efforts were made in that direction. Strathclyde Social Work 
Services estimate that their welfare rights officers, if 
they devote their whole time to individual welfare rights 
work, each secure £150,000 extra income from all sources ~
SB, UIB, Housing Benefit and so on - for those whom they
, . 13advise.
The unemployed are further discriminated against by 
being denied the long term rate of SB which is paid to those 
under retirement age who have been living on SB for over one 
year. The long term rate is for adults slightly over 25%
higher than the normal rate and in 1983-84 amounts to £11.05
more a week for a married couple and £7.30 more a week for
a single person. The mass of the long term unemployed - 
except males over 60 years provided they cease to register - 
never receive this long term rate no matter how long they 
have been out of work or in receipt of benefit. According 
to the SBC, in November 1980 about 190,000 claimants who 
should have had the long term rate of SB if unemployed people 
had been treated the same as the sick and disabled were being 
denied this payment. To end this discrimination and allow 
the unemployed to claim the higher rate of SB would have 
cost around £135 million in 1981-82^^ - less than half of 
one per cent of the total £29,500 million spent on social secur­
ity in that year. Overcoming this inequity affecting the long 
term unemployed was given high priority by the former SBC who 
pointed out that "such people have no chance of securing 
work while uneirployment remains at its present level, and it 
is unjust to deny them the increase in benefit all others
get."^5
A strong emphasis behind recent social security policy 
has been to economise on public expenditure. Obvious financial 
benefits have accrued to the Government as a result. Not 
only have indirect savings been made through the refusal
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to extend the long term SB rate to all the long term 
unemployed and the absence of stronger campaigns to 
encourage the take-up of benefits, but direct savings 
have also been made at the expense of the incomes of the 
unemployed and social security claimants in general. Late 
in 1982 it was argued that due to the erosion of all 
social security benefits the Government was paying around 
£2 billion less than they would have done had the real
1 f\
value of benefits been maintained since they took office.
3. Incomes In and Out of Work
In its provisions to maintain the unemployed a further 
motive of the Conservative Government's approach has been 
to restore work incentives and encourage unemployed people 
to make greater and more determined efforts to find work 
by reducing the attractiveness of unemployment. This notion 
embodies a particular theoretical view of the cause of 
unertployment. It sees a significant proportion of it as 
a consequence of over-generous welfare benefits in comparison 
with wages which thereby reduces the incentive to work. 
Whereas this may be an understandable position at a time 
of full employment its perpetuation when there is an 
absolute shortage of jobs demands a re-examination of the 
validity of the assumptions upon which it is based.
Exairples of unemployed people and their families 
being financially better off on the dole than in work have 
often been cited by the media and Parliament. These, 
however, tend to be based on individual and unrepresentative 
examples which may be interesting but are no substitute 
for hard facts about the difference in incomes in and out 
of work. A large amount of evidence has been collected 
which overwhelmingly shows that people suffer a substantial 
drop in income when they become unemployed, the proportion 
who get more money in benefit than in wages being very 
small.
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A popular method of comparing the difference between
incomes in and out of work is by the use of 'family income
replacement ratios' which express the total of all sources
of regular family income while out of work as a proportion
of total income prior to unenployment. From November 1977
data it has been estimated that - even during the earlier
period of unenployment when ratios tended to be higher -
at the most 2% of men headed households with potential
17replacement ratios of above 100%, Those who do have
high replacement ratios are a small group and tend to be
people with large families living on SB whose previous
earnings were low. A DHSS sample study found that only 6%
of men received benefits while unemployed that exceeded
their net earnings, two-thirds had dependent children
and half had previous earnings in the bottom tenth of the
earnings distribution. A substantial proportion were much
worse off since they had become unemployed - for around a
third of the men total family incomes were less than half
l8that received when previously in work.
Not only do the vast majority of the unemployed receive 
weekly benefits much lower than their previous earnings, 
these benefits also tend to be much lower than the future 
level of earnings the unemployed probably expect to receive 
if they found a new job. Surveys of the unemployed have 
found people to be fairly flexible about the level of
19wages they would be prepared to accept on return to work. 
Although, not surprisingly, there is a widespread reluctance 
to take a job which would pay the same or only slightly more 
than the level of social security benefits they received, 
there is little evidence to support the case that unreal- 
istically high wages are being sought or that employment 
opportunities are being turned down because of unacceptably 
low pay. Work by the DHSS estimated that at least half the 
unemployed covered by its study were willing to go to work 
despite a drop in their real pay and that of those who had
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found jobs many were receiving wages that - after allowing
for inflation - were lower than those enjoyed prior to 
20unenployment.
There is, however, another way of looking at the so- 
called incentive problem. Although only a few people get 
more out of work than in work, many do not get much more 
in work either. Indeed, as the tax threshold has, in 
real terms, fallen over the past generation, the incomes 
of the working poor have been brought closer to those of 
the unemployed. Therefore instead of attributing the 
problem - as is often done - to high benefit levels, it 
could equally justifiably be attributed to low earnings 
and high income tax rates on the poor. This perhaps makes 
it more of a Treasury problem than a DHSS one.
For most of the unemployed then, there is a clear 
economic incentive to return to work. The financial 
reward, however, is not the only attraction. There are 
many other incentives to work such as to escape the stigma 
attached to being unemployed and to return to the comrade­
ship of fellow workers. Money benefits can also come in 
other ways apart from wages. The employed often participate 
in pension schemes and enjoy fringe benefits like lunch 
vouchers and other perks. It may also be the case that 
people in work are involved to a greater extent in the black 
economy than the unemployed, although firm evidence of this 
is still to emerge. This may surprise some but perhaps: 
it should be expected given that unemployed people tend to 
become socially isolated and participate less in their 
community. They have less money to buy the materials 
with which to operate in the informal economy - like those 
needed to decorate homes, repair cars and so on - and they 
lose contact with the people - those in work - who are more 
likely to demand and be able to pay for these services.
These various attractions of work can be powerful influences
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and are often neglected by defenders of the unemployed who 
have been driven to adopt an increasingly defensive posture 
as they have tried to reject and discredit opponents* 
assertions about work incentives thereby, in effect, 
reinforcing the significance of financial comparisons and 
disregarding many other important incentives to work.
The significant reduction in incomes arising from 
unemployment and the fact that many of the jobless are 
eager to return to work even in return for significantly 
lower wages than they received in the past, undermine the 
theoretical assumptions of recent welfare policy. The 
Government's position is that benefit levels are a disin­
centive to work. Evidence, however, proves this is not 
true in general terms. Even in the few cases where it 
may be so those affected are workers with children and 
who were previously on low pay. Hence, to increase 
‘incentives* among this group, cuts would have to be made 
in benefits for families with children. Yet - as evidence 
below suggests - it is precisely these families which have 
the hardest time as benefits for children are set lower in 
relation to their needs than benefits for adults.
Despite this evidence, the Government has responded - 
as it did in the early 1930s - by treating the incomes of 
the jobless as an economisable item and have begun to 
dismantle many of the concepts upon which the post-war 
welfare state was founded. The link between benefits and 
rising incomes has been broken and benefit scales, set 
against average earnings, are now lower than the level of 
National Assistance rates in 1948. The remainder of this 
Chapter will now consider what being unemployed means for 
the standard of living of those out of work and whether they 
are a distinctive group in this respect from other workers 
on low incomes.
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4. Unemployment and Poverty
The inter-war depression threw up massive sections of
the community in manifest squalor and deprivation, with
many on the brink of starvation. However, because identical
suffering does not exist on the same scale today, it would
be wrong to assume that the problem of poverty has been
solved. The nature of poverty in the 1980s is complex and
to the SBC - whose definition is frequently cited - it
denotes *a standard of living so low that it excludes and
21isolates people from the rest of the community.* To 
avoid poverty the SBC argued that
"people must have an income which enables them to 
participate in the life of the community. They must 
be able, for example, to keep themselves reasonably 
fed, and well enough dressed to maintain their self 
respect and to attend interviews for jobs with 
confidence. Their homes must be reasonably warm; 
their children should not feel ashamed by the quality 
of their clothing; the family must be able to 
visit relatives, and give them something on their 
birthdays and at Christmas time; they must be able 
to read newspapers, and retain their television 
sets and their membership of trade unions and 
churches. And they must be able to live in such a 
way which ensures, so far as possible, that public 
officials, doctors, teachers, landlords and others 
treat them with the courtesy due to every member of 
the community."22
Accepting the SB level as the line below which people 
can be considered to be in poverty, then rising unemployment 
and the cuts in insurance benefits have meant that increasing 
numbers of people have fallen to or below this mark which 
denotes a standard of living which the SBC considered to 
be
"...barely adequate to meet their needs at a level 
which is consistent with normal participation in 
the life of the relatively Wealthy Society in which 
we live."23
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The general pattern of financial hardship, the use of
savings, the frequent recourse to borrowing and the
subsequent problems of debt and the failure to meet payment
commitments which often arises from depending on maintenance
at this level has been exposed by a large amount of 
24research. One study - echoing the findings of many 
others - uncovered that even by economising most were 
unable to stretch their allowance to cover their needs 
and had to use up savings - if they had any - or borrow 
money in order to provide for themselves and their families 
the basic necessities of food, clothing and warmth. Even 
with this supplementation financial resources were often 
still insufficient and almost half of the unemployed house­
holds surveyed had incurred debts or were in arrears with
25rent, fuel bills or hire purchase payments.
As savings are used up, other goods such as cars and 
furniture are sold for money and debts are incurred, the 
reality of spending lengthening periods out of work is 
that living standards are adjusted downwards to what, for 
many, is an impoverished level. Even the temporary 
protection from this provided particularly for those in 
steady and relatively high paid employment has gone with 
the abolition of ERS. A study of the long term unemployed 
by the MSC has revealed pervasive complaints of financial 
hardship among this group. In many cases disposable income 
was found to be enough only for existence rather than 
living, and some of the jobless had to sell off some of 
their possessions to survive.
In addition to the use of academic research an alternative
and perhaps more illuminating way of demonstrating the
hardship experienced by the unemployed is by reference to
individual accounts given by the jobless themselves.
27Newcastle Trades Council and an MP from the North East 
28of England have each separately compiled many of these
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accounts, the latter sending them as an educational parcel
to the Prime Minister, In a similar vein the Child Poverty
Action Group surveyed sixty-five families on SB, many of
29whom were long term unemployed. Families frequently 
told of being unable to afford normal household commodities 
such as toothpaste, washing up powder, newspapers or 
television. Children missed out on school trips, toys and 
new clothes, and the financial burden of travel often meant 
very irregular contact with friends and family, even when 
certain individuals were ill or in hospital. It was often 
impossible to heat the home due to the difficulty in meeting 
bills, this being a particular problem in council houses 
with expensive heating systems. The especially difficult 
struggle the unemployed on SB face even when compared with 
the disabled, one parent families and other SB claimants 
has been highlighted by David Donnison the former Chairman 
of the SBC, He points out that the jobless
"are generally less likely than other claimants 
to have the full set of clothing listed in our 
B040 guidelines, less likely to own domestic 
equipment such as vacuum cleaners and refrigerators, 
more likely to live in overcrowded houses, more 
likely to run up debts, and less likely to have 
savings. When debts accumulate, or savings are 
spent, the money is usually used to buy food and 
clothes and to pay the rent - the basic essentials 
for keeping the wolf from the door."30
Within this general hardship suffered by the unemployed
the group who fare worst of all are those with dependent
children. At the close of 1980, for example, around one-
quarter of a million unemployed accounted for almost half
a million dependent children. The SBC have concluded that
there is ample evidence that unemployed families with children
are more seriously affected by poverty than others living
31at or close to SB levels. The main reason for this is 
the low rates paid in SB for children. David Piachaud's 
study, 'The Cost of a Child', strongly suggests
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that children's rates are lower in relation to need than
adult rates, as do comparisons made by the SBC with rates
paid in Germany and other countries. Child Benefits too -
paid to families with children whether in or out of work -
are set lower than need. It has been estimated that if
they were to genuinely provide for even the minimum
requirements of a child, they would need to be raised by 
32about one half. In fact to match the level of child
support in 1955 they would have to be raised from £6.50 -
33the rate from November 1983 - to more than £9.00.
The problem of child poverty is not restricted to the 
unemployed. In Peter Townsend's national study of poverty, 
next to pensioners living alone, the group with the highest 
incidence of poverty were families with four or more children. 
Indeed more than half the people in poverty were accounted 
for by families with dependent children, these being mainly 
larger families of low paid workers (see Table 6.3). Since 
this work was carried out in the late 1960s a new pension 
scheme and other benefits have been introduced for pensioners. 
These changes along with the huge increase in unemployment 
must mean that it is even more true today that children - not 
old age as commonly assumed - are the principal cause of 
poverty if that standard is defined in Townsend's rather 
ambitious way. The unemployed, therefore, are not unique 
in the hardship they suffer but are joined by many low paid 
workers with children. The fact that this latter group 
account for a large share of those in poverty is perhaps 
not surprising given that Britain is a country with low 
minimum wages, no effective enforcement of a legal minima 
and low child benefits.
5. Conclusions
As in the inter-war years rising unertpl oyment has meant 
that over half those out of work have come to depend on
34
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Table 6.3: Percentage of Persons in Different Types of
Households with Gross Disposable Income below 
the Deprivation S t a n d a r d ___________
Type of Household
Percentage of Persons 
in Each Type of 
Household in Poverty
Total No. 
= 100%
Percentage 
of Persons 
in Poverty
Single person
aged under 60 17.1 111 1.6
over 60 64, 8 227 12.5
Man and woman
both over 60 45.7 332 12.9
one over 60 23.1 104 2.0
both under 60 9.4 510 4.1
Man, woman,
1 child 5.2 402 1.8
2 children 16.3 687 9.5
3 children 25.7 389 8.5
4+ children 60.8 309 16.0
3 adults 12.5 554 5.9
3 adults
plus children 19.0 603 9.8
4 adults 6.5 245 1.4
Others without
children 13.9 183 2.2
Others with
children 29.7 476 12.0
All types 22.9 5,137 100.0
Source: Townsend P. (1979) 'Poverty in the UK*, p.290
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means tested assistance for their maintenance. With high 
unemployment likely to persist, this situation seems set 
to continue and possibly worsen for some time to come.
Recent Government policy has done nothing to halt this 
shifting dependency of the unemployed away from insurance 
and onto means tested maintenance. In fact, in the scrapping 
of ERS, the Government has intensified it and has continued 
to perpetuate discrimination against the unemployed by 
treating those without work less favourably than other 
groups among the poor. It is, therefore, the unemployed - 
many of whom make up the very poorest in our society - who 
are paying alarge part of the financial cost of running the 
economy under conditions of high unemployment.
Much of the discrimination against the unemployed 
within the social security system and the reluctance to 
improve the living standards of the jobless is justified 
on the basis that the unemployed are in some way responsible 
for their plight by pricing themselves out of jobs and that 
benefits should be lowered to increase the incentive to 
work, thereby forcing people back into employment. When 
examined against the evidence available these assertions 
cannot be sustained in general terms. It is the lack of 
jobs not the level of benefits which is responsible for 
employment. For the childless and those with one child, 
benefits could be increased without seriously damaging 
people's desire to work which is motivated by a wider 
range of concerns than merely its financial attractiveness.
Improving the living standards of the unemployed with 
larger families is more complicated. They are not a distinc­
tive group in the poverty they experience but are joined 
by many others in work who receive low wages and have 
families to support. This makes it particularly difficult 
for Governments to be generous in their treatment of the 
unemployed with children lest they provoke opposition among
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the large numbers of the working poor who might then be 
worse or at least no better off. In the past such tensions 
between those excluded from work and the working poor were 
less likely. When unenployment was not so much of a problem 
being usually very brief and when more working class families 
with children paid no income tax, priority in welfare 
policy could be given to raising pensions, improving dis­
ability benefits and so on. However, now that unenployment 
is high, frequently long term and producing widespread 
hardship, and with people possibly more aware of the costs 
of social services because of the fall in tax thresholds, 
any attenpt to tackle the problem head-on by raising benefits 
for the unemployed with large families threatens to divide 
and split the working class by provoking resistance among 
low paid workers. Apart from radical change in the distri­
bution of wealth, work and power in society, an attack on 
family poverty which avoids the potential divisiveness of 
concentrating on the unemployed would require increases in 
Child Benefits, Family Income Supplement (FIS) or other 
benefits which go to the working poor. Given that take-up 
rates of FIS have been poor, currently only about 50%, 
the single most suitable and immediately feasible option to
reduce poverty in Britain is probably to increase the
35level of Child Benefits.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
HEALTH, SOCIAL AND OTHER EFFECTS 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT
1. Introduction
The consequences of unemployment do not stop at lower 
living standards and poverty. The possible effects on 
people's psychological and physical health and on their 
social relationships and conduct brought on by material 
hardship, the disruption of normal routines arising from 
unemployment, and other factors - like attitudes to work 
and non-work - have been subject to a great deal of 
speculation and research. Much of this suggests that some 
of the unemployed suffer not only a fall in living standards, 
but a decline in their health and can be encouraged into 
anti-social or criminal activity. If this is the case then 
it holds major political and moral implications.
This Chapter examines some of the existing evidence 
and considers to what extent it allows arguments for 
causal link-ups between unemployment and various indices 
of ill health and social disorder to be sustained. During 
this review of the research, suggestions are made about 
what might be the main factors connected with unenployment 
which bring damaging human and social consequences. The 
Chapter concludes by discussing how some of these negative 
influences might be removed and the implications their 
removal could have for Government * s treatment of the 
unemployed.
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2. Psychological Implications
Working people, particularly in areas of high unem­
ployment, rely heavily on social networks. They often 
live in a 'word of mouth economy* in which jobs are secured 
not from job centres or newspaper advertisements, but by 
hearing from a workmate, relative or friend about them.
Other information, about housing and welfare rights for 
example, probably comes in the same way. Once out of the 
main job-related networks people are less likely to hear of 
opportunities in a wide range of areas; concerning work, 
recreation, shopping and so on. It is not only the 
unemployed male head of the household who is affected. The 
fact that social security rules penalise the working wife, 
taking benefit away, pound for pound, as wages rise after 
disregarding only the first £6 per week, also tends to 
exclude the whole family even more completely from these 
networks. When these important human ties are broken, 
unemployed people are more likely to suffer poverty and 
psychological consequences of their exclusion such as 
loneliness and depression.
Recent work on the psychological effect of unemployment
builds on a tradition begun in the 1930s. Researchers in
that era were largely concerned with the psychological
effects on unemployed people and stressed the importance of
work and a structured working life and the pathological
1
symptoms emerging when these were removed. Two contemporary 
writers summarised what seemed to be the general pattern 
to the psychological deterioration effected by continued 
unemployment in the following terms:
"...first there is shock, which is followed by an 
active hunt for a job, during which the individual 
is still optimistic and unresigned; he still 
maintains an unbroken attitude. Second, when all 
efforts fail, the individual becomes pessimistic, 
anxious, and suffers active distress; this is the
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"most crucial state of all. And third, the individual 
becomes fatalistic and adapts himself to this new state 
but with a narrower scope. He now has a broken 
attitude,"2
A similar pattern, proceeding through four stages of 'shock*,
* optimism* , 'pessimism*, to finally ‘fatalism*, was outlined 
by Bakke in 1933, (see Fig. 7.1). Recent research suggests 
that a similar pattern still exists today, particularly 
among prime age working groups with responsibilities and a 
history of steady employment. In his national survey of the 
unemployed Daniel (1974) found common complaints of boredom 
followed by depression and apathy and then by feelings of 
personal failure and inadequacy. Some of the jobless also 
felt that others looked down on them because they were
3
out of work.
More recent investigation among the long term unemployed 
confirms the corrosive effects of prolonged unenployment on 
an individual's mental attitude. Researchers have concluded 
that
"there comes a point when people can no longer sustain 
the motivation in the face of continued rejection, 
heightened awareness of their own shortcomings, 
disillusionment with job finding services, belief that 
all available options had been covered, and a 
knowledge that jobs are scarce anyway ..- people become 
locked into a vicious circle and lack of success in job 
finding reduces even further their chances of finding 
work."4
The lowest levels of self esteem were found among the young, 
who suffered badly because of the break up of social contacts 
and the loss of school friends, and older people whose working 
lives had ended prematurely. Few people among these groups 
were able to organise and use their enforced free time in a 
constructive way.
A DHSS funded series of case studies of unemployed
Figure 7.1: The Psychological Experience of
Unemployment
Money 
WorriesMorale
Take a 
Lower Wage?
Abandon my 
Skills? Declining Self- 
Respect
Should I
Move? Diminishing Chance 
f Another Job
Give up Trying 
Altogether?
O P T I M I S M
SOURCE: Harrison (1976), p.340, from Bakke (1973).
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families found that the loss of a job could set in motion 
psychological changes which in some breadwinners could result 
in clinical depression. A wide range of possible symptoms 
were identified including feelings of sadness, hopelessness 
and self-blame, lethargy, lack of energy and loss of self 
esteem, insomnia, withdrawal and poor communication, loss 
or gain of weight, suicidal thoughts, impulsive and sometimes 
violent outbursts, and an increased use of tobacco or 
alcohol. Not everyone subject to depression experienced the 
same symptoms at the same time. Nevertheless, the researcher 
felt able to conclude that where the depression occurred 
immediately after the loss of a job anxiety and agitation 
predominate, but if it occurs after many months of unsucc­
essful job search it is characterised particularly by 
lethargy, resignation and withdrawal.^
Damaging psychological effects of unemployment are not 
confined to the individual but can extend into marital and 
family relationships. The lack of money and the greater 
time families find themselves together often combine to
7
increase tension and ill feeling between husband and wife.
Pressures can range from minor irritations like ‘getting on
each other's nerves* to more serious emotional difficulties
and permanent rifts in a relationship, with the failure to
understand one another's problems and support each other.
The author of the DHSS sponsored research mentioned above
found that difficulties were particularly severe in cases
where problems may have existed in a relationship prior to
unemployment, the continued unemployment of the breadwinner
sometimes creating tensions severe enough to break up the
household. In cases where the male breadwinner was unemployed,
there being no alternative means of support, the response of
wives to their husband's unemployment was often one of
bitterness, blaming him for being out of work and accusing
0
him of not really being committed to finding a job. The
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results complemented earlier work by the same author 
which provided evidence that psychological tension could, 
at times, result in extreme cases of marital violence
9
and divorce.
3. Links with Mortality
Perhaps the most controversial area within the 
debate on unemployment and health has been the attenpt to 
demonstrate a statistical association between unemployment 
and death. Work in Britain follows in the wake of US 
efforts, where research by Dr. Harvey Brenner excited 
much attention. Looking at American records of business 
cycles from 1900 onwards, and correlating these with 
indices such as mortality rates in general, mortality due 
to heart disease, alcohol consumption and associated ill­
nesses, psychiatric hospitalisations, suicide and homicide, 
Brenner claimed a strong positive relationship between 
economic instability and the deterioration of health, with 
health indices usually lagging one to five years behind 
economic indices. He argued that on the basis of data 
covering a thirty year period, a 1% rise in the rate of 
unenployment in the USA sustained for six years had been 
associated with approximately 36,887 deaths and 4,227 
extra state mental hospital admissions.
Repeating his work for the UK using time series data 
for 1936-76, Brenner demonstrated that workers in industries 
exposed to continuous economic fluctuation - such as those 
involved with cars, clothing, building and recreation and 
those in semi-skilled or unskilled eirployment - suffered 
increased mortality two to three years after a recession. 
Furthermore, he argued that workers subject to 'downward 
social mobility* whether through recession, redundancy or
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technological change will also have an increased likeli­
hood of mortality, particularly if another stress 
a p p e a r s . F r o m  his data suicide and homicide rates 
lagged one year behind an economic downturn, while deaths 
due to heart disease began to increase after two to three 
years and persisted in the community for ten to fifteen 
years. The general impact of high unemployment in Britain 
in recent years did not appear to have increased overall 
mortality rates but had slowed down their long term decline. 
If Brenner is correct, then a sustained rise in unemployment 
of one million over five years could be associated with 
around 50,000 additional deaths and over 66,000 cases of 
mental illness. For Liverpool he suggests that every 1% 
increase in unemployment between 1970 and 1975 was accom­
panied by an additional 220 deaths in the over-45 age 
group. In Scotland, largely because of a poorer health 
record and a long period of heavy redundancy, deteriora­
ting health begins more quickly - about two years sooner -
11than in England and Wales. Support for this has come
from the Scottish Health Education Group who claim that
the rate of deaths from heart disease in Scotland increases
12after only about a year's unemployment.
Although the relationships Brenner and others are
seeking to prove carry huge political implications, much
of the existing evidence should be treated with caution.
Bramer®s approach has been criticised and the model he
adopts challenged as being incorrectly specified, omiting
certain variables and based on weaker than necessary data.
Critics argue that the interrelationship he adopts between
the incidence of poverty, unemployment, low earnings and
high mortality and high morbidity rates makes it very hard
to disentangle the effects of unemployment from the effect
13of other variables.
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Much of the criticism levelled against Brenner's work 
and approaches like it seems justified. The complex and 
variable nature of the time lags he uses is suspicious 
given that a desired association between 'cause* and 
'effect* can often by achieved by changing the length of 
lags adopted. A proper statistical test of a relationship 
between unemployment and health should probably first 
develop an explanatory theory, demonstrate that it works on 
the population for which it was designed, and then seek to 
show that it works again by applying it to a different 
time and place without amendment. Dr, Brenner never does 
this but rather tinkers with the lags and correlation co­
efficients to adapt them to each new data set. Furthermore, 
researchers in this field do not seem to have worked out 
clearly specified causal theories which could be rigorously 
tested by comparing mortality rates for different kinds of 
diseases - which might be related or unrelated to unem­
ployment and affect different types of workers - in a way 
that would refute, test and develop hypothesis.
4. Effects on Mental Health
Possibly a better way of attempting to demonstrate 
the relationship between unemployment and ill health is 
provided by a study of school leavers in Leeds. The 
young people were interviewed three times each over a 
period of about two and a half years. The psychological 
health of those unemployed after leaving school was 
compared with their counterparts who had found employment 
School leavers who were unemployed and wanting a job were 
found more likely to suffer from minor psychological 
disorders than those who were employed. As the initial 
round of interviews had revealed no differences between 
the young people in regard to their psychological health
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before they had left school, the differences seem to have 
emerged after leaving school with the health of those 
experiencing unemployment deteriorating. The results are 
a significant step towards establishing the direction of 
the relationship between unemployment and psychological 
disorder, strongly suggesting that it is unemployment 
that leads to the problem rather than the other way round.
Another study in Dundee compared the types of medical
complaints suffered by workers before and after the
closure of their factory was announced. Men in the
process of becoming redundant were found to be more prone
to headaches, gastric upsets, feelings of fatigue and
suffocation, dizziness, insomnia, vague aches and pains
15and other evidence of distress. The results show how 
pending redundancy can spark off a range of ailments among 
workers affected although the evidence would have been 
more conclusive had those workers suffering more ailments 
been followed up to determine whether they were more 
likely to continue reporting ill-health if they remained 
unemployed than colleagues who remained in work.
Extreme expressions of mental ill health are suicide 
or attempted suicide and there is disturbing evidence that 
the incidence of people taking their own life while subject 
to a depression induced by joblessness has been rising. A 
steady decline in the suicide rate during the 1950s was 
reversed in 1972 and has since risen along with the level 
of unemployment. It was recently claimed that unemployed 
men were more than twice as likely to commit suicide as 
those in employment, possibly reflecting the capability of 
unemployment to induce a fatal dpression in a man previously 
in good health.However, this relationship - if it 
exists - is not a simple one. Prior to 1972, as suicide 
rates had been falling while unemployment had been rising
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other factors apart from the numbers out of work must 
have been operating. The introduction of non-poisonous 
North Sea gas was probably a main one.
The argument that unemployment itself can create
severe mental distress or deep depression resulting in
suicide is supported by numerous examples of people taking
their own life reported by coroners* inquests and the press
throughout the country. In some cases suicide has taken
place very early into unemployment or even at the
prospect of it. One foreman at GEC Stafford was highly
distressed at having to notify workmates of redundancy and 
17killed himself. Another man, married in his late 
twenties and working at the Dunlop factory in Speke, took
18his life after learning that he was to be made redundant.
In other instances suicide seems more related to the inability
to adjust or accept being out of work. In Sunderland a
coroner attributed a man's suicide to the fact that he
"was unemployed for the first time in his life, at fifty-
two years of age, and could not cope with the feelings of
inadequacy and frustration of being out of work." Around
the same time the Newcastle Journal reported the case of
an unemployed Newcastle man found hanged at his home by
his young son. The coroner was told by the man's daughter
that her father had become depressed after being made
redundant because he was unable to find work. He had
said the money he was living on was very low and on one
19occasion had said he wished he was dead.
The psychological syndrome outlined by Bakke and 
mentioned earlier, (see Table 7.1), could help to partially 
explain some suicides. In the four cases cited above 
workers took their lives either at a very early stage when 
they appear to have been deeply distressed and unable to 
cope with the prospect of unemployment or at a later point 
when they had become demoralised by their failure to find
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a job. In each instance suicide probably took place at a 
time when morale had fallen steeply, which corresponds to 
Bakke's * shock* and 'pessimism* stages. Although Bakke's 
graph provides no timescale for the syndrome - a difficult 
task as it would depend on the state of the economy and how 
individuals perceive their prospects in the labour market - 
it suggests that there are certain times before unemployed 
people become resigned to their plight when they are more 
prone to acute mental distress and its possible tragic 
conseque nces.
Bakke's scenario suggests a low but less fluctuating
morale among those who become 'fatalistic* about their
prospects of finding employment, which probably refers to
people who wanted to work but now believe that they will
not find a job and are managing to cope with this realisation.
It says nothing, however, about the relative size of this
group. Indeed it may well be a diminishing one as periods
out of work lengthen, with workers becoming more and more
prone to pathological symptoms. One study has looked at
the relationship between unemployment and attempted suicide
70in Edinburgh over the fifteen years 1968 - 1982. Apart 
from finding a strong link between unemployment and 
attempted suicide - unemployed men being eleven times more 
likely to attempt suicide than employed men - the relationship 
between attempted suicide and duration of unemployment was 
particularly strong. In one year 2,165 out of every 100,000 
men out of work for more than a year attempted suicide, whereas 
for those unemployed between six months and a year the figure 
was 1,193, and for those unemployed less than six months it was 
708. In this and other instances it seems, therefore, that the 
duration of unemployment is more important than total numbers 
out of work, in explaining the detrimental effects on health 
among the jobless.
When considering the evidence at hand about the effects
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of unemployment on health more generally, it is important 
to distinguish between different groups among the jobless 
and the source of the pressures they experience. It is 
only since about 1979 that the numbers of people in work 
have been falling, which means that a number of people 
adversely affected by unemployment will be those, such as 
school leavers, who expected to enter the formal economy 
but are now being denied this opportunity. The damaging 
effects of unemployment on those who expected to be in 
work are therefore largely created by the attitudes and 
expectations of the rest of society. For other groups 
the nature of the problem will be different. Workers 
normally in employment but now out of a job, while also 
affected by social attitudes to work, may be damaged to a 
greater degree by other factors like the effects of poverty, 
loss of income and so on arising from depression.
Another factor, and one connected with the type of 
workers most vulnerable to uneirployment and the deprivation 
it causes, is that lower occupational groups tend to suffer 
poorer health at all stages of life than better off groups.
A Working Party reporting to the DHSS in 1980 found that 
in 1971 the death rate for unskilled adult males was 
nearly twice that of adult professional males with the gap 
in the death rate for certain specific diseases even wider.
A particularly disturbing conclusion of the report is that, 
despite the existence of the National Health Service, there 
has been no improvement in the health standards of manual 
workers relative to professionals over the past thirty years, 
Indeed in some cases - blue collar workers compared to 
white collar workers of a similar age for instance - there
has been a deterioration in the relative position of the
21poor.
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5. Crime and Disorder
Unemployment can have far reaching social conse­
quences beyond the health of individuals and their families. 
There may be a causal link between the extent of unemploy­
ment and the level of criminal activity and the degree of 
turbulence in society, although - as with the effect on 
health - evidence available is often contentious or 
speculative. Most of the available evidence focusses on 
the actual association between unemployment and crime 
rates and a good deal comes from American studies. In 
addition to his research on mortality, Brenner also undertook 
time series work in which he examined unemployment and 
crime data over a period of seventy years for the US,
Canada and the UK. He concluded that significant relation­
ships existed between economic policy and measures of 
national well-being and that actions which influence 
national economic activity, especially the unemployment
rate, can have a substantial bearing on criminal activity
22in addition to physical and mental health.
Further evidence of a positive association between
unemployment and criminal activity, particularly amongst
the young, is provided by Phillips et al who argued in 1972
that changing labour market opportunities were sufficient
to explain increasing crime rates on the basis that young
people not working were found to have significantly higher
23crime rates than those who were. Almost a decade earlier, 
another researcher, examining the effects of income on 
delinquency, concluded that a drop in income could have as 
great an impact as unemployment and suggested that a 10% 
rise in income in high delinquent areas could be expected 
to reduce delinquency rates by 15% to 20%. However, 
since crime rates have risen over a long period when real 
incomes were rising too, this correlation cannot be true
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in a simple or direct sense. It may be relative, rather 
than absolute, poverty that is related to delinquency.
The above case may suggest that certain groups - like young 
males in their late teens - tend to become more crime- 
prone when deprived of standards of living because they 
see others enjoying them which they have come to expect.
But there will also be other factors at work. Increasing 
affluence plus the growth of supermarket and self-service 
retailing, for example, means that there is more to steal, 
located in more readily accessible places.
The feelings of those in the front line against crime
tend to support the case for an association between criminal
activity and unemployment. The 1980 Annual Report of the
Northumbria Police compared two six month periods in which
crime and unemployment figures were collected in the
county: January - June 1978 and July - December 1980,
It was found that unemployment rose by 29% and crime by
14% between these two periods. The study also found a rise
of 48% in the number of detected crimes committed by
24unemployed people. Further evidence of an association
is provided by the Association of Chief Probation Officers
who claim that their case-load of work is made up of people
between 80% and 90% of whom are unemployed. In their
experience they claim that there is no doubt that uneraploy-
25ment and crime are linked.
The causal relationship between unemployment and crime 
is a two-way one. Compared to those in work the unemployed 
are treated by the legal system in a manner which damages 
their general employability. Statistics show that unem­
ployed offenders are less likely to be given bail and receive 
parole than employed offenders and more likely to be given
a custodial sentence or end up in jail through non-payment
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of f i n e s . I t  is generally held that having served a 
prison sentence detracts from 'employability*, especially 
in times of high unemployment, much in the same way as 
the experience of long term unemployment does- Studies 
have also shown a link between recidivism and unemployment, 
One concluded that offenders who committed their original 
crime while unemployed had a 73% chance of being reconvic-
ted.27
In addition to overtly criminal activity, rising 
unemployment will influence the level of stability or the 
extent of disorder in society. Although the degree of 
political and public tolerance of current levels of unem­
ployment and the absence of jobless protest may seem 
surprising in the present economic crisis, civil disorder 
has broken out and, in part, is attributed to unemployment. 
The urban riots during the summer of 1981 have been blamed 
on a complex range of causes. But, as the Scarman Report 
highlighted, in addition to issues concerning the police, 
poor housing, racial tension and so on, high unemployment 
in the city districts subject to turbulence was thought to 
be an important causal factor.
6. Effects on Social Structure and Mobility
If the numbers of people excluded from the formal 
economy persist or rise then it will probably mean profound 
changes in social structure. It is difficult to predict 
with certainty what these will be although a number of 
preliminary speculations are possible. Since the War the 
British economy has been characterised by certain features, 
many of which have been undermined by rising unemployment.
Up until 1979 it was an excepted norm that the vast bulk 
of the labour force would be in stable continuous enployment.
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the numbers of people experiencing long term unemployment
would be small, and the majority of those who fall out
of work would be unemployed for only a temporary period
before returning to employment. Evidence also points to
rapid social mobility in the post war period for people
born between 1908 and 1947 and the gradually rising
probability for sons of manual wage workers and men from
intermediate classes to gain access to service-class 
28positions. Almost continuous and often relatively 
high rates of economic growth transformed the occupational
29division of labour, and rapidly so from the 1940s onwards.
The growth of professional, higher technical, administrative, 
and managerial positions created room for others to acquire 
upwards social mobility through individual advancement, 
as is reflected in the massive growth over the years 
1950 to 1975 in the number of women at work, a significant - 
though less massive - increase in white collar and more 
skilled jobs and a decline in unskilled employment.
However, despite the chances of men from all social back­
grounds gaining entry into the expanding higher levels 
of the occupational and class structures having increased 
in the post war period, relative chances of social mobility 
have not only remained unaltered but have tended to widen,
and no significant reduction in class inequalities has
30been achieved as a result of economic growth.
The economic situation and the changes it afforded 
for social mobility have changed markedly since the early 
1970s. We may be moving towards a situation where the 
stable employment sector is steadily shrinking while the 
numbers excluded from work on a long term or possibly 
permanent basis is rising. Between these two extremes 
there may be a growing population of * sub-employed* who 
oscillate between low paid and insecure employment and 
unemployment and who along with the rest of the jobless
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are locked into poverty. There is also no longer the 
same opportunity for enhanced living standards through 
individual advancement. The changed economic circumstances 
mean that there is very little individuals acting alone 
can do to effect changes in the social structure. Advance­
ment, if any, for most working class people will in future 
need to be collective with people acting as members of 
their class, occupation or community. However, the scope 
for collective action may have been undermined by the 
nature of recent social mobility. By being based more on 
individual advancement and less on collective action, the 
type of social solidarity which will now be needed may 
have been reduced. It may also mean that those who remain 
in work, and do relatively well, will be less inclined to 
feel a loyalty and responsibility to the unemployed. As 
Goldthorpe has suggested,
"...the extent of upward social mobility over recent 
decades, occasioned by the expansion of the service 
class, has been a major stabilising influence in 
British society in creating a sizeable grouping of 
men within this class who are aware of having 
'made their way* and done well for themselves .,, and 
whose attitudes towards the existing order of society 
would thus seem likely to be ones of approval and 
gratitude."31
Furthermore, it has probably
"...removed the possibility of widespread resentment 
over the extent of inequalities of opportunity ... (and) 
... served to obscure the fact that the social 
policies of the post war period must be reckoned as 
largely ineffectual so far as the creation of a more 
open society is concerned."32
The way changes in social mobility and in the confidence 
and security of the working class have been brought about 
in recent years seems, therefore, to have had an important 
bearing both on the potential for future advancement and 
in public attitudes to unemployment.
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7. Conclusions
The evidence available on the health and social 
consequences of unemployment is conplex. It covers many 
issues; some results are concerned with the effects of 
unemployment while others deal with the effects of non­
work. Even in cases where the evidence of a positive 
association is strongest, it is often difficult to determine 
whether the main cause of the problem stems from the level 
of deprivation experienced or is influenced more by attitudes 
about work and employment. Falling living standards, 
depression, stress and so on are clearly evident among 
the unemployed although the causal tie-up with indices of 
ill health, criminal activity and turbulence are often 
unclear. More research is needed and of a type where the 
findings are less likely to be dismissed on methodological 
grounds and thereby allow the damaging effects of unemploy­
ment and their political and moral consequences to be 
avoided.
Although research of this nature is valuable, it may 
be more important to focus on the attitudes of the whole 
society to unemployment to understand why being out of 
work can be so damaging to people. Individuals have expecta­
tions about securing employment and these are encouraged 
and endorsed by broader public attitudes. When the oppor­
tunity to enter paid work is denied, people often suffer 
negative psychological consequences, particularly when they 
perceive that critical social attitudes are directed towards 
them because they are unemployed. These attitudes, operating 
both at an individual and group level, may be more 
significant in explaining certain damaging effects of unem­
ployment than are the material hardships which the unemployed 
undergo.
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In a changing economy many of our traditional notions 
about employment and unemployment are becoming outdated 
and can be used to generate and sustain social attitudes 
critical of those out of work. The damage these bring to 
unemployed people could be ameliorated by a political 
approach which would not encourage them - for example, by 
not presenting the unemployed as a burden on the taxpayer - 
although a more significant change will require a broader 
shift in public attitudes, particularly among those in 
work. Only if a collective, caring, mutually supportive 
response to social problems and needs is more widely 
advocated can we expect a more humane attitude to the 
unemployed to emerge.
In addition to removing many of the damaging social 
pressures being exerted on those out of work, a change in 
public attitudes could open up possibilities for new policies 
geared to better the lot of the unemployed of which there 
are probably several options open to Government. It could 
adopt economic policies designed to return to full employ­
ment or something nearer to it. Alternatively, if it 
decided that it is not possible to rebuild the formal 
economy as it existed. Government could either explore 
ways of sharing out work and non-work more fairly and 
reducing working hours for all or it could accept a 
continuing distinction between the employed and the non­
employed but attempt to bring the living standards of the 
unemployed closer to those of the employed. However, 
changing attitudes need not lead to reforming policies.
Other, less attractive, scenarios can also be envisaged.
If attitudes among the majority of the workforce who are 
still in work harden against the unemployed, more repressive 
attempts to drive down wages, cut social security benefits 
and divide and control workers could emerge.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENCIES - THE EMERGING 
TRADITION OF AREA-BASED ECONOMIC REGENERATION
1. Introduction
During the 1970s the British Government abandoned the 
policies followed since the war for managing the economy on a 
national scale and thereby maintaining high levels of 
employment. Government, it is now assumed can do no more 
than provide an environment that encourages economic recovery: 
it cannot bring recovery about. Consequently as unemployment 
has risen. Government has developed alternative strategies 
on a local scale concerned with economic development and 
the training of the unemployed and local steps to reduce 
unemployment. The main themes behind the response of Central 
Government and agencies allied to it include the targetting 
of action towards defined localities whose scales vary but 
are usually urban in character, and the promotion of small 
scale private capital as the principal agent of economic 
regeneration and employment growth. This Chapter looks at 
the development of these essentially urban area-based strategies, 
giving particular attention to the ideas and influences which 
have shaped them. It concludes by considering how the 
underlying political and economic assumptions of this tradition 
have altered under a change in Government and a deepening 
crisis in the economy.
2. Origins and Development of the Area-Based
Approach _________ _______________ _
(i) Early Influences and Initiatives
Perceptions about the nature of urban problems began
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to change around the mid-1960s. In addition to the obvious 
problems of physical decay and congestion, town planners and 
city administrators generally increasingly examined urban 
communities in terms of their social and economic character­
istics. At the same time new ideas were germinating in the 
field of social policy. Poverty was 'rediscovered* - or 
perhaps redefined in relative terms - and complacent notions 
that economic growth alone had or could cure deprivation, or 
that poverty could be treated by marginal improvements in 
welfare benefits, were rejected in favour of seeing people's 
problems in the context of the community in which they lived.
As David Donnison points out, this rediscovery among social 
policy makers of community and the spatial problems that had 
for long been contented with in aspatial fashion, brought 
about a convergence with the town planning fraternity who were
expanding beyond traditional notions of physical improvement
1to include consideration of economic and social strategies. 
Changing perceptions were endorsed by major Government 
Reports of the period. A common prescriptive theme - shared 
by the 1965 Milner Holland Report on London Housing,^ the 1967
3
Plowden Report on Primary Schools and the 1968 Seebohm Report 
on the co-ordination of social services for deprived individuals 
and families'^ - was the need for existing and additional 
resources to be directed at specific problems of deprived 
areas and administered by comprehensive and co-ordinated 
public services working at a closer proximity to the local 
community.
Although area-based schemes of slum clearance and 
related housing improvement had existed for some time, the 
first specific policy to emerge from the new synthesis of 
ideas was the introduction of Educational Priority Areas 
(EPA's) in 1967. The Plowden Committee argued that poorer 
living standards and environmental conditions in certain
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urban localities handicapped the educational progress of 
deprived children and recommended EPAs to promote positive 
discrimination in the allocation of resources towards certain 
schools in the hope that standards in deprived areas could be 
raised closer to the norm and thereby compensate children for 
certain inhibiting factors in their local and family environ­
ment. The Report also recommended more effective policies 
for parents in the work of schools and for giving schools a 
firmer basis in the local community. As a result of the new 
EPAs old buildings were replaced or improved, additional 
amenities introduced to help schools play a larger part in 
the life of their communities, and finance provided for 
special salary supplements to attract teachers to disadvantaged 
areas.
A more general policy to deal with what was seen as 
the relatively small pockets of deprivation scattered through­
out urban areas was announced in 1968, Urban Aid - which 
became widely known as the Urban Programme - was established 
to provide additional government resources to areas of 
’special social need*, these characterised by poor environ­
ments and high concentrations of large families, immigrants, 
overcrowding, children in care and the unemployed. Through a 
system of competitive bidding by local authorities Central 
Government would provide 75% grant expenditure on projects - 
particularly in the fields of education, housing, health and 
welfare - which would not have been undertaken without addit­
ional financial support. In practice, however, grant expend­
iture in Urban Aid in its early period fell short of the £20m 
to £25m expected over its first four years and resources 
went mainly towards the provision of day nurseries, nursery 
education and child care.
The experience of early initiatives suggested that
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deprivation would not be solved merely by the provision of 
additional facilities or resources but would require a more 
comprehensive and co-ordinated programme of community 
development based on research and action. Similar ideas had 
been floated several years earlier in the United States and 
British policy makers in the Home Office drew encouragement 
from them when formulating their plans for tackling depriva­
tion by action at the neighbourhood level. The American 
anti-poverty programme which these ideas spawned had, on the 
whole, been a disillusioning experience, but this message 
seems to have been neglected in the formulation of the
5British experiment - the Community Development Project (CDP).
The apparent reluctance within the Home Office to temper 
enthusiasm in the light of comments from American reformers 
possibly reflects a deeper reason behind the appeal of 
'community action* - that it seemed the only alternative 
available to public authorities to counter deprivation apart 
from expensive policies to raise social welfare through 
universal benefits or humiliating selective means tested 
xemedies to deprivation which would be very difficult to 
administer.^
The CDP was set up in 1969 in twelve deprived neigh­
bourhoods scattered throughout the country. The prevailing 
notion was that for most people poverty had been removed 
under an existing vertically integrated structure of social 
services which performed well. A solution to the small 
amount of deprivation which persisted was thought possible - 
despite growing difficulties in the national economy - through 
concerted action at the neighbourhood level. Local teams 
were set up in each area and given a wide remit to work 
closely with local residents and local authorities to highlight 
needs and develop solutions by strengthening and co-ordinating 
public services in their areas. Particular emphasis was 
given to improving the co-ordination and delivery of these
■Ï,
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services by tapping and fostering individual and community 
self-help.
(ii) New Definitions and Explanations
In reality the outcome of CDP disappointed the more 
optimistic hopes and reformist ideals of those responsible 
for its establishment. Some valuable successes were achieved 
such as the creation of community support groups, law and 
advice centres, neighbourhood councils, many other small 
scale projects and - in some areas - an influence on the atti­
tudes of local authorities. However the main contribution 
was not the presentation of iirplementable proposals but the 
development of new explanations of deprivation and their 
diffusion among those concerned with urban problems. The CDP 
analysis broke with the dominant notions of contemporary 
policy by rejecting that the problems of deprivation were 
residual and lay in the inherent pathologies of local 
communities. The Teams presented their areas as "hard 
pressed working class communities suffering progressive under 
development in terms of industrial decline and the changing 
composition of the local labour force." Social problems were 
not rooted in local pathologies but arose "from a fundamental
7
conflict of interests between groups or classes in society".
In short, the CDPs "went Marxist".
In their prescriptive solution the CDP teams were 
highly suspicious and critical of Government - both central 
and local - perceiving its role as essentially that of servant 
to the dominant and ruling interests in society and holding
■
little prospect of achieving the radical redistribution of 
organised public and private power required if poverty was 
to be eradicated. Change from within was also seen as 
unlikely given the depressed and apathetic nature of deprived 
communities and the limited potential for self-help which
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existed. CDP rejected the assumption that policies geared 
to local scale amelioration could effectively treat urban 
problems. This would require fundamental social and economic 
changes which, as a first step, would require raising the 
level of education and consciousness in working class 
communities in ways that would enable people to press for 
change on their own behalf.
Although the exposure that urban problems were 
rooted in structural economic decline began to influence 
ideas about urban policy, the arguments for far reaching 
socialist policies were of little use to Government, The 
CDP failed to link its radicalism with concrete, specific, 
feasible proposals that public authorities and communities 
could act on. One reason for this could be that the structural 
analysis - while not wrong in the understanding it 
provided - inhibited subsequent action because it created 
the impression that power to control the destiny of society 
was too remote from ordinary people for them to exert a real 
influence, and that any reformist locally based action not 
part of a strategy of radical change was doomed to co-option 
or suppression by more powerful interests.^
With few practical suggestions emerging, Government
support for CDP was wound down. What seemed a more acceptable
substitute was introduced by the Home Office in 1974. Seven
local authorities were invited to set up Comprehensive
Community Programmes (CCPs) which were to be small teams
working under the leadership of their Chief Executive to
identify and analyse the whole range of economic, social
physical and environmental problems of their area and make
proposals for corrective action within a five year time 
9scale. CCPs were essentially administrative initiatives 
designed to get the bureaucratic machinery working more
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effectively and direct the major programmes and policies 
of public agencies to those most in need. With the lack 
of any additional resources, and the fact that the initiative 
resulted in little more than pilot research projects in only 
three areas, CCPs proved a relatively ineffectual response 
to deprivation though they did indicate that any solution 
would be more conplex than previously assumed.
Two years prior to CCPs an investigative study whose
results were to have a major influence on subsequent urban
policy had begun. In 1972 the Department of Environment
selected three localities - inner Liverpool, Lambeth, and
the Small Heath area of inner Birmingham - to be the subject
of the Inner Areas Studies (IASs). Consultants were
appointed and given a wide working brief which included
promoting a better definition of inner areas and their
problems, establishing how action projects and area management
could be employed to alleviate physical and social inadequacies,
and identifying the consequences these innovations would
10have for local authorities.
These studies provided a voluminous mass of comprehen­
sive analysis and description of contemporary urban problems
and multiple deprivation and a range of pragmatic and
11implementable policy recommendations. Their conclusions - 
completed in 1977 - exposed the inner areas as being 
characterised by large concentrations of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers, lower levels of training and car 
ownership, higher unemployment rates and inadequate state 
benefits. Deprivation was widespread and focussed on certain 
groups within the community such as the unemployed, one- 
parent families, the single, and in particular the elderly 
and families with dependent children. Low incomes created a 
great deal of hardship, and problems such as indebtedness and 
default on bill payments were common. Recommendations were
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varied but essentially built upon the fundamental issues 
of housing and employment and included proposals for 
industrial development, an expansion of training opportunities, 
improving accessibility in the housing market and the 
channelling of resources to areas of greatest social need.
(iii) Revised Ideas and New Directions
By the mid-1970s urban policy makers were discussing 
the problems of British cities very differently from the 
formulae used less than a decade before. Early initiatives 
had regarded the problem of deprivation as residual to a 
generally healthy economy and prosperous community, considering 
it the result of a 'cycle of deprivation* in which a small 
number of people were caught up by virtue of their own 
individual or social inadequacies. Solutions were seen in 
terms of positive discrimination and improved service delivery 
at the local level, and encouraging local residents to 
overcome their own inadequacies by providing services for 
family support, pre-school programmes and family planning.
The practical and theoretical legitimacy of these notions 
were progressively eroded. Feedback from experimental projects 
exposed the practical limitations upcn which they were based 
and the analysis provided by CDP and the IASs redefined the 
urban problem by denouncing the assumptions behind early 
initiatives and providing a convincing explanation of urban 
deprivation rooted in structural economic decline calling for 
decisions and policies at national and international scales. 
Despite general agreement about the cause of urban problems,
CDP concluded - partly because of the way problems were 
conceptualised - that only radical change could tackle what 
were local manifestations of the crisis within capitalism, 
whereas the IASs felt problems could be tackled by a committed 
and 'total* approach within the existing economic and political 
system.
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Understandably Government acted on the more optimistic 
and reformist notions of the IASs though even before the 
Consultants' final reports were completed it was clear 
that urban policy was taking on major new directions under 
the Labour Government of 1974-79. An emerging 'urban 
dimension® to economic and regional policy became evident 
with the decision in 1976 not to proceed with the plans for 
Stonehouse New Town and the coincident establishment of 
Britain's first major area-based attack on urban deprivation 
in the East end of Glasgow. The Glasgow Eastern Area 
Renewal Project (GEAR) was set up to allow central and local 
government along with other statutory agencies with policy 
remits relevant to the area to work in co-ordinated partner­
ship» This policy turn-around in the West of Scotland 
heralded the coming shift in policy emphasis which would 
in future give greater priority to the allocation of resources 
to the older industrial areas.
The following year Government announced its intentions
for urban policy in the White Paper 'Policy for the Inner 
12Cities, 1977. A new intra-regional dimension with a 
specific urban and inner urban focus was to be added to 
traditional regional policy. The inner areas of London and 
Birmingham, previously neglected by regional policies, would 
be promoted to a position of second priority behind the 
assisted areas. Rate support grants to local authorities 
would be used to ensure that policies and programmes gave 
priority to the inner cities, local authorities themselves 
would be granted new powers to help industry and improve 
the industrial environments of urban cores. The MSG would 
explore ways in which its manpower policies could be made 
more relevant to the labour market requirements of inner 
urban areas. Apparently influenced by the CCPs, resources 
would be provided through a more unified approach among the
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different agencies and tiers of government with voluntary 
and private sectors involved to a greater extent. A 
selected number of areas would be offered the opportunity 
of embarking on a closer form of unity - a 'partnership® - 
with central government in dealing with urban problems. 
Additional resources were to be provided through the Urban 
Programme which was to be recast to include, in addition 
to social projects, the possibility of expenditure on 
industrial, environmental and recreational matters.
3. Assumptions behind the New Urban Strategy
These new policies were shaped by a number of underlying 
assumptions about how urban problems could be solved, new 
economic activity and employment generated and about the 
role which public authorities should play in this process.
A large amount of criticism was directed towards post war 
planning policies which had sought a solution to the 
problems of large cities by developing new town communities 
outside the conurbations to ease congestion and enable 
dispersion from the cities, and, in turn, facilitate 
complementary policies of redevelopment and improvement 
within urban areas. Critics pointed to the lack of spatial 
sensitivity and the absence of an urban dimension within 
this strategy. The inner areas of the South East and Midlands, 
despite having more in common with assisted areas like 
Clydeside, had been grouped with their surrounding and more 
prosperous regions and treated as non-assisted areas and 
existing social and economic problems compounded as a result 
of dispersal strategies which selectively creamed off the 
better jobs and more mobile residents. Local communities 
and their industry had also been directly damaged by intra­
urban renewal policies. Certain aspects of new residential 
development were frequently unpopular with tenants.
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Industrialised building techniques, for instance, often
created homes which were unimaginatively designed, lacked
privacy, were prone to dampness and whose structural
l3problems were exacerbated by poor maintenance. The 
comprehensive redevelopment which preceded new construction 
was blamed for the closure or forced relocation out of the 
city of many local industries and the disappearance of many 
small premises in which small firms had thrived. Entrepren­
eurial interests were certainly poorly catered for in the 
new urban environment - housing schemes, for example, 
provided fewer opportunities for new businesses to start - 
and aggressive attitudes to the non-conforming user were 
adopted and probably further acted against the inner city 
as a location for investment.
Although much of this criticism is justified there are
also some important observations and research findings which
reduce the blame for economic decline that can be directed
towards regional and urban policies. New Towns have
probably had a less damaging effect on deprived inner areas
than is commonly assumed. In London, for example, population
overspill has not - in the main - come from the overcrowded
residential districts. Less than one fifth of those leaving
the urban core migrated to the new towns and authorities
in these areas have been less active in promoting the decanting
of people than authorities in less congested districts on 
14the periphery. In respect to detrimental effects on
industry, other factors apart from physical renewal are in
play. In Glasgow during the 1960s - the city's high period
of comprehensive redevelopment - evidence suggests that
industrial liquidation was more the outcome of economic
pressures on a weak industrial structure than the result of 
15urban renewal . Employment decline also reflected the 
substitution of capital for labour and the tendency for 
manufacturing industry to gradually decentralise away from
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the high rental core of the city and for new plants to
settle outside the inner areas. Expansion and changing
space requirements were found to be more important influences
behind firms moving out of the city than was redevelopment
which seemed to be responsible for only a small percentage
of relocations to new t o w n s . E v e n  where firms have been
forced to relocate it may have involved less hardship than is
commonly assumed. Research has found that firms in other
areas considered acquisition procedures had been reasonable 
17and efficient, compensation adequate and a useful
18injection of working capital, and their new location
generally satisfactory compared to their old inner city 
19premises.
For many businesses it appears that a move to a location 
on the periphery or a new town location often reflects a 
genuine locational preference. Assuming that any interference 
with this desire would involve some degree of loss in product­
ivity and investment through forcing industries to non- 
optimal locations, a case can be made in favour of dispersal 
and green field development policies as ultimately being in 
the best interests of the cities who would benefit in the
20long term through the creation of a sounder national economy.
Indeed to accuse regional policy of neglecting urban areas
is somewhat to belie its purpose and effect. Post war
state intervention in industry has committed itself to the
restructuring and regeneration of British industry to improve
profitability and competitiveness in world markets, and the
mergers, rationalisations and the substitution of capital
21for labour have been designed to achieve this. Resulting 
employment decline has been particularly heavy in the older 
urban areas because of their industrial structures and, in 
the main, job losses have been permanent and losses to the 
economy as a whole rather than the displacement and removal
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22of employment to other areas. It is, therefore, probably 
more appropriate to interpret the contradiction not as 
having been one between the inner cities and areas favoured 
by regional policy, but rather as between the cities and 
the demands for profitability and international competitiveness.
Despite the somewhat fragile nature of certain criticisms
of previous urban and regional policies, in the White Paper,
'Policy for the Inner Cities', the Government strongly
endorsed the rejection of traditional approaches and announced
that the new urban strategy would reverse these. Although
it also recognised that urban problems had been caused by
"other social and economic forces which could only be
reversed with great difficulty or at unacceptable cost", the
White Paper - rather paradoxically - argued that by
changing "the thrust of the policies which have assisted
large scale decentralisation and in the course of time to
stem the decline, achieve a more balanced structure of jobs
and population within our cities and create healthier 
24policies." Future urban policy would, therefore, tackle 
only one set of 'causes' at a time when the arguably more 
significant set of economic reasons for urban decline 
were becoming more intractable. Changes in the wider economy 
meant that the future task of Government would be less 
about containing and managing growth pressures on cities or 
the regional distribution of mobile industry and investment 
in a buoyant economy. Large parts of Britain's urban areas 
were becoming locked in chronic decline and the onset of 
national economic recession and a slump in the world economy 
meant there was little likelihood of help from the wider 
economy.
Despite the apparent reduction in mobile industry and
2 .
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large scale investment. Government optimism that urban 
decline could be reversed persisted. It was founded, not 
only on the ability of existing public agencies to alter 
their strategies to favour urban areas but, in complement, 
on the growing attention being given to the small private 
firm as an important element in enhanced national economic 
g r o w t h , a n d  the prime agent of urban regeneration. Popularity 
surrounding the small firm had grown since a Government 
commissioned enquiry into small firms - the Bolton Report - 
was published in 1971.^^ For about half a century before 
this the proportion of small firms in the British economy 
had been in steady decline. Politicians and economists had 
come to regard them as anachronistic to the needs of a modern 
economy, considering them unable to harness advanced techno­
logical systems and obstacles to a process of growth which 
required complex technological processes and large units of 
production. The Bolton report contradicted many of these 
notions. It found that around one and a quarter million 
small firms existed and accounted for one quarter of the 
“working population and almost 20% of GNP. To the Committee 
small firms played a "vital role in the preservation of a 
competitive private economic system." Advocacy of small 
enterprise was also reinforced by a progressive disillusion­
ment with the policies of industrial corporatism and 
restructuring. By the 19 70s these were widely regarded as 
having failed to cure the problems of low productivity, lack 
of competitiveness and outdated technology. These problems 
continued while large scale employment loss and social 
tensions - particularly in the inner cities - increased and 
it was believed that the classical values of entrepreneurship 
and individual freedom were eroded by the mediocrity and 
bureaucracy of State control.
Research since the Bolton Report has provided further 
evidence of a causal relationship between a healthy small
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28firm sector and a buoyant and strong national economy.
A further assertion is that small firms are a major source
29of new employment. A significant impact of small
enterprise on new jobs is, however, far from conclusively
proved. Despite frequently quoted work from the US that
claimed small firms with under 20 employees were responsible
80for 66% of new jobs created between 1969 and 1976,
British evidence suggests that in the short to medium term
manufacturing firms with fewer than twenty-five employees
can make only a small contribution to the level and growth 
3lof employment.
A crusading role for small enterprise in the new urban
policy was introduced during the Labour Government of
1974-79. The Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, told small
businessmen that "big oaks from little acorns grow and
Britain's industrial future will rest in good measure upon 
3 2your efforts." The advocacy of small scale capitalism by 
a Labour administration was perhaps not surprising. The 
Government was presiding over the highest levels of unemploy­
ment since the War and some response to recession and the 
legacy of industrial restructuring policies was a political 
necessity.
A more vociferous advocacy of small firms has since 
been made by Conservative Governments to whom the cause of 
the small entrepreneur is consistent with the Party's political 
and economic ideology. State interference in the natural 
working of the economy is anathema, and, by stripping away 
bureaucratic controls and red tape, new enterprise will be 
created, individual freedom and initiative enhanced and not 
only the economy but society as a whole will be regenerated. 
These notions are clearly evident in a speech by Sir Geoffrey 
Howe when on opening one of his Government's new urban 
initiatives - the Enterprise Zone in the Isle of Dogs - he 
said:
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"Our once flourishing inner cities had been founded 
on the dynamism of individuals, their initiative and 
healthy pursuit of wealth. Could not entrepreneurs 
create a prosperous society there again? We had to 
free entrepreneurs from interfering regulations ... 
and we had to attract people with enterprise and 
initiative to generate new wealth and new jobs . ,33
4. Urban Policies
(i) The New Urban Programme
The legislative framework for new urban policies
was provided by the passage of the Inner Urban Areas Act 
34in 1978. The Act enables the Secretary of State to grant 
a variety of powers to specially designated local authorities 
to provide loans for the acquisition of land and the carrying 
out of works on land, and both loans and grants for 
environmental improvements and the converting, improving, or 
modifying industrial or commercial buildings in Industrial 
Improvement Areas which some authorities were empowered to 
declare. In localities designated as Partnership areas 
additional powers are given to the appropriate District and 
County Councils to make interest free loans for site prepara­
tion and infrastructural provision, and grants for both 
assisting in the payment of industrial and commercial rents 
and for relief from loan interest for small companies.
Resources have come mainly from the Urban Programme 
which was recast and expanded from £30m in 1976-77 to £l25m 
per year with the intention of a continuing commitment of 
£l,000m over the coming decade. Priority in the allocation 
of Urban Programme expenditure has been given to the 
Partnership authorities of which seven were selected following 
the Act - Liverpool, Birmingham, Lambeth, London Docklands, 
Manchester/Salford, Newcastle/Gateshead and Hackney/lslington.
211.
Fifteen Programme authorities - areas of urban stress - were 
also selected where priority, though to a lesser extent 
than in the Partnerships, had been given and a further 
nineteen urban localities were identified as areas to receive 
special attention in the distribution of urban aid grants.
The Partnerships were intended to enable the joint
participation of central and local government in the
preparation of comprehensive programmes to outline the areas'
problems, review existing policies and their shortcomings
and prepare long term strategic plans and three year action
plans. In addition to channelling more resources into
selected urban areas, the purpose behind 'partnership*
was to achieve comprehensiveness in the preparation of the
strategy, both in the unity of the projects and the
involvement of all key agencies and interests, and ensure
that policies devised were realistic and enable national
political thinking to focus on urban policies and responses.
In practice, however, the normal administrative structures
adopted have been challenged as immense bureaucratic and
fragmented and having failed to involve local communities
and bring about new effective means of communication between
35residents and decision makers.
The policies which have been implemented in the 
Partnerships seem to correspond less to comprehensive 
strategies of physical and social development and more to 
an essentially pragmatic and ad hoc range of expenditure 
proposals. In the main industrial policies have involved 
rehabilitation and improvement to industrial premises, the 
construction of new industrial units and extensive promotional 
work. Policies in other fields have attempted to complement 
economic projects. New houses have been built and improve­
ment projects carried out, the private sector has been 
encouraged to participate in inner area locations, and local
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authority mortgages provided for people wishing to purchase 
older properties. In the area of transport and associated 
environmental improvement, projects have explored ways of 
improving accessibility to employment opportunities by 
road and rail. A variety of other initiatives have also 
been implemented in the fields of education, leisure, 
community development and cultural p r o m o t i o n . T h e  source |
of innovation has come mainly from within local authorities 
and in many ways policies are similar to those which have 
been carried out in other areas, or those which probably 
would have been had the resources been available to fund 
them.
Since 1979 the Conservatives have given partcular
emphasis to using modest amounts of public expenditure to
stimulate larger amounts of private investment and in this
way generate new employment. In 1982 the Department of
Environment announced a new financial provision - the Urban
Development Grant (UDG) - as an addition to the Urban
Programme. Inspired by previous experimental initiatives
dealing with derelict land reclaimation and low cost home
ownership in urban areas which suggested that small amounts
of public money could stimulate significant private sector
development. Government hopes the new UDG will "lever
private sector investment in the inner cities by providing
the minimum public sector contribution necessary to bring
forward otherwise marginal private sector development schemes
37and create permanent jobs in the inner cities." £70m
was earmarked under the Urban Programme for the financial
year 1983-84 which the Government estimated could - if the
number of proposed schemes already existing between local
authorities and private firms came to fruition - generate
38further investment to total £700m.
(ii) Departments and Agencies of Government
Certain Government Departments and Agencies with an
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economic remit are seen as having a vital role in developing 
new urban strategies. However, having essentially 
operated at a national or regional scale, this new respon­
sibility to act also at a smaller area level has not always 
been easily accommodated. The experience of these larger 
public authorities in local regeneration policy raises a 
number of issues, not least being whether urban and 
national economic development can be consistent with one 
another or how real the commitment of Central Government 
is to reverse decline in urban areas.
Government's main line industrial policies are the 
responsibility of the Department of Industry (DI). Normally 
half of the DI 's resources - which totalled £777m in 1982-3 
has gone on Regional Development Grant (RDG) which is paid 
in varying amounts depending on whether the area of 
assistance is a Special Development Area, a Development 
Area or an Intermediate Area. Until recently many 
deprived urban areas have, potentially, been able to tap 
this money but drastic changes in the spatial pattern of 
assistance has reduced the number of areas covered. Apart 
from RDG the DI can promote economic regeneration in other 
ways. The 1972 Industry Act allows loans, interest relief 
grants, or removal grants to be given under Section 7 to 
assist industrial projects aimed at improving employment 
prospects in disadvantaged areas and further selective 
assistance under Section 8 for projects benefitting the 
community as a whole. In addition, through the work of 
the English Estates (EE), formerly the English Industrial 
Estates Corporation, which it controls, the DI has been 
involved in an extensive programme of factory construction.
Despite the apparent possibilities for the inner cities 
to benefit, research into the effect of these policies
39suggests that on the whole effects have been marginal. By
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the late 1970s only a small proportion of the DI's 
budget was being directly allocated to the major conurba­
tions and the DI does not seem to have embarked on any 
serious redefinition of its policy boundaries to create a 
specific urban or intra-urban d i m e n s i o n . I t s  spatial 
focus remains linked to that of the region or larger areas, 
and an insistence on financial viability as a criterion 
for assistance must act against the older urban areas as 
these are generally non-optimal locations for new or mobile 
firms. The inner areas seem to have done less well from 
RDG than might have been expected given their industrial 
structure which might also reflect less dynamic local 
economics and a growth of service sector employment - not 
generally appropriate for regional assistance - in these 
a r e a s . O n l y  Section 7 assistance and the factory programme 
seem capable of channelling additional resources into the 
cities on top of what would have been spent there anyway.
The DI has only marginally modified its work and the 
spatial distribution of its resources to favour the inner 
areas. It remains - perhaps rightly - committed to 
improving the national economy through policies which 
arguably have assisted industrial trends which have created 
more damage to the urban cores than current policy could 
hope to rectify.
A more appropriate vehicle for urban regeneration 
might have been Britain's principal economic development 
agency the National Enterprise Board (NEB) which was 
established by the Industry Act 1975 and operated until 1981 
when it was merged with the National Research Development 
Organisation to form the British Technology Group. The 
NEB had wide powers to develop, assist or protect the 
British economy through the promotion of industrial efficiency 
and international competitiveness and was able to provide 
financial aid, normally in the form of equity capital, for
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the expansion and modernisation of manufacturing industry.
It was initially anticipated that the NEB would
4-2direct its attentions to areas of high unemployment, the
potential role of the Board as a powerful agent of urban
regeneration did not materialise. There had been a growing
regional dimension evident since 1976 when regional directors
were appointed for the North East and North West, whose
investigations on the potential for regional investment
has led to the establishment of regional boards with
delegated authority to spend up to £500,000 on soundly based 
43investments. Although some of this may have benefitted 
the more deprived urban areas, on the whole selective 
investment in the Partnership and Programme areas was very 
limited and far less than what could have been expected 
given the size of their total workforces. By the end of 
1978, for example, only nine firms had been supported in 
these areas with investments totalling £8.75m.^^
Apart from the rescue of a few large companies, like 
British Leyland and Rolls Royce, the NEB focussed its 
investment on potentially successful firms in anticipated 
growth sectors such as computers and electronics, scientific 
and medical instruments and machine tools. These are 
enterprises to whom an inner city location is probably less 
attractive in lacking suitable modern premises and manpower 
skills, and whose employees are in such high demand that 
they can - as was demonstrated in the case of the NEB * s 
micro electronics subsidiary INMOS - influence the locational 
decision of the firm in favour of environmentally attractive 
locations outside the older urban areas. Even where the NEB 
was interventionist, instead of benefitting, the inner 
cities generally suffered employment loss through the type 
of industrial restructuring, rationalisation of production 
and switching of investment described above. In fact such 
consequences could have been greater had the level of inter-
■
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vention by the NEB been as great as originally intended.
It has been economic development agencies operating 
at a sub-UK level - principally the Scottish Development 
Agency (SDA) and the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) - and
'U
not their former counterpart the NEB which have become 
heavily involved in economic regeneration initiatives in 
urban areas. Their operations, which cover land renewal, 
industrial estates, investment, industrial promotion and 
advice, have become increasingly targetted on a small 
number of areas where regeneration efforts have been 
concentrated. In Scotland the area approach of the SDA 
began largely as a result of central government direction
'I
through the Scottish Office which steered the SDA into 
integrated industrial and environmental projects in the 
east end of Glasgow, Ayrshire and Clydeside. Since then 
it has formalised this role imposed from above into a more 
corporate strategy for allocating its resources and 
co-ordinating its own operations. This has allowed the 
Agency to embark on a number of new-style area projects 
and a policy decision has been made to spend 60% of its 
resources which can potentially be allocated spatially - 
around half of all expenditure - on area development.^^
An important feature of the SDA's recent initiatives is the 
emphasis on 'economic welfare* as opposed to the explicit 
concern with 'social welfare* evident in its first project,
GEAR.'^^ This perhaps reflects new perceptions about economic 
growth and curing deprivation within urban policy. Public 
policy no longer seeks to tackle poverty and unemployment 
head-on but hopes that the spin offs from the generation of 
wealth in the private sector will ameliorate them. The 
area-based role of the SDA is discussed and evaluated in 
greater detail in Chapter 14.
(iii) Support for Small Enterprise
In the process of economic regeneration and wealth
;
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creation the small firm is seen as having a key role and 
central government and its agencies have become increasingly 
concerned with creating a better financial, legal and 
administrative climate within which this sector of the 
economy can expand. The first significant group of 
budgetary measures were introduced by the Labour Government 
in 1977 and 1978 and included an increase in the corporation 
tax profit limits of small companies, raising the threshold 
at which a company must register for VAT, simplifying VAT 
return forms and allowing VAT relief for bad debts, improving 
income tax relief for losses on new businesses and raising 
the thresholds for relief from capital gains tax.
A more comprehensive financial package for small 
enterprise has been developed by the Conservatives. The 
Spring Budget of 1980 established a new Venture Capital 
Scheme which allowed losses on equity investment in unquoted 
trading companies to be offset against income. Cuts were 
.also made in Corporation tax and tax relief given for
interest on borrowed money, capital expenditure was made 
eligible for 100% allowance, and the DI was allocated 
£5m for the construction of small nursery units in association 
with the private sector and tax rules were changed to make 
the break up of large firms easier.
Two new initiatives were introduced in 1981. In an
effort to tap the massive resources of the private sector
a Business Start Up Scheme was established to provide income
tax relief for investments of up to £10,000 - later raised
to £20,000 - in the equity of companies starting new trades.
The Government estimated the initial provision could lead
to £200m being invested in small firms at a cost to the state
47of £50m in lost revenue. To help firms unable to raise 
sufficient collateral when borrowing money, a Loan Guarantee
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Scheme was also introduced. The scheme was a limited one,
providing loans of up to £75,000 from a budget of £50m
a year for a three year period and was intended to be self-
financing, By September 1982, however, problems were
evident with the failure rate among firms having received
48loans being far in excess of initial predictions.
The machinery of economic planning has also tailored 
its policies to support the small firm sector, A Small 
Firms Division within the DI runs a Small Firms Information 
Service providing free information and advice on wide ranging 
business problems and a Counselling for Small Firms Service 
which operates throughout the country providing paid advice 
from a team of experienced businessmen on how to increase 
turnover and productivity. In addition to advisory help, 
some financial assistance has been available, for example, 
to pay half the cost of feasibility studies into collaborative 
arrangements between small firms and to partly fund the 
New Enterprise Development Project in the North East which 
provides a specialised counselling, promotional and 
educational service to those interested in stimulating the 
growth of the small firm sector in the region. The DI 
has also - through EE - been funding the construction of 
premises under 1,000 sq. ft. and increasing the scope for 
small premises construction by adjusting Industrial 
Development Certificate (IDC) regulations to allow local 
authorities and private developers in areas where IDC 
controls operate to construct up to 50,000 sq. ft. without 
first securing IDC approval.
Despite the many new provisions emanating from 
Central Government, some commentators feel that existing 
support for small enterprise remains inadequate if the 
elaborate hopes surrounding this sector are to be met. One
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critic points to inadequate resources, particularly in
research and statistics, poor co-ordination with other
Government Departments and the lack of direct responsibility
for many aspects of government activity which bear directly
49on small businesses.
Development Agencies have also been giving greater
attention to the small firm. Shortly before its demise the
NEB - in partnership with the banks - set up two
schemes in the North of England; Newton Securities (Northern)
Ltd to provide unsecured loans of between £5,000 and
£25,000, and a similar body, Sapling Enterprises Ltd, to
give guidance and help and long term investment of at least
£50,000 to a selected number of small firms. A more
general scheme - Oakwood Loan Finance - was also established
to provide finance to both new and established businesses
with a high growth potential and can give five year loans
of up to £50,000 at 2% above the minimum lending rate with
repayments deferred until the beginning of the fourth 
50year. A more active and comprehensive role in promoting
small enterprise has been adopted by the SDA and WDA and
their encouragement through advice, finance and premises
provision has become a central feature of the area-based
policies of these agencieso In fact the gap in provision
existing in England has led to calls from politicians for
the establishment of an Agency similar to the SDA or WDA
51to cover this part of the UK.
In addition to small scale private capital, central 
Government has also encouraged, albeit tentatively, small 
co-operative forms of business activity. The Industrial 
Common Ownership Act of 1976 empowers the Secretary of 
State for Industry to make loans for the development of 
co-operative ventures and provide grants to supportive bodies. 
Of the latter, the most important is Industrial Common
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Ownership Finance Ltd (ICOF), a non-profit making loan 
fund servicing co-operative projects. By giving a proper 
definition to the co-operative form the Act in turn allowed 
the 1976 Finance Act to introduce relief from capital gains 
tax and capital transfer tax for 'employee trusts'. The 
Co-operative Development Agency was established in 1978 
which - though unable to give direct financial assistance - 
promotes the co-operative ideal by providing a legal and 
managerial counselling service. The CDA has continued under 
the Conservatives though the level of grant aid was cut by 
one-third from its first three year resource allocation to 
£600,000.
(iv) Conservative Policies
In addition to small cuts in the financial allocation
to the Urban programme totalling £18.3m over 1979-1981,
a penalising of high spending authorities by withholding
rate support grant one result of which was a loss of around
53£166.2m in grant to the Partnership authorities and a 
sharpened promotion of the small firm, the Conservatives 
have introduced other important developments to urban policy. 
Apparently inspired by the ability of New Town Development 
Corporations to deliver the implementation of a comprehensive 
package of physical and economic development, and frustrated 
with the difficulties experienced in developing co-ordinated 
partnership strategies in urban areas, the Government estab­
lished Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) for London Docklands 
and the old Merseyside Docks. Each has the basic remit of 
securing regeneration of the area. Members of the UDC are 
appointed by Central Government and given wide powers to 
acquire and assemble land, to grant planning permission on 
land they own or sell, manage and build housing, and 
construct necessary roads. Economic development powers include
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the provision of infrastructure and financial assistance to 
industry, and resources to fund these activities are provided 
by Government,
A number of specific criticisms can be voiced about 
UDCs, Not least concerns the apparent erosion of local 
democracy resulting from the switching of responsibility and ^
decision making away from elected local representatives, and 
the reduction in the ability of local authorities to exercise 
choice and allocate priority among new policies. It also 
seems contradictory to compare the traditional new town task 
of accommodating growth forces and their locational prefer­
ences on a green field site with the task of managing urban 
decline in areas where the forces of restructuring and 
decentralisation have created much of the problem. Nevertheless 
UDC leaders appear optimistic. According to the Chief 
Executive of Merseyside UDC hopes are pinned on a strategy 
which emphasises supporting and expanding existing industry, 
encouraging new enterprise, avoiding bureaucracy and red tape,
and tailoring policies to involve the private sector at every 
54opportunity.
Possibly a more controversial initiative was introduced 
in the Spring Budget of 1980 with the announcement that a 
number of Enterprise Zones (EZs) were to be set up in areas ?
of economic and physical decay. By 1984 twenty-two EZs had 
been established. These are, however, markedly different 
from what early debates about the idea in the late 1970s had 
envisaged. Early discussion was about laying the conditions 
whereby the vibrant small scale laissez-faire economies 
evident i n Singapore and Hong Kong could be emulated in 
Britain's declining inner cities. As the concept was developed, 
notions about freeport incentives and reducing health and 
safety at work and employment protection measures were eliminated;
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Some concessions have been made by reducing planning 
controls, but the package as it operates is essentially a 
fiscal policy subsidising capital and land in very small 
areas - usually around 500 acres. The Zones will operate 
for a ten year period and businesses within them enjoy 
exemption from development land tax, exemption from rates 
on commercial and industrial property and 100% capital 
allowances for commercial and industrial buildings.
Planning procedures are simplified with developers not 
requiring planning permission for developments conforming 
to zoning in the approved plan. Firms are also exempt 
from the requirements of Industrial Training Boards and 
Government interference in the collection of statistical 
material is minimal.
Although the eventual impact of EZ'a is open to
speculation there is some early evidence about what seems
to be happening. Initial fears of returning to nineteenth
55century industrial environments appear - in the main - 
unfounded given the high incidence of publicly owned land, 
the remaining levels of planning control, and the release 
of substantial public resources in many Zones. Elaborate 
hopes surrounding economic regeneration may well be over- 
optimistic. The second year monitoring studies for the 
DoE suggest that industrial activity setting up in the 
Zones has mainly been drawn out of other areas, these
56frequently in close proximity to the Zones themselves. 
Indeed, the Zones which appear most successful in attracting 
new investment are - contrary to the original concept - 
those where public expenditure and the energy and commitment 
of public agencies have been greatest.
A bne-off• initiative and one which emphasises both 
the Conservative's approach to urban policy and the lack
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of complementarity between the two key Government 
Departments took place in Merseyside in 1981. Following 
serious civil disturbances in the Toxteth area of 
Liverpool, Government established the Merseyside Task 
Force - an interdepartmental group of civil servants 
staffed by officials from the DoE, the DI, the MSC, 
secondees from the private sector and led by the former 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr. Heseltine.
No new resources were formally attached to the Task Force 
but it was able to tap some small additional monies from 
an underspend on the Urban Programme. In its first twelve 
months the Task Force liaised informally with local 
government, looked for ways that administrative blocks 
on existing programmes could be removed, and initiated 
support for new schemes. The North West regional offices 
of the DoE and DI devolved their Merseyside activities 
to offices in central Liverpool and the DI seconded personnel 
to the Task Force. But as the Task Force has continued 
beyond its first year it has not proved possible to 
formalise this collaboration. The lack of complementarity 
in the economic development role of both these Departments 
is reflected in the use of resources. While the DoE has 
sought to revitalise the inner conurbation and promote 
small scale enterprise, the vast bulk of the DI*s regional 
policy expenditure has not gone towards those areas where 
the most severe social and economic problems are concentrated, 
Furthermore it has been associated with large scale job 
loss. Between 1978-9 and 1982-3, eleven firms in Merseyside 
received some £65 million in regional development grants 
equal to or in excess of £100,000 and were responsible 
for the loss of over 12,000 jobs.^^
5. Conclusions
Area-based urban strategies have become an increasingly
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important element in Government's counter-deprivation and 
economic renewal policies. However, with the worsening 
economic situation, the basic question of whether Government 
possesses the power to reconcile social needs with the 
pressures of economic change is sharpened. Until recently 
it thought it did. But since the Conservatives took office 
in 1979 a fundamental change in the philosophy about economic 
regeneration policy is noticeable. Before then the revital­
isation of deprived communities was seen as a social 
investment to counterbalance the concentration and rational­
isation of capital encouraged by regional and national 
economic policies and enable depressed areas to play a 
stronger role in a healthy wider economy. But more recently, 
as Peter Morris points out, "economic viability no longer 
seems to depend on incorporating the wasted talents and
resources of society, but on the competitive attraction of
58
capital at whatever social cost."
Conservative responses seem to reject the starting 
point of urban policy adopted by previous liberal democratic 
Governments - that economic activity should be regulated 
in conformity with social ideals. In fact this approach is 
now believed to have created much of the problem by - as 
Marris again suggests - setting goals "which were incompatible 
with the incentives to which economic relationships respond, 
so raising unrealistic expectations, overtaxing and over­
burdening the economy with a level of social benefits and
5 9egalitarian idealism which it could not sustain." This 
in turn led to inflation and economic stagnation which 
further reduced Government's ability to satisfy expectations. 
Consequently a very different starting point has been 
adopted which sees Government's task as being to regulate 
social expectations in accordance with the requirements of 
the economy. Here the role of the State is not to arbitrate 
between economic and social needs and ensure that growing
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prosperity is distributed equitably, but to act entrepren- 
eurially and, by manipulating taxes, environmental controls, 
subsidies, infrastructural and social investments, create 
the conditions in which the private sector can expand and 
accumulate wealth. Policies are still frequently pursued 
at a local scale but the assumption that social objectives 
are subordinate to economic circumstances and only through 
the generation of wealth under private sector expansion 
can deprivation and unemployment be ameliorated represents 
a major shift in the philosophy of area based economic 
development.
Later chapters of the Thesis will attempt to test the 
effect area-based policies have had on the welfare of 
communities on Clydeside, and consider alternative and 
possibly more effective ways that the public expenditure 
channelled into deprived communities could be used to 
generate work and incomes for local residents.
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CHAPTER NINE
GOVERNMENT MANPOWER POLICY AND 
THE UNEMPLOYED
1. Introduction
In addition to its economic and urban policies. Central 
Government has used manpower policy as one of the main tools 
with which it has responded to rising unemployment. As a 
result, large amounts of resources have been channelled into 
programmes involving unemployed people. Since their origins 
in the mid-1970s, these programmes have developed not only 
in terms of their number and scale, but in their underlying 
aims and purposes. This chapter examines the evolution of 
manpower policies for the unemployed and how these have 
changed as the numbers out of work have risen. It identifies 
the new directions in which manpower policy has been moving 
in the early 1980s and concludes by considering what this is 
likely to mean for the unemployed and projects designed to 
help them.
Modernising the Public Enployment 
Service
Major Central Government intervention into the labour 
market dates from the first decade of the twentieth century 
when the State found a new role for itself in ameliorating 
unemployment and destitution by helping the natural labour 
market function more effectively. The establishment in 1909 
of a national network of Labour Exchanges allowed a better 
linkage between the "sellers* of labour and the "buyers*
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and laid the administrative and policing framework for the 
development of unemployment insurance from 1911, Apart from 
controls exerted on the workforce during wartime, the basic 
structure of the manpower system laid down during the early 
period remained unchanged for almost sixty years. Some 
consideration had been given during fluctuations in the 
economy in the late 1950s as to how the supply of trained 
labour might be increased and the public services infra­
structure improved to ensure effective growth once industry 
revived, but it was not until the early 1970s that the existing 
system was firmly seen to be unsuitable to a modern labour 
market, and changed. The public employment service was 
scrutinised as part of an overall examination of the public 
administration system. Opportunities for adult retraining 
were identified as inadequate and the Employment Exchanges, 
still closely associated with the administration of unemploy­
ment benefit, were seen as a limited service failing to
1meet the needs of a wider client group in the labour market.
Institutional responsibility for manpower policy 
was re-organised by the 1973 Employment and Training Act 
which established a new semi-autonomous organisation; 
the Manpower Services Commission (MSC). Taking over certain 
responsibilities previously with the Department of Errploy- 
ment, the new agency was thought better able to develop 
a corporate and co-ordinated national strategy than a 
Department of Central Government. An initial priority 
of the MSC was to improve and expand industrial training 
to meet expected national manpower requirements. This 
involved the Commission in a wide range of activities.
The Training Opportunities Scheme, for example, launched 
earlier in 1972 to expand the opportunities for adults 
wishing to train or retrain, was increased, and financial 
help was given to industrial training boards along with 
assistance to develop a strategic long term view of their
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industry's training requirements.
Probably the principal development at this time, 
was the Job Centre Programme. Launched in 1973, this 
phased out the existing Employment Exchanges, which were 
often situated in dilapidated buildings in unattractive 
locations and retained the stigma of the dole queue, 
replacing them with new style offices conveniently placed 
in main shopping streets. Here people could search for 
jobs themselves among the shop front displays of vacancies, 
and could call on trained staff for advice or for more 
specialist services such as occupational guidance. The 
principal function of the new Job Centres was to assist 
in the restructuring of industry and accommodate the 
anticipated expansion of employment consequent upon the 
success of the Government's industrial strategy.
3. Temporary Expedients
By the mid-1970s worrying changes were taking place 
in the economic context within which a manpower policy 
geared to full employment and growth would operate. Both 
unemployment and inflation were rising, industry was 
becoming more capital intensive with a declining capacity 
to absorb labour, and demographic trends indicated that 
greater numbers of people would soon be joining the labour 
force. Even on the most optimistic forecasts the MSC 
recognised that unemployment would probably remain at a 
historically high level until 1978-79.^ Nevertheless, 
the problem was treated as a temporary cyclical downturn 
in the economy, and in 1976 the MSC announced it was 
gearing its services towards the Government's target level 
of unemployment in 1979 of 700,000, However, it also 
noted that it should be prepared to deal with a range of 
possibilities, and less fortunate alternatives, which
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suggests that people had some idea that high, long term 
unemployment was a distinct possibility, but were not 
able or willing to openly confront the prospect.
As the unemployment situation subsequently worsened, 
a number of special employment measures were tagged on to 
mainstream policy. Their main characteristics were the 
reduction of the labour supply by providing temporary 
work or training, protecting existing jobs by subsidising 
wages, and encouraging early retirement. The first major 
provision, the Job Creation Programme (JCP), had been 
launched in 1975 to provide short term socially useful 
jobs for people who would otherwise have been unemployed 
and provided work lasting between six months and one year
for around 200,000 people during its two years of operation.
This was followed a year later by the Work Experience 
Programme (WEP), a three year programme to give unemployed 
sixteen to eighteen year olds an introduction to, and 
experience of, working life.
Although both JCP and WEP were intended to run for 
only short fixed periods, they signalled the beginning of 
other such measures. Political concern about unemployment, 
particularly among school leavers was rising. And, since
the proportions of 16, 17 and 18 year olds not in full
time education in Britain is higher than any comparable /€
economy, it was natural that Government found itself 
looking for a device to occupy and control large numbers of 
youngsters who in other countries are in some sort of 
education or training. The MSC was the instrument chosen 
to fill the gap left by the failure of the educational 
system and a working party was set up to examine how the 
existing WEP could be rapidly expanded and brought within 
a coherent administrative framework without incurring major
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additional costs. The outcome of this study in 1977, 
argued for a widespread temporary programme of counter 
cyclical measures to protect the motivation and abilities 
of a significant proportion of the working population, and 
advocated an extensive package of work experience and work 
preparation schemes for unemployed youth through a range 
of community business sponsors.
Rapid political support for the recommendations led to
the establishment of the Youth Opportunities Programme
(YOP) in 1978. In its first year YOP provided temporary
employment for up to six months after leaving school for
almost 190,000 young people. The scheme soon received
further commitment from Government and a subsequent decision
to fund the scheme until 1983 indicated that special youth
employment measures would be required over a longer
period than first thought. Participants on YOP received
a tax free weekly allowance, which in 1982 amounted to
£25, and sponsors were reimbursed for administration and
some overhead costs. The programme was designed to cause
least interference in the labour market. It was not about
the generation of jobs for young people, but sought to
increase their chances of securing employment by giving
them an experience of working life during which they
could assess their own capabilities, develop skills and
5test occupational preferences. Youngsters were involved 
in a variety of schemes under YOP, the largest of which 
was Work Experience on Employers' Premises (WEEP) which 
claimed around two-thirds of all YOP trainees in 1981-82.
In the wake of youth measures, a programme for adult 
and long term unemployed was introduced in March 1978.
The existing JCP was replaced by the Special Temporary 
Employment Programme (STEP). The scheme depended on sponsors 
coming forward and was to make 25,000 temporary jobs
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available each year, a less extensive provision than YOP,
with priority given to those aged nineteen to twenty-four
and jobless for six months or more, those over twenty-five
years who had been out of work for over a year, and those
areas of the country where unemployment was highest.
Places on the scheme lasted a maximum of twelve months and
wages were paid at the agreed local rate for the job with
sponsors fully reimbursed for wages of employees and 
6supervisors.
A number of other manpower measures were introduced
around this time in response to rising unemployment. The
Temporary Employment Subsidy (TES), which operated between
1975 and 1979, sought to protect existing jobs by providing
employers who deferred ten or more redundancies with a
subsidy of £25 per week for a year and £10 per week for the
six months thereafter for each worker whose redundancy
was avoided. The largest number of people covered by TES
was 200,000 in May 1977, Although research suggested that
7TES involved a positive net cost to the Exchequer, the 
possibility of displacement effects among other firms and 
across geographical areas caused the EEC to interpret the 
scheme as a subsidy to wages and therefore infringing on 
the Treaty of Rome and order the practice to cease. It 
was replaced by the Temporary Short Term Working Compensa­
tion Scheme, which subsidised employers to divert potential 
redundancies into short time working. The final applica­
tions for this scheme were taken in March 1984. A. further 
initiative, also designed to get unemployed people off 
the unemployment register and thus reduce the increasingly 
shocking statistics of those out of work, was the Tob 
Release Scheme. Introduced by the Department of Enployment 
in 1977, a weekly allowance is paid to workers to retire 
early provided the employer agrees to replace the retiring 
worker with someone who is unemployed.
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There have been other schemes, but the main focus 
of special employment measures has been on work experience 
and training for young people and job creation for adult 
and long term unemployed. These two areas have claimed 
an increasingly large share of the MSC's total budget.
The largest proportion has gone on youth measures, which 
reflects the political priority given to responding to 
rising unemployment among school leavers. A comparative 
neglect has been shown to the adult unemployed, despite 
evidence which suggests that it is the mature worker, not 
the young, who suffer most from unemployment.^ Indeed 
upon taking office the Conservative Government cut the 
STEP budget for 1979/80 from £84 million to £54 million 
and limited its application to a number of the more deprived 
regional and urban areas. However, as long term unemploy­
ment rose in areas previously unaccustomed to the problem, 
STEP became thoroughly inadequate both in scale and 
geographical relationship to the problem, and a new scheme, 
the Community Enterprise Programme (CEP), was introduced 
in April 1981 to replace it. The cash limit for CEP in 
1981/82 of £95 million was a substantial increase on 
s t e p 's final year expenditure of £47 million, and, instead 
of being spatially concentrated, CEP operated nationwide 
with sponsors able to arrange off the job training and 
further education to help employers develop or acquire 
skills. YOP on the other hand, from beginning as a 
temporary measure to assist a minority of disadvantaged 
teenagers, developed steadily into a mass programme for 
school leavers. As unemployment rose, target figures were 
successively revised in mid-year to meet new guaranteed 
levels of provision promised by politicians. The annual 
throughput of YOP was raised to 440,000 in November 1980 
and to 550,000 a year later.
By the beginning of 1982, special measures, such as
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YOP and WEP, instead of being phased out as was originally 
intended, had been expanded rapidly. Over the five year 
period 1976-81, the proportion of the MSC's total budget 
spent on special programmes rose from 8% to 43% and a 
new division, Special Programmes, was added to the MSC*s
existing structure to administer them. Original notions
about improving people's employability and providing 
temporary morale boosting employment at a time when other 
job prospects were low were retained as schemes were expan­
ded. However, as high unemployment persisted, these 
became progressively more inappropriate and programmes 
grew to be steadily out of touch with the social and economic 
realities of the labour market. Youth policies, for example, 
became less successful in meeting their principal objective 
of getting young people into formal employment. Although 
the WEEP scheme began promisingly with around 78% of
trainees subsequently moving into full time jobs in
9September 1978, the numbers finding jobs fell steadily,
and by May 1981 only around 31% of participants secured
10work after leaving the scheme.
Apart from declining vacancies, other aspects of work 
experience and job creation measures served to reduce 
their effectiveness in ameliorating unemployment. A great 
deal of concern was expressed over the possible substitu­
tion effects of these policies, with trade unions, particularly 
those representing low paid workers, worried about the 
displacement of adult jobs by YOP trainees. The extent 
of the problem was difficult to determine precisely, though 
it was estimated that between one quarter and one third
of YOP trainees had been used by employers as substitutes
11for paid employees. Further evidence suggests that a 
significant proportion of those kept on after completion 
of YOP were the better quality trainees who would possibly 
have been taken on anyway. In around one third of the
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cases employers were found to have used the scheme as a
12screening process for potential new recruits. In respect 
to adult job creation, the concern that schemes should not 
interfere with the normal workings of the labour market 
often led to a situation where contradictory considerations 
operated. Jobs supported were supposed to be socially 
useful and worthwhile, of benefit to both those employed 
and the community. But at the same time they had to be 
temporary and not substitutes for jobs that otherwise would 
have been done. Not surprisingly, the difficulty of 
adapting these programmes for normal economic activity 
resulted both in a lack of sponsors coming forward from the 
private sector and considerable difficulties for groups 
who tried to use them for economic development purposes. 
Consequently, temporary jobs were often confined to relatively 
low quality local authority employment.
The educational input to YOP schemes was also well below 
what the MSC had hoped for, and training often fell short 
of young people's expectations and requirements. Partly 
this was because in order to meet early targets, the balance 
of YOP places had shifted away from more expensive schemes 
which offered a greater potential for planned education and 
training, such as Training Workshops, towards cheaper place­
ments with private employers for work experience. However, 
it probably also reflected the initial aim of YOP, as being 
to improve the employability of a disadvantaged minority with 
little philosophy about training attached to it. Subsequent 
attempts to improve the quality of the scheme were inhibited 
by the pressure of expanding it into a mass programme, and 
the fact that those who became instructors and supervisors 
tended to be skilled males, previously unemployed, without 
teaching qualifications or experience, who generally found
great difficulty in developing an educational role wider than
13teaching their own trade skills. Moreover, since they were
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given no security of employment or firm plan for their 
futures, it is not surprising that many were not particularly 
good teachers.
4. Changing Directions in Manpower
Policy ___ ____________
By the early 1980s policy makers regarded existing special 
employment measures, which had been developed in an ad hoc 
fashion largely in response to political pressure, as having 
many limitations but capable of providing a base and some 
useful lessons for the construction of new policies, and 
they began to discuss how these could be developed. Since 
then major changes have taken place in manpower policy, and 
others may be forthcoming, which create a new set of 
relationships between this area of Government policy, the 
unemployed and the economy.
In 1981 the MSC launched an examination of how an 
entirely new braining system for young people and for adults 
requiring training or retraining could be established.
Through a consultative document, ®A New Training Initiative*, 
three main objectives were identified to act as guidelines 
around which much of subsequent policy would be based. The 
first was to develop skill training, including apprenticeship, 
in such a way as to enable individuals entering at different 
ages and with different educational attainments to acquire 
agreed standards of skill appropriate to the jobs available 
and to provide them with a basis for progression through 
future learning. The second was to move to a position 
where all young people under the age of eighteen had the 
opportunity either of continuing in full time education or 
of entering a period of planned work experience combining 
work related training and education. The third was to open 
up widespread opportunities for adults, whether employed, 
unemployed or returning to work, to acquire, increase or
240.
update their skill and knowledge during the course of their 
working lives.
(i) Policies for Youth
Against a background of urban rioting the subsequent
debate focussed largely on the development of youth
measures. In December 1981 both the MSC and the Government
produced separate recommendations. The Government's
plans, outlined in a White Paper, were to replace YOP
by a scheme which would cater for 300,000 young people
annually, the aim being "to equip them to adapt successfully
to the demands of employment" by providing them with the
type of skills employers would need and, in the process,
15"get a better trained and more flexible workforce".
The proposal included reducing the existing YOP allowance 
from £25 to £15 and encouraging participation in the 
scheme by withdrawing supplementary benefit from any 
unemployed school leaver until September of the following 
year. These suggestions were strongly criticised, and the 
scheme itself was widely felt to be inadequate and retain 
the major limitations of YOP. The MSC's recommendations 
differed in a number of respects and received a more 
favourable reception. They argued that training should be 
made available for all young people, and made no reference 
to compulsory participation or changes in the qualifying 
criteria for supplementary benefit. The emphasis, however, 
still remained on vocational training, as one might expect 
given the strong business and industrial interests 
represented by the CBI and the TUG within the MSC,
Following these two sets of proposals concerning a 
new Youth Training Scheme (YTS), a Youth Task Group was 
set up to review the scheme and make recommendations.
The Group brought together high level representatives from
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the CBI, the TUC, the voluntary sector, the careers and 
information service, the MSC and relevant Government 
Departments; a composition described as "almost exclus­
ively male, middle aged," and deliberating on a training 
scheme which was going to affect the "majority of every 
generation of school leavers until the end of the century 
and probably beyondo"^^ The Group's recommendations were
17published in April 1982. They received unanimous 
support from the MSC, and were subsequently accepted by 
the Government which would probably have found rejection 
difficult without damaging the credibility of the MSC, 
or more significantly, the new Chairman of the Commission 
which it had recently appointed.
The new YTS began replacing YOP in April 1983, and 
by September of that year all sixteen year olds who had 
left full time education were guaranteed a place on the 
scheme as were some seventeen year olds, the eventual aim 
being to cover all youngsters in these age groups. 
Participation is voluntary and the scheme intends to 
provide an integrated programme of training, work experience 
and relevant education, usually for one year, at the end 
of which successful trainees will receive a certificate 
validated by a recognised body, like City and Guilds- 
Drawing on a wide range of sponsors from public, private 
and voluntary sectors, two modes of funding are available. 
Where a complete programme is provided, the sponsor is 
paid £1,850 which includes the trainee's weekly allowance 
of £25. If the sponsor also operates as a managing agent, 
whose responsibility it is to ensure that trainees under 
other sponsors receive the correct balance of education 
and training, an additional payment of £100 per trainee 
is made. Alternatively the MSC itself can function as 
the managing agent, and arrange with sponsors of community 
projects, training workshops, information technology
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centres and so on, to provide schemes for training and
work experience. Sponsors can add to the trainee's
allowance from their own resources to reflect the value
of productive work done. Although this concession was
partly made to allow trade unions to adopt a negotiating
role for trainees, research suggests that by the close of
1983 few trainees were receiving more than their £25 
1ftallowance. By April 1984 460,000 places had been created 
on YTS of which about 340,000 had been taken up, the short­
fall reflecting a significant overestimation of the 
demand for places partly caused by an unanticipated rise 
in the numbers of young people staying on at school 
beyond the minimum leaving age.
Although its origins lie in YOP, and many continue
to associate it with the old school of thought, policy
makers have attempted to distance YTS from the image of
being a temporary measure in response to high unemployment.
The Youth Task Group explicitly stated that "it was not
about youth unemployment", but "about providing a permanent
19bridge between school and work," As such, it represents 
an atteirpt to improve a system of industrial training 
which has been historically deficient. Traditionally 
the education system has been geared to the academically 
better able, with the majority of school leavers entering 
the labour market with little or no educational quali­
fications. Of those not securing an apprenticeship, the 
numbers of which fell by around 60% during the 1970s, 
only a small minority have received any formal educational 
and vocational preparation as part of their first
20 ftot
enployment. In this respect Britain ha^compared 
favourably with its other leading competitors. Young 
people in Germany, for example, have been almost six 
times as likely to enter formal apprenticeships lasting 
one or two years and which also incorporate elements of
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21further education.
Although improvements of the kind YTS intends to 
bring are required, two basic criticisms concern the 
timing of the scheme and the economic role it envisages 
for young people. The aims of YTS would have been ideal 
at a time of full employment when many young people 
entered work with little prospect of subsequent training 
or education. But when unemployment is high, and likely 
to remain that way, a main effect of training for work 
is likely to be an even fiercer competition among teen­
agers who have not moved onto higher education for the 
existing jobs available. It may also lead to an increase 
in the qualifications demanded of young people by employers 
The MSC have predicted that only 200,000 of the 500,000 
sixteen year olds leaving full-time education in 1983-84 
will find jobs, and, when distributional considerations 
are taken into account, the prospects for young people 
living in job-starved communities will be bleaker still.
To cater for the numbers of young people who will be 
excluded from formal work is not the purpose of YTS. As 
the Government's White Paper stated, people are seen as 
"our pre-eminent resource", and on the assumption that 
new technology can improve productivity if a "better 
educated, better trained and more adaptable workforce" is 
made available, the objective of YTS is to equip young 
people with the skills required by industry.
The YTS is complemented by a Department of Employment 
initiative which builds upon another assumption within 
current Conservative economic theory - that high youth 
unemployment is a result of unreasonably high wage levels. 
The Young Workers Scheme (YWS), introduced in 1982, is 
designed to "encourage employers to take on more young 
people at wage rates which reflect their lack of training
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22and relative inexperience," From April 1984 employers
can receive a subsidy of £15 for each young person provided
that their net earnings do not exceed £50 per week.
As eligibility is restricted to people aged seventeen or
who having left school at sixteen have been unemployed
for at least a year, the scheme is tailored to improve
recruitment into YTS and increase the likelihood that
people leaving YTS will move into jobs. As the incomes
they will receive will be low, YWS essentially represents
a Government Department actively subsidising a reduction
in the wages of young people despite having a statutory
obligation to enforce minimum wage orders. There is
evidence that in certain areas, like shop and farming
work, where statutory minimum wage levels exist, that
by operating the YWS the Department of Employment is
encouraging employers to break its own rules. Furthermore
a significant number of jobs subsidised by YWS appear
to have existed beforehand, and other forms of abuse, such
as illegal deductions of pay and threats against workers
23seeking union recognition, have also been revealed.
(ii) Policies for Unemployed Adults
Programmes for unemployed adults, although given a 
lower priority than youth strategies, have also developed 
in ways which have broken new ground for the MSC and 
indicate the likely role this area of manpower policy will 
play in a period of high unemployment. In the March 
Budget of 1982 the Government announced it planned to 
provide an additional 100,000 places for the long term 
unemployed on top of the existing 30,000 under the CEP 
which was to be replaced. The plan, which was to engage 
the long term unemployed in socially useful activity in 
return for a wage marginally higher than the allowance 
they were receiving in supplementary benefit, met with
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widespread political opposition. Although unable to
block its eventual implementation, opposition was
sufficiently intense for the MSC to discuss ways it could
be overcome and the new Community Programme (CP)
successfully operationalised. These included denying
trade unions a veto on projects, by-passing Area Boards
if they were unlikely to approve rejected schemes,
pressurising recalcitrant local authorities, and offering
voluntary organisations special deals to gain their 
24support.
The CP began in September 1982 with a commitment
for two years to cater for the same groups as the former
CEP and provide them with twelve months work in projects
of an environmental, social or cultural nature. The
widespread suspicion that CP was a second rate replacement
for CEP, lacking in quantity and inadequate in the extent
of training and work experience it provided, was reflected
in the small number of places provided in the early
25months of the scheme. This prompted the MSC to embark 
on a gentle lobbying of potential sponsors to show a 
stronger backing and commitment. The CP is administered 
through a number of managing agents who allocate workers 
to a range of sponsors. Sponsors are paid £440 to cover 
costs for each place provided, £60 per week to meet the 
wages of each worker, plus employers' national insurance 
and the salaries of supervisors calculated at one per 
ten places. Managing Agents receive £lOO per annum for 
each place provided. Sponsors can pay workers up to 
£92.50 per week, higher if they provide the extra money 
themselves, but because resources are allocated on the 
basis of an average payment of £60 per week, it means 
that for every worker earning over £6C^  another will have 
to earn less than the average, which at standard rates
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of pay determines that this job will be part-time. The 
part-time element allowed a greater coverage of the 
adult long term unemployed than under CEP and represented 
yet another device for using money to get as many people 
as possible off the unenployment register for each pound 
spent. However, even with its targets fully met, CP 
is likely only to cover around one-tenth of its eligible 
population.
Training under CP is given very low priority and can 
only be paid for by deducting money from overhead expenses 
or wages budgets. Indeed in the MSC's deliberations on 
adult training generally, there has been little mention 
of the problems of marginal workers and other disadvantaged 
groups like women, ethnic minorities and the disabled.
The emphasis is set firmly on the economic role of policy. 
For example, in a discussion paper on adult training in 
1983, intended to stimulate widespread public debate 
about the issue, the MSC identified the main purposes of 
new training and retraining programmes as being to raise 
the productivity and flexibility of the labour force; 
enable management and other employees adjust quickly and 
effectively to new methods, processes, products, services 
and technologies; overcome skill shortages and ensure 
that training in new skills is sufficient; help those 
starting up new firms to establish business activity 
successfully; and enable individuals to update and 
extend their s k i l l s . T h e s e  aims, and policies based 
on them, may well take the improvements to Britain's 
system of industrial training begun by YTS some way 
further. But a market led approach to adult training 
has little to offer that proportion of the labour force 
not required by industry, or those parts of the country, 
like some inner city areas and large peripheral housing 
estates, where incoming investment and the demand for new 
skills is less likely.
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Although education and training are seen essentially 
in terms of preparing people for work, there are some 
indications that the MSC is considering ways that it 
can become more relevant to the unemployed and deprived 
communities. The Director of the Commission has indicated 
that the MSC intends to increase its involvement in 
community based projects which have been developed by 
local people and others such as local authorities, business­
men and voluntary groups, and which encourage economic 
regeneration by attempting to draw on resources from a 
variety of agencies. Instead of individual programmes 
being promoted by separate sections of the MSC, involve­
ment in these "collaborative local projects" would be 
characterised by a new style of policy delivery under 
which bits of existing programmes, like YTS and CP, might
be adapted to help local communities put together schemes
29for social and economic development.
(iii) New Enterprise
While it seems poised to become more amenable to 
locally based and self-help action, the MSC has already 
broken new ground for manpower policy in an area not 
previously considered legitimate for public agencies - 
the direct creation of new productive enterprise. In a 
joint initiative with a number of institutions of higher 
education, the MSC runs the New Enterprise Programme 
(NEP). Under this, potential entrepreneurs, who have 
to be unemployed and over the age of nineteen, participate 
in sixteen week courses involving both intensive residen­
tial study and the practical establishment of the new 
business with expert tuition and supervision given 
throughout. The MSC pays the institution's fees, provides 
participants with a full subsistence allowance for the
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duration of the course, and meets expenses during the non- 
residential phase. The total cost to the Commission is 
around £4,000 per individual. In 1983 around thirteen 
courses operated, with only around fifteen individuals 
on each. It is not expected that the scheme will cater 
for more than 200 in total each year. Intake is highly 
selective and organisers report low failure rates among 
the businesses which have been established.
Another initiative geared to the creation of new 
economic activity is the Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS), 
Introduced in 1982 in five pilot areas and given national 
coverage in August 1983, the EAS attempts to draw the 
long term unemployed into self-employment by providing 
an allowance of £40 per week for people who have been 
out of work for six months or more and with £1,000 to 
invest in a new business. An evaluation of the scheme 
by the MSC at the pilot stage found the main beneficiaries 
to be middle aged married males who had been made redundant 
from industries where they had often held professional 
or managerial positions and who considered themselves 
to have possessed experience directly relevant to the 
business before they set up. At the time the overall 
impact appeared small. Only around 13% of applicants 
indicated that they would not have started their business 
in the absence of the allowance, and few thought it 
likely that they would take on any employees.
Both the NEP and the EAS may hold only limited 
prospects of creating entrepreneurial activity among 
individuals not already on the fringe of self-employment, 
but this need not mean that programmes to encourage people to 
set up indigenous small scale enterprises are inappropriate 
for other groups. There can be several reasons why 
certain unemployed people do not take advanatage of
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existing provisions, though they might be better able to 
if policies were developed to correspond more to their 
needs. The NEP, for example, is interested primarily in 
those already with an advanced potential to become, successful 
small businessmen, while the EAS is merely a wages subsidy 
and, despite targetting itself on the long term unemployed, 
where educational and cultural barriers to self-employment 
are likely to be most intense, it provides no educational 
or training input. Furthermore, the EAS is designed only 
to support self-employment and forms of collectively owned 
enterprise, like community businesses which will be discussed 
later, have not been able to use the scheme. In these 
cases although unemployed people, if recruited, may 
participate in the management of the enterprise, their 
official status is still considered to be 'employee* and 
not 'entrepreneur*, thus precluding help from the EAS.
5. Conclusions
From their origins in the mid 1970s, programmes for 
the unemployed had by the close of the decade become a 
large part of the MSC's work and a huge demander of its 
resources. They were founded on the hope that unemployment 
would eventually fall and thereby erase the need for them.
But as high unemployment has persisted, with no sign of 
falling significantly, approaches rooted in this tradition 
have been forced to change. Manpower strategy has moved 
away from directly ameliorating unemployment to become 
increasingly concerned with improving the quality of the 
labour force as a resource to make industry more productive 
and efficient - while still performing the politically 
essential task of reducing the unemployment figures. Youth 
policies, for example, no longer seek to provide temporary 
relief from unemployment but are geared to improving the 
system of industrial training through which young workers 
will become more adaptable to the requirements of potential
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employers. Although coping with unemployment is not 
the main priority, certain policies appear to have been 
tailored to accommodating the problem in certain ways. In 
the CP, for example, the tacit pressure on sponsors to hire 
part-timers inherent in the scheme is perhaps a recognition 
that more flexibility and greater toleration of long-term 
under-employment will be acceptable.
Although a declining priority towards the unemployed
is evident, manpower policies will continue to have an
important bearing on the fortunes of those excluded from
secure employment and the role they will play in the economy.
For many, participation in schemes like YTS and CP will be
no more than a postponement or temporary release from
unemployment. For the young in particular, this postponement
could be quite lengthy. On leaving school, successive
spells on YTS, employment under the YWS and finally work
on the CP, could take them several years into their adult
working life. The incomes people on these schemes receive
are being kept low, or forced further down, as a result
of deliberate Government strategy. Those affected tend to
be the poorer and less fortunate workers, and they face a
future in which their living standards will be lower and
their employment less secure than they would probably
have experienced in the past. On the CP, for example,
very few workers, possibly only those who are single and
living at home or unemployed women who are not entitled
to benefit, will receive incomes higher than what they are
31entitled to on social security. Some unemployed people 
will become better trained or maintain a certain level of 
morale as a result of participating on these programmes, 
and may, therefore, stand a better chance than other 
disadvantaged workers of securing jobs if the demand for 
labour rises. However, perhaps more significant effects
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will be the benefits which flow to industrial interests 
and others who are doing relatively well despite the 
economic crisis, through the avoidance of potential unrest 
and the maintenance of a trained and relatively cheap 
reserve of labour.
Despite these rather bleak prospects, there may also
be some hopeful possibilities. Programmes for young people
and the adult unemployed will remain important features of
Government manpower policy. In 1985-86, for example, the
proportion of total MSC expenditure estimated to be spent
32on YTS and CP is 46% and 26% respectively. How these 
programmes are implemented and how adaptable they become, 
will largely determine what can be achieved by those who 
use them to support locally based action. Hopefully they 
will become more supportive of economic projects initiated 
or targetted on communities and groups in greatest distress. 
This could involve providing a demand element to current 
supply based public sector economic regeneration policies 
and allowing greater flexibility in the use of programmes 
like YTSI CP and EAS for community based economic development 
initiatives.
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CHAPTER TEN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AND 
EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVES
1. Introduction
During the debate on local government reorganisation
in the early 1970s, recommendations that local authorities
extend their role to encompass 'the overall economic,
1
cultural and physical well being* of the community were
2
soon accepted within Government policy. These sentiments 
have since proved prophetic. A decade of almost continuous 
recession and rising unemployment has left many local 
authorities with enormous financial, environmental and 
social problems. Rate income has been reduced by 
industrial closures, and the loss of jobs and selective 
population decline have reduced local spending power 
and community wealth. Acute problems of physical 
dereliction and polarised and deprived communities are 
exerting intense demands on local authority services 
and finances at a time when their resources are diminishing 
and subject to a tightening control and cutback by 
Central Government. As traditional options for renewal 
and economic regeneration disappear, local authorities 
have been forced to search for solutions themselves and 
investigate alternative ways in which their powers and 
skills can be adapted to secure new investment and jobs. 
This Chapter reviews how local authorities are responding 
to these new challenges. After briefly sketching the 
economic development powers and the main sources of 
finance available to local authorities, recent organisa-
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tioDal and procedural changes introduced to facilitate 
economic policies will he discussed. Following this I 
shall draw out the main areas of activity, citing 
illustrations and the more innovative initiatives as 
an indication of the direction in which local economic 
policies are moving.
2. The Scope for Action: Powers and
Resources  ________
Local authorities have no specific statutory 
duties relating to economic development. Although 
policies concerning housing, planning, transport and 
so on, will have an important bearing on supply side 
aspects of the local economy, authorities wishing to 
play a more direct role in promoting industry, with 
the exception of a small number who acquired special 
powers through local Acts of Parliament, have relied 
on the powers contained in public general Acts which 
can be exercised by any local authority. The legislation 
outlined below is that pertaining to England and Wales.
In Scotland the powers are broadly similar, but the 
complexion of local economic development is often 
different because of the prominent role played by the 
SDA, which involves itself in local regeneration policies, 
jointly negotiating an economic development package 
with the relevant local authorities and providing a large 
proportion of resources necessary to implement it. The 
role of the SDA is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters 8 and 14.
The Local Authorities (Land) Act 1963 allows 
authorities to acquire and develop land for industry 
and commerce. More general powers to acquire land, 
erect buildings and undertake other works in the interests
256
of proper planning are contained in the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1971. The 1963 legislation also allows 
authorities to grant loans of up to 75% for the erection 
of buildings on land sold or leased by the authority. 
General powers to assist industry and commerce are also 
available in the Local Government Act 1972. Section III 
provides a general power to do anything conducive or 
incidental to the discharge of any local authority 
function. Section 137 of the same Act allows local 
authorities to incur expenditure up to the value of a 
2p rate product in the interests of their area or 
inhabitants. Many councils have relied heavily on 
this provision to raise funds for their economic strategies 
In addition to these powers, authorities designated 
under the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 have some further 
powers which have already been described in a previous 
chapter on Central Government's economic policies.
The disparate and ad hoc collection of rights 
regarding the role of local authorities in assisting 
industry and commerce has made for an inequitable distri­
bution of powers and resources which has often borne 
little relation to the severity of the problems being 
experienced. Although in no way adequate to reverse 
decline, Tyne and Wear has had its own Local Act, 
enjoyed Special Development Area Status, is a designated 
Partnership area and contains one of the Government's 
enterprise zones, whereas Sheffield has had no specific 
local powers and lies outside the main provisions of 
Government urban and regional policy, forcing it to rely 
on general powers and locally mustered resources. In 
1980 the Government set up a Committee to review the 
appropriate role for local government in assisting 
industry and commerce and the legislative implications of
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this. Reporting in July 1980 the committee argued that 
local government should have a role working alongside 
the private sector and Central Government and identified 
two options for legislation: either broadly based
but limited financial powers could be given to all 
authorities, or powers could focus on those with more 
severe economic problems, enacting specific and wider
3
ranging powers for them. The Government's Official 
response came in a Green Paper in March 1982 which 
suggested that local authorities be allowed to give 
greater financial assistance to private sector land and 
building projects and that all authorities be allowed to 
spend only up to one %p rate per annum to assist small 
independent firms employing no more than twenty-five 
people, apart from districts designated under the Inner 
Urban Areas Act which could spend up to the 2p rate 
on firms regardless of size or status.
The Government's suggestions were so unpopular that 
it was forced to change its plans and introduce amendments 
to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 
enacted in July 1982. Provisions within this legislation, 
while extending the powers of the Local Authority (Land) 
Act 1963 to allow authorities to provide more support to 
private sector land and building initiatives, clarified 
the use of the 2p rate provision for all authorities 
without any restrictions concerning the nature of firms 
helped whether through loans, guarantees or grants. The 
Act also clarified the use of the Employment and Training 
Act 1973 by authorities entering into arrangements with 
the MSG in order to fund training and employment 
initiatives.
Although these developments protected and extended
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the powers available, the main barriers to economic 
development activity are not legislative but financial.
A survey by Boddy (1982), for example, found that none 
of the authorities he interviewed had volunteered lack 
of powers as a constraint on activity? the overriding 
obstacle experienced was lack of financial resources.^ As 
Central Government's resources targetted at area-based 
economic development are provided selectively, many areas 
with severe problems miss out. Although the legal 
provisions exist for these authorities to raise money 
locally, effective controls over local government expend­
iture exercised by Central Government make it difficult 
to do so without resources being drawn from other services, 
like refuse collection and fire prevention, which are 
financed from the same part of an authority's budget 
as economic development. Recent Central Government 
policies have actually extended central control over the 
ability of local authorities to raise resources locally 
through the rates and new measures have been introduced 
to control capital expenditure by penalising authorities 
who exceed their spending targets (ie * rate-capping*).
The targets for local authority revenue expenditure 
are assessed each year by Central Government through a 
Grant Related Expenditure Assessment. Authorities who 
spend above their targets are penalised in two ways.
First the contribution made by Central Government 
through the Rate Support Grant is substantially reduced. 
Second, Government also sets annual expenditure targets 
and authorities who exceed these suffer the holding 
back of grant which they otherwise would have received.
The severity of these penalties can mean that the amount 
of money an overspending authority can lose through the 
holding back of grant can far exceed that which they
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overspend. For Merseyside County Council in 1984-5, 
for example, this system has meant that local rate 
payers have had to pay £3 for every £l the Council
5has spent beyond its target figure for total expenditure.
Faced with these constraints some local authorities 
have sought alternative ways to fund their economic 
policies. Partnership with private developers has 
become particularly popular and over half the total 
stock of small factory units in England and Wales have 
been provided in this way, A small number have also 
drawn on the pension funds of local government staff 
to provide finance for industrial investment, though 
this has raised a number of problems concerning account­
ability and the determination of an acceptable rate of 
return. Others may be preparing for open conflict with 
Central Government. The crisis created by Liverpool 
City Council * s refusal in 1984 to agree a budget and 
the threatened intervention of Government by sending 
in commissioners to run the city was eventually overcome 
following Government's guarantee of additional resources, 
but similar conflicts could be emulated next year.
3, Organising for Economic Development 
new structures and procedures
Many local authorities have altered, some radically, 
their administrative structures to facilitate new 
economic strategies. It is common to find that 'industry* 
'economic* or 'employment* sub-committees have been 
established, which can be relatively powerful groups 
within a Council's overall committee structure, at 
times chaired by the leader of the Council and including 
chairmen of other major committees.  ^ Some authorities 
have given groups with such a remit full Committee status.
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It has also become a widespread practise to set up 
special teams and panels of officers who operate with 
an employment remit and frequently work to the Policy 
and Resources Committee or sub-committee of the authority. 
One of the most extensive programmes of internal restruc­
turing has been undertaken in Sheffield where the City 
Council has set up an Employment Committee consisting 
of twenty-one members and an Employment Department with 
a potential for sixty staff and an initial budget of 
£2^ 5 million drawn from the product of a 2p rate. The 
Department's role is to develop 'measures agreed by the 
City Council to defend, generate and expand employment 
within the city.'^
In addition, and in some cases as an alternative, 
to altering internal structures, authorities are 
involved in new non-statutory agencies, like local 
economic development corporations or agencies, or local 
enterprise trusts or boards, which operate relatively 
independently from the established local bureaucracy.
The impetus for their establishment has not, however, 
always come from a local authority. The private sector 
is heavily involved - as the next Chapter will show - 
and in many cases local authorities and representatives 
from business organisations operate these agencies in 
some form of partnership.
An important motive for an authority to establish 
a new external body can stem from the belief that it is 
faced with a number of difficulties, such as the scale 
of the problem, lack of available skills, and the day- 
to-day pressures involved in running local government, 
which would inhibit implementation of the desired economic 
strategy. This seems to have been the case in Greater
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Manchester where the County Council has established an 
Economic Development Corporation, a company limited by 
guarantee with £5 million funding to which the authority 
has transferred its entire Industrial Development Service. 
For similar reasons Enterprise Boards have been established 
by the Greater London Council (GLC) and the West Midlands 
County Council. Responsibility for implementing the 
GLC'5 industrial strategy is vested in the Greater 
London Enterprise Board (GLEB), again a company limited 
by guarantee and made up of Council members and represent­
atives from trade unions, co-operatives, finance, local 
government and technical institutions. GLEB's running 
costs of £30 million are realised from the GLC's rate 
revenue by use of the 2p rate provision. In the West 
Midlands the Enterprise Board also plays a central role 
in the authority's economic policies. It is responsible 
to the Economic Development Committee (EDC) of the 
Council, liaises with the Economic Development Unit (a 
group of officers), and is made up of ten Directors 
appointed by the EDC, six county councillors and seven 
staff. It also derives its budget - which totalled 
£7.4 million in 1982-83 - from rate revenue.
Where new external structures have been introduced 
by lower tier authorities, they give strong priority 
to job generation. In Wandsworth, for example, the 
Borough Council in partnership with the London Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry and Industrial Common Ownership 
Finance, has set up a Development Agency which aims to 
create 1,000 new jobs in new manufacturing co-operatives, 
become self-financing within five years, and eventually 
establish a revolving loan fund for investment in the 
firms it helps to create.^ Again with the emphasis on 
jobs, efforts begun by Cunningham District Council in
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the west of Scotland in response to a large scale employ­
ment contraction at the local ICI plant led to the estab­
lishment of an Enterprise Trust pulling together
representatives from public agencies and local business 
9interests. Initiative 
throughout the country.
s like these are taking place
In the terminology surrounding new groups and 
structures and the staff positions within them, labels 
like 'employment* and 'enterprise* are increasingly 
used in place of 'industrial' which perhaps indicates a growing 
sensitivity to jobs and the potential impact of local 
authority policies on employment. It is probably also 
due to recognition that 'industry* often means 'manufac­
turing' which is likely to employ a declining proportion 
of the labour force. 'Employment* and 'enterprise® can 
cover services as well. Developments in the London 
Borough of Lewisham reflect this. Following the 
appointment of an Industrial Development Officer in 
19 74, an Employment Sub-Committee and an Employment 
Promotion Unit was set up and a Principal Employment 
Officer appointed. Since then a Job Creation Officer 
has been added. However, it is not only in the names 
given to new structures which suggests priorities and 
policies are changing. Many of the new jobs emerging 
in relation to economic development are calling for new 
skills and capabilities. Job descriptions often demand 
a clear understanding of the needs of industry and the 
operation of trades unions, and indicate that recruits 
can expect to work closely with groups in the community, 
including trades councils, women's organisations, ethnic 
minorities and local universities and colleges.
To facilitate a new role in economic development, 
though also partly in response to central government
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directives,major changes have been made to local
planning policies and procedures. Planning regulations
relating to industry have been relaxed, industrial
areas located within residential localities are being
protected instead of being persecuted, and mixed use
redevelopments are being encouraged. Much of this
reverses the traditionally low priority which has been
given to industrial uses generally within land-use
planning when compared to housing and commercial ones.
Some authorities have gone further and given special
employment status to parts of their areas. Wandsworth,
for example, has designated a number of localities
'local employment areas' in which existing users are
given long term guarantees about the future of their 
11sites. A priority towards industry and jobs is also 
evident in the policy objectives of local and structure 
plans. The aims adopted by Lambeth are similar to 
those of many other authorities. Here the Development 
Plan's objectives are to minimise the disruption and 
displacement of firms by Council or other developments, 
resist changes of use from those which generate employ­
ment or indeed any that involve job loss, and give a
high priority to processing applications for industrial
12and commercial development. In addition to content, 
procedures by which plans are prepared and revised have 
also changed. Local plans for industrial areas are 
being produced more quickly and provisions are being 
introduced to overcome the inherent difficulties 
structure plans have in accommodating rapidly changing 
economic problems and needs. An example of the latter 
is the City of Newcastle's Employment Policy and 
Programme - an annually revised policy document which 
attempts to relate economic problems to potential policies 
undertaken by the entire range of public and private
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13agencies involved in economic development.
An active role for local authorities in economic 
development is not one which existing legislation 
accommodates easily or which Central Government encourages 
to any great extent. Neither, with the traditional 
and centralised bureaucracies of local government 
organised essentially for controlling and delivering 
services, has it been an easy one to develop. Nevertheless, 
many local authorities have felt some response to economic 
decline and high unemployment is necessary and have 
re-organised their structures and procedures - though 
not all in the same way - to enable action. The 
following section examines the various types of 
initiatives taking place.
4. Local Economic Initiatives
(i) Industrial Promotion
Industrial promotion is an area of local authority
activity which has grown in recent years. Although in
the early 1970s most County authorities and over one-
third of lower tier authorities in England and Wales
employed an officer specifically concerned with economic
development, their involvement was usually only on a
part-time b as i s . H o w e v e r ,  following local government
re-organisation, many new full time Industrial Development
Officers were appointed, and by 1981 almost three-
quarters of all authorities with a population greater
than 150,000, including the new towns, had an officer
employed full time on promoting economic development.
Most of these officers had teams of people working
l5under their direction. Their work mainly included
265.
publication and distribution of literature about the 
area, advertising in the media, producing posters, 
running exhibitions, sending out mail shots and following 
up leads from business and trade journals by travelling 
to meet businessmen.
The timing of this growth in promotional activity 
was unfortunate. It coincided with the onset of a 
recession which has diminished the level of economic 
activity in the country. The fall in the demand for 
labour has meant that firms have found it easier to 
secure the manpower and skills they require without 
moving in search of these as previously they might have 
had to do. As a result, the attraction of what poten­
tially mobile investment exists has become more diffi­
cult and competition among local authorities has 
intensified as the stock and mobility of investment has 
declined. The wastefulness of much of this promotional 
activity has led some authorities to adopt more 
sophisticated approach which might avoid duplicating 
the efforts of others and stand a better chance of 
success in a highly competitive market. Marketing 
and public relations consultants have been hired to 
run professional advertising campaigns, banks of detailed 
knowledge have been built up with a view to promoting 
development by offering to provide firms with the 
technical knowledge they might require, and efforts 
have been made to attract firms from North America,
Europe and Japan, Much of this remains highly speculative 
and often little reward is forthcoming. International 
promotion in particular demands more resources and 
expertise than domestic activity and carries the danger 
that resources may be too thinly deployed to have any 
meaningful effect. Indeed some cities have become 
disenchanted after only a brief period of involvement.
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Both Glasgow, which paid out around £190,000 in salary 
and expenses to maintain a business executive in Los 
Angeles for which it had received no incoming investment 
in return after two years, and the GLC, which had spent 
£80,000 through its London Industrial Centre on foreign 
promotion, have both scrapped their initiatives.
With the decline in footloose investment at home 
and abroad, there has been a noticable shift in promo­
tional activity away from the passive dissemination of 
information towards encouraging new indigenous enterprise 
and helping existing firms to expand. Some authorities 
draw on the technical and commercial expertise of local 
colleges, universities and business schools to provide 
small enterprise with advice, and campaigns and competi­
tions are being run through the local media to encourage 
people to establish new businesses. Swansea has been 
particularly inventive, and gives regular boradcasts 
through the local radio to inform local businessmen 
of the successes and difficulties being experienced 
among the business community.
(ii) Improving the Industrial Environment
Despite popular rhetoric about physical planning 
inhibiting economic development, local authorities have 
often found the likelihood of generating economic activity 
to be enhanced by actively improving the environment of 
industrial areas. The rehabilitation of small run down 
industrial localities was pioneered by Rochdale in the 
mid-1970s and here planners claimed that essentially 
physical measures involving small amounts of expenditure 
when coupled with a stated commitment to revive the area 
succeeded in improving economic stability, secured new 
investment and boosted confidence and morale among local
267.
businessmen. The concept was further developed in 
Tyne and Wear and Liverpool before emerging in a 
co-ordinated legal and financial framework in the 
provisions concerning Industrial Improvement Areas 
(IIAs) contained in the Inner Urban Areas Act. IIAs 
are small areas where firms can receive assistance 
with environmental improvement and grants of up to 
50% to convert or improve their premises, and they 
have become key elements in the industrial strategies 
of Partnership authorities. In 1982 Tyne and Wear and 
Liverpool had twenty-one and eight respectively and in 
areas not covered by partnership agreements authorities 
have developed similar schemes to IIAs. Policies of 
this sort certainly appear successful in improving 
the physical image of parts of cities. However, if 
the resources being released towards physical improve­
ment are to be justified in employment terms, then it 
remains to be conclusively shown that either further 
economic decline has been halted or that new indigenous 
investment has been generated as a result.
Another environmental initiative, much removed 
from starting with run down industrial districts, is 
the Science Park, which several authorities hope will 
stimulate economic development through the encouragement 
of high technology firms with a high growth potential. 
Generally these are serviced and landscaped industrial 
estates, restricted to tenants involved in research, 
development and production in high technology. They are 
often closely associated with a university or college.
In Glasgow, for example, the District Council, the SDA 
and the city's two universities, have collaborated to 
establish a Science Park with a capacity to provide 58,000 
sq.ft. of industrial premises at an estimated total cost
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17of £6 million. The concept of growth based on the
high technology small firm is a relatively new one in
Britain. The idea stems from America where there is
a much stronger tradition of the academic entrepreneur.
However, even there, less than half of the established
Science Parks appear successful and some are no more
l8than low density industrial estates.
(iii) Premises and Workshops for Industry
The development of factory premises and workshops
has become a widespread part of local authorities* work
since the mid-1970s. A survey of the provision of small
units up to 5,000 sq.ft. by all English local authorities
and new towns between 1976 and 1981 found that of
the authorities responding over 90% of Metropolitan
Borough Councils, all the Metropolitan County Councils
except the West Midlands, most of the New Towns and
just under half of the County and District Councils
had built small units over this period. Overall 54% of
responding authorities had provided premises with the
largest number of units (44%) accounted for by the District
Councils because of the greater number of these 
19authorities. However, although involvement was high 
among authorities in the assisted areas, the extent of 
provision was found to be smaller than in the non­
assisted areas. This partly reflects the particularly
low indices of entrepreneurship which exist in the least
20prosperous parts of Britain and the reluctance of 
the private sector to get involved in property development 
and management in these areas. In fact it seems that 
private developers found large factories so much more 
profitable to provide that they left a gap in the market - 
the small factories - which public authorities initially
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filled: since then private enterprise has come in to
build them too.
An important feature of recent public sector 
industrial premises policies has been to cater for 
people who appear to have potentially good business 
ideas but who may lack the necessary business or technical 
skills, or the resources to get started. Since around 
1980 authorities have increasingly sought to provide 
for this group through the development of enterprise 
workshops or seedbed centres. These tend to be sheltered 
environments of subsidised and often very small workshop 
spaces. On-site management services frequently provide 
telephone answering, letter writing, VAT and PAYE and 
other business services to tenants. Technical and 
management advice may also be available and in some schemes 
access to communal machinery, heating, lighting, mainten­
ance, rates and so on are provided free of charge. The 
intention is often to nurse the tenant to a position 
of competitiveness and viability and techniques like a 
sliding rental scale which subsidises the business during 
its early period have been employed for this purpose. 
Certain schemes also operate a formal training initiative 
in conjunction with providing premises. The New Enterprise 
Workshop in Newcastle, for example, encourages new tenants 
to enrol on a business course run by the local polytechnic 
and designed with the workshop clients in mind.
Another type of scheme, closely related to the 
enterprise workshop idea, is the innovation centre or 
venture workshop. However, instead of providing mainly 
a trading base for new enterprise, this operates as a 
resource centre for product development where people can 
have access to tools, equipment, expertise, advice and 
other materials. New manufacturing ideas can be explored
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and products assessed and modified in the light of a 
technical, managerial or marketing problems. As a 
result entrepreneurs are in a stronger position to 
seek financial support from potential bankers who tend 
to relate loan security to their knowledge of the past 
history of the product or service concerned.
Despite the enthusiasm surrounding the provision 
of premises and workshops and the subsidising of people 
to start their own businesses, the justification for 
these policies and their importance in economic development 
strategies may not be as conclusive as many currently 
presume. If the reluctance of the private sector to get 
involved reflects in part a limited opportunity for profitable 
investment, then local authority provision and the 
subsidies attached to it may be supporting inefficient 
production and activities which threaten the existence 
of other enterprise and jobs. It is possible that 
market imperfections explain a significant part of 
private sector inactivity in certain areas of the country.
But if so, then instead of local authorities filling 
this gap in the market it might be more appropriate for 
them to persuade private developers to do it or at 
least set about removing the restraints which deter them.
(iv) Finance and Investment for Industry
In managing their local property market local
authorities can offer financial concessions and incentives
to prospective tenants. Over half the local authorities
in England and Wales give concessions, mainly rent free
21periods, to new tenants of council owned properties.
On the whole these are used sparingly and given only for 
limited periods of time, reflecting not only the tendency
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for authorities to seek some return on their investment
but the fear that they would otherwise attract too many
firms who would need a continuing subsidy to survive.
The provision of loans and grants has been less common.
It was reported in 1980 that only around 17% of authori-
22ties were giving loans to industry. However, since 
then these provisions along with equity finance have 
become inportant tools in the strategies of certain large 
authorities. The GLEB can provide grants of up to 
£0.5 million to companies in the form of regular contri­
butions to working capital or labour costs, rent or 
interest rate subsidies. In addition it can provide 
unsecured loans of up to twice and secured loans of up to 
six times the value possible in grants, with interest 
normally charged at market rates, and may take equity 
in companies of up to twice the value it can give in 
grants. The West Midlands Enterprise Board considers 
itself a public sector development capital company for 
the region whose task is to invest primarily in existing 
medium to large firms through the provision mainly of 
equity finance, normally within the range of £100,000 
to £3 million, to companies which offer long term 
prospects for growth but which cannot obtain the necessary 
risk capital from traditional sources of investment 
finance.
Other authorities have also broken new ground in 
assisting businesses financially, though on a more modest 
scale. In Sheffield, the City Council in partnership 
with the Co-operative Bank has introduced its own 
version of the Government's Loan Guarantee Scheme, 
providing low interest loans mainly of between £5,000 
and £30,000 to local businesses who have been unable to
24obtain an equivalent level of finance from other sources.
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Swansea City Council have introduced a similar scheme.
Here the Council's Development Company can guarantee
up to 80% of a firm* s overdraft so long as it does not
exceed £25,000 and provided that the applicant's bank
25will lend the 20% balance unsecured,
(v) Manpower and Training Initiatives
Local authorities can involve themselves in manpower 
policy in a number of ways. All can participate in 
MSC programmes, though the extent of involvement often 
depends on the attitudes of local trades unions who, in 
some parts of the country, have restricted the development 
of schemes because of fears that they would displace 
existing jobs, poor quality of the training provided or 
mistrust concerning their political motives. Some 
councils have adopted MSC schemes and tried to build 
upon them. By spending £8 million topping up £5 million 
from the MSC under the Community Programme (CP), Leeds 
City Council have been able to recruit 1,300 long term 
unemployed and increase the average £60 weekly wage 
available under the CP to meet proper union rates of 
pay. In other areas, Nottingham and Greenwich for 
example, local authorities have supported or taken over 
the operation of existing MSC training facilities which 
have been subjected to the threat of closure.
In response to the many weaknesses in MSC policy 
provisions, alternative manpower initiatives have been 
introduced. Temporary wages subsidies giving priority 
to certain groups in the labour market have been set 
up by several authorities. A pioneering influence was 
Cleveland County Council which secured finance from the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and supplemented this with a
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local employment fund drawn from the 2p rate provision 
and set up the first local authority recruitment scheme 
in 1980. With an annual budget of £117,000 in 1981-82, 
£36,000 of which came from the ESF, this allowed for 
the creation of 150 new jobs in local firms. These were 
aimed at people aged under twenty, particularly those 
disabled through physical handicap or lack, of formal 
qualifications, who had never been in full time employment 
and had been unemployed for over a year. Under the 
scheme employers could apply through the careers services 
for a premium of £30 a week for six months so long as 
the jobs are genuinely additional to the firm and 
permanent. Cleveland subsequently expanded its employ­
ment fund to £1.5 million and introduced a more general 
provision which provided a 30% wages subsidy for up to 
26 weeks for any person taken into permanent enployment 
who had been resident in the District for six months or 
more. Initially the scheme sought to cater for around 
640 p l a c e s . O t h e r  authorities have followed Cleveland's 
lead and have drawn on ESF resources to help fund similar 
recruitment schemes.
A role for local authority manpower policy in economic 
development has been institutionalised in London where 
the GLC has established the Greater London Training Board 
(GLTB), a Council committee which, in addition to council 
members, draws representatives from trades unions, 
employers, women’s groups, ethnic minorities, the voluntary 
sector, the Inner London Education Authority and the MSC. 
Its main purpose is to provide grants for adult training 
to both statutory and voluntary bodies and the emphasis 
of its work differs from the ’economic* focus of the 
MSC's approach to training discussed in Chapter 9. The 
role of GLTB is to ’promote human centred and socially 
useful technologies *, such as energy conservation and
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pollution control schemes, and to cater for groups like 
women, ethnic minorities and the disabled by providing 
them with the type of help which will allow them to
define and devise training programmes which meet their
. 27needs.
(vi) Interventionism and Socialising Production 
in the Local Economy _____________________
In order to implement their economic and employment 
objectives some authorities intervene directly in the 
workings of their local economies and exert a degree of 
influence over local enterprise. The nature of these 
interventionist policies differs widely, varying in 
terms of the degree of selectivity that is applied, the 
amount of public control that is exercised on private 
industry, and the principles upon which the strategy of 
intervention is based.
One obvious opportunity open to local authorities 
to directly boost their local economy is by channelling 
resources spent on goods and services towards local 
businesses, and many authorities are either operating or 
considering initiatives in this area. Glasgow District 
Council appear to be among the first to discriminate in 
favour of local firms when awarding Council contracts.
In May 1982 an experimental policy was adopted whereby 
if a Glasgow firm submitted the second lowest tender for 
any work and was within 2% of the lowest offer, then it 
would be given the opportunity to carry out the work.
In August 1983 the policy was reported as having had a 
modest impact - diverting almost £300,000 to local firms 
and sustaining 24 jobs - but on the calculation that the 
replacement of the 2% with a 5% threshold would realise 
around £1,5 million for local firms and sustain a minimum
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of 125 jobs, this higher margin was adopted and the policy 
continued for a second experimental year,^®
Where a policy is applied generally, as in the above
example, with no selectivity in terms of the size or
type of firm, it may well involve certain elements, such
as unfair competition and displacement effects, which
serve to dilute the impact on employment. In an effort
to avoid these risks and maximise the effect of economic
policies, some authorities adopt a more selective approach
and target resources on certain parts of the local
industrial structure. The GLC and the West Midlands
both concentrate their employment policies on medium to
large firms on the grounds the fortunes of these will
determine the main movements of employment in their
areas. The West Midlands provides no special help to
small firms, and although some assistance has been
given by the GLC, the council considers it more
significant to concentrate on those sectors of the
London economy where small firms predominate rather than
29on the size of firm.
Where authorities do promote small scale enterprise, 
the direct encouragement of workers* co-operatives has 
become increasingly popular since the second half of 
the 1970s when Wandsworth began the recent tradition 
of supporting this form of enterprise. In London the 
GLEB have, in addition to financing new co-operatives, 
intervened in cases where an existing private employer 
was closing its operation and have restructured the 
workforce on a co-operative basis. As a necessary 
complement to this process of restructuring and promotion 
of the co-operative form, authorities like the GLC and 
Sheffield give a key role to the publicly managed
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provision of technical expertise and innovation. Efforts
are being made to link up the technological skills
available within local polytechnics and universities
with production in the local economy. In Sheffield
product development companies have been formed jointly
with the local Polytechnic to develop new technologies
which will contribute to the welfare of the community
and existing enterprise and which will not subordinate
30human labour to market interests. One outcome has 
been the design of a de-humidifying process for houses 
around which a workers* co-operative has been formed.
The enterprise has a large market in the local council 
housing stock a large proportion of which is faced with 
dampness problems.
In London technology networks have been set up by
the GLC. These are based in local polytechnics but have
shop fronts separate from each institution so that the
community has direct access to their resources. The
aim is to make a direct contribution to employment by
researching new products and systems, and providing
information and practical help to new firms and co-operatives,
firms being restructured by GLEB, and groups waging
31campaigns such as energy conservation. It seems that 
Polytechnics play larger parts in these developments 
than Universities, which may be partly because the 
Polytechnics belong to the local authorities and are anxious 
to secure their goodwill.
In an attempt to ensure that firms which receive 
public help will conform to their employment objectives, 
local planning agreements are being used by some authorities. 
Most of these agreements concern observation of Government 
employment legislation, the rights of workers to join trade
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unions and so on, but some authorities have tried to
develop their use further, Sheffield City Council has
insisted on formal agreements with assisted firms which
guarantee that future product development, manufacturing
32and employment will be concentrated in the town.
The West Midlands Enterprise Board plans to seek agreements
with firms to ensure that they will not move any material
part of their operations outside the County without
permission from the County Council, meet future investment
and job targets, and allow the Enterprise Board to appoint
33a non-executive Director onto their board of management.
In the work of local authorities like Sheffield, the 
West Midlands and the GLC, economic policies and public 
resources are being used not solely for economic develop­
ment, but also to lever the balance of power away from 
private capital towards the interests of labour and local 
communities. These efforts are being made at a time when 
wider political and economic conditions are particularly 
unsupportive of interventionist strategies by public 
authorities. Recession and rising unemployment seems 
to have strengthened the bargaining power of capital 
at the expense of labour and weakened the hold 
individual local authorities have on potentially mobile 
local firms. Furthermore, given the high profile adopted 
by these local authorities or their agencies in negotia­
tions with the private sector and the fact that local 
industry is being forced to pay through higher local rates - 
and possibly lower profits - for the controls imposed on 
it, these policies may be counterproductive. Certain 
firms might be discouraged from seeking help because of
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the ’official* nature of bodies who administer it, while 
others may choose not to expand or invest in these areas 
because of the conditions imposed.
Qualifications concerning the potential success of 
interventionist strategies also relate to the type of 
enterprises likely to emerge from a more direct role for 
the local state in the local productive process.
Sheffield has been more explicit than most local authori­
ties in its aim to develop new forms of enterprise 
which produce socially valuable goods and are less 
dominated by the profit motive. It may well be more 
difficult to run such enterprises efficiently, particularly 
at a time when private enterprise, which is less 
burdened by social responsibilities but seeks primarily 
a return on capital, is finding it difficult to expand. 
Indeed many reject the case for public intervention, 
and not purely on political grounds, but because they 
feel that it will be ineffective in terms of economic 
development. For example, those responsible for the 
Council’s economic policies in Swansea aim to boost 
the overall level of economic activity by increasing the 
number of exchanges of an economic nature which take 
place in the community - a very different philosophy 
concerning economic development from Sheffield’s and not 
one whose motivation starts from the need to respond 
directly to the problems of unemployment and its social 
consequences.
5. Conclusions
Economic policies have grown rapidly to become an 
established feature of the work of many authorities.
The development of this role has had to overcome many
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financial and structural constraints and accommodate a 
Central Government which has conceded a role for local 
authorities in economic development relunctantly and 
continually seeks to limit the extent and control the 
form of this activity. Indeed the growing number of 
financial and political controls emanating from Central 
Government is increasing the dependency of local 
authorities on the central State and eroding their scope 
for independent action generally. Despite this, the 
involvement of local authorities in employment and economic 
initiatives seems certain to continue, at least until 
unemployment falls substantially or action is taken on 
a wider political level to amerliorate the many economic 
and social consequences that arise at the local scale.
In most of the subsidies and resources being channelled 
towards local enterprise there is a clear 'private* 
interest. A 'public* one will usually depend on securing 
an overall increase in local wealth or redistributing 
existing opportunities towards less well off groups in 
the community. However, if the resources going to local 
enterprise - of which a large proportion has been raised 
from within the local community in rate income - is 
serving to subsidise inefficient production and displace 
existing enterprise and jobs, then there is no obvious 
justification for this and the money might be better 
spent ameliorating disadvantage in other ways. Later 
chapters will deal with certain aspects of this dilemma 
by considering the local impact of small firms in new 
premises provided by the public sector in Clydeside.
In terms of the overall contribution to the stock of 
enterprise and jobs, the effect of current local authority 
policies will - at best - have only a marginal impact on
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the economy of their areas. This is not a reflection
of the weaknesses of individual policies, but a comment
on the apparent limitations of local action which cannot
reverse what is happening within the national and
international economies upon which local production
largely depends. Even the highly interventionist and
employment oriented policies of Sheffield City Council,
for example, had sustained or created 2,000 jobs, at
34the most, by May 1984. It is perhaps best to regard 
the current activities of local authorities as experiments 
from which to learn what it might be possible for local 
government - and perhaps national Government also - to 
achieve under more favourable economic and political 
conditions.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE EMERGING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES
"Industry cannot just opt out of society's problems, 
particularly those that press on the local community 
where it operates ... I believe that large scale 
industry, whilst remaining efficient and profitable 
... also has a duty to help its own localities."
CoC. Pocock ^
(former Chairman of Shell)
1. Introduction
An important outcome of rising unemployment and inner 
city decline in Britain has been a widespread concern among 
companies, both private and public, about its consequences 
and how they should respond. Philanthropy and a charitable 
orientation are not new phenomenon. Throughout Britain's 
industrialisation industrialists - Owen, Cadbury, Booth 
and Rowntree are but a few - have sought to improve conditions 
for their employees and their communities. Nor is the help 
given to voluntary organisations a recent development.
Ten times more private support is given to the voluntary 
sector in Britain than in any other OECD country, and, 
according to the Charities Aid Foundation, some 0.1% of 
corporate profits was donated to the voluntary sector in 
1981-82. However, with the growing economic and social 
problems since the late l970s, this corporate social 
responsibility has developed from essentially charitable 
activities - such as establishing contacts with schools,
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organising activities for disabled children and providing 
facilities for community groups - into initiatives concerned 
with reducing the numbers out of work, stimulating economic 
development and providing other services for the unemployed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review corporate activities 
in this area and give particular consideration to their 
implications and the motives which encourage companies to 
become involved,
2. National Developments
An expanding role for private sector organisations in
the broad area of economic and employment policy follows on
logically from the marked change in Central Government
philosophy under the Conservatives. Based on the assumption
that Government does not have the commercial initiative or
expertise to revitalise those areas worst affected by
economic decline - like the inner cities - Central Government
has been actively encouraging industrialists to come
together, become more involved in the community and seek
practical solutions. American capitalism is particularly
sophisticated in its social responsibility role - channelling
1.77% of annual corporate profits towards voluntary or
2
charitable purposes - and much of the recent British 
experience dates from a meeting in 1979 between Tom King, 
then the Environment Secretary, the US Ambassador and a 
number of US firms operating in the UK in an effort to learn 
from American activities. A conference was subsequently 
held in April 1980 at Sunningdale and brought together 
industrialists from large firms in both countries. Following 
the conference a working party comprising industrialists 
and officials from the Department of Environment was 
established to look at community involvement. By April 1981 
it was agreed that an independent organisation, Business in 
the Community (BIC), should be set up to promote social
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responsibility activities among industry. BIC began in 
June 1981 with an executive unit of two staff and by 
Easter 1983 had grown to consist of a part-time director, 
a full time Chief Executive and seven secondees from 
industry. A similar - though smaller - organisation for 
Scotland was established in October 1982. Although a 
national organisation, BIC encourages many of the locally 
based projects and initiatives discussed below, particularly 
the formation of enterprise trusts throughout the country. 
According to its Chief Executive the local focus reflects 
the realisation among leading industrialists following the 
riots in British cities in 1981 that not only should they 
be involved in social responsibility but that if community
3
involvement is to be effective then it has to be local.
Another Government inspired private sector organisation 
is the Financial Institutions Group, established by the 
Secretary of State for the Environment in September 1981,
The purpose of the Group, which comprises managers seconded 
from pension funds, building societies, insurance companies 
and clearing banks, is to work jointly with Government in 
devising mixed funding projects under the Urban Programme.
In addition to generating new economic programmes in 
partnership or independent from government, the business 
sector's co-operation in the implementation of public 
policy - particularly manpower strategies - has become 
increasingly important for the success of existing Government 
programmes. The employer's organisation, the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBl), has adopted a co-ordinating role 
in respect to the youth policies of the MSG. In November 
1980, in response to the shortfall in places being offered 
by large employers to the MSG, the GBI established a 
Special Programmes Unit to market the scheme. The SPU 
comprises a regional network of fifty representatives
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seconded from senior management positions in public and 
private industry. The Unit's main objective has been to 
secure training places for young people - originally under 
YOP but now the YTS which replaced it - and it also promotes 
longer training courses among employers, finds sponsors for 
apprenticeships, and markets some of the products of training 
workshops.
Further evidence of a need for the SPU's work emerged 
from research it commissioned among employers in four 
English towns, each selected to represent different aspects 
of the UK's employment situation. The results were grim, 
particularly for young people. Unemployment seemed certain 
to increase further beyond 1983, and even where output was 
expected to increase much of it would not require any increase 
in labour. Local employers were demonstrating a particular 
antipathy towards hiring young workers, many having decided 
to limit or abandon altogether the recruitment of 16 to 18 
year olds. A particularly disturbing finding was that 
although employers claimed to be aware of the problems 
posed by rising unemployment, few were aware of the local 
nature of the problem or about the existing MSG schemes 
available. Furthermore, the likelihood of locally-based 
ameliorative action by these companies appeared small 
because the researchers found only a limited degree of 
identification with the local community
The SPU appears to have made a significant impact 
in increasing the participation of employers in MSG Youth 
schemes. By the Spring of 1982 it had found 32,000 new 
YOP places for the MSG. Since the onset of YTS which had
200,000 private sector places available in 1983-84 the Unit 
has been assisting the implementation of the new scheme by 
organising a national programme of conferences and workshops 
and by running seminars for leading employers to inform them
288.
of how they can both contribute and benefit from the 
scheme.^ Indeed the Unit's role in implementing the YTS 
may have become so vital that without it the YTS would not 
succeed.
The need to bring the level of unemployment down is 
also reflected in the CBI's attitudes to national economic 
policy and in certain other aspects of its work. Following 
support for the idea of an action group on unemployment at 
its annual conference in 1981, the CBI set up a Steering 
Group under the Chairmanship of Sir Richard Cave of 
Thorn EMI. Its main objectives are to co-ordinate the 
CBI's own work on unemployment, explore what business can 
do to ameliorate the problem, look at opportunities to 
rethink and experiment in the way working time is organised, 
talk directly with Government about it and explore the 
potential for working with the unions. The Group's first 
report - published in October 1982 - is weak on practical 
suggestions on how to reduce unemployment, which is not 
surprising given the CBI's rejection of a general reflation 
and support for only a modest increase in public expenditure. 
Nevertheless, a number of its recommendations are feasible 
and could make some impact. These include providing a 
small stimulus to the economy by encouraging labour intensive 
sectors like tourism and construction, promoting job sharing 
or splitting so long as business costs are not increased, 
reducing the demand for labour by cutting the size of the 
labour force by providing training for young people and 
early retirement for older workers, and by providing 
special assistance to areas and invididuals most severely 
affected by unemployment. In addition to discussing these 
suggestions, the CBI has been trying to encourage large 
firms to use their purchasing power to stimulate domestic 
industry. Campaigns to buy British have been run and
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exhibitions held throughout the country which offer small 
firms the chance of supplying components which larger firms 
currently buy from abroad.
3. Company Initiatives
Much of this emerging corporate responsibility among 
large companies finds expression in a wide range of initia­
tives at the local level. I do not propose to give a full 
account of these here, but rather to illustrate the main 
types of activity individual companies are involved in 
within three broad areas of training, encouraging small 
firms and providing other assistance to local communities.
A number of training projects - mostly for young 
people - have been organised which aim not to prepare 
people for work within the sponsoring firms but to improve 
their prospects of finding work elsewhere. One such 
scheme is Project Full-employ which began with a number of 
large London firms attempting to contribute to the life 
and social skills training of disadvantaged youngsters, 
particularly those from ethnic minority backgrounds and 
lacking in formal educational qualifications. In 1984 ten 
centres were operating in London, Bristol and the West 
Midlands providing short work preparation courses followed 
by placements. The instructors are mainly experienced 
managers or supervisors drawn from sponsoring firms and 
the Project received contributions in terms of management, 
resources and work experience placements from local 
authorities, the MSC and local employers. Another work 
preparation initiative is the Transition to Working Life 
project which operates in a number of cities including 
Glasgow, North London and Wolverhampton. Funded by the 
MSC this has brought young people - who can be unemployed.
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on an MSC scheme and so on - to meet with employed people 
seconded from firms and discuss their perceptions of 
working life and the difficulty they are experiencing in 
securing work.^
While possibly improving the confidence and marginal 
competitiveness of a small number of young people it seems 
unlikely that training schemes of this sort will result in 
significant numbers of those affected finding employment - 
there is an absolute shortage of jobs for young people and 
many of the initially better qualified aze also on training 
programmes under the MSC. In this context, developing the 
link between training and starting up a new enterprise has 
proved attractive. Project Pullemploy, for example, has 
begun to experiment with self-employment training courses, 
and an initiative by Shell UK - Livewire - which began as 
a pilot project in Strathclyde Region and Northern Ireland 
in September 1982 to encourage young people to start their 
own business has since been given national coverage. In 
Strathclyde the Livewire scheme received support from other 
public and private bodies, principally the Regional Council 
which provided around 45% of the total costs. Young people 
between sixteen and twenty-five were invited to participate 
in a competition and submit their suggestions for a new 
enterprise. These were evaluated by a group of management 
consultants who in turn sought advice from a network of 
business advisors with whom entrants could also consult 
freely, 273 entries had been submitted by the closing date 
and, by the time the advisors had reduced this number to a 
final list of six, fourteen businesses from the scheme 
were trading full time and a further six part-time.^
The encouragement of small enterprise is the main 
area in which large companies claim they can contribute
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directly to promoting economic regeneration and new
employment. Some - Imperial Chemical Industries, for
example - run 'start your own business' training courses
for employees being made redundant and who are keen to
move into self-employment by either providing these
courses itself or by funding employees to go on training
schemes elsewhere. W.H. Smith and Tesco offer redundant
shops to their ex-managers on special terms and have found
that without the overheads of the large firm the new
independent retail outlets have often proved a success.
Another common method of hiving-off peripheral bits of a
company's corporate structure is where managers, perhaps
in partnership with other investors, buy-out part of the
parent company and run it as a separate business. There
is also some evidence that larger firms are becoming more
sensitive to the requirements of smaller enterprises in
their relationships with them. While in the past the
commercial policies of large companies have often damaged
small firms by being slow to meet bills or extracting
onerous credit terms from small suppliers, there now seems
a greater willingness to open up their purchasing and seek
10new sources of supply from small local firms.
A large amount of the assistance given by large 
companies to small firms and other community projects is 
help in kind, principally through seconding personnel 
such as accountants, lawyers, surveyors, scientists and 
technicians to groups who would have difficulty in 
purchasing these skills commercially. These individuals 
can provide one-off advice while still working in their 
normal job, or they can be released to work either full­
time or part-time outside their company. A large number 
of the new private sector organisations being set up to
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to promote economic development - like enterprise trusts - 
are managed by secondees from established firms. In 
addition to BIC, an important and longer established 
intermediary in the encouragement of secondments is the 
Action Resource Centre (ARC), set up in 1973 by a group of 
senior industrialists to act as a broker between companies 
and projects of benefit to the community by arranging 
suitable secondments from one to the other. ARC is sponsored 
by over 150 companies and operates on a regional network 
covering many urban areas in England and Wales. A similar 
body exists in Scotland which, although operating independ­
ently, is affiliated to its southern counterpart. Although 
in recent years the emphasis of ARC's work has focussed 
on schemes which ameliorate the problem of unemployment, 
activities and priorities vary between the regions. In 
Merseyside, for example, youth unemployment has been 
the main concern and businessmen were seconded from a
number of leading firms to work on workshop and community
11training facilities under the former MSC's YOP. In
the London Borough of Islington the main activity of ARC
secondees is assistance to small firms through a Small
Business Counselling Service, established by ARC and funded
under the Urban Programme. In 1980 the Service was
staffed by six secondees and provided advice to both would-be
entrepreneurs and existing local firms and also to the
local authority on the feasibility of grant applications
12from local businesses. In Scotland the emphasis has
been on developing community businesses - a new form of
co-operative enterprise which is discussed more fully in
a later chapter. Although individuals have been seconded
on a full-time basis - some for up to two and a half years -
part time help has become more popular as firms have become
increasingly reluctant to release staff for longer periods
13due to the recession.
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Community involvement activities need not be
channelled through an intermediary organisation. Some
companies, Levi Strauss & Co. and Marks and Spencer for
example, are directly active in the localities in which
they have a factory or store. Levi Strauss, which employs
some 2,200 staff in seven locations in the UK, has a
community involvement team of employee volunteers at each
plant. The Teams support local community groups and
charities and are supported by the company in the form of
cash grants to complement the fund raising efforts of
employees involved in the local organisations. In 1983 the
Teams distributed £64,000 in grants to projects such as
city farms, community newspapers, battered women's shelters
and hospitals. A further provision - the Special Emphasis
Grants Programme - has been operating since early 1983
with the express purpose of stimulating training and
employment initiatives to diversify and strengthen the
local economies of plant communities.^^ Marks and Spencer
have a long tradition of involvement in communities in
which it trades and donates a substantial sum to charity
each year. In 1984 the sum is expected to be around £2.5m,
but as this is also the company's centenary year an
additional central contribution of approximately £3m - or
between £5,000 and £25,000 per store - has been donated
for staff to allocate to projects which will benefit their
15local communities.
4. Enterprise Agencies and Trusts
In their efforts to stimulate economic development 
firms frequently prefer to collaborate with other companies 
in some form of enterprise agency or trust. Two early 
and influential examples in this tradition are the London
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Enterprise Agency (LEnTA) and Birmingham Venture, set up 
in 1979 and 1980 respectively. LEnTA was originally 
established by nine large companies, though its membership 
has since increased, and aims to promote urban renewal 
and economic regeneration in London. The Birmingham 
project was more specifically concerned with complementing 
the Government * s partnership programme for the city and 
has developed from an original nucleus of five companies.
In Birmingham donations from each sponsoring company 
ranged from £1,000 to £3,000 in 1982 and in London the 
member companies contribute a minimum of £20,000 annually 
to LEntA either in the form of cash or seconded staff.
Both agencies have been involved in a range of similar 
activities which include running seminars and training 
programmes for new entrepreneurs; counselling small firms; 
assisting with publicity, marketing and exhibiting 
products; linking up new start-ups or existing firms 
with larger enterprises and potential investors; and 
encouraging the supply and development of land for industry 
and small premises construction. In addition to encouraging 
the formation of smaller local borough-based agencies in 
Greater London, frequently arranging to attach their 
seconded managers to these, LEntA has also set up an 
Innovation Fund in partnership with the National Westminster 
Bank to allocate grants to selected individuals or small 
company innovators to finance the. development stages of 
promising new products or process ideas.
Both these agencies are part of a new movement in 
local economic planning in which the private sector is 
now playing a stronger role through the growth of local 
enterprise trusts which often operate in complement to 
the work of public agencies. The nature of these new 
organisations varies, though the earliest and best example
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upon which many of the later agencies have been modelled
is the Community of St. Helens Trust. This began in 1977
following an initiative by local employers, principally
Pilkington, the glass company, which was in the process of
both local and national restructuring. The Trust was
staffed with a director and three secondees from private
industry. It identified its objective as being to combat
unemployment by drawing together the resources available
within the local community, including those of the local
authority, banks, trade unions and the chamber of commerce
to create an environment favourable to the growth of 
15enterprise. It has pursued this aim in a number of ways. 
Having no resources of its own with the exception of a 
limited fund for the provision of seed capital, the Trust 
has relied on the resources of constituent supporters 
and provides advice to local firms on how to raise funds 
from other sources and secure available grants. It also 
operates a grant scheme on behalf of the County Council, 
taps specialist and technical advice from its members, 
co-ordinates private and public sector property development 
and finds new markets for small firms by introducing them 
to larger companies. After almost five years in operation 
it had dealt with 1,248 clients, and had been involved in 
141 new business start-ups, 16 part-time businesses, 109 
expansions and 195 consultancy c a s e s . I t  is, however, 
impossible to quantify the exact effect the Trust has had 
on local jobs and enterprise. Registered unemployment has 
lagged substantially behind the number of redundancies, 
but this generally tends to be so due to early retirement# 
discouraged workers not registering as unemployed and so 
on, and the Trust has provided no information to demonstrate 
that the disparity is greater in St, Helens than elsewhere. 
The Director has claimed that the majority of the new 
entrepreneurs and employees have come from the unemployment
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register but has no records or evidence to back this 
claim.
It has been within this context of inadequate 
evaluation that enthusiasm for the enterprise trust idea 
has grown among politicians and policy makers. Their 
number has expanded rapidly. Around forty had been established 
in the UK by the summer of 1981 and by April 1984 the 
number had swelled to 160 with many more in the process 
of being set up. They have become somewhat an established 
tool of local economic policy and in some areas their 
establishment has followed efforts by the local authorities, 
some of whom have transferred a degree of responsibility 
for local economic planning to them. Generally the trusts 
are similar to the St. Helens model. They tend to be 
companies limited by guarantee, independent of their 
initiating companies and groups and the public bureaucracy, 
highly accessible to local firms and capable of reacting 
quickly to approaches from both existing entrepreneurs 
and people considering setting up in business. Those 
seconded to work in the trusts do not provide all the 
expertise businessmen require but act as contact men who 
can draw on help from others and provide a focal point 
through which key agencies in the community - the local 
authority, companies, banks, trade unions, professional 
bodies and voluntary agencies - can collaborate to encourage 
small firms and economic development. Typically their 
management structure consists of at least one full-time 
officer, with secretarial support, and assisted by some 
combination of full-time and part-time secondees from 
large firms and panels of individuals and organisations 
who will provide assistance on call free of charge.
The operating budgets of trusts tend to be modest, 
often in the region of £15,000 to £30,000 per year. In
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addition to help in kind in the form of advice and time 
given by other firms* employees, trusts* resources can 
also include premises given or loaned to it, 
donations and subscriptions from sponsoring companies, 
and grants from public authorities - often through the 
urban programme and in Scotland the SDA - and the EEC. In 
Scotland, for example, where 16 enterprise trusts were 
operating in May 1984, most were receiving public 
financial support for a temporary period of three years.
Activities of these organisations differ with local
circumstances though their main function lies in the
provision of advice and support to small enterprise. This
often includes providing access to technical and professional
assistance and information, and promoting collaborative
arrangements among small firms in their marketing, use of
common services, shared space in buildings and so on. Some
trusts have developed small seed-bed premises and, although
they rely mainly on mobilising existing financial institu-
18tions, a few have their own modest investment funds.
5. Special Subsidiaries and Units
Some large firms have established special-purpose 
subsidiaries or units with the specific purpose of 
promoting economic development by encouraging small firms. 
Shell UK, for example, set up a Small Business Unit in 
1978. The Unit - whose budget was around £200,000 in 
1981 - co-ordinates the company's help to small firms 
through, for instance, its membership of LEntA, and has 
funded a series of research projects in a number of 
academic institutions. In the case of some other companies 
the subsidiary is not essentially a new group or organisa­
tion but a financial resource. In 1980 Pilkingtons set up
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Rainford Venture Capital, a subsidiary with £2m to 
invest over a two year period in firms which would boost 
the economy and generate employment in the St, Helens 
area.^^ It appears this finance is being allocated very 
selectively with Pilkingtons viewing the operation as a 
strictly commerical proposition. The company expects the 
initial capital will have turned into £20m by 1990 and 
after approximately eighteen months of the fund's establish­
ment although around 900 entrepreneurs had approached the
20fund only two secured capital totalling £570,000. A 
similar financial initiative, but one more explicitly 
concerned with job creation in a locality, is Tate and 
Lyle's scheme which provides venture capital of between 
£10,000 and £20,000 for each job created by other local 
firms. In Glasgow one company was loaned £400,000 in 
return for a commitment to create 150 jobs on the understand­
ing that the first offer of these jobs would be given to
21Tate and Lyle employees.
Perhaps the best known initiative in this area of
corporate regeneration activity is the British Steel
Corporation's subsidiary, British Steel Corporation Industry
Limited (BSC Ind.) This organisation dates from 1973
when the need to do something by way of repairing the economy
of areas affected by steel closures was recognised in a
Government White Paper which stated that the Corporation
would begin to play a part in promoting alternative employ- 
22ment. BSC Ind. as it currently functions dates from
1978 when its operating style was substantially reshaped
and its annual budget greatly increased to total around
23£20m in some subsequent years. Operating on a decentral­
ised management structure with a small central team in 
London and regional centres in Scotland, the North East, 
Scunthorpe, Corby, North Wales and South Wales, the
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subsidiary's objective is to diversify the local industrial 
structure and replace jobs lost in steel. It helps companies 
start up, expand or relocate to areas worst hit by steel 
closures and in the four years up to March 1982 claims 
to have helped over 900 companies committed to creating
27,000 new jobs.^^ However, as with many job creation 
programmes, it is difficult to determine from the evidence 
available how many of these jobs are genuinely new and 
would not otherwise have existed. BSC Ind helps small 
firms secure money available from existing sources of 
investment finance, including that coming from government 
regional and urban policy, loans from the European Coal and 
Steel Community, and training grants from the European 
Social Fund. It also provides assistance directly by 
helping with market research and consultancy studies, 
leases plant and equipment to businesses on favourable 
terms, and in some cases secures access for firms to 
trade with the parent company. Certain of BSC's old sites 
have been released and developed into new industrial 
estates by public agencies. Near Shotton, for example, 
a 600 acre industrial park has been developed by the 
Welsh Development Agency, and in Glengarnock in Scotland 
the Scottish Development Agency has redeveloped the site 
of the old steel works. A proper evaluation of BSC Ind's 
work is inhibited due to lack of information as the 
subsidiary does not release expenditure figures for 
programmes in different parts of the country.
6. Workshops for Small Enterprise
BSC Ind. has had an important influence on popular­
ising the neighbourhood workshop concept - already 
discussed in the chapter on local authority initiatives -
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as a new concept in local regeneration policy. Instead
of demolishing all the buildings at a redundant steel
works, suitable ones are preserved, provided with road
access and essential services, and offered as premises to
small firms. BSC Ind. claim that the primary aim is job
creation, ideally for ex-steelworkers. However on the
basis of the two Scottish schemes I visited - at Tollcross
in Glasgow and Glengarnock, Ayrshire - a wide variation
was evident in the background of workshop occupants,
Clydeworkshops at Tollcross was the firsh scheme and began
in 1978. Twenty existing buildings covering sixteen acres
were converted into a workshop complex of over eighty
units totalling 63,000 sq.ft. The scheme appeared highly
successful, developing at a much faster rate than expected
and attracting a wide variety of small firms. A great deal
of publicity was generated, not least among local authorities
many of whom sent representatives to visit the project.
BSC Ind. responded with the rapid expansion of the
workshop concept in its other closure areas. By 1982
workshops were operating in around seven other areas and
several more will have been developed since then. BSC Ind
aim to obtain a reasonable return on capital in the rental
of workshop units though an element of subsidy is implied
in that they could probably get more for them. Units are
let on flexible terms on a license which allows the
entrepreneur to leave after giving three months notice.
Workshop schemes are run by a residential manager who is
responsible for vetting tenants and ensuring they have a
reasonable chance of success. Viability and employment
are the main criteria in the selection of applicants and in
the allocation of premises both manufacturing and service
25activities are admitted.
In addition to public authorities, other companies
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have followed BSC Ind.'s lead. British American Tobacco 
(b a t ), for example, which employed 31,000 in the UK in 
1983, have been restructuring and significantly reducing 
their national workforce. In conjunction it has constructed 
small low-cost premises in areas such as Toxteth and 
Brixton where large numbers of jobs have been shed. The 
Toxteth project is particularly impressive in its scale.
A large derelict transit shed on the Liverpool docks was 
leased by BAT Industries, a subsidiary of BAT, and 
rehabilitated. In March 1984 it housed 127 firms who 
occupied premises ranging from 200 to 2,000 sq.ft. BAT 
Industries were not involved in any capital outlay in 
the £l.^m conversion cost, having used the parent company's 
credit worthiness to raise risk capital and drawn on a 
Council grant of £200,000, regional development grant, 
and 100% tax write-off in the first year of operation 
under the Industrial Buildings Allowance Scheme. The 
whole project in Liverpool is expected to eventually 
break even by 1985.^^
The managers of the Toxteth workshops claim a large 
proportion of their tenants were new start-ups. But even 
if their impression is true a more detailed investigation 
would be needed to determine the extent of displacement 
effects on existing enterprise and jobs in Liverpool 
before a full assessment of the impact of the workshops 
could be made. This and other evaluative questions are 
dealt with more fully in a later chapter where some evidence 
on the impact in firms occupying new and rehabilitated 
public sector premises is presented. However, certain 
features of the enterprises occupying the Toxteth workshops 
can be observed which suggest that large communal workshop 
developments of this type are having some positive net 
impact. At least one of the new firms has found a genuine
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gap in the market by operating a salvaging service for 
houses and industrial premises damaged by fire. This 
service used to be carried out by the fire brigade but 
was lost when the fire brigade was •streamlined* through 
public expenditure cutbacks. There has also been a spin­
off for a number of other firms in the workshops involved 
with roofing, shopfitting and so on which have received 
work from the new salvage company.
7, The Underlying Motives of Corporate Intiatives
A necessary prelude to evaluating the effect of 
this growing corporate responsibility is to consider the 
motives which underlie it. Some observers will no doubt 
find it difficult to shake off a natural suspicion over 
economic and employment projects promoted by organisa­
tions which operate primarily on the profit motive and have 
themselves been responsible for substantial employment 
loss. It is precisely this suspicion and cynicism which 
the public statements of companies involved are attempting 
to dispell by stressing the social responsibility aspects 
of their activities while admitting a certain degree of 
self-interest but stressing that this is respectable and 
legitimate.
Companies have been keen to concede, that social 
conscience and a fear of social unrest have been main 
spurs to their recent activities. Both these sentiments 
are often closely associated as the following statement 
by Sir Adrian Cadbury, Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes 
indicates:
"These inequalities, which are accentuated by 
unemployment, must be the concern of tomorrow's 
managers on moral grounds and grounds of maintain-
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"ing the stability of society of which their 
companies are a part. Managers are likely 
therefore to become increasingly involved in 
lending their business skills to help relieve 
unemployment."27
There must be many industrialists who care sincerely
about the consequences of rising unemployment and feel
they have a basic obligation to the community of which
they are a part. The concern attached to rising youth
unemployment in particular has led the CBI to lobby
Government for an expansion of training provisions and
encourage firms in the localities - by the type of measures
described earlier - to provide greater placement opportunities
and to undertake special training initiatives. At both
national and local levels this concern has been sharpened
by the fear that high unemployment could lead to a
turbulence and unrest which would damage the long term
profit making potential and jeopardise the survival of
industry. The Director of the St. Helens Trust, for
example, claimed that one of the purposes behind its
establishment was to "prevent Luddite attitudes among
28 .unemployed workers." In this sense then, the social 
responsibility activities of companies are not considered 
to be a drain or an alternative to profit but rather an 
investment from which the community benefits and which 
also forms part of the company's survival kit.
A more explicit recognition of mutual gain concerns 
the benefits which are thought to accrue to large firms 
and the economy as a whole through the promotion of small 
firms. In support of its activities in this area. Shell 
UK have argued that,
"... any company should be concerned about the 
environment in which it is operating ... support
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for small firms is surprising only because of its 
lateness ... a thriving economy is the best 
environment for successful operations."29
While small firms can draw on valuable professional 
and managerial skills and advice through secondments and 
support agencies established by larger companies, equally 
concrete gains can accrue to the donor firm. The skill 
and abilities of staff are often improved through secondment 
and many firms have recognised the usefulness of this 
practice in the personal and career development of middle 
management. Secondment can also be a useful tool in a 
large firm's manpower strategy. In the face of recession- 
induced cutbacks, it offers a way of holding onto valuable 
management expertise instead of laying off and risking the 
possible loss of experienced staff to other firms. Further­
more, it allows a kinder approach to redundancy by easing 
older members of the company into retirement while still 
keeping them active and useful. In this and other forms of 
help given by companies to charitable purposes and organisa­
tions, like enterprise trusts, which encourage business 
activity there is also a significant financial attraction. 
Under the 1982 Finance Act companies - if they are in profit - 
can recover 50% of the value of any help they give.
A further incentive for companies to act in a socially 
responsible fashion lies in the fact that the public attitudes 
towards consumer purchasing can be strongly influenced by 
the image in which the producer company is held. Experience 
has shown that where a company is seen to fail to take 
social responsibility factors into account in its operation 
the loss of coprorate image can be bad for business. An 
extreme example of this has been Nestle which found itself 
facing boycotts and consumer barracking over its marketing
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30of baby foods in the Third World. Perhaps a more 
fundamental reason connected to public attitudes which 
explains private sector activity in the area of economic 
regeneration is that it serves to keep public agencies from 
interfering with local industry. If the private sector is 
demonstrating a socially responsible attitude, and more 
specifically if local politicians and public officials are 
convinced that it has particular skills to stimulate economic 
development that they do not have, then public agencies may 
be less likely to adopt interventionist strategies in 
the local economy.
Although private sector initiatives often coincide with 
major technological and organisational changes and subsequent 
job loss within the company concerned, the possibility of 
a strategic link between these changes and job generation 
projects is not one which large companies have alluded to 
in public. Nevertheless the appearance of social responsibility 
and the promise of significant numbers of new jobs can have 
important public relations consequences. They may create 
strong expectations among local politicians and officials 
that jobs to be lost will be replaced and also undermine 
resistance to closure and cutbacks among local trades 
unions. Pilkington*s announced its plans to 'find the new 
British entrepreneurs of the 1980s' in February 1980. Over 
the following two years - which also saw the company play 
a leading role in developing the national organisation 
Business in the Community - Pilkington cut its tXK workforce 
by around 3,000 with 800 of the job loss coming in the St,
Helens area where it was involved in a number of initiat­
ives. Also in Merseyside, in 1984 BAT were involved in a 
phased closure involving the loss of 1,200 jobs just shortly 
after establishing its new enterprise workshops.
In the case of BSC Ind the relationship between social
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responsibility, industrial and public relations and
employment decline is even more stark. The blaze of
publicity which surrounded the reorganisation of the
subsidiary in 1978 coincided with a Government White Paper
on the future of the British Steel industry which recommended
that BSC negotiate closure at a number of plants. The
highly visible presence of BSC Ind and the enthusiasm which
has surrounded its activities have gone hand in hand with
the restructuring of the steel industry towards viability
which between 1975 and 1982 involved the loss of around 
3l125,000 jobs. The subsidiary's role in the restructuring 
of the steel industry can therefore be seen as a highly 
political one which has helped manipulate the process of 
industrial change in the interests of capital. In some 
cases BSC Ind has moved into steel closure towns prior to 
any agreement being reached between trade unions and the 
company on the need for closure and before alternative 
strategies could be discussed. In Workington, for example, 
within one week of the announcement of plans to close 
the local steel works, BSC Ind had submitted a report to 
the council outlining what it could do to regenerate the 
area. Originally it was intended that BSC Ind would 
continue to operate until March 1984 by which time most 
of its activities will have been passed over to enterprise 
agencies run by local authorities. By the same date, 
however, it was expected that BSC's national workforce 
would be 40% of the 1975 total when BSC Ind was created.
There is, therefore, strong justification to view this form 
of job creation agency as an exercise in managing and 
implementing planned redundancies by assisting industrial 
policy makers achieve their commercially inspired objectives.
8. Conclusion
The growing private sector responsibility for training, 
economic development and the welfare of deprived communities 
reflects Central Government's ideology that lasting economic
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regeneration and a reduction in unemployment cannot be 
achieved by direct public sector action but requires to be 
private sector led. But there are also a number of strong 
vested interest reasons why it pays companies to get involved. 
The desire to avoid any social disruption or interference 
from public agencies is clearly a strong motivation of 
many, particularly those involved in shedding substantial 
numbers of jobs. A similarly strong commitment to generate 
employment in their areas - despite claims to the contrary - 
is much less conclusive. A large part of the case for the 
activities of enterprise trusts and other projects which 
encourage small enterprise is that higher proportions of 
self-employment will both improve the health of local and 
national economies and raise the demand for labour. Evidence 
presented in various parts of this thesis suggests that 
such assumptions should be treated very sceptically, 
particularly the generation of jobsfor unemployed people.
The greatest contribution to rising unemployment comes 
from employment loss among medium and large firms. If 
private sector organisations really wanted to make a signifi­
cant impact then one might reasonably expect some action 
on this front. However while business has been enthusiastic 
in co-operating with public agencies - and often receiving 
resources from them - in the promotion of small firms, 
there has been negligible interest in joint collaborations 
which explore how existing enterprise might be salvaged 
and large scale job loss avoided, or which negotiate an 
appropriate level of financial compensation for the local 
community for the damage suffered through disinvestment.
As was discussed in the previous Chapter, authorities like 
Sheffield and the GLC consider detecting pending industrial 
closure at an early stage and then responding at least to 
slow the rate of decline as being central to their industrial 
strategies. Those large companies most active in regeneration 
such as the British Steel Company, adopt the very opposite 
approach.
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If a real concern to reduce unemployment existed, firms 
could also adopt - or at least seriously discuss - a 
number of other policies which are at present employed 
only to a limited extent or not at all. Some considera­
tion has been given recently as to how the purchasing policies 
of large companies can be tailored more to domestic 
suppliers. But few firms - if any - operate a similar buy 
British policy to Marks and Spencer which reckons that it 
pays to buy 90% of the goods it sells from Britain because 
a large part of the company's prosperity depends on the 
prosperity of the country. There seems to be even less 
consideration of how industry's pension funds, a huge 
financial resource of which a large amount flows overseas, 
could be invested to generate jobs within Britain. But 
even if there was the recent experience of the National 
Union of Mineworkers - mentioned in the next Chapter - 
suggests that this sort of strategy may well be banned 
by the courts.
These criticisms do not deny that many people in 
the business world are genuinely concerned about unemploy­
ment and want to do something about it. Indeed many of 
the creative ideas which find expression in locally 
administered projects, not only in the private sector but 
in public and voluntary agencies also, depend on individuals 
with local loyalties and a commitment to shape the future 
of their town. However, one of the main troubles faced 
by cities today is that many no longer have a local 
business elite in big firms with local loyalties. Charles 
Booth, Josephine Butler and Eleanor Rathbone all came 
from Liverpool, but such people no longer exist there.
Without this sense of place - and it was found to 
be lacking in the CBI's four town studies - much of the
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basis for local action is missing. Private sector 
organisations have been trying to stimulate a sense of 
local loyalty and a capacity for local action and the 
developments outlined above point to some noteable 
successes. Nevertheless, given that at the same time 
the business community has an established practice of moving 
executives around, which discourages them from participating 
in local politics and public affairs, and avoids a proper 
evaluation of local policies which would enable a better 
assessment of possible alternatives, the scope for both 
loyalty and effective action at the local scale must be 
being simultaneously undermined.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
TRADE UNIONS AND THE UNEMPLOYED
"Unions fight for .,, the employment of those 
who are already organised ... Unemployed who are 
not trade union members will not agree with us 
on this issue because they want to get jobs ... 
Yet it must be stressed again that the unions 
will not and cannot undertake to protect all 
those who are not working."
Trad, Soviet Newspaper, 1925.
(Quoted in Garraty J. (1978),
'Unemployment in History, p.191,
1. Introduction
Rising unemployment probably presents even greater 
problems for organised labour than it does for the 
interests attached to capital on the other side of the 
industrial spectrum. The closure of industries and the 
falling numbers in work undermine both the resources 
and the size of the trade union movement. Between 1979 
and the end of 1982, for example, workers in unions 
affiliated to the TUC fell by almost 14% from 12.2 million 
to 10.5 million. In addition to the loss of membership 
subscriptions, a growing pool of non-unionised surplus 
labour has undermined the strength of the trade union 
movement as the vehicle of working class organisation and 
progress. There are other reasons why the trade unions 
should want to counter these trends. For example, a 
high proportion of the unemployed were previously union 
members before they lost their jobs and many of the new 
entrants to the labour force would have joined trade 
unions if the opportunity through employment had been open
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to them, A strong sense of loyalty and commitment 
exists within the movement to help these people and 
this Chapter will discuss the policies and programmes 
trade unions are involved in. In particular it will 
speculate on the motives behind current strategies, 
examine the relationships between programmes and unemployed 
groups and consider what the future role might be for 
the unemployed in the labour movement.
2. Economic Policies
A condemnation of mass unemployment plays a central 
role in the alternative economic strategy of the trade 
union movement. At a national level the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) challenges the basic assumptions of 
conservative economic policy. It rejects the assumptions 
that a trade off has to be made between labour costs 
and inflation, that lower wages will lead to more jobs, 
that high unemployment is a necessary prelude to economic 
recovery and growth and that new technology will inevitably 
lead to job loss. Instead it argues that action can 
be taken which could significantly reduce unemployment in 
the short to medium term. In 1983 the TUC set out its 
prescription in a document outlining a specific programme 
of policies built round a one year action plan which 
would cut unemployment by 574,000 and cost £10 billions, 
and a five year expansion plan designed to lay the basis
for future growth and bring unemployment down to below
1
one million. The main characteristics of the TUC's 
strategy include increasing Government spending to boost 
demand and pull the economy out of recession, protecting 
against the consequent danger of rising imports by 
urgent measures to increase competitiveness and control 
imports, devaluation to boost competitiveness, reimposition
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of exchange controls and ensuring the pound is not 
thereafter overvalued, coupled with a 10% reduction 
in working time over five years to bring the length of 
the working week down to thirty-five hours. These 
policies would be contested by many and the result of 
the 1983 General Election and a number of opinion polls 
suggest they have yet to convince the majority of the 
electorate. But a study of local responses to unemployment 
is not the place to make any general assessment of them 
and I have summarised them here as a reminder that the 
main proposals of the labour movement are not confined 
to the local scale but form part of larger national 
strategies.
As the trade union movement awaits a change in
national Government there are some signs that certain
unions have begun to embark on economic policies which,
though at present likely to remain limited, would probably
become more widespread if the Conservatives were not in
power. The TUC and the Labour Party are already agreed
that a greater proportion of the huge assets contained
within Britain's pension funds - estimated at over
£70,000 million in 1983 - should be used to back projects
which foster investment and generate employment in British 
2industry. Although it was subsequently defeated in the 
courts, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) took the 
most active lead in this area and attempted to influence 
decisions about investments from the miners' pension fund 
by refusing to accept recommendations from the fund's 
financial managers who have traditionally sought only 
the highest possible return on assets controlled. The 
Union's leaders argued that the £3 billion fund should 
be used to invest in British industry and jobs, and, 
having an equal number of nominees among the fund's
316
trustees as has the National Coal Board, initially- 
frustrated planned investments in rival oil and gas
3
industries and in overseas security and property.
A further attempt to encourage economic development 
and lower unemployment directly was launched in December 
1983 by the South West Region of the Transport and 
General Workers Union (TGWU). The scheme - Unicorn 
Marketing - depends on wholesalers, manufacturers, 
insurers and so on providing trade union members with 
more favourable trading terms than the norm in recognition 
of the enormous sums of money that they spend overall.
The plan is for a group of trustees to supply goods and 
services to the 250,000 union members in the region at 
highly competitive discounts. The commission the 
trustees receive, which the organisers hope will total 
£3 million after two years, will be channelled into a 
fund and used to promote worker co-operatives and small 
businesses.^ Apart from these efforts to tap their 
pension funds and purchasing power for economic development 
purposes, most of the trade union movement's practical 
response to rising unemployment has been to try to raise 
the level of public concern, press for a better deal for 
the unemployed within Government's manpower and social 
security provisions, and mobilise and organise the jobless. 
However as these activities are discussed in turn below, 
it should become clear that not all of whah is happening 
in these areas is solely in the interests of the unemployed,
3, Raising Public Concern
As the priority given by the electorate to a reduction 
in unemployment will have a vital bearing on the prospects 
of a new Labour Government being returned and on its
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ability to implement an alternative economic strategy, 
the trade union movement has sought to raise the level 
of public debate and change people's complacent attitudes 
towards unemployment. One approach has been to organise 
large conventions and set up special committees which 
rally together people and organisations from a variety 
of backgrounds and interests and provide a forum from 
which to generate new ideas and public concern. A 
lead was taken by the Scottish TUC in December 1980 
when it organised a Standing Convention on Unemployment - 
effectively a day-long grand debate with invited speakers 
and contributions from the floor. Apart from media 
coverage of the event, the main outcome was the establish­
ment of a Standing Commission which brought together 
representatives from voluntary organisations, trade 
unions, churches, public authorities and business organ­
isations who were to meet regularly and generate specific 
policy proposals which could be put to Central Government 
and implemented. A similar initiative was subsequently 
taken in Wales where the TUC, the CBI and the local 
authorities formed the Welsh Committee for Economic and 
Industrial Affairs and a special convention comprising 
organisations from a wide cross-section of Welsh life 
was set up. However, on the basis of the Scottish 
example at least, collaborative initiatives of this sort 
appear to have had disappointing results. Sadly - but 
perhaps not surprisingly, given the broad collection of 
interests involved - the Scottish Standing Commission 
found itself unable to agree on firm, implementable
recommendations and was wound up without having any
5marked effect on policy.
Another strategy through which the labour movement 
has tried to incite public anger over the high numbers
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out of work has been through organising marches and 
demonstrations against unemployment. As was also the 
case in the 19 30s, the main impetus for this activity 
has come from members of the Communist Party and other 
far-left groups operating within trades councils and 
unions. Organising unemployed protest has not been a 
role which the official labour movement has embraced 
with much enthusiasm. Its involvement has come in 
response to what it has considered to be potentially 
disruptive or politically damaging action by factions 
within it or on its fringe. A March for Jobs in 1980, 
for example, had abused the TUC delegates at their 
annual conference almost as fiercely as the Tories.
Partly in self-defence and to diffuse and control this 
unrest the TUC has taken a greater involvement in the 
running of subsequent marches and demonstrations but its 
commitment has never been strong. The People's March 
for Jobs in 1981, although considered a success at the 
time, did not seem to significantly alter public attitudes 
towards unemployment and gave the TUC some justification 
for avoiding similar large scale demonstrations until 
1983 when it was forced to act again. A plan by the 
TGWU to organise a large march from Glasgow which - 
joined by six feeder marches - would converge on London 
amid mass demonstrations at first received no firm backing 
from the TUC and Labour Party leaders. The TUC Finance 
and General Purposes Committee rejected the idea, 
apparently on the advice of the Labour Shadow Cabinet 
which feared that it might damage the Party's electoral 
prospects.^ But the TUC's position changed and official 
support was given when it became apparent that a ground- 
swell of support for the march was building up among 
individual trade unions. In these cases where the official 
labour movement has brought organised protest against
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unemployment within its auspices and taken an organising 
role, the main beneficiaries may not have been the 
unemployed. The large numbers of union banners, the 
shouts - not for better benefits or more jobs - but 
for "Maggie Out" and "Fight the Cuts", and the low 
representation of claimants and unemployed worker groups 
all suggest that marches and demonstrations have been 
mainly protests of the employed who have used the issue 
of unemployment for their own purposes.
4. Improving the Lot of the Unemployed
In addition to its reluctant support for political 
protest the TUC has made some attempt to protect the 
living standards of the unemployed by lobbying Government 
over the level of social security benefits. Early in 
1982 a number of specific recommendations concerning 
improvements to the social security system and capable 
of immediate implementation emerged in the TUC's Benefit
7
Charter for the Unemployed, This favours providing the 
long term unemployed with the higher rate of long term 
supplementary benefit, protecting the real value of 
benefits against inflation, returning to the unemployed 
the money Government has saved by abolishing the earnings 
related supplement and taxing benefits, and giving young 
people leaving school an immediate right to supplementary 
benefit. For the longer term the Charter recommends that 
unemployment benefit be set high enough to keep people 
off the means tested supplementary benefit and continue 
until a suitable job is found. A new earnings related 
supplement payable for the first year is proposed in 
addition to the flat rate benefit and, for people remaining 
out of work beyond a year, a higher flat rate benefit 
similar to invalidity pension rates. A further recommanda-
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tion which affects the incomes of the unemployed is 
that travel and other local facilities should be provided 
to the jobless at concessionary rates. The TUC considers 
that Central Government should fund any concessionary 
fares scheme so as to ensure a standard service throughout 
the country and avoid a disjointed provision dependent 
on subsidies from individual transport authorities.
Many of these arguments are not new but echo what 
other reformist groups have been saying for some time.
While the Supplementary Benefits Commission, claimants' 
unions and others have been arguing for the long term 
supplementary benefit rate for the unemployed since 1976 
the TUC has always given priority to death benefits, 
pensions and other things which go mainly to the employed 
at some stage of their lives. Indeed the TUC's stance 
on protecting the incomes of the jobless has come rather 
late in the day and may be motivated by other interests 
apart from reforming egalitarianism. A large part of 
the strength of trade unions and unorganised workers also 
may rest upon the system of social security which Britain 
has built up during the twentieth century. It has been 
high enough to help protect union negotiated wage levels 
by giving unions the opportunity to resist demands for 
wage reductions, even at the cost of unemployment, and 
diminish the likelihood of an individual taking a position 
at less than the negotiated trade union rate.^ Maintaining 
the level of financial maintenance for the unemployed, 
particularly when it is threatened, seems to be in the 
interests of trade unions and their members also. As in 
1931 when the TUC clashed and broke with the Labour 
Government over the cutting of the dole, the TUC's 
current concern in the face of threatened cuts in benefits - 
in addition to a genuine concern for the welfare of
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jobless claimants - probably represents the trade union 
movement protecting its own ability to fight for better 
working conditions and wages for its members at a time 
when these too are under threat. Another effect of social 
security and the level of benefits paid has been to 
avoid the desperate poverty and social unrest which 
might otherwise have occurred, thus freeing organised 
labour from the potentially disruptive consequence of 
large-scale unemployment.
Manpower policy - and in particular the special 
programmes of the MSC - is another area in which the TUC 
has lobbied for a better deal for the unemployed. As 
the TUC serves in an advisory capacity at a national 
level within the MSC it can attempt to directly influence 
the guidelines and monitoring of the Commission's 
policies. At this level the TUC has tended to endorse 
the MSC's programmes, and at the same time press for an 
expansion of temporary employment provisions for the long 
term unemployed, an improvement in the quality of training 
and education in youth schemes, and a rise in the level 
of allowances or wages paid. However, support for MSC 
programmes at this level is no guarantee that individual 
trade unions will co-operate. At a local level trade 
unions are represented on Area Manpower Boards along 
with local authorities and employers and it is here 
that choices are made whether or not to support individual 
schemes which can be characterised by low pay, non­
unionised workplaces and a privatisation of youth training. 
Union representatives can object to schemes, argue for 
improvements or reject them altogether - scope which has 
frequently found the movement at the local level at odds 
with the guidance of its national officials. In 1981, 
for example, widespread hostility was voiced at union
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conferences against exploitation of young people under
YOP and motions were submitted to the TUC annual conference
calling for complete withdrawal from both YOP's main
scheme WEEP and the MSC (dealt with in Chapter 9). In
September of the same year mobilisation of YOP trainees
in the north east by NUPE (the white collar union) led
9to two strikes and a local rally. More recently the 
YTS which replaced YOP has also received less than unanimous 
support, particularly in the craft unions who see it 
threatening their established structure of apprenticeship 
training, and in the early months of the adult Community 
Programme certain unions and branches were found to be 
imposing blanket bans on the programme or frustrating 
its implementation by imposing impossible conditions for 
the approval of projects.
5. Unemployed Workers Centres
The most direct way in which the TUC has attempted 
to deal with unemployment at the local scale has been 
through a strategy of organising the unemployed. Since 
late 1980 it has been the policy of the TUC's General 
Council to sustain the movement as a collective organisa­
tional framework for workers in and out of employment in 
two main ways: first, by establishing a national network
of centres for the unemployed and, second, by retaining
10and recruiting unemployed people as union members. 
Inspiration for the first of these had come from Newcastle 
where a Centre had been set up by the local trades council 
and run jointly with a local Unemployed Worker's Union. 
Although the project had struggled with limited and 
unguaranteed financial support from a combination of local 
authority, charitable and MSC sources, its efforts 
stimulated an interest among voluntary groups and trades 
councils and unions from other areas. In January 1981
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the organisers of the Newcastle Centre convened a
national conference of community groups and trades councils
to discuss how their initiative could be adopted and
developed and, more generally, how the unemployed should
best organise themselves. It was at this conference -
which I attended - that the TUC chose to announce its
own guidelines which committed it to develop a national
network of centres and laid out how these should be
11developed and controlled. They identified three 
main objectives of the new centres: a) to provide
unemployed people with information and advice about 
opportunities and assistance for training and mobility 
and to channel requests for assistance from individual 
workers who are in need of representation before 
tribunals to the affiliated union of which they are a 
part; b) to provide a contact point in the local 
community where unemployed people could make contact 
with each other and organise activities; and c) to 
make representations on behalf of the unemployed to 
help promote schemes under the MSC programmes and to 
push for discretionary concessions for the jobless.
TUC Regional Councils, in conjunction with local trades 
councils and full time union officials, would propose 
the new centres, set up steering committees and approach 
local authorities. Centres would be managed by equal 
numbers of trade union representatives - nominated by 
the Regional Councils - and representatives from the local 
authority. Their progress would be monitored and the 
TUC notified of any centre or management committee acting 
outside the guidelines. Arrangements in Scotland were 
basically the same as the rest of Britain, though there 
is no equivalent to the English and Welsh TUC Regional 
Councils. Trades councils - the next level of affiliated 
organisation below the Scottish TUC - therefore play a 
more important role in inplementing the guidelines.
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It was clear from the start that the TUC intended
to keep tight control over the centres and avoid their
use for activities which could be described as 'political*.
This increased the likelihood that the MSC would support
the programme and provide funds but it also meant that
the unemployed would be excluded from managing their
own centres. Understandably these conditions have been
utterly unacceptable to many activists among the unemployed,
and, despite small concessions made by the TUC to allow
voluntary and unemployed groups to be invited onto
management committees, the entrenched and bureaucratic
position of the trade union hierarchy has proved to be
an important cause of the emergence of an independent
unemployed movement - discussed below - and the existence
of a small number of centres which operate independently
from the TUC. In some towns these independent centres
have been funded by the local authority. Sheffield
City Council appear to be the most supportive, providing
funds for over thirty unemployed and drop-in centres
12
around the city.
In their actual operation the official TUC centres 
vary enormously. In some areas trades councils sympathetic 
to the demands of unemployed activists to run their 
own affairs have invited the unemployed groups to 
participate or, in some cases, take control of the centres. 
Although breaching the TUC's strict regulations, the TUC 
continues to list these centres as 'official* ones in 
its regular Bulletin on Centres for the Unemployed.
According to this Bulletin around 180 centres had
been established by the end of 1983, though other reports
suggest that only up to one-third are effectively 
13active and only half open for the full five days each
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week. Many of the premises these centres occupy have 
been provided by local authorities, often on a nominal 
or rent free basis, others by a trade union or local 
Labour Party, and some by a local church or trust. The 
TUC has provided help by releasing representatives to 
run advice sessions, assisting in the preparation of 
publicity material on a centre's activities, supplying 
information for courses, alerting local trade union and 
DHSS staff to new centres in their areas, and providing 
books, furniture and other basic material to equip them 
for use. Some union branches make regular financial 
contributions by giving the equivalent of 5p or lOp a 
week for each branch member, though in no case - as an 
early survey of centres found - has the money received 
been sufficient to employ s t a f f . A  general reluctance 
among trade unions to channel resources into centres 
for the unemployed is hardly surprising. With industrial 
closures their workload has increased and - in many 
cases - their income has been drastically reduced owing 
to falling membership. However, it has been suggested 
that if only even one fifth of TUC affiliated trade 
union members could be persuaded to contribute to a 
levy of 2p or 3p per week, then around £2 million could 
be raised annually for work among the unemployed.
Almost all centres provide some form of advice giving 
facility, snack bar and games room. Campaigns for cheaper 
fares and facilities have been organised, unemployed 
representatives have been sent to the meetings of local 
trades councils or union branches, and educational courses 
on a variety of subjects have been run.
Some centres have been very active and are widely 
used by the unemployed, but this is exceptional and their 
development has been tediously slow and disappointing.
326.
One reason for this has been that much of the financial
support upon which centres and their staff depend is
insecure and restrictive. MSC provisions - mainly under
the Community Programme (see Chapter 9) - can fund the
salaries of staff for one year only apart from one
key worker who can stay on. This means that good teams,
where they exist, will often be broken up after twelve
months. The acceptance of these funds in the first
place imposes severe restrictions on what a centre may
do, and activities which the MSC or the Department of
Employment (DE) deem 'political* are prohibited and
centres which get involved in them run the risk of
having their funds withdrawn. This happened in Sheffield
where the MSC, despite the centre being one of the most
successful with around one hundred people using it each
week, withdrew its £36,000 grant following the Centre's
17participation in demonstrations against unemployment.
At the same time as support for the Sheffield centre was 
axed in March 1983, the MSC was also directed by the DE 
to stop funding any new centres until more restrictive 
operating guidelines could be agreed with the TUC*
Apart from political controls, other factors - 
related more to the personal impact of unemployment - 
weaken the likelihood of active participation of the 
unemployed in facilities set up for them. The idea of 
belonging to the unemployed, or more specifically 
attending a centre exclusively designed for them which 
offers no scope to change or even protest about their 
plight, is clearly not one which people can derive much 
pride and enthusiasm from. Furthermore, a normal 
* non-working' day for many of the unemployed can be a 
full and tiring one and preclude involvement in the type 
of activities a centre might offer. Due to low incomes.
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the need to economise can demand long searches among 
shops for the best buys. Shopping might have to be 
built around visits to the local centre and employers 
in search of work, and long waits at the local offices 
of the DE and DHSS to follow up benefit claims and ensure 
that they receive the full amount due. All these activities 
may have to be carried out on foot because of the 
prohibitive cost of a car or public transport. Hence, 
even where the desire to participate exists, it may 
be worn down by the hardship and demoralising effects 
of prolonged unemployment.
6. Recruiting and Retaining the Unemployed
The second element in the TUC's strategy of organising 
the unemployed is to ensure that the jobless remain part 
of the trade union movement. A resolution carried by 
the 1981 TUC Congress called on the General Council to 
"actively pursue a policy which will lead to greater 
representation for the unemployed in the trade union 
movement." It has attempted to meet this resolution by 
encouraging individual unions to retain members who are 
made redundant on full union rights and actively recruit 
other unemployed workers including school leavers and 
those on Government training schemes. It was hoped 
that the new centres would play an important role in 
this process by putting the unemployed in their locality 
in touch with the trade union movement.
The official TUC line is that the unemployed can
contribute to formulating union policy only through
membership of an affiliated union and that only by retaining
and recruiting the unemployed can unions themselves
l8understand and identify with the jobless. The TUC is
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firmly against the unemployed organising outside trade
union structures, fearing this would weaken the labour
movement as a whole and make it easier for the Conservatives
to divide working and non-working sections of the labour
force. In this spirit it has deemed that "trades councils
and TUC centres should not have any dealings with
bodies describing themselves as unemployed workers
u n i o n s " . T h e  onus for recruiting the unemployed is
placed on individual unions. However, before this was
firmly decided the TUC did consider the possibility of
establishing some form of unemployed workers union
itself. The idea received the support of certain unions,
including NALGO, and SOGAT (one of the print unions),
but was finally rejected on the grounds that it would need
a significant increase in the TUC's income and would
tend to duplicate unions' own machinery and services.
It was also claimed that the progress of the new
centres could be jeopardised by raising demands and
expectations among the unemployed that could not be 
20met. Subsequent developments suggest the TUC may 
have made the wrong choice. The centres seem to have 
failed in their own right and - more significantly - 
local level recruitment into individual unions has not 
been anywhere near as comprehensive as was hoped. The 
rules and regulations of many unions exclude people from 
either becoming or even retaining membership. Even 
where membership status is allowed the unemployed are 
often prevented from participating on equal terms with 
members who have jobs. In other cases where the unemployed 
are welcome it has not always been easy to involve them.
If, for example, a union branch is based on the workshop 
and agendas dominated by the concerns of employed 
members, it is likely to be difficult for the unemployed 
to attend meetings and participate, in union affairs.
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A survey of Britain's fifty largest unions in the 
summer of 1981 exposed the limited extent to which the 
TUC aims were being carried out and some of the major 
barriers which would have to be overcome if the unem­
ployed were to become more involved. Thirty unions 
had rules explicitly preventing recruitment of the 
unemployed, six did not allow existing members to 
retain membership when they lost their jobs, and nine 
placed limits on the right to retain membership. Many 
of the others, although they allowed the unemployed 
to remain as members, placed significant conditions 
on this such as limiting membership to those who had 
been made redundant but excluding those who had received 
compensation under a redundancy agreement, limiting 
the time the unemployed could remain as members, and 
restricting the opportunity for the unemployed 
to participate in union activities by denying them 
voting rights, disallowing them from standing for 
national office or transferring them to holding branches 
which do not meet. Only 10% of the unions surveyed
permitted the unemployed to join on reduced contributions
21and enjoy full membership rights.
Some unions have recently relaxed their rules to 
encourage the recruitment and retention of the unemployed. 
The TUC has also amended its rules to allow unemployed 
people to act as delegates at Annual Congress, although 
by retaining the requirement that all delegates should 
be financial members or full time paid officials of 
an affiliated organisation it remains impossible for 
many unemployed people to take up this opportunity.
Despite some small progress the relationship between 
the trade union movement and the unemployed remains 
weak at the local level. A more recent study of the
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eighty-five unions affiliated to the Scottish TUC
found that sixty-eight did not allow the unemployed
to join, thirteen did not allow existing members to
retain membership when they became unemployed, and of
22those who did several allowed only limited rights. 
Furthermore, as only nine of the unions surveyed in 
Scotland were considering the need to make further 
changes in their rules, the indications are that the move­
ment seems unlikely to embark on the widespread changes 
that are required if the TUC's objectives are to be 
met. Faced with this intransigence there is little 
the TUC can do directly. Although it sounds powerful 
and influential, in reality the TUC is no more than a 
loose-knit federation of independent bodies with a very 
small staff and cannot enforce anything which member 
unions are prepared to resist.
7. The Unemployed's Response
The combined effect of TUC policy and the rules 
of individual unions deny a huge section of the unemployed 
a form of representation within the labour movement 
which would guarantee them scope for representation on 
an equal footing with those in work and allow them to 
voice their opinions collectively as workers who are 
united in their search for jobs. Official trade union 
strategy for organising the unemployed makes little 
concession to principles of self-help and democratic 
control. As such it has aroused the suspicion among 
unemployed activists that the intention behind it is 
to control rather than confront unemployment. They fear - 
with justification - that by denying the unemployed 
control of their own centres and the opportunity to 
make a political protest their independence and the scope
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for grassroots initiative is being undermined by the 
TUC and other public bodies.
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the 
cautious and centralised response of the trade union 
movement has spurred some of the unemployed to build 
their own autonomous and democratic movements. Mobilisa­
tion began in earnest following the Newcastle Conference 
in 1981 when the official TUC plans became clear.
Since then growth has been slow but the movement is 
gradually coming together with an identify of its 
own under the National Unemployed Worker's Movement 
(NUWM). Certain unemployed groups, particularly those 
in London and the South East who had already developed 
their own federal structures, were at first reluctant 
formally to affiliate to the emerging NUWM though 
they shared most of its aims. These and others joined 
with the NUWM in 1983 which is developing as a national 
federal body for unemployed groups and in 1983 had 
over 140 separate groups affiliated to it. The decision 
to call the organisation a 'movement* rather than a 
'union* was designed to avoid being proscribed under 
the TUC's rule against unemployed workers unions.
The Community Resource Unit (CRU) - a small body 
funded by the Gulbenkian Commission in 1980 initially 
for three years and led by Jim Radford - chose to 
focus its efforts particularly on work for unemployed 
groups because so few others were doing anything in 
this field. The Unit has been closely involved with 
the unemployed movement and has identified several 
reasons which explain the difficulties the unemployed 
face when trying to mobilise. A central weakness has 
been a shortage of effective spokespeople and negotiators.
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Those who are the most active in unemployed groups and 
the NUWM are mostly those with strong trade union 
backgrounds, and, by virtue of their personal character­
istics, they are also more likely to return to paid 
employment than other members of the unemployed. The 
CRU has found the administration of the unemployed 
movement to be unreliable, evolving and characterised 
by abysmally poor communications. The Unit points to 
a lack of organisational expertise and reliable 
secretarial back up and resources. This creates an 
inefficiency among unemployed people who are not in 
themselves incompetent and leads to a loss of confidence 
and a decline in participation in the groups they have 
established. The CRU has sought to provide what help 
it can but has often found it difficult to deliver 
owing to the suspicions which unemployed groups have 
come to have of outsiders whose offers of 'help* have
often been motivated by the desire to control and use
23unemployment for their own ends. Many in NUWM - 
particularly those in London, which is inevitably the 
heart of any communications system to be built up - 
are opposed to employing anyone; yet incapable of 
organising a really effective volunteer service of 
unpaid people.
The NUWM is developing as the main vehicle through 
which unemployed groups are lobbying the trade union 
movement to alter its practices. It is pressing for a 
dual membership arrangement whereby the NUWM would be 
recognised and the unemployed given a collective voice 
and, wherever possible, the right for individuals to 
retain membership of their separate unions. To allow 
the jobless to take a more active part in trade union 
affairs, the NUWM has also asked for the withdrawal of
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various union directives which have been sent to
trades councils and branches which exclude the unemployed
from representation, and for a review of the TUC's
guidelines which officially debar the unemployed from
24running their own centres. Certain parts of the 
labour movement, some trades councils for example, 
are responding favourably to these sentiments but 
there has been no overall indication that official 
trade union policy is in the process of changing to 
favour the demands of the unemployed.
8. Conclusions
Trade Unions cannot by themselves bring unemploy­
ment down by any great extent, but the policies and 
programmes that will be required to achieve an early 
reduction in unemployment will need their co-operation 
and place a number of demands on them. If, for example, 
labour is to be redeployed on a large scale, it will 
probably require the abandonment of many restrictive 
practices and controls on entry to occupations currently 
exerted by unions. An alternative economic strategy 
is also likely to seek a redirection of resources 
which flow abroad from pension funds which unions 
partly control, and if a reduction in working hours 
is to lead to a significant number of new jobs then 
those in work - particularly the higher paid - must 
be prepared to suffer a reduction - or at least restraints 
in pay. These and other policies which could bring 
unemployment down are technically feasible but politically 
very costly, and there is no guarantee that the official 
trade union movement would be able to see them through 
or that their working members would accept them. While 
these stark choices are yet to be faced, strong vested
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interests exist in using the issue of unemployment to 
attack the Conservative Government and its policies 
and to argue for greater support for the labour movement - 
so long as the threat of damaging unrest and political 
protest can be managed and controlled.
Meanwhile the unemployed are being denied an 
independent and effective voice within the trade union 
movement. As a result the opportunity to participate 
and gain experience of collective action and an identity 
as members of their class and its political movements 
through struggle and resistance is dwindling. Indeed 
much of our treatment of the unemployed almost seems to 
have been arranged to deprive a growing proportion of 
younger working people of that kind of experience.
The unemployed movement which is slowly building up 
outside main trade union structures - as it did in 
the 1930s - is likely to be severely restrained 
without a platform where it can collaborate with other 
groups and interests. Movements restricted to the 
poor and the unemployed rarely - if ever - seem to have 
been the sole motivators of reform and social change.
They have always needed allies, among the middle class, 
civil servants and in some countries the peasantry, 
to bring about major change. Unemployment and the way 
we respond to it may also be reducing the possibilities 
for fruitful alliances of these kinds. Without allies 
the unemployed movement is likely to remain weak and 
ineffective in much that it attempts; having no political 
or industrial muscle to force people to take notice of 
its demands. It is significant that where Government 
has responded directly to action by the unemployed it 
has been because it has been sufficiently frightened. The 
riots in Liverpool, for example, spurred the channelling
335.
of additional Government resources towards the city, 
though the provision of small amounts of money to 
modify unrest is not the only option open to Government 
if anarchic activity becomes more widespread. More 
overtly repressive ones are also possible.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES - COMMUNITY 
BUSINESSES IN SCOTLAND
1. Introduction
The previous five chapters have dealt mainly with 
policies and programmes initiated by Government and its 
agencies or other public or private organisations in response 
to high unemployment. To complete the range of activities 
at a local and urban scale this chapter.examines some of the 
community-based initiatives which have begun to emerge in 
economically deprived areas. Local people, community 
activists and voluntary groups have begun to play an 
important role in attempts to establish new forms of 
economic activity based on unconventional forms of ownership 
and control and designed explicitly to meet local needs 
and generate employment opportunities among the unemployed.
In a number of townships in the highlands and western 
islands of Scotland, local residents - with the help of 
the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) - had by 
September 1984 set up 16 community co-operatives which 
provided 99 full-time and part-time jobs and work for a 
further 150 outworkers. In lowland Scotland voluntary 
groups in particular have been active in developing 
community businesses; enterprises based on similar 
principles to their northern counterparts.
The following discussion will concentrate on developments 
in central and urban Scotland. Much of what is happening 
here, while perhaps more advanced, is similar to other
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areas of the UK. Furthermore, I have been closely assoc­
iated with developments in this region of the country in 
recent years and have also carried out some detailed 
fieldwork and empirical work on community businesses in 
this area as part of a short term project funded by the 
ESRC. Since 1980 I have attended numerous meetings and 
seminars organised by community business groups and in the 
early months of 1984 attempted to contact all known 
initiatives. I was successful in gathering basic employment 
data on 25 enterprises - the vast majority of those 
existing. I visited 16 of these, including all the more 
established ones, to examine their operation, interview 
the managers and where possible chat to other workers. On 
each of these visits a short questionnaire was distributed - 
via the managers - for staff and workers to complete and 
return to me. The questionnaire asked for details about 
current and previous employment, experience of unemployment, 
wage rates, personal details and worker's attitudes to their 
jobs in the community business. 127 completed questionnaires 
were returned; a response rate of almost 50%, Only some 
of the questionnaire results are presented below. A fuller 
account of the findings has been published as a separate 
Discussion Paper. (See Appendix B for questionnaire details)
The chapter begins by charting the recent development 
of the community business movement in Scotland and the 
involvement of public authorities in this process. Following 
this 1 will examine the types of activities community busi­
nesses are involved in, considering how they differ from 
normal firms and how far they match up to the idealism 
which inspired them, and then present some evidence on 
their achievements, so far, particularly in terms of 
employment generation.
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2. Origin and Definitions
Local people involved in establishing community- 
based employment projects have relied heavily on 
outsiders such as community development workers and 
planners from local government and voluntary sector 
organisations who have helped initiate projects and 
organise and advise activists in local communities. It 
is not surprising that locally based employment initiatives 
do not arise more from essentially grassroots action led 
by poorer groups in the community. The disappointing 
performance of Centres for the Unemployed and their like 
(as shown in Chapter 11) suggests that unemployment is 
a rather ineffective basis for mobilising people at 
the local scale. One organisation which has proved largely 
instrumental in developing the idea of community businesses 
has been the Local Enterprise Advisory Project (LEAP), 
set up in 1978 by Strathclyde Regional Council using 
urban aid money. LEAP operated until around June 1984, 
working with people and community groups in areas of 
high unemployment in the Strathclyde Region to assist 
them to start up new economic activity, and has helped 
popularise the notion of community business among other 
community groups and the wider public.
Partly as a result of LEAP's work the number of 
community business initiatives has expanded rapidly and 
umbrella and federal organisational structures have been 
formed by people connected with projects and others working 
in the field to provide information networks between 
different projects, promote the idea of community business 
and lobby for support from Government. A count made by 
LEAP early in 1984 showed that sixteen community businesses 
were trading in Strathclyde. Trading was imminent in a
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further seven cases and another twelve projects were 
at the initiation and discussion stage. In the spring 
of 1981 Community Business Scotland (CBS) was formed 
as a federal organisation covering all of lowland 
Scotland and has developed a membership comprising 
people actively involved in trading concerns, represent­
atives from support bodies like local authorities, 
charitable organisations and private agencies, and other 
interested parties. CBS has directly encouraged 
community business by running training courses and 
helping individual projects share their ideas and 
experience with others. It has also attempted to secure 
a more favourable policy environment by publicising 
the concept and its requirements to public agencies and 
financial institutions in an attempt to ensure that 
these groups are better informed and more sympathetic 
to approaches for help. At a more local scale beneath 
that of CBS, community business groups have been 
coming together to form regional federations through 
which they can negotiate with a collective voice, thus 
laying the groundwork for a comprehensive two-tier 
structure of voluntary support above the level of the 
individual enterprise.
Ideally a community business differs markedly from 
the traditional private enterprise or worker co-operative, 
The following aspiration has been generally adopted by 
those working with them as the long term objective 
of this form of enterprise:
"A community business is a trading organisation 
which is owned and controlled by the local 
community and which aims to create ultimately 
self-supporting and viable jobs for local people 
in its areas of benefit, and to use any profits 
made from its business activities either to create
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more employment, or to provide local services, 
or to support local charitable work. A 
community business is likely to be a multi­
purpose enterprise and may be based on a 
geographical community or on a community of 
interest. It will have limited liability and 
in some cases will acquire charitable 
status o"2
As the movement is still a very young one, few community 
businesses come near to meeting this theoretical definition. 
In 1984, for example, only two of the enterprises in 
Strathclyde were wholly dependent on the income they 
generated themselves or on funds raised from non-public 
sources. Given responsibilities such as expanding jobs, 
protecting welfare and democratising the enterprise 
which are added to the need to achieve commercial viability, 
it is not surprising that it may well take longer to make 
community businesses viable and successful operations 
than it does more traditional forms of enterprise. People 
working with them feel that it takes at least five years 
before a community business can support itself and its 
staff out of the revenue it generates. The ideals of 
reinvesting any surplus money in other local projects or 
involving local people beyond the small numbers already 
active through community councils, trades councils and 
so on, therefore operates over a much longer timescale 
than the more immediate need to become commercially self- 
supporting.
3. Relationships with Government and the 
Public Sector
Although the development of the idea of community 
business has relied mainly on the initiative of community 
activists working either outside mainstream bureaucratic 
structures or on the fringe of them, the possibilities they
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appear to hold for generating economic activity in 
deprived areas and creating jobs for the unemployed 
has excited a great deal of attention among public 
authorities desperately looking for ways to bring 
unemployment down. Some local authorities in particular 
have begun to support community businesses as part of 
their economic and social strategies.
(i) Central Government
Resources used in the development of community 
businesses so far have come mainly from Central Govern­
ment or regional or national agencies which it controls. 
The broadening of criteria for giving urban aid in 1981 
to include wealth-creating projects enabled support to 
be given to community businesses which otherwise would 
have been much more difficult to arrange. Total 
expenditure figures are not available from the Scottish 
Office, but in Strathclyde Region, the area receiving 
the largest support, in the financial year 1984-85 12 
community businesses were receiving a total of £433,99 3 
in urban aid, of which £262,003 was in recurring revenue, 
£33,000 in non-recurring revenue and the remaining 
£138,990 in capital grants. The recurring revenue is 
usually given for a three year period, though this can 
be extended for a further two years.
Despite this support, the Scottish Development 
Department (SDD) - which administers the urban programme 
for the Scottish Office - is still in a dilemma as to 
how far Urban Aid can be used to support new productive 
enterprise. Being concerned about the possibly disruptive 
effects on existing firms, SDD is unsure if it can go 
beyond providing funds basically for the conversion and
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renting of premises and the payment of staff salaries 
and administrative expenses. However, for the time 
being at least, new projects are unlikely to get support 
from urban aid for other reasons. The urban aid budget 
in Scotland for 1984-85 has been severely cut from its 
previous year's allocation of £34.8 million to £26.5 million.
A policy package from Government more specifically 
geared to the requirements of community businesses had 
looked likely in 1980 when, referring to the new MSC 
Community Enterprise Programme (CEP), Mr. James Prior, 
then Secretary of State for Employment, indicated that 
the Government planned to provide funds for partnerships 
involving the private sector, public and community bodies 
in the creation of new enterprises. He added that "We 
hope that the money that we are allocating out of the 
new CEP for community enterprise operations, such as 
those carried out ... under the community business ventures, 
will begin to play a larger part." At the same time 
the MSC, jointly with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 
set up a Community Business Ventures Unit (CBVU) to 
examine existing community business ventures and to assess 
and make recommendations about the possibilities for 
further development. The group recommended that a 
development fund be established by public, private and 
community bodies and jointly operated by them to provide 
financial and other forms of support to individual 
initiatives. The initial optimism about forthcoming 
support diminished when the MSC began to distance itself 
from the Group's work. The shift in attitude may have 
reflected doubts about the MSC's involvement in assisting 
the creation of new economic activity of this sort, but 
for whatever reason the MSC's Director turned down 
membership of the CBVU after having been accepted and the
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MSC decided not to publish the Group's report. The 
report was published by the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation later in 1981,^
(ii) National and Regional Agencies
Despite the absence of resources specifically tailored 
to the needs of community businesses, MSC programmes 
have been used by a number of projects as a method of 
funding the salaries of workers for a year and as a way 
to train and learn to manage the workforce, carry out 
market research and build up a track record to assist 
them to obtain other forms of funding However, as 
these resources are designed to be used for training and 
not the for the development of new enterprises and jobs 
within them, a major restriction community businesses 
have faced is the * claw-back* of any profits made under 
the operation to the MSC. As a consequence, during the 
early stage in their development when these businesses 
often face greater problems than conventional firms, 
projects are denied the opportunity of accumulating capital 
to invest in machinery and equipment and build up a cash 
flow with which to pay wages and lay out money for work. 
Some have managed to avoid these rules, but usually by 
operating illegally and concealing their profits in second 
bank accounts.
The regional development agencies of Government have 
also been active. The SDA has since 1982 shown a growing 
interest in community businesses and in certain areas 
has commissioned voluntary organisations associated with 
community businesses to undertake consultancy work and 
carry out feasibility studies. It has also been involved 
in the establishment of a number of projects. In some
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localities subject to comprehensive area-based treatment, 
lump sums of money - in Motherwell there is £150,000 - 
have been set aside to support community businesses.
But this money has proved difficult to tap and local 
activists have complained about what they consider to be 
excessive caution shown by the SDA and a reluctance to 
respond to a new form of economic activity unless it 
presents itself as potentially viable in a normal way.
The SDA* s position is that its role is not to support 
enterprise which is inefficient or which would only be 
competitive as a result of public subsidy, and possibly 
displace more efficient businesses. Although many others 
in the public sector share this view, it creates an 
important dilemma for those involved in promoting community 
business. If these enterprises strive to become potentially 
viable and respectable to possible supporters by drawing 
on expert business advice and formulating the type of 
business plans necessary to secure normal financial 
backing for the business launch tangible financial benefits 
may well be forthcoming in the short term. However, if 
public authorities are not encouraged to recognise their 
uniqueness, there may also be the profound danger that 
the radical nature of community businesses as a potentially 
new form of social and economic organisation will be 
damaged and along with it the chances of developing self- 
managed approaches to community economic development.
The cautious position of Government and its agencies 
in lowland Scotland typified by the SDA contrasts sharply 
with the work of the HIDB in rural areas where, perhaps 
because of the lower likelihood of distorting competitive 
relationships in local markets, public funds have been 
used to a greater degree in the support of community-based 
enterprise. In addition to its normal package of loans
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and grants the Board appoints field officers to explain 
to local communities the assistance available and help 
steering committees of local residents devise and develop 
acceptable plans. New projects receive establishment 
grants which match funds raised by local steering 
committees on a pound for pound basis. The Board also 
provides for the cost of a manager for three years and 
further financial support for several years more.
Community business activists regard the provisions 
of the HIDB with a degree of envy. But as they become 
more successful and sophisticated in putting their case 
to public agencies and officials working in them the type 
of help they require might, tentatively, emerge. Ideally 
the type of package community businesses are lobbying for 
includes quicker decisions on applications for Urban Aid 
and MSC funds; wider and more flexible criteria in MSC 
programmes; greater understanding of their situation and 
needs by public and private lending agencies; small 
grants for feasibility studies market research and business
planning; interest free or low-interest loan facilities;
5and an accessible and relevant loan guarantee scheme.
(iii) Local Authorities
It has been among some of the local authorities 
that the commitment to develop community business as a 
distinctive form of economic activity exists, though this 
commitment has taken a number of different forms. In West 
Lothian, the involvement began when the District Council 
abandoned its Local Plan for a small number of mining 
villages in the south west of the District at the Report 
of Survey Stage because it recognised that no issues 
meriting local plan treatment were going to emerge.
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Coincident with this disillusionment with the traditional 
planning process, the Council recognised that unemployment 
was an issue on which it could take effective action, 
and in 1982-3 'Economic Regeneration* became the largest 
item in the Planning Department's modest budget - 
claiming £100,000 out of the total £190,000,^ The 
Department also reorganised its Policy and Implementation 
section to create a new group: 'Social and Economic
Initiatives'. Its staff works in a very different way 
from fellow town planners, spending a good deal of time 
working with community groups and providing them with 
finance and helping them secure further funds, for example 
from the Urban Programme and the MSC, to develop employment 
schemes and convert an old school into a work orientation 
and small business centre. The officers, see themselves 
as an uncommmitted resource capable of becoming closely 
involved with local people and groups in a non-manipulative 
process geared to avoid rigid and limited bureaucratic 
objectives and getting tangible benefits from the local 
authority system.
A new approach which brings together social and 
economic objectives has also been accommodated without 
such a major internal restructuring. In Glasgow District, 
the Council's Planning Department have, while recognising 
the distinctiveness of community businesses, decided to 
regard them as one other element within their overall 
economic strategy which includes the promotion of conven­
tional small enterprise.
Central Regional Council is another authority 
innovative in the community business field. Here the 
effort has been directed mainly into establishing an 
independent development unit outside the authority's
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internal structure. In conjunction with CBS the Regional 
Council has established Community Business Central as a 
three year project modelled on LEAP to promote the concept 
of community based employment throughout the region to 
which around £50,000 over a three year period has been 
committed in urban aid money. The Regional Council will 
also provide other help to the Unit in kind, lobby for 
additional resources from Government for community 
businesses, and explore how its existing small firm 
policies could be tailored to meet their needs. The Unit 
is staffed by three workers, one of whom has been seconded 
from private industry through the Scottish Action Resource 
Centre, A management committee including representatives 
from the Regional Council, local community businesses, 
trade unions and the SDA has been set up to help the Unit, 
which also has at its disposal £5,000 to use for feasibility 
studies, market research and other needs.
The independent development unit seems to be the 
main way the public sector in Central Scotland is moving 
in its support for community businesses. The largest 
initiative in this line to date is in Strathclyde. Here 
the Regional Council and others have established 'Strathclyde 
Community Business Ltd' (SC6) which will run for three 
years with a possible extension to five. The new unit 
represents a major shift, and means that the treatment 
of community businesses will no longer be considered by 
Council committees or administered by Council officers 
or carried out on behalf of the Council by LEAP. LEAP 
has been phased out in conjunction with the setting up 
of SC&, though its experience has been retained with its 
ex-director appointed to head the new group. Established 
as a company limited by guarantee, initially with seven 
staff, some of whom are ex-LEAP employees, SC6 will operate
350.
independently with its own funds, management and staff, 
and co-ordinate the involvement and resources of a number 
of other public organisations. A Board of Management will 
direct company policy and authorise loans and grants 
and will comprise representatives from the major sponsors, 
which, in addition to the Regional Council, include the 
SDA, Glasgow District, Community Business Scotland,
Community Business Strathclyde (another federal organisation 
made up of enterprises in the Region), and the private 
sector agency Scottish Business in the Community. The 
Unit's remit is to stimulate interest in community business 
through working closely with community development staff 
already in the field; provide training and counselling 
with the help of existing agencies, academic institutions 
and private industry; and provide appropriate financial 
support drawn from the funds of the sponsoring agencies, 
from private firms and supportive bodies like the MSC 
and HIDB, from an allocation of urban aid monies, and 
from a consultancy fund and a grants and loan fund at
7
its disposal.
Strathclyde Regional Council seem likely to put in 
£325,000 to the Unit and Glasgow District at least £25,000. 
The Scottish Office will provide the Urban Aid money it 
might have spent normally, but this will be paid in the 
form of a block grant from the Region to the Unit whose 
responsibility it would be to approve projects. The SDA 
expect to provide a contribution to cover funding for 
the Unit, a proportion of overhead costs of running 
particular community businesses and unsecured loans of up 
to £10,000 for individual projects. The MSC have decided 
not to put money into the Unit but will consider individual
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projects through its Area Boards and hope to respond 
flexibly to community businesses. The Scottish Trades 
Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry 
support the creation of the Agency, although both are 
concerned that community business activities should avoid 
threatening existing jobs and firms. Most of these 
organisations regard the new Unit as an experimental 
project the results of which will be followed closely 
and will probably determine the longer term involvement 
local authorities and other leading public sector organisa­
tions will have with community businesses. If the Unit 
is seen as a success - though different organisations will 
not define this in the same way - it may well provide a 
model for similar developments in other areas.
4. Characteristics and Classification
A closer examination of what the many projects currently 
labelled community business actually do reveals a varied 
and disparate range of activities. At face value some 
appear quite similar to normal businesses of the same type 
while others bear very little resemblance to traditional 
commercial enterprise at all. Current activities can be 
grouped into four broad categories although individual 
community businesses can be involved in more than one of 
these. However, discussing each group in turn and citing 
the types of activities within each, helps to provide a 
clearer picture of how distinctive different projects 
are from more conventional forms of economic activity and 
employment initiatives, and the, often differing, prospects 
they hold for boosting jobs and incomes based on a new 
set of relationships with workers and the local community.
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(a) Providers of Temporary Employment and
Training_____________________________
Community business has often been based wholly or 
partly on providing zemporary employment for adults and 
young people using funds from the MSC. The use of the 
old Special Temporary Employment Programme and the Youth 
Opportunities Programme and their current equivalents - 
the Community Programme and the Youth Training Scheme - 
has often been the main way projects have got started; 
these funds allowing people to come together with overheads 
and salaries guaranteed if only for a temporary period.
The types of activities currently taking place include 
the recycling of donated furniture and other household 
goods which are given to local social work services for 
distribution to poorer groups in the community, the carrying 
out of environmental improvement work on land or buildings 
in the locality, operating a market gardening scheme the 
produce from which is passed on to local groups and 
institutions on a non-profit making basis, an energy 
project which mainly carries out draught proofing for 
pensioners the material costs of which are paid for by 
the DHSS, and other handyman and small repair services for 
the old, disabled or single parents where the work is 
carried out free of charge and clients provide the materials. 
Although there is a strong orientation towards providing 
a service of benefit to the local community, there may 
appear to be little difference between these projects 
and temporary MSC schemes generally. The main difference 
is that most community businesses which have drawn on MSC 
funds have done so largely through expediency given the 
difficulties they experience in building up the cash flow 
and capital necessary to sustain the jobs when the funding 
stops. Organisers of community businesses based on or
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operating temporary employment projects have looked for 
ways to continue and develop the operation independently 
from MSC resources. The older and more established ones 
which began using MSC money have achieved this transition 
from temporary employment and training to operating 
commercially with greater self-sufficiency. The task, 
however, has often been difficult and a small number of 
projects have had to be disbanded in the process.
(b) Commercially Trading Enterprises
A number of projects which have made the above 
transition are - along with others - operating commercially 
in the market place and trading in similar ways to a 
normal firm. Some businesses trade from a retail outlet 
or shop. Goods which are sold to the public in such a 
way include donated and then refurbished furniture and 
other household goods - like electrical appliances, 
second hand clothes and new garments and craft products.
The refurbishment or manufacture of these take place 
either within the same premises from which they are sold 
or within a workshop or a number of individual homes 
physically separate from the shop. Other enterprises 
operate through contract work, secured from other businesses, 
local authorities, housing associations, or other organisa­
tions, or by providing services for groups or individuals 
in the local community. A wide range of activities are 
covered by community businesses of this sort - removals, 
printing, sandblasting and graffiti cleaning, and other 
very specific types of work for individual clients. It 
is in cases where community businesses trade essentially 
as a retail outlet or focus mainly on one area of contracting 
activity that they appear to come closest to resembling 
a conventional enterprise. However, although there is an
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inevitable tendency to consolidate the market position 
of the commercial activities they have chosen, community 
businesses - though not all - seem less inclined to 'sit* 
on this or reap financial rewards. The tendency is to 
take on board other activities and become multi-functional 
enterprises. This may reflect the fact that community 
businesses currently operate mainly in bits of the market 
with low growth and profit potential, but it possibly also 
reflects the greater priority given to maximising the 
creation of jobs as opposed to maximising a return on 
capital.
(c) Home Production
Home production provides an input into the operations 
of around a dozen community businesses which are either 
trading or hope to do so soon. It is an attractive 
activity for new and undercapitalised initiatives in that 
as workers operate part-time from the home and often 
provide - initially at least - their own materials and 
equipment, the demands on cash flow to support continuous 
overheads and wages can be reduced to usually one full-time 
individual. There is a variety of approaches to home 
production being taken by community businesses, each 
basically related to which bit of the market goods are 
being aimed at and the location of potential customers.
In Port Glasgow, for example, home produced Arran sweaters 
and soft toys - good quality middle market products - are 
mostly sold through a shop in the centre of the town. 
However, the potential sales of goods to the same community 
in which they are produced has an important bearing on the 
scope for generating income. The smaller and poorer the 
community is, the more reliance on local sales inhibits 
the expansion of home production and the growth of the
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community business, and, where sales are made, represents 
the recycling of limited local wealth as opposed to a 
transmission of wealth earned from richer groups. As a 
consequence of this dilemma, community business groups 
have been looking at ways to sell a greater proportion 
of home based goods outside their areas and bring new 
money into the local economy. Some advertise at fairs 
and run stalls in neighbouring towns. And in Forgewood, 
a depressed housing estate in Motherwell, home produced 
knitwear of a fashionable type is sold mainly through 
agents operating outside the area on the basis that it 
should generate more earning power. There has been an 
attempt to overcome the lack of resources and skills 
individual businesses face in marketing and distributing 
their wares to the wider community by setting up a 
community business principally to carry out this function 
for a variety of home producer groups. But this initiative, 
the Home Production Sales Organisation, has developed 
markedly differently from this intention. It has its 
own group of knitters who produce high quality garments, 
the intention of the business being to break into the 
top region of the fashion market which, although fiercely 
competitive, is constantly changing and capable of rewarding 
successful new styles with high financial return.
(d) Micro Development Aqencv
The final category of community business can be 
termed a micro or local development agency. This group 
differs , the most from conventional enterprise, but - 
as suggested below - probably holds out the best prospects 
for the generation of new economic activity. The basic 
characteristic of this type of community business, which 
distinguishes it from others, is the objective not of
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seeking the expansion of employment within the business 
itself but through the encouragement and development of 
enterprises or less formal forms of self-help operating 
with varying degrees of independence which need not be of 
a community business form. Given this basic aim, as 
with the other broad categories of community business, a 
number of different approaches exist. In most cases the 
key to the work of this type of initiative is the 
management and provision of premises or workshops to 
other users - usually small firms and in some cases local 
authorities - in return for a rental income which in 
turn pays the wages of the community business staff. In 
two areas of Glasgow - Govan and Garthamlock - old school 
premises have been renovated to provide modern workshops 
and office accommodation in units ranging up to 600 sq. 
ft. In the council estates at Easterhouse and Forgewood 
smaller 'nest egg* workspaces and retail premises have 
been provided by converting council houses which would 
otherwise have been vacant, and in Denny a derelict granary 
has been renovated in a managed workshop project. New 
schemes are also emerging in at least five other areas: 
the largest to date being a £1.2 million SDA financed 
conversion of a former bakery in Govan to provide 80,000 
sq. ft. of lettable space.
The management of premises for small firms and 
associated property development is the domain of private 
sector providers and public authorities. However, in 
the growing number of instances where community businesses 
have taken the initiative it seems highly unlikely that 
the provision would have been made. The fact that community 
business providers will be prepared to accept much lower 
levels of profit returns explains the absence of the private 
sector, but it also seems likely that public authorities
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would not have taken the initiative on their own 
accord despite the apparent high demand from small businesses 
for community business run schemes. In Govan, for example, 
it took four years of active campaigning to convince the 
SDA that it should support the conversion of the bakery 
into workshop premises.
Another, quite novel, example of a micro development 
agency exists in the East End of Glasgow. Instead of 
providing the physical basis in which new enterprise can 
set up, a main function of this initiative - Poldrait 
Service and Industry Limited - is to develop ideas for 
new viable businesses, secure the appropriate resources 
from banks, enterprise trusts, local authorities and 
other public agencies needed to launch and support the 
business, and draw together locals to form a workforce.
The aim is to establish as many of these new indigenous 
enterprises as possible, nurse them and the workers 
towards viability and then hive them off. In the words 
of the community businesses Director,
"Once a business is established to the point 
where it becomes viable, Poldrait will 
encourage the individuals working in that 
business to take it on as their own, thereby 
creating self-sufficiency. Poldrait will 
remain available to assist them in any way, 
so as to create confidence and remove any 
uncertainty that individuals may feel in 
*going-it-alone*."
In 1984 Poldrait secured the patent for the manufacture 
of thermoplastic road markings and had secured the funds 
necessary to begin the manufacture and laying of these 
at busy road junctions. The community business plans 
to start up this enterprise, recruit and train workers 
to carry out the operation. When a position is reached
358.
when those involved in the enterprise can run it 
themselves as a viable proporition Poldrait will float- 
off the operation as an independent concern.
Apart from creating new firms, independent, or poten­
tially so, micro development agencies have also operated 
MSC schemes. Poldrait, for example, is a Managing Agent 
for the MSC's Community Programme. Under this type of 
community business there seems to be a greater chance 
of turning at least part of these MSC schemes into some 
form of continuing enterprise. Often having premises 
at their disposal, and being able to marshall advice and 
resources and provide some of this themselves, micro 
development agencies are better equipped than other 
community businesses to achieve this - it has already 
been done and other transitions are in process.
5. Employment Impact
My survey work traced and gathered basic employment 
data on twenty—five community businesses, undoubtedly 
the vast bulk of those existing and including all of the 
established initiatives in Scotland. The total number of 
people working in these enterprises around March 1984 
was approximately 430. This figure does not include the 
numbers associated with community businesses either in a 
home production capacity or those who work or use premises 
provided by them. When an estimated 300 home producers 
and around 170 workers in other enterprises are taken into 
account, the number of people working in or in association 
with community businesses is, approximately, in the region 
of 900. This figure excludes at least 20 people who work 
within public agencies, voluntary organisations and independent 
development units, and whose work consists, in whole or part, 
of promoting community businesses.
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Workforce size varies under different community 
businesses but is generally related to the type and 
classification of the project, as is the nature of 
employment provided and the possibilities for growth.
The largest employers are those who provide temporary 
employment by operating MSC schemes. Workers on these 
account for around two thirds of all employment in 
community businesses and the numbers involved in individual 
initiatives are as much as lOO. When workers whose 
wages are paid by the MSC are excluded, the numbers 
employed directly in community businesses are small. An 
approximate average across existing businesses is five 
employees. Of the community businesses who are trading 
commercially, the largest workforce is nineteen and 
in this case the enterprise is one of the oldest and 
most established. The number of jobs in the micro devel­
opment agency structures is also small - currently around 
a dozen - and unlikely to grow much further. However, 
when taking into account the work of these organisations 
in facilitating or initiating the emergence of local 
indigenous enterprise, the impact on economic activity 
and jobs is a significant one. The rehabilitated school 
in Govan houses 25 small firms - around 60% of which are 
new - providing around 90 jobs - and a second workshop 
scheme currently under way will provide space for a 
further 50 firms and 250 jobs while adding only two extra 
jobs to the core staff.
The potential for an expansion of jobs among those 
community businesses which are trading commercially would 
appear to be small in the near future. It will probably 
be an important success if existing numbers of workers 
and the markets they operate in are consolidated. In 
terms of the numbers of people affected, the largest 
contribution is likely to be among schemes which draw on
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MSC resources and community businesses which boost the 
stock of local enterprise and jobs through providing 
premises and workspaces.
There is an inherent tension between the main object­
ives of community businesses. While more conventional 
enterprise need only be concerned with achieving a return 
on capital invested, community businesses are also committed 
to expand employment and protect the welfare of workers 
and the local community. Most projects resolve this 
dilemma by regarding commercial viability as a 'means' to 
meeting the other objectives. Most managers I spoke 
to regarded 'jobs' as being their main criteria of success 
and a number stated clearly that they were prepared to 
accept lower returns than traditional firms in order to 
sustain a relatively larger workforce and better working 
conditions. The wages in one building company were higher 
than those in most private firms without being damaged by 
competitors partly because the community business set its 
profit margins lower, often between 5% and 15% of the tender 
price, whereas private firms might go for between 30% 
and 50% In this and other cases the prospects of short 
term business expansion have probably suffered as a result 
of protecting a certain level of workers* welfare. In 
the management of its contract cleaning squad, Poldrait 
decided not to compete with the low wages paid by its 
competitors and accepted a slower rate of growth as a 
result. However, according to the Chief Executive, one 
benefit of this is that its reputation as a good employer 
helped to secure a contract from the District Council. 
Indeed, if it is the case that community businesses can 
be relied on to provide more socially acceptable conditions 
of employment and better relations in the workplace and 
with the local community than other small firms, it
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opens up the possibility of justifying a very different 
set of relationships between public organisations and 
this form of economic activity and the provision of even 
greater support to community businesses than is presently 
being given to traditional small scale enterprise.
The extent of work opportunities and the incomes 
paid to people involved in home production schemes vary.
In the Forgewood council housing estate in Motherwell 
the community business has about 80 home producers on 
its books. Not all are active, but of those who are the 
manager reported that top earnings can sometimes reach 
£160 per month though the average is £6 per week. In 
Port Glasgow around 85 of the registered home producers 
are active and each knits on average two Arran sweaters 
a month which generate an income of £18 for the worker.
Up to 100 people produce goods for the Home Production 
Sales Organisation whose production capacity is currently 
between 150 and 200 sweaters a month. The Trade Development 
Officer of this community business reported that a good 
hand knitter would take on average one night to make a 
simple sweater in return for £6. A more complicated 
sweater would take between three and five nights in return 
for £14. For groups using knitting machines production 
capacity was greater - approximately six simple sweaters 
or one complicated one could be produced in a day.
In the main those who participate in home knitwear 
schemes are provided with the wool they require, but other 
costs incurred in production, such as heating and lighting 
are not covered. Home producers are often single parents 
or wives with unemployed husbands who live in areas which 
offer few other prospects of employment or income generation. 
For those people, selling goods which they can produce 
in the home may bring a valuable supplement to the household
.1
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income, but in total this income amounts to little more 4
than what will help pay the rent. It is difficult to
envisage how home production can go beyond this marginal
role. The reality is long hours for low returns, and
frequently in poor working conditions. It may also involve
wives, whose husbands are in receipt of supplementary
benefit, in social security fraud. The 'disregard*
rules in these cases are very severe. Wives can earn
only £4 per week. Any additional earnings are deducted
pound for pound from their husand's supplementary benefit.
"K
I found no evidence to suggest that community business 
activists were encouraging people to declare earnings 
through home production, and organisers of home knitwear 
groups reported that, to the best of their knowledge, 
knitters did not voluntarily declare their income. Hence Î;
it seems likely that a proportion of home produced goods ||
are in effect being subsidised by social security mainten- ||
ance.
People employed in community businesses are mainly 
males, who accounted for over 70% of those responding to 
the questionnaire. Almost 80% of the jobs of those ||
responding were full-time; that is providing employment 
for at least thirty hours per week. Perhaps the most 
striking feature of the workers surveyed was the tiny 
proportion (7%) who had previously been in work immediately 
before starting their present job. Over half of these 
completing the questionnaire were on MSC schemes which 
meant they must have been unemployed beforehand, and this f
was also true in most of the remaining cases. A strong 
bias towards recruiting unemployed people and other 
disadvantaged workers was stressed by those running 
community businesses and is endorsed by the questionnaire 
results. Almost 94% of all those employed were either 
previously unemployed, school leavers or students, house-
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wives, or on temporary schemes (Table 13.1).
Table 13,1: Previous Employment State of
  Workers in Community Businesses
Number of % of Total
Workers Workers
Employed or Self-
Employed 9 7
Unemployed 86 68
School-Leaver or
Student 17 13
Housewife 6 5
Temporary MSC Scheme 8 6
TOTAL 126 99
More than half of all workers (57%) seem to have 
experienced particular disadvantage in the labour market, 
either having been out of work for a year or more immediately 
before starting their present job, or having suffered 
more than one spell of unemployment in the previous four 
years, or both. Most of those unemployed immediately 
before starting their current job gave the duration of 
unemployment experienced (see Table 13.2). 69% were long
term unemployed , having been out of work for a year or 
more, and shared 105 years of unemployment between them 
or an average of almost 2 years each. Just short of 
half this group had been out of work for 2 years or more 
and accounted for almost 69 years of unemployment between 
them; almost 3 years per person. Almost 78% of all 
workers had been out of work at least once in the previous 
4 years (see Table 13.3). A large proportion of these
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(32%) of all workers) had a recent history of repeated 
unemployment having experienced two or more spells of 
unemployment over the four year period.
Table 13.2: Duration of Unemployment Experienced by
_______  Community Business Workers
Number of 
Workers
Less than 1 year 24
Between 1 and 2 years 38
Over 2 years 12
Over 3 years 2
Over 4 years 2
TOTAL 78
Table 13.3: Spells of Unemployment Over Previous Four
__________  Years Experienced by Community Business Workers
Number of Spells Number of Workers Total Number of
Experienced _________________  Separate Spells
1 59 59
2 22 44
3 11 33
4 3 12
5 3 15
8 1 8
TOTAL 99 171
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Although the sample was only a small one, the impact 
of community businesses on unemployment is impressive 
when compared to job generation under traditional small 
firms which will be examined in the next chapter.
However, before this can justify a case for substantially 
greater public support, the effects on existing enterprise 
and jobs need to be considered. It is difficult to reach 
firm conclusions on this issue, but a number of points 
can be made in favour of community businesses. Although 
some are in direct competition with other firms for work, 
some of the commercial services and the way they are 
offered are new to the immediate local economy. Furthermore, 
at times the methods used in securing work - such as 
approaching potential houssKolds directly to interest 
them in maintenance and repair work - may create a 
certain amount of demand which did not exist. Other 
enterprises have managed to provide facilities - such as 
workspaces and cafes - which did not exist in their 
areas, or, by supplying suitable premises have enabled 
others to provide new services. In some cases genuine 
niches in the market have been found. To date these 
have probably been in activities which the private sector 
has avoided because of the prospects of low profits, but 
if some of the projects currently emerging come to fruition 
community businesses could demonstrate a level of profit­
ability that is respectable in conventional market terms.
Given that it is overwhelmingly unemployed people 
who are securing work under these structures, a further 
justification can be made for support on the basis that 
it is appropriate to take into account the savings to the 
state as people are taken off social security and pay 
income tax as well as the costs when considering the 
provision of public funds to community businesses. Adopting
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this perspective a project can be cost effective without 
achieving viability in a traditional market sense.
Calculations on this basis across nine community business- 
type enterprises in London found that, after taking into 
account what the state would have to pay in unemployment 
and other benefits, in every case benefits outweighed 
the costs and justified public support of the projects.^
6. Conclusions
Much of what is happening within community businesses 
at present is far removed from the theoretical vision of 
what these enterprises might achieve. Nevertheless, the 
philosophy behind them remains an important reference 
point and ideal for those working in and joining the field 
and some projects have the ability to develop towards it.
The achievements so far are not so much the creation of 
new models of economic and social development as the 
encouragement of a degree of economic activity in deprived 
communities which would not otherwise have taken place.
In the main this has provided work and incomes for the 
unemployed and other marginal workers and involved other 
local people in management and organisational capacities 
through which they have gained valuable political and 
administrative skills.
To develop further, community businesses and initiatives 
like them will require a greater backing from government 
and public agencies than they currently receive. The 
help which would ease some of their immediate 
problems has been mentioned above. But given the numerous 
difficulties they face including the problems of reconciling 
often conflicting objectives, the lack of suitable management 
experience, and the challenge of rebuilding the confidence 
and abilities of workers and communities which have experienced
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high and prolonged unemployment, the state will have to 
underpin them for several years, possibly indefinitely.
This could be done in various ways. Greater financial 
support, more appropriately designed to the needs of these 
enterprises, could be provided to fund salaries, training 
and the purchase of equipment. Help in kind could be given 
by providing premises, land or skilled personnel, which 
community businesses could use to strengthen their operation 
and generate a larger cash flow. A stronger public commit­
ment to this sector of the economy could also mean that 
larger amounts of public expenditure are channelled towards 
it through the state demanding and paying for the types of 
services community businesses can provide.
The potentialities of community businesses also seem 
likely to depend partly on where power over their affairs 
ultimately lies- That seems likely to change, starting with 
local authorities, the MSC and SDA, because they hold the 
funds crucially needed, but then passing to local community 
organisations or the workers themselves, if they succeed.
Which outcome it is may be very important. If community 
businesses take on the characteristics of workers co-operatives 
and expansion is determined by existing workers, who at 
least can veto proposals for taking on more staff, these 
organisations will probably remain small. It will only pay 
the existing staff to take on more workers if that makes all 
of them more productive, whereas a conventional firm needs 
only to be sure that extra staff will increase profits 
on the capital invested in it.^
However at present community businesses are proving 
difficult for a number of agencies to support. The 
combination of motives for profit and for social welfare 
has meant that this form of economic activity is struggling 
between two sets of institutional attitudes which have
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traditionally distinguished between social and economic 
policies, and between the public and private sectors of 
the economy, and find it difficult to respond to projects 
which combine these objectives. A significant change and 
a reduction in these dilemmas will depend on a political 
and widespread recognition of economic self-help as a 
legitimate activity worthy of public commitment and support. 
The particularly high participation of previously unemployed 
people in community businesses seems to justify such a 
recognition.
Despite the many barriers community businesses face 
they have helped to get - and been helped by getting - 
public authorities, central and local, to abandon their 
very long-standing traditions of clear separation between 
public and private sectors. But this, in turn, may bring 
dangers, precisely the dangers which that clear separation 
was supposed to guard against, of corruption and people 
using public money to enrich themselves and their friends.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
COMMUNITY LEVEL EFFECTS OF LOCAL ECONOMIC 
REGENERATION IN CLYDEBANK AND THE 
GEAR AREA
1. Introduction
Glasgow's east end, the location of the Glasgow Eastern 
Area Renewal Project (GEAR), and Clydebank a town of some 
50,000 people in the north-west of the Glasgow conurbation 
are the two parts of Clydeside where major 'top-down* public 
sector regeneration strategies have been implemented.
Under these initiatives large amounts of public expenditure have 
been channelled into providing new small premises or rehabili­
tating existing industrial buildings, improving the industrial 
environment, and creating a strong publicity push to attract 
new investment and create employment. In GEAR, the first 
scheme of this kind in the UK, the construction and 
rehabilitation of housing and large scale landscaping work, 
were included as an integral part of the strategy.
The types of policies operating in both areas have,been 
central to the Government's approach to revitalising 
declining urban localities since the late 1970s. The 
development of urban policy and the philosophy underlying it 
has been discussed in Chapter 8. Both GEAR and Clydebank 
are very much part of this tradition, hence the following 
discussion which considers the impact of policy in these 
areas should have a relevance wider than the West of Scotland 
alone.
The purpose of this Chapter is to make a preliminary
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assessment of the effects and effectiveness of area-based 
economic regeneration policy by looking at the impact of 
policies for the support of small firms in public sector 
premises, particularly in terms of employment, in these 
two places. The main questions I will explore are to what 
extent have the policies operating solved the problems of 
economic decline confronting GEAR and Clydebank, and how 
effective have they been when set against the aims and 
objectives of the public agencies involved? The main 
method of enquiry I used involved a questionnaire survey of 
small firms occupying SDA premises in each area. But before 
presenting the results of this research, it is useful to 
briefly outline the nature of economic decline in these areas, 
the problems it has creaked, and then the response this has 
prompted from public agencies - particularly the SDA.
2. A Legacy of Decline
The characteristics of a local economy and its labour 
market, and the various consequences of decline are important 
considerations when evaluating the impact of renewal policies. 
It is these problems that public authorities seek to address, 
and their programmes must be judged by the degree to which 
they solve or ameliorate them. Glasgow's East End and 
Clydebank have suffered a steady erosion of their industrial 
bases over the past two decades with decline becoming 
particularly intense during the 1970s. Since 1961 the GEAR 
area lost over 24,000 manufacturing jobs by 1982 and
Clydebank over 27,000. Some small employment growth has 
taken place in the service sector, but when compared to the 
overwhelming collapse in manufacturing its contribution in 
jobs pales into insignificance in numerical terms. The poor 
performance in the local economies is largely a consequence 
of having a disproportionately high level of employment
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concentrated in manufacturing industry, particularly the
more vulnerable sectors, at a time when these sectors
and manufacturing as a whole have been in decline nationally.
As a result, wider economic trends have been translated into 
their economies, and the extent of national decline magnified 
at the local scale. The loss of jobs has come mainly 
through the contraction or closure of established local 
employers, many of whom had become household names, in 
Scottish manufacturing industry, such as Singer and John 
Brown in Clydebank, and Clyde Iron Works and Templetons in 
GEAR. The detrimental impact on local employment and the 
base of industrial training in each area has been accentuated 
by the fact that these were often large firms. At the time 
of my survey in 1982, the ten largest manufacturing firms 
in GEAR - though they still accounted for around two-thirds 
of the area's total workforce - had reduced their workforces 
by 30% or 3,200 jobs since 1977. In Clydebank the collapse 
of employment in large firms was even more pronounced. Four 
firms had accounted for 60% of employment in local manufacturing 
industry in 1978. By 1982 two of these - including Singer 
which had employed 5,600 in 1976 - had closed, and the 
remaining two had drastically reduced their workforces.
The erosion of an area's industrial base of this 
magnitude can have far reaching consequences for the working 
life of that community. The problems it creates are not 
necessarily identical but are themselves influenced by particular 
local characteristics. One effect is on the size and structure 
of the local population. As employment opportunities decline 
some workers and their families will leave in search of work 
elsewhere. Those migrants tend to be the most mobile, with 
better skills and prospects of securing work than the poorer 
and less able they leave behind. Both study areas have lost 
large amounts of population. Strathclyde Regional Council
373.
expect Clydebank's population to have fallen from 58,727 in 
1971 to around 49,500 by 1985, a decline of almost 16%. In 
GEAR, where industrial decline has been combined with a 
massive slum clearance programme, population loss has been 
catastrophic, falling from 81,900 to 45,000 (-45%) between 
1971 and 1978. This has left the area with a terribly 
imbalanced demographic profile with abnormally high concentra­
tions of old people and teenagers and relatively few in the 
parental and working age groups between 25 and 50 years.
Another direct reflection of decline can be seen in 
local unemployment rates. In the summer of 1982, 17.2% of 
Clydebank's workforce (6,265 people) were out of work and, in 
the same year, in GEAR, male unemployment averaged around 
30% - a figure far higher than any comparative local statistic 
for the city, region or country as a whole. When one 
considers that GEAR's population of 45,000 is roughly 
equivalent in scale to towns like Perth and Ayr then the 
extent of the problem ( almost one in three of the workforce 
jobless) becomes clear. The relationship between local 
unemployment and the number of jobs in an area is not a simple 
one but it is particularly important when considering the 
type of employment strategies which might be appropriate. 
Clydebank had a workforce of around 24,500 but had only approx­
imately 17,250 local jobs in 1981. It may, therefore, seem 
surprising that uneirployment is not higher. Indeed it was 
slightly lower than the regional average at the time of the 
survey. The explanation lies in the fact that Clydebank, as 
a source of employment and a local labour market, is closely 
integrated with the surrounding urban economy. The area 
experiences large flows of labour both in and out, thus 
cushioning the town from adverse changes in the local economy. 
Approximately two-thirds of those working in Clydebank 
commute to the town, mainly from north-west Glasgow and
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Dumbarton, some nine miles to the West. A similar proportion 
of the local residents in employment work outside the town.
GEAR also has a large interchange of labour with the
wider conurbation, though less pronounced than in Clydebank.
Almost half the resident workforce appeared to hold jobs
1
outside the area in 1982. However, the relationship 
between jobs and the proportion of residents who are 
economically active is the reverse of that in Clydebank.
GEAR is *job rich'. Despite having an unemployment rate of 
around 10% above that in Clydebank, there are around 40,000 
local jobs for a local labour force of about 16,000. Put 
another way, while in Clydebank there is approximately 0.7 of 
a job for every worker living in the area, in GEAR there are 
over three and a half as many, or 2\ jobs per worker.
The reason why unemployment in GEAR is so high, despite 
this apparent abundance of jobs is that the area houses 
higher concentrations of workers of a type who are most 
vulnerable to unemployment generally, principally the unquali­
fied young, the unskilled, and redundant workers from industries 
rooted in decline. Most young people in the East End leave 
school without any qualifications and unemployment in the 
under 18 age group is twice the Glasgow level. Over one- 
third of the jobless have been out of work for over a year, 
many for much longer. Those particularly affected by long 
term unemployment are young adults under 24, in what should be 
the first decade of their working life, and older workers 
over 45 who will find it difficult to find employment again. 
Almost one-quarter of the long term unemployed in 1982 had 
been out of work for over three years. Therefore, despite a 
gross surplus of jobs, large numbers of local people are 
being effectively excluded from the employment opportunities 
which exist because of their personal characteristics-
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The scenario of decline could be extended further to
cover the multiple social problems which arise through the
impoverishment of a community suffering from industrial
decline. A study of the effects of unemployment in
Clydebank one year after the Singer closure found rent
arrears had risen by 21% over the previous twelve months and
the number of households whose fuel and rent bills were
paid direct by the Department of Health and Social Security
had grown by 18% and 14% respectively. Social Workers* case
work with families had also increased by 21% and reports from
2
childrens* hearings by 38%. In GEAR perinatal mortality 
rates are far in excess of the Greater Glasgow average, as 
are court reports, reports to childrens* panels and the
3
number of children in residential or foster care. As 
Chapter 7 indicated, prb&lems such as these need not be wholly 
or directly attributable to unemployment, but, nevertheless 
a growing body of research suggests that there is often a 
strong association between unemployment, poverty, ill health, 
certain types of crime and various other indices of social 
stress.
Even a summarised and patchy description of the legacy 
of industrial decline in GEAR and Clydebank should serve to 
emphasise one of the key issues in any evaluation of area- 
based responses to the problem. If economic policies operating 
solely in a particular locality are to be effective in 
confronting and tackling industrial collapse and help people 
who have suffered as a result, then we should expect to see 
tangible benefits in the economic and social welfare of 
poorer groups who are tied to, or trapped in an area, and who 
face relatively greater disadvantage in the labour market.
3. From GEAR to Clydebank - The Developing
Tradition of Area-Based Development
The first major response at in intra-urban scale to
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economic decline in the UK was made in Glasgow's East End.
The announcement of the GEAR scheme in 1976 was of historic 
significance. It was the first large inner city regeneration 
initiative, predating the whole urban policy tradition which 
began shortly after with the passage of the Inner Urban 
Areas Act and is continued with Urban Development Corporations.
The project marked the beginning of the official switch in 
Central Government policy away from the new town programme in 
favour of redirecting resources towards deprived inner city 
areas. In the West of Scotland this switch saw Government 
abandon its plans to develop Scotland's sixth new town at
■
Stonehouse. At the same time GEAR was introduced as a new 
multi-tier structure to be led by the SDA, and constitute a 
partnership between different levels of government and other 
statutory agencies. Apart from the SDA, the other partners 
were Glasgow District Council, Strathclyde Regional Council, 
Scottish Development Department, the Scottish Special Housing 
Association and the Housing Corporation. The intention was 
that these agencies would work closely together and deploy 
resources more effectively in the East End. Unlike the Urban 
Development Corporations in England GEAR was never an 'agency* 
as such, having no legal identity or powers.
The estimated total cost of the scheme in completed 
and on-going projects over the period 1977-84 is around 
£200 million. £26.7 million is accounted for by Strathclyde 
Regional Council, £41.4 million by Glasgow District Council,
£45.2 million by the SDA, £39.3 million by the Scottish Special 
Housing Association, and £44 million by the Housing Corporation.
It is difficult to determine precisely how much of this is 
'new* money, mobilised by the GEAR Project. With the 
exception of the SDA, most of the authorities would probably 
have incurred similar amounts of expenditure in Glasgow's 
East End anyway» A substantial proportion of the SDA* s
4
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resources is, however, probably due to the intervention.
The initial task was loosely defined as the reconstruc­
tion of Glasgow's East End and the creation of a balanced 
and thriving community through comprehensive social, economic, 
and environmental measures, but by May 1980 the SDA had 
identified a clearer and ambitious set of aims and objectives. 
These were concerned with (a) helping residents secure employ­
ment; (b) retaining and creating jobs; (c) improving the 
quality of life; (d) improving the environment; (e) creating 
better housing; and (f) involving the community.
This focus on one of Scotland's worst industrial 
blackspots was a new one for the SDA and not one for which 
its internal structure was particularly geared. At the time 
it was probably seen as a 'one-off* project. In 1978, however, 
when disaster threatened some small townships in Ayrshire 
with the closure of local steel works, the SDA was again 
involved in an area initiative. Here a small group of SDA 
officials teamed up with BSC (Industry) Ltd., which, as 
described in Chapter 11, is a body established by the British 
Steel Corporation to move into steel closure areas and 
help create jobs to replace those being lost. This initiative 
was called a 'Task Force' and excited a lot of attention and 
enthusiasm as a new approach to local economic regeneration.
The Task Force idea was soon deployed again, this time 
in Clydebank. Following the announcement that Singer (then 
the town's largest employer), planned to substantially cut 
back its workforce, Clydebank was visited by the Scottish 
Office Minister for Industry and Education. A working party 
bringing together officials from central government, the 
relevant local authorities, the MSC and the SDA was set up 
under the chairmanship of the Economic Advisor to the Scottish 
Office to examine the problems and imbalances in the local
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labour market and prepare the main elements of a strategy to
resolve these problems. Soon after. Singer decided to close
completely with the loss of a further 3,000 jobs. The working
party reported in December 1979 and, in response to its
recommendations. Central Government decided that the SDA
should set up a Task Force in the town explicitly to
5co-ordinate efforts to generate new employment. Had the 
Singer collapse not prompted the high profile response from 
Central Government that it seemed to, the SDA might have 
undertaken some special programme of physical redevelopment 
in the town anyway. During 1979 the District and Regional 
authorities had been preparing along with the SDA a joint 
initiative which could have led to the release of substantial 
SDA resources into the area. The financial commitment of the 
SDA to Clydebank totals £19 million of which £10,5 million 
had been spent by March 1982.^
Part of central Clydebank was subsequently designated an 
Enterprise Zone in which firms receive 100% rates relief and 
100% capital allowance on new building works. With large 
amounts of public resources going into providing serviced 
sites and premises, however, Clydebank is very much a 
'planned environment' and quite distinct from early free 
market conceptions of Enterprise Zones which gave rise to 
fears that they signalled a return to the squal )r of 
Nineteenth Century industrial environments in the hearts of 
British cities. Enterprise Zone status for Clydebank essentially 
provided yet another marketing tool and an additional layer 
of financial incentives to a strategy based on heavy 
expenditure by a national development agency in the creation 
of an attractive, modern, and well serviced environment for 
businesses. The consultants commissioned by the Department 
of Environment to monitor the enterprise zones found that the 
Clydebank zone had received the second largest amount of
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public expenditure by May 1982, Furthermore, enterprise zone 
designation had not altered existing organisational structures 
and development plans were proceeding as they would have done
7
in the absence of designation. Clydebank proved to be a 
watershed in the SDA's role in local economic development.
Until then the Agency's area-based approach had been largely 
the result of central government direction through the Scottish 
Office. Since the beginning of its involvement in Clydebank, 
however, the SDA has formalised this role (imposed from 
above) into a corporate strategy for allocating its resources 
and co-ordinating its own operations. This has allowed 
the Agency to embark on a number of new-style area projects 
in other parts of Scotland and a policy decision has been made 
to spend 60% of resources on area-focussed projects.
There are some notable differences in emphasis between 
GEAR (the SDA* s first generation area initiative) and 
Clydebank (the beginning of numerous second generation 
projects). The stated objectives of policy in GEAR were 
ambitious, wide ranging and fairly specific. In Clydebank 
this is not the case. There is less discussion about community 
issues, the timescale of the project is shorter and 
predetermined, and there is a move away from an explicit 
concern about creating jobs and improving residents' chances 
of employment in favour of vaguer notions associated with 
improving the health of the local economy and generating 
wealth. There may be obvious reasons for these changes. One 
is probably that policy makers recognise serious weaknesses 
in certain aspects of their strategies and are reluctant to 
make claims they may not be able to sustain. However it 
probably also reflects the sharpening of the free-market 
philosophy which has been taking place within Government's 
local economic development strategies. As Chapter 8 discussed, 
social objectives seem to be becoming subordinate to economic 
circumstances, the assumption being that by subsidising the
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generation of wealth under small-scale capitalism Government 
can ameliorate locally concentrated deprivation and reduce 
unemployment. A recent and important development within 
the SDA's area-based policies reflects the sharpening of this 
philosophy. Since 1983 the SDA has been providing support 
for the development of a network of enterprise trusts 
throughout Scotland.
4, Questions and Issues
The main 'top down' strategies of Government and its 
agencies embody a particular set of assumptions about the 
way economic regeneration and a reduction in unemployment 
can be brought about. Put simply, if rather crudely, they 
are based on the hope that by expanding the stock of small 
premises in an area, tidying up the industrial environment 
and providing a range of financial and other incentives 
particularly geared to the small firm a wave of new 
entrepreneurs will come forward and set up new businesses.
Some of these individuals will previously have been employed 
in contracting local industries, and, by setting up new 
firms, (possibly using their redundancy money) they will 
provide jobs to replace those lost, with many of these 
jobs going to local people from the unemployment register 
The role of public organisations is seen to be one of 
facilitating traditional private sector led development by 
becoming more accessible at a local level, less bureaucratic 
and providing the infrastructure required by industry. In 
short a collapsing large-scale manufacturing sector will be 
replaced with a dynamic small firm sector with a strong 
potential for employment growth. It amounts to a deliberate 
attempt to reverse the patterns Sydney Checkland thought 
he had discovered in his well known study of Glasgow's economic 
history, "The Upas Tree", In which he suggested that the city's 
traditional concentration on heavy engineering and shipbuilding
Q
had destroyed the growth of other activities.
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This scenario may not be one to which all policy 
makers will privately subscribe, and enthusiasm seems 
partly to arise from the lack of any convincing alternatives 
available to those working on an urban scale. Nevertheless, 
these notions underlie most area-based policies and, on 
the basis of statistics showing overall totals of firms 
setting up and jobs created frequently quoted by the 
responsible public agencies and in the press, there are 
probably many people who already regard these policies 
as a success. In GEAR, for example, the SDA expected 
to have created up to 4,865 jobs by 1983 as a result of 
its factory and workshop development. In Clydebank, 
the SDA reported in April 1984 that projected total 
employment among the 170 firms occupying their premises 
at the time was around 2,098 jobs but gave no time scale 
for this estimate.^
At face value these are impressive statistics. However, 
before the success or otherwise of the policies operating 
can be judged in terms of the extent to which they 
ameliorate the types of problems confronting local residents 
and the economies of these communities, factors other 
than highly aggregated statistics need to be taken into 
account. What actually happens within a locality as a 
result of a policy needs to be disaggregated to a greater 
extent to enable that policy's relevance to local employment 
problems to be judged. We need to know, for example, what 
is genuinely new in terms of enterprise and jobs and how 
much of this economic activity is attributable to the 
policies being pursued. We should also consider redistri­
butive effects which might not be immediately obvious 
from looking at one locality in isolation. These effects 
can be both positive and negative. Where a firm relocates 
it may release vacant premises, which, because they are
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older and cheaper, may more likely be filled by a new
firm thereby giving a hidden boost to the emergence of
10new indigenous enterprise. In other instances the 
redistributive effects could be damaging if firms relocate 
at the expense of enterprise and jobs in other areas or 
gain a competitive advantage over other firms by operating 
within a relatively subsidised industrial environment. 
Chain-reactions will also take place among workers already 
in employment which might result in a reduction of unemploy­
ment, For example, where somebody leaves a job to go to 
one in another firm the vacancy created may be filled 
by someone previously unemployed.
"Softer" and more qualitative issues are also 
important. As large proportions of an area's labour force 
can be virtually excluded from the formal economy we 
should ask who is gaining and who is losing from the 
employment generated, and consider not only the numbers 
previously unemployed who are securing jobs, but the 
types of groups amongst the unemployed they represent, 
how they found out about and secured a place in work, and 
where they live. Similar questions can be directed 
towards the entrepreneurs by considering the extent to 
which local people, particularly from among the unemployed, 
are moving into self employment. When assessing the 
potential of area-based policies in more general terms 
we should also consider the costs of the whole operation, 
possibly in terms of cost per job, and think about ways 
that public resources being released in depressed communities 
might be more effectively used to generate enterprise 
and jobs in the local economy and provide work and 
incomes for local people.
These were the main types of issu&s the survey work 
in GEAR and Clydebank tried to pursue. The research
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methodology I employed was to visit owners and managers 
of individual firms occupying SDA-owned premises and 
conduct a structured questionnaire interview with them (Appendix 
3). Between January and March 1982 I attempted to conduct a 
census of all such firms. SDA records of its tenants 
identified 78 firms in GEAR and 70 in Clydebank at the 
start of this period- However, a subsequent on-site 
inspection of individual premises uncovered a total of 65 
firms in the GEAR properties and 58 in Clydebank. The 
shortfall in number from the SDA figures was presumably 
made up of firms who had either recently vacated their 
premises or had yet to move in.
I began the interviewing work by conducting a pilot 
survey of 20 firms in order to test the questionnaire.
Letters were sent to each firm alerting them to the coming 
survey and its purpose and requesting their help. On 
completion of the pilot work some small modifications were 
made to the questionnaire. The main body of the survey 
work was then tackled in a similar fashion. Firms were 
contacted by letter and subsequently visited. If it was 
not possible to interview a relevant individual on this 
occasion attempts were made to arrange a more appropriate 
date where possible. On average un-surveyed premises 
were visited three times in a bid to conduct the question­
naire, During the interviewing process in Clydebank I was 
assisted by a colleague, Mr. John Black, who I was able 
to employ using a small grant made available by the 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.
A total of one hundred interviews were carried out 
which amounted to just over 80% of firms occupying SDA 
premises at the time of the survey. Total employment among 
the sarrple firms was 1^J5 people which, in the context of 
the local labour markets, amounted to about 2% of those
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working in GEAR and 1.8% of those working in Clydebank.
The vast majority of the premises were small, some being 
workshops. Much of the information gathered was due 
largely to the fact that firms were small and that the 
people interviewed had an intimate knowledge about employees 
and their background. '
5. Characteristics of Small Firms
In both areas the vast majority (84%) of the firms 
visited were independent enterprises, being either sole 
owned, a partnership or a private limited company: 13
were branch plants and three were subsidiaries. Business 
activities were fairly wide-ranging, being spread across 
thirteen industrial groupings in each area, the five 
most important of which were Distributive Trades, 
Miscellaneous Services, Timber and Furniture, Mechanical 
Engineering and Metal Manufacture which accounted for 58 
firms in all.
Two-fifths were new, their business activity not
previously having taken place in another location on a
full-time commercial basis. The remaining three-fifths
had previously occupied other premises from which they
had relocated part or all of their business activity. A
significant spatial difference between the two areas in
this respect was that, in GEAR only one-quarter of the
firms were new enterprises, whereas in Clydebank the figure
was more than twice as high. The SDA's own information
on firms occupying their premises in Clydebank indicates
the continuance of this higher ratio of new firms as the
scheme has progressed. In April 1984, of a total of 170
11firms, 104 or 61% were new companies. In both areas
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the incidence of new firms was significantly higher in 
the smaller premises of under 1,000 sq.ft. than in the 
larger ones.
Although the majority of the firms had relocated 
from other premises a more precise knowledge of geographical 
origin is needed in order to assess what has happened 
to the overall stock of enterprise, both in the local 
area and the wider urban economy, and to help determine 
the wider reverberations in the spatial distribution of 
industry. Of those firms which had moved, the overwhel­
ming majority (89%) had relocated within the Glasgow 
area. In fact, in GEAR approximately two-thirds of the 
moves took place within the East End itself. Overall, 
in the majority of premises, the provision of small 
factory units neither led to the emergence of new economic 
activity, nor did it achieve anything but a negligible 
attraction of business from outside the region. Only 
two firms had come from outside Strathclyde and both had 
gone to Clydebank. In the main, the targetting of supply 
based development programmes on GEAR and Clydebank seems 
to have had the effect of shuffling and redistributing 
existing enterprise within the conurbation (see Table
14.1)
Table 14.1: Origins of Relocating Firms -
Location of Previous Premises
Local Glasgow Strathclyde Other
GEAR 25 11 3
Clydebank 7 10 2 2
Total 32 21 5 2
Although incoming investment from outside the conurba-
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tion has been small, indirect benefits could come from the 
type of chain reactions mentioned above which can be 
sparked off in the industrial premises market by firms 
moving. A framework for evaluating this process has been 
outlined by Valente and Leigh (1982), who from their research 
in the South East where the demand for premises vary were 
pretty optimistic about the likelihood of new enterprise 
emerging from this filtering process. To calculate, in 
part, the impact of firms moving into SDA premises I asked 
firms who had relocated if they knew the current use of 
their old premises. Seven of them did not know, but of 
the 53 who did, 18 knew their old premises were occupied 
by another firm who moved in after they had left and 13 
premises were still occupied either by the respondent firm 
or another with which it had shared the premises (see Table
14.2), About half the old premises, then, were occupied 
and providing work, though not necessarily in new firms. 
Indeed this figure will probably be higher once seven of 
the premises which were known to be vacant are used again 
for another purpose. Thus at one step back in the chain 
reaction, more than half of the original premises had either 
contributed to housing a second tier of new enterprise and 
employment or, at least, probably provided a better basis 
for the expansion of existing businesses. If half the new 
premises and a similar proportion of premises involved in 
subsequent links of the chain have these multiplier effects, 
then the total number of enterprises affected will be double 
the number of new premises initially provided.
As to why firms had chosen to locate in their premises, 
two dominant factors emerged in both areas - the availability 
of suitable premises or site, or both; and the generally 
favourable location and accessibility of the area. In GEAR, 
proximity to markets was also emphasised, whilst in Clydebank
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most firms mentioned the financial incentives available 
under the Enterprise Zone (see Table 14.3). Many of the 
reasons given (like available premises, location and so on) 
may not, however, satisfactorily explain locational decision 
making among firms. Apart from the special features of the 
Enterprise Zone, many of the so-called 'attractions' of 
the areas could equally apply to other industrial estates 
within the conurbation. What might be more significant in 
attracting firms to these areas could be preferences of the 
SDA acting as a property agency, to allocate premises in the 
localities where it particularly wishes to be seen to be 
successful. One-third of the way through the survey firms 
were asked whether their current premises had been the first 
offered to them by the SDA. For the vast majority this was 
indeed the case.
Table 14.2: Current Use of Previous Premises
No. of 
Premises
Occupied by Another Firm 18
Occupied by Respondent Firm 9
Demolished 9
Vacant 7
Home 5
Occupied by Existing Firm Which 
Shared the Premises 4
Derelict 1
Unknown 7
TOTAL 60
/Table 14.3 Over
Table 14.3: Locational Choice
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Reason Given by Firm
No. of Times 
GEAR
Mentioned
Clydebank
General Location and Accessibility 18 13
Location to Home 9 2
Location to Markets 17 2
Suitable Premises and Site 
Financial Incentives (i.e. in 
Clydebank Enterprise Zone)
15
5
26
24
Attachment to Area 10 1
Availability of Labour 3 1
Advice and Assistance 1
Only Option Open 6 1
NB Some firms gave more than one reason.
It seems unlikely that many of the firms would have 
been lost to the Regional economy in the absence of the local 
renewal programmes. Although about one-third had considered 
an alternative location, for seven firms this was a local 
one, for 17 a location elsewhere in Glasgow and for ten one 
elsewhere in Strathclyde. Therefore, had they not set up 
in their present location most would probably have looked 
for another location within the city. The official Government 
monitoring study of the enterprise zone in Clydebank confirmed 
this finding by concluding that had firms not located in 
the locality where the special policy was operating most 
would have remained in the region anyway with only 15% 
locating elsewhere.^^
Further information concerning the markets of the firms 
surveyed confirms their close association with the urban
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economy: 53% of the firms purchased their main supplies
from within the conurbation while over half the firms' 
main customers lay within Strathclyde Region and were 
centred mainly on the Glasgow conurbation (see Table 14.4),
Table 14.4: The Markets of Firms
Strath- Total
Local Glasgow clvde Scotland UK Abroad Firms
Origin of
main 6 47 5 11 23 7 99
supplies
Origin of
main 4 32 16 37 9 1 99
customers
6. The Self-Employed
Changing the focus from firms to people, the survey 
collected information on the entrepreneurs of 92 firms;
163 individuals in all of whom 78 were in business in GEAR 
and 85 in Clydebank. In GEAR 31% of these individuals 
were engaged in new firms while in Clydebank the corresponding 
figure was 48% reflecting the higher percentage of new firms 
in the area.
One aspect of a successful locally targetted economic 
policy would be the extent to which it provides local people, 
particularly those shed by local firms which have contracted 
or closed and who remain unemployed, with opportunities to
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enter self-employment and set up new businesses. From an 
examination of the residential pattern of entrepreneurs in 
new firms, however, few people from the local area appear 
to have started businesses. Only 12 people or 18% of those 
in new firms, lived locally and a further 16 elsewhere in 
the city. Over half of the 'new entrepreneurs' lived 
outwith Glasgow, possibly preferring the more affluent and 
environmentally pleasant townships outside the urban area 
(see Table 14.5).
Table 14.5: Residence of Entrepreneurs
Relocations 
New Firms
Local
16
18
Percentage of Total 
Strathclyde 
Glasgow Region Other
37
25
37
35
10
22
Total
100
100
TOTAL 17 32 36
Note: Information is for 163 individuals
15 100
The extent to which people have moved from unemployment 
into self-employment has also been small. Only about 8% of 
all entrepreneurs, or one in five of those in new firms, 
claim to have been previously unemployed prior to setting 
up in their premises. The 'unemployed entrepreneurs' (14 
in all) were responsible for 9 firms employing a further 16 
workers. Their enterprises were mainly service concerns 
(like the motor trade, printing and bicycle repair), and 
jobbing manufacturing (like joinery and shopfitting, and the 
manufacture of nameplates). Only one of these entrepreneurs
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lived locally. Most came from elsewhere in the city or 
region. All but one of these firms were based on an activity 
in which the owners were skilled and had previously worked.
In the sole non-conforming case two young men had started 
a business out of an existing bicycle repair hobby.
Furthermore, entrepreneurs in five of the firms had previous 
experience of self-employment.
Although these 14 people had previously been unemployed, 
the length of time spent out of work was overwhelmingly of 
short duration. In only one case was the businessman out of 
work for over six months, and this was a peculiar case 
caused by an unexpectedly long delay in finding an 
alternative location for a firm forced to relocate through 
the compulsory purchase of its old premises in the city 
centre. The entrepreneurs in four of the nine firms had already 
decided to become self-employed whilst previously working 
as an employee with another firm, and in three of these 
cases the individuals chose to quit their work or accept 
voluntary redundancy to realise their aspirations.
The survey results therefore provided little evidence 
to support the assertion that the provision of small 
premises and other incentives had significantly widened 
the possibility of self-employment as a realisable option 
for unemployed people. In the small number of cases 
where self-employment had been taken up by people 
previously out of work, these were either individuals who 
had already selected self-employment as their aim, or 
who on being made redundant demonstrated their greater 
aptitude to escape unemployment by setting up their own 
firm. The essentially transitory nature of the unemployment 
experienced can perhaps best be regarded as a short holiday - 
either chosen or forced - filling the interim period
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between leaving paid, employment and starting their own 
enterprise.
Unskilled adults and the long term unemployed are 
conspicuously absent among the "enterprising unemployed*.
In GEAR, for example, a household survey conducted at 
the same time as my series of small firm interviews 
found that only about 4% of all residents had ever
12considered self-employment as an option open to them.
These findings are not surprising. For many workers in 
areas like the East End and Clydebank their experience 
of employment has been unvaried, unskilled and in large 
firms in declining sectors of the economy. Even where 
established industrial skills exist they are often not 
easilty transferable to independent small-scale production. 
As David Storey has pointed out, depressed areas of the 
country reflect lower incidences of entrepreneurship 
than more prosperous ones In Clydebank this was
evident when I spoke to the organisers of a joint SDA and 
MSC "Start your own business* course run from the local 
technical college. At the time of my survey few unemployed 
or local people had participated on the course. The 
vast majority were already on the fringe of self-employment 
with a well developed business idea. Many came from well 
outside the town and almost all held jobs, the course being 
run in the evenings to suit their employment commitments.
Overall, therefore, the type of people going into 
business for themselves are precisely those one might expect 
to do so. On the whole, the new entrepreneurs were skilled 
males with a solid working experience as employees in their 
line of business and its markets, frequently with sales 
and management experience. In short, they were suitably 
equipped from the experience of paid work to go into self-
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employment and survive in business without special forms 
of "hand-holding* from outside sources. To reach other 
groups of workers in the local community it would appear 
that new forms of education, training and other support 
will first be needed to be built into current supply side 
policies to provide these people with the opportunity to 
even consider self-employment.
7. Employment Generation
Including both entrepreneurs and workers, the 100 firms 
I surveyed were providing work for a total of 1,175 people,
696 of whom were working in GEAR and 479 in Clydebank. New 
firms accounted for 372 or 32% of the jobs. For all but one 
of the firms, information was collected on the composition and 
occupational structure of the workforce (see Table 14.6).
Table 14.6: Employment by Sex and Occupational
___________   Structure ________________ ____
All Firms New Firms
% %
Male 74 77
Female 26 23
Total 100 100
Owners
Directors 14 20
Managerial
Professional 11 8
Technical
Clerical 8 8
Manual
Skilled 39 38
Manual
Unskilled 28 26 
Total 100 100
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There was an interesting difference between the 
occupational structure of workforces in GEAR and Clydebank. 
Among new firms in GEAR the proportion of managerial, 
professional and technical staff and manual skilled workers 
was lower, and the number of manual unskilled workers 
higher, than the average across both areas. In Clydebank 
the pattern was the exact opposite of this. In GEAR, for 
example, 29% of employees in new firms were skilled manual 
workers while in Clydebank the proportion was 46%. 
Alternatively, while the manual unskilled*s employment share 
in GEAR was 47%, it fell to 9% in Clydebank. There may be 
several reasons for this lower use of skilled manpower in 
GEAR, possibly the greater use of working wives which was 
observed during the interviews along with the tendency for 
owners to operate in both a managerial and skilled worker 
capacity, thus reducing the need to hire labour of this 
type. But, more generally it probably also reflects the 
lower skilled nature of the GEAR labour force compared to 
that in Clydebank.
Since setting up in their premises about two-thirds 
of the firms had increased their number of employees, adding 
a gross total of over 400 jobs. New firms accounted for 
some 56% of this increase. The principal reasons for 
employment growth in both areas were given as market and 
business expansion and an increase in the amount of work 
received. The extent of job growth per expanding firm 
averaged slightly over six persons. More than half this 
small boost to employment had, however, been eaten away by 
job losses - concentrated in GEAR - among a smaller group 
of firms who had declined in employment (see Table 14.6).
Two firms in particular were responsible for most of the 
job loss in GEAR. In GEAR, after subtracting the number of 
jobs lost from those added, the aggregate net job increase
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since the firms set up in their premises was only 39 
jobs. Employment growth was, paradoxically, only 
sufficient to marginally offset decline and contributed 
little to the overall stock of jobs in the local labour 
market.
Table 14.7: Employment Change Since Setting
__________  Up in Current Premises_________
GEAR CLYDEBANK Total
Firms Jobs Firms Jobs Firms Jobs
Increase 39 246 26 158 65 404
Decrease 7 207 1 13 8 220
No Change 7 - 20 - 27 -
TOTAL 53 + 39 47 +145 100 +184
In both areas most people found out about jobs
mainly through word of mouth, (see Table 14.8).
Entrepreneurs tended to hire friends, family or others
known to them. Over half of the firms used 'personal
contact* as their principal method of labour recruitment
through which they hired 46% of their recent recruits.
The Job Centre was used by one-third of the firms as their
main recruitment method. This predominance of personal
contact in the hiring process is endorsed by the household
survey of GEAR residents mentioned above. 32% of
workers claimed to have found their present or last job
through word of mouth compared to 14% who had found work
15through the Job Centre.
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Among new firms, the allocation of job opportunities 
through networks of personal contact was even more marked: 
three quarters used this method to recruit 80% of their 
employees. One would expect small firms, particularly 
new starts, to select their workers very carefully, 
choosing people known to be trustworthy and efficient, 
and in whom the owners have confidence. There was also 
another factor (which emerged more by chance than design) 
to explain the previous associations between entrepreneurs 
and their employees. It seems that some of the 'new 
firms' could better be described as 'phoenix enterprises' 
as they comprise, in part, a regrouping of old workforces 
shed by local firms which had either closed or cut back 
on employment. In at least five of the firms in GEAR 
the entrepreneurs had established their businesses in a 
salvageable portion of their old firms' market and 
employed a number of their ex-colleagues. This process 
is perhaps more a reflection of industrial restructuring 
and employment contraction as opposed to the emergence 
of new indigenous enterprise and may deserve more systematic 
study.
Table 14.8: Method of Recruitment
Proportion of Recently Hired Recruits
Personal Job
Contact Centre Advertisement Other Total
All Firms 46 34 14 6 100
Relocations 35 41 18 6 100
New Firms 80 12 3 5 100
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Three direct tests of a policy's relevance to a local 
community and its worth as a corrective to high unemployment 
are the residential spread of the workforces in firms, 
t h e  number of people securing work from positions of 
unemployment and the length of time these people spent 
out of work. Although 86% of the employees lived somewhere 
within the city, less than half lived locally and even 
among the new firms, which might be expected to recruit 
from the local area to a greater degree, the situation is 
virtually the same, (see Table 14.9). At face value, the 
policies seem to have been more successful in generating 
jobs for the unemployed generally than they have been in 
directing them to local people. Information was obtained 
on the previous employment situation of almost 400 workers, 
69% of whom had been out of work immediately before 
starting their present job. Among the new firms the propor­
tion previously unemployed was lower at 64% (see Table 
14.10). There was a slightly different pattern between 
the two areas in this respect. In GEAR almost three- 
quarters of the employees had previously been unemployed 
and among new firms the proportion was 80%. In Clydebank 
the corresponding figures were lower at two-thirds and 54% 
respectively, which could reflect a higher degree of 
labour 'poaching* among firms entering the enterprise 
zone.
Table 14.9: Residence of Employees
Percentage of Employees 
Strathclyde 
Local Glasgow Region Other Total
All Firms 42 44 13 1 100
Relocations 42 44 13 1 100
New Firms 41 44 14 1 100
398.
Table 14.10: Previous Employment State of 
Recent Recruits
Percentage of Recruits
Unemployed Employed Other Total
All Firms 69 31 1 100
Relocations 71 28 1 100
New Firms 64 36 - 100
Where an employee is taken from a position of 
employment, this may provide a vacancy in another firm 
which could be filled by someone from the unemployed 
register. Thus, in a similar fashion to the filtering 
process in the industrial premises market described above, 
jobs filled by previously employed people may have some 
hidden impact on local unemployment rates through a chain 
reaction in the labour market. Assuming the same ratio of 
employed to unemployed observed among the recent recruits 
(i.e. 3l = 59) in the sample firms holds throughout this 
multiplier, and that all the jobs vacated by workers 
leaving other firms were subsequently filled, then we 
might expect the following: (see Table 14.11)
/Table 14.11
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Table 14.11; Job Filtering Process
Number of Jobs 
Going to Employed
Number of 
Jobs Going 
To Unemployed
Total Number of Jobs 
Generated in Firms 
Surveyed
124
(31%)
276
(69%)
Indirect Job 
Generation During 
Filtering,
Stage (i) 38 86
( ii ) 12 26
( iii) 4 8
(iv) 1 3
(v) — 1
Effects 55 124
If the assumptions above hold, then the direct 
generation of 400 jobs among the sample firms will have 
had an indirect employment effect on a further 179 
workers in other firms. Of these, 55 will already have 
been in work and will have changed their employer, while 
124 unemployed people will have moved into jobs. Hence 
the number of unemployed people moving into paid employment 
following the firms setting up in their premises would 
have increased from 276 to 400, a rise of nearly 45%. 
Furthermore, assuming the same ratios for the residential 
spread of employees as identified in Table 14.9, 52 
of these 124 unemployed people will live in the local area.
My assessment of chain reactions of the above sort 
should not be regarded as a rigorous or accurate treatment 
of the issue. But it should highlight the fact that job
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generation among firms in SDA premises will have 
created a series of ripples within the existing stock of 
paid labour in other firms. As a result of the vacancies 
created by people leaving jobs to go to new ones, the 
total number of unemployed and local people finding work 
as a consequence of the factory-build policy is likely 
to exceed that indicated by the numbers employed among 
the sample firms alone.
When the duration of unemployment experienced 
(known in almost three-quarters of the cases) is considered, 
the attack on unemployment eppears much less profound.
Of those previously unemployec^ only 10% in GEAR and 14% 
in Clydebank had been out of work for over six months.
The vast majority had been jobless for a matter of weeks 
or at the most a few months. A large proportion of the
Vi-
workers either seem to have known that another job was 
imminent or were quickly snapped up by employers known 
to them. Their experience of unemployment can, therefore, 
best be regarded as frictional. Having been out of work 
for a short transitory period between jobs they form a 
group quite distinct from the long term unemployed.
Considering future employment prospects, 16 firms 
had existing vacancies with an average of two per firm.
Existing job opportunities were especially low in GEAR, 
where only three firms claimed to have vacancies offering 
a total of five jobs. Over the following two years, 
however, most of the firms (almost three-quarters) hoped 
to increase their workforces, mainly in the skilled 
category. Only three firms expected the numbers they 
employed to decline. These predictions should probably 
be regarded as rather optimistic as respondents tended 
to give upper-level estimates - the chances of these
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forecasts being borne out often depending on the success 
of a certain product or a significant improvement in 
the economy.
Employment predictions are also made by the SDA.
When allocating premises, the Agency note both 'existing* 
employment within the firm and the 'additional* increase 
expected above this. The sum of the two across all 
firms represents the number of 'new* jobs the Agency 
'expect' to provide in an area. This seems a very 
unsatisfactory way of evaluating the likely impact of 
policy, and when such figures are broadcast to the wider 
public they are probably a misleading way of presenting 
the performance of a scheme. The whole concept of a 
‘new* job is very complex and the simplistic way it is 
often interpreted by public authorities, who have strong 
vested interests in being seen to be successful, can 
grossly exaggerate and distort the real employment effects.
SDA disaggregated data on employment projections 
was only made available for GEAR. Here, by 1983 the SDA 
expected to have created up to 4,855 jobs as a result of 
their factory and workshop development. By disaggregating 
this figure to the level of individual firms it is 
possible to directly compare for the firms surveyed the 
possible future employment as perceived by the owners 
with the predictions of the SDA, Of the Agency's 
predicted jobs in the factories surveyed 43%, or over 
500 in total, had still to materialise. Among the new 
firms alone the shortfall was 33% which meant that 
employment needed to increase by 50% to reach the SDA's 
estimates. On the basis of the optimistic forecasts by 
the firms, future employment growth will probably fall 
substantially below the Agency's predictions. Even the
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owners of firms did not consider more jobs to be the 
main impact of the scheme. When asked about their
perceptions of GEAR and what it would do for the local
* / farea only one respondent suggested new employment opportun!- 
ties for local people. Overwhelmingly, businessmen felt |
the scheme's main contribution to be the improvement to 
the physical environment and the general image of the 
area and an expansion of the opportunities open to small 
firms.
I
Some assessment of the overall cost to the public 
purse of the operation related to the employment gain /
is a popular method for evaluating economic policies 
of this kind. It is also a vital question if policy 
alternatives are to be considered. However, it is also |
a notoriously difficult calculation to make accurately 
because of the problem of separating out the amount of ^
economic activity and jobs which would have existed 
anyway, independently of the effects of the policy. I 
attempted to estimate the costs involved in providing 
the 100 premises I covered by combining information I 
obtained on both capital and running costs from the SDA, 
private consultants, and the questionnaire survey. Using |
this information I was able to estimate an average /
capital cost of £25 per square foot of industrial floor- ■:]
space, running costs involving insurance, maintenance and
$
rates at an average of £1.52 per square foot, and an 
annual rent of £1.70 per square foot. These estimates 
are at 1982 prices and are the average of ranges which 
vary by premises and area. On the basis of these figures 
and an average size of premises of 5,000 square feet in 
the 100 covered in the study, the total capital cost to 
the SDA would have been around £12.5 million. This excludes
i:
costs involved in land acquisition and environmental
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improvement which is often an integral part of the factory 
policy. Annual running costs would total £760,000 which, 
if all rents were paid and not lost through giving rent- 
free periods, would be more than offset by some £850,000 
in annual rental income.
Translating the above figures into a cost per job 
estimate, the 1,175 jobs existing in the firms at the time 
of the survey would, therefore, have been associated with 
a capital cost of approximately £12.5 million or a 
'cost per job' of some £10,638. A more realistic estimate 
would be to relate the capital cost to jobs in new firms. 
These numbered some 372 which gives a much higher cost 
per job figure of around £33,602. As with the estimate 
I gave earlier in this chapter concerning chain reactions, 
these figures should be treated with caution and regarded 
more as a 'back of an envelope* calculation than the 
result of rigorous and systematic enquiry.
8• Conclusions
What then have regeneration policies really achieved? 
Much of the emerging industry and employment is not new 
but would probably have existed anyway, if not in the 
study areas then elsewhere in the conurbation. A number 
of existing firms have been redirected and some new 
enterprises attracted into each area, and a certain 
amount of business, which might have left the locality had 
suitable premises and other incentives not been available, 
has been retained. A proportion of the economic benefits 
enjoyed by GEAR and Clydebank have, therefore, been won 
at the expense of other areas where a degree of disinvestment 
and job loss and a diminished ability to attract industry 
will have been experienced.
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In the implementation of policies each area has
been treated as a separate spatial entity and little
prior consideration seems to have been given to effects
on spatial processes in the economy of a much wider area.
This criticism does not dispute that local regeneration
policies should include many of the measures they currently
do. Past redevelopment policies and the design of new
urban environments have often been insensitive to small-
scale enterprise and many of the old industrial premises
which existed have been demolished. Furthermore, many
commentators, notably Fothergill and Gudgin, have argued
that an important cause of decline in large cities seems
to be that "too many firms find themselves in constrained
locations, operating with inadequate premises and sites,
hemmed in by existing urban development, and with no
16room for expansion." Although policies geared to 
providing an adequate range of industrial premises in 
urban areas should, therefore, have a role, the redistrib­
utive effects observed in GEAR and Clydebank suggest 
the selection of areas for this kind of treatment should 
perhaps be carried out on a more systematic and rational 
basis. This could mean that policies be formulated and 
monitored on a larger conurbation or regional scale, 
with help to firms given on a more selective and targetted 
way.
The direct impact on jobs has been modest and the 
cost of those jobs which may have been created as a result 
seem to have been high, particularly if the aim is to 
provide opportunities for local residents and for the 
unemployed. Assuming that the firms surveyed in GEAR 
were typical of all those in SDA premises at the time, 
the factory build policy had, by the spring of 1982, 
brought a net increase of around 400 jobs of which around
405.
200 would have gone to local people - a tiny contribution 
when compared to the 4,000 unemployed residents in GEAR. 
Similarly, in Clydebank, on the basis of the average size 
of firm surveyed, 650 genuinely new enterprises of an 
equivalent size would be needed to replace the local jobs 
lost by the Singer closure alone since 1978,
In addition to their failure to significantly reduce 
the extent of unemployment, the policies appear severely 
deficient as measures to improve the economic welfare of 
disadvantaged and marginal workers. Although unemployed 
people were filling jobs, they were not the type who find 
themselves repeatedly out of work or jobless for long 
durations. They were the better off groups among the 
unemployed, those more equipped to seek out and secure 
employment through a series of informal contact networks 
built up with employers, ex-workers and friends. To be 
effective in providing work and incomes for disadvantaged 
workers in depressed communities locally based strategies 
should recognise the social impacts of unemployment which 
serve to break up social networks and exclude people from 
activities in the community they would have participated 
in had they been in employment. They should also recognise 
that apparently similar areas like GEAR and Clydebank may 
have a widely different reservoir of skills, entrepreneurial 
capacity, and so on and tailor their plans to suit each.
Despite many weaknesses in these policies, there 
have been some other positive impacts in addition to the 
modest effect on jobs. The morale of the local business 
community will have been boosted and an amount of renewal 
and tidying up of derelict industrial landscapes has taken 
place which no-one would have otherwise attempted, at 
least not on the same scale as that actually undertaken.
"I
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This achievement was not the main objective but it 
is still a significant gain, and, if a major industrial 
revival does come eventually, then these places may, as 
a result of creating a modern, well-serviced industrial 
environment, be in a position to secure more benefits 
from it than they otherwise would have done. It may also 
be possible to further enhance the contribution and 
effectiveness of these policies through a greater integra­
tion of supply-side provision within the local economy, 
in which the demand generated by public investment is 
used to boost locally produced goods and services. By |
a planned allocation of contract work on construction, 
housing, the environment, and so on, the health of the 
local business community can be improved by giving greater 
priority to firms in the area. The fact that they had 
not received any preferential treatment in the allocation 
of work generated by the scheme was a complaint made by 
a number of firms in GEAR.
Positive discrimination in favour of new and existing 
economic activity in the local area could be extended 
further towards an integrated economic and employment 
strategy. Where the skills required do not already 
exist locally, training programmes and other developmental 
work and support could be initiated to establish them 
within new business structures - possibly like those 
described in the previous chapter - in a bid to ensure 
that the local community, particularly its more disadvantaged |
residents, benefit to a greater degree. The next and 
final chapter of the thesis will develop this prescriptive 
theme concerning local economic initiatives further.
'fr
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
CONCLUSIONS
1, Introduction
The final Chapter begins by presenting a brief 
synthesis of responses to unemployment in the UK, 
focussing on the main developments since the late 19 70s 
and discussing what these have meant for the agencies 
involved and people working in them. An assessment of 
the impacts of the current policy spectrum is then 
presented which argues that a number of weaknesses and 
constraints inhibit the potential for more effective 
policy development, I then move on to suggest how some 
of these barriers might be removed to enhance what can 
be achieved at the local scale and allow policy to become 
more relevant to the needs of the unemployed in the 
light of economic and social realities. The Chapter ends 
on a cautionary note, recognising some of the inevitable 
limitations and dilemmas attached to locally based policies 
in the current economic crisis.
2. Synthesis
Since first recognised as a problem in its own right 
the level of unemployment in Britain has been determined 
by the interaction of changing economic circumstance and 
political priority. Chapter 1 showed how early efforts 
to deal with the problem through labour market organisation 
and national insurance were only partially successful.
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Until the Second World War, society's treatment of the 
unemployed fluctuated with the state of the economy and 
at times of deepest crisis the living standards of the 
jobless were traded-off against other economic considera­
tions. Following the War and the great effort and sacri­
fice it had demanded of the nation the political commit­
ment to keep unemployment down and avoid the mass suffering 
of the depression years was stronger than ever before. 
Furthermore Government was equipped with the policies 
to achieve this and by the use of such measures unemploy­
ment was kept at historically low levels until 1966 
(Chapter 2), Although the long term trend in unemployment 
began to creep higher after that date, it was not until 
the mid 1970s that confidence in traditional policies 
crumbled (Chapter 3). As a result of growing economic 
difficulties which could not be reconciled with full 
employment priorities. Government switched the thrust 
of policy away from controlling unemployment towards 
securing other gains - principally lower inflation. Since 
then unemployment has risen - particularly steeply since 
1979 - to reach levels unprecedented since the 1930s.
While many commentators expect unemployment to remain 
at historically high levels, possibly permanently, the 
actual level of unemployment still depends on the priorities 
of Government and other key institutions. It should be 
possible to get large numbers of people back to work by 
implementing a tough and very widely accepted incomes 
policy and if higher priority was given to training in 
new forms, to redeployment of labour likely to increase 
productivity, to stemming the outflow of capital and 
investing more of it in British manufacturing industry, 
and so on. The problem with implementing such a package 
is that many of the most powerful organisations in the
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country - the TUG, the CBI, the City - are each opposed 
to some of these measures.
Essentially political issues of this kind will, 
nevertheless, ultimately have to be considered if 
Government is to do the things that will get us back 
towards full employment. But even if these issues are 
resolved and the demand for labour rises strongly 
unemployment problems will still persist. Economic 
revival will increase the displacement of jobs and the 
redundancy of traditional skills as a result of higher 
investment in new technological processes. Many of the 
new jobs created will be different from those in the 
past, demanding new skills and possibly less labour. 
Therefore even in a more prosperous economy large numbers 
of people might continue to be unemployed, some faced 
with long periods out of work, possibly for the rest of 
their lives.
Although the nationwide political commitment to 
implement the type of policies which might reduce unemploy­
ment is currently lacking, the stresses arising from 
industrial collapse and the rising jobless total have 
prompted other approaches to generating jobs. These have 
involved not only Central Government, but local government 
and a number of other organisations, such as trade unions, 
private firms and voluntary groups, who previously did 
not have a role in these issues. As a result, a complex 
series of overlapping policy initiatives have emerged, 
some of which conflict, and many of which break with 
established patterns and roles.
In the past Central Government's interventionist role 
in the economy was restricted either to the national level
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at which it manipulated the demand for labour or to the 
regional level at which it sought to reduce the imbalances 
between the more prosperous and less prosperous parts of 
the country. Since the late 1970s a new tradition of 
economic policies has developed which targets resources 
towards cities, or parts of them, where industry is 
declining, and at groups of workers who are doing less 
well in the labour market. These developments have 
converged with a new interest in economic development 
among local authorities and one which breaks with local 
government's traditional urban responsibilities which
were confined to accommodating the pressures of economic 
growth, carrying through large scale physical renewal 
and construction 
social services.
programmes and managing the delivery of i
.
The new economically-oriented urban policies - 
particularly those of local government - called for a 
critical reappraisal of long standing assumptions about 
a variety of social services. The established 'professional 
model' of a top-down, centralised service which offered 
the public little chance of shaping or participating in 
the development of the service but which operated in a 
rather blinkered, functional fashion with little co­
operation with other public services is under assault.
The collapse of local economies has played an important 
part in compelling people involved in the management of 
these services to consider how they might change and 
experiment with them. Throughout the country local 
authorities and other public agencies have been decentral­
ising and devolving their services, setting up and 
participating in new bodies with economic responsibilities 
and seeking to involve local communities in the decision­
making process.
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The changing administration of some social services 
is reflected in changes in the jobs officials do. In 
agencies taking the more innovative initiatives, public 
officials are having to develop new skills and work in 
ways they never expected when they underwent their 
professional and vocational training. Planners, housing 
managers, people in chief executive's departments or others 
finding jobs in new economic development agencies are 
having to develop a keener economic and area-based focus 
to their work and strike up new links with the communities 
they serve. They are increasingly being called on to 
understand the needs of industry and businessmen, the work 
of trade unions, utilise the resources of other agencies - 
such as MSC programmes, EEC monies and Urban Aid - and 
work within the new devolved structures that are being set 
up. The jobs of social workers and community development 
staff have also been changed by the poverty caused by 
rising unemployment. These workers are having to develop 
roles more ostensibly concerned with economic and employ­
ment issues than in the past, such as ensuring that people 
claim all the social security benefits to which they are 
entitled, and to encourage new forms of mutual aid and 
community-based economic projects.
The urban policy spectrum is further complicated 
by the participation of non-statutory agencies in economic 
development. The role of corporate organisations has 
grown rapidly in recent years, with 'third arm' agencies 
staffed by private sector representatives strongly 
encouraged and often subsidised by public authorities.
In Scotian^ enterprise trusts, discussed in Chapter 11, 
receive £45,000 per annum from the SDA towards their 
operating costs. Similarly the promotion of self-help 
and voluntary initiative is encouraged by both Government
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and corporate bodies. Many of the initiatives taken in 
this area also draw financial support from the public 
sector, mainly through urban aid, and from the private 
sector in the form of entrepreneurial advice and training 
support. The growing interest of these groups in social 
and economic welfare is beginning to bridge traditional 
divisions between public and private, and formal and 
informal, sectors of the economy.
It would be wrong to assume that the activities of 
different agencies or even the various policies of each 
are given equal weighting or priority. The strategies 
of Central Government and its agencies, reviewed in 
Chapters 8 and 9, command the largest amount of resources 
spent on economic development. To date these have been 
channelled mainly into large scale investment in providing 
sites and building factories for industry, providing 
loans and grants to businesses, and operating national 
programmes of training and job creation measures for 
unemployed adults and young people. These policies 
represent a major shift in the role of Government away from 
tackling unemployment directly to creating an environment 
suitable for private sector expansion. The economic 
initiatives of local authorities are frequently similar 
to those of Central Government - largely because they often 
depend on Government agreement and part funding owing to 
the more limited resources at the disposal of local 
authorities. Some authorities have attempted to develop 
an independent and radical alternative to conventional 
economic policies (see Chapter 10), but apart from very 
large authorities, like the GLC which has its own Act 
of Parliament, enlarging its powers, the amount of resources 
that can be raised are modest. Central agencies like SDA, 
HIDB, the UDCs, also have larger powers to spend money than
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local government has- They also do not have to get 
Committee and Council approval for action so can react 
faster.
Although public policy has succeeded in attracting 
some substantial private sector investments back into 
urban areas, the amount of resources accruing from 
corporate bodies to fund their new social responsibility 
activities is relatively small. The resources at the 
disposal of voluntary and community groups involved in 
economic and employment projects, despite their often 
highly innovative nature, are usually even smaller still.
3. Assessment
Even the dominant economic policies of Government 
and other public authorities have clearly not succeeded 
in reversing the decline of local economies, but there 
have been other worthwhile gains as a result of their 
implementation. As my research in GEAR and Clydebank 
showed (Chapter 14), enormous improvements have been made 
to the environment of previously decaying industrial 
areas as a result of heavy infrastructural investment 
which may help to stabilise the economies of these places 
and set them, and the surrounding city, in a better 
position to gain benefits from any future economic revival. 
Without the improvement made to Glasgow's image as a result 
of six years of GEAR it would have been difficult to run 
the recent 'Glasgow's Miles Better* Campaign convincingly. 
The numerous public policies targetted at developing small 
businesses will have significantly widened the options 
for self-employment, and as a result of Government manpower 
policy the skills and employment chances of a large number 
of workers have been improved, though many will have to
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move to other areas of the country to realise them. The 
institutional capacity among local authorities and other 
organisations to devise and carry through economic and 
employment policy has been enlarged as a result of the 
mobilisation of skills and resources not previously 
associated with this area.
While these are important contributions there are 
a large number of limitations and constraints to the main 
public sector strategies which reduce the relevance of 
these policies to the needs of the unemployed and inhibit 
the scope for more effective action. A major weakness is 
that the gains accruing are highly selective. Unemployed 
people setting up new businesses in factories built by 
public authorities, securing steady work as a result of 
training programmes, or finding jobs within the highly 
assisted small firm sector, tend to be the better-off 
groups among the unemployed. Large numbers of the jobless 
particularly the long term unemployed - are excluded 
from these gains and have little immediate prospect of 
returning to work. Initiatives which could offer more 
effective ways of generating work and incomes for these 
groups - like community businesses (Chapter 13) - are 
given much lower priority and receive only modest and 
cautious support of a kind frequently ill-designed to 
meet their needs.
In addition to the exclusion of large groups of 
the unemployed from the benefits of current economic 
policies, whole communities are also neglected. The 
selection of localities for area-focussed economic 
treatment is frequently carried out in an ad hoc and 
unsystematic fashion, leading to the exclusion of areas 
which may have more pressing social and economic problems.
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Regeneration policies have been targetted mainly towards 
inner city areas and localities of large scale industrial 
collapse. The economic problems of the * outer-city*, 
especially the large peripheral council housing estates, 
have so far received less attention in the economic 
strategies of public authorities. Often with greater 
concentrations of high and long term unemployment, fewer 
existing local jobs and less economic activity going on, 
these communities are marginal to the economic life of 
the city and reflect a very different - and possibly 
more intractable - set of problems than the inner areas.
Ironically, high unemployment areas, like the 
peripheral estates, will in future probably receive 
less resources precisely because of the problems they 
face. Current directions in MSC main programmes emphasise 
training for the needs of industry and place a growing 
reliance on existing local employers to provide MSC- 
backed training places within the firm. Areas of high 
unemployment where there is no skill shortage, or with 
little existing local industry, or where the traditional 
industrial training base has been eroded by contractions 
and closures, will therefore receive fewer resources.
These are areas which desperately need the support of 
manpower programmes which can be used flexibly and 
innovatively to train and help local people develop 
alternative employment opportunities within new indigenous 
forms of economic activity.
A further weakness in many of the main economic 
programmes is the waste of resources arising from the 
lack of selectivity and sensitivity with which they are 
allocated. The blanket provision of financial incentives 
to industry and the targetting of resources towards
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In addition to lack of complementarity between 
agencies, it has often proved difficult to co-ordinate 
the policies of the same agency when responsibility is 
shared across a number of divisions or departments. 
Remaining with the MSC, the Enterprise Allowance Scheme
particular urban areas without also discriminating among
the beneficiaries of those resources means that scarce
public money is being used to support enterprises and
jobs which would have existed anyway. For example, the
redistributive effects whereby such firms were attracted
into GEAR and Clydebank as a result of the provision of
small factories in these areas greatly diluted the
employment inçjact of the public expenditure involved.
In other areas of the country similar policies have
been almost totally discredited. In Merseyside, which
has experienced one of the largest industrial collapses
since 1979, 50ha of land were taken up for advanced
factory development between 1979 and 1983 and in August
1984 45% of the new industrial floorspace which had
1been provided was recorded as vacant.
The policies and programmes of key agencies involved 
in economic development are often fragmented which 
inhibits the possibility of complementing existing 
resources and strengthening their impact. The MSC's
"'i:
training and job creation programmes, for exairple, are 
subject to very strong central control and operate outside 
other mainstream economic strategies. It has not yet 
been possible to develop local manpower packages to fit 
the requirements of locally determined priorities or build 
in a supply side dimension to MSC schemes which would 
enable them to be linked up with other local programmes 
such as the development of workshops and small firms.
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(EAS), designed to promote self-employment among the 
unemployed, is administered by the Employment Division 
and cannot be linked up with the Training Opportunities 
Programme of the Training Division. There is, therefore, 
no formal training input to the EAS despite the very real 
need for training among the scheme's participants. The 
budget arrangements of local authorities are equally 
inflexible. Where, for example, resources are allocated 
for a transport scheme in a particular locality and 
not spent - perhaps because of a shift in policy priority - 
they still cannot be used for other purposes, such as 
economic development. As any resolution of these budgetary 
contraints will require amendments to the legislation 
dealing with local government finance, the contradiction is 
perhaps better regarded as perpetuated by Central Government, 
not local authorities.
Indeed it is probably at the level of Central 
Government that the failure to co-ordinate the economic 
policies of key Departments - principally the Department of En­
vironment (DoE) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI - 
formerly DI) - has been most stark and reflected in 
fundamental conflicts in policy directions. As Chapter 8 
showed, even where major efforts were made - in Merseyside 
under the joint DE and DTI Task Force - it has not been 
possible to sustain any formal joint working relationship 
or tie-up between the economic development resources of 
these Government Departments. While urban policies of 
the DoE had been having some small impact on promoting 
economic activity, the independently applied and larger 
resources of the DTI's regional policy had, since the 
late 1970s, been allocated outside the areas of highest 
unemployment and had gone mainly to a small number of 
large firms responsible for large scale job loss.
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The policies of other Government Departments not 
directly concerned with economic development and employ­
ment generation can frustrate these objectives. Despite 
Government's frequent encouragement of unemployed people 
to start up new businesses and develop self-help options, 
many are unable to take advantages of the time and resources 
they may have available because of current social security 
rules. The social security system, described in Chapter 6, 
is almost wholly isolated from economic and employment 
policies. Because of the full employment assumptions 
which underlie the rules and the public attitudes it 
reflects the involvement of unemployed people in economic 
initiative is often penalised by withdrawal of benefit.
The DHSS has recently made minor changes to its rules.
For example, unemployed claimants can now undertake 
certain forms of vocational training without loss of 
benefit. But the current system of unemployed maintenance 
continues to undermine a more productive and creative use 
of enforced leisure time and discourages participation in 
the programmes of other agencies which could assist this.
The intransigence of social security is not unique 
but reflects in exaggerated form the anachronistic atti­
tudes of other leading institutional and political inter­
ests. Many of the current weaknesses and contradictions - 
and I have raised only some above - are perpetuated by 
the main political parties, the trade unions, big business 
and so on. In part they represent the failure of these 
interests to fully re-examine their role in the economy 
on the basis that unprecedently high levels of unemploy­
ment could become a permanent feature of society in the 
future - a reappraisal that could usefully open up new 
opportunities to use resources in radically new ways and 
support policies that would be more relevant to an era
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where large numbers of people are excluded from work in 
the formal economy. But the reluctance to do this 
probably also reflects the self-interest of these insti­
tutions and the deliberate avoidance of forms of action 
which seriously challenge their established roles and 
priorities. By seeking to prevent extra-union organisa­
tion and deny the unemployed an independent political 
voice - they are not even allowed to control their own 
centres which local authorities and the TUG provide for 
them - the trade union movement has retained credibility 
as representing the working class and defused a degree of 
protest which could have challenged this, (Chapter 12), 
Similarly, as I argued in Chapter 11, corporate bodies 
have been good at devising a wide range of economic 
initiatives, and have received significant gains in 
return, but they have not been prepared to do what the 
unemployed really want - protect and provide jobs.
The difficulties discussed earlier in agreeing a 
package that would reduce unemployment and be acceptable 
to the key institutions involved are, therefore, also 
reflected in barriers to action at the local scale. Much 
of the help given to the unemployed by these powerful 
institutions is on terms which serve institutional interests 
or define the needs of the unemployed in ways which avoid 
conflict with these interests.
4. Opportunities
Removing these barriers and constraints on locally- 
based initiative will require major political decisions 
to change the policy emphasis and practice of public 
agencies and departments. These changes are unlikely to 
happen overnight. The only political party which is
■"tiî
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seriously discussing the changing nature of work and
how to deal with an economy which requires much fewer %
workers than in the past is the Ecology Party which does
well to retain its deposits at the General Election.
However, despite the persistence of old values, elected
public authorities still need to remain credible in the
eyes of the communities they serve. The consequences
arising from the exclusion of a large number of workers i
from the economic life of the nation threaten to under-
mine this credibility and is hastening the reassessment
■ H
of traditional values. In a sense, therefore, the i
■Ï
economic crisis is creating opportunities for progressive id
change. d
We can learn a good deal about how the resources 
of public agencies might be deployed more effectively 
to meet local needs and priorities from the experience 
of the many innovative projects which exist. At present 
many are operating opportunistically, their success often 
dependent on the ingenuity and effort of a few key 
individuals involved. We need to develop a more systematic 
understanding of local initiative - how projects can use 
resources and programmes in new and innovative ways, 
the reasons why potentially worthwhile schemes fail 
or are frustrated, and so on. These lessions should 
serve to demonstrate how existing policies can be made 
more effective and identify the new ones needed to 
support local initiative.
I;
These lessons also need to be fed back into education 
and training if these systems - which prepare the managers 
and policy makers in our public services - are to remain 7
relevant to changing social and economic realities. It 
will mean changing and revising educational courses to
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foster a deeper understanding of problems and creative 
developments in the practical field. Students would then 
be better equipped for the challenges they would face.
In return the academic community could offer public 
authorities the capacity to critically and objectively 
evaluate policies and programmes and disseminate the 
results among practitioners and activists - tasks which 
would call for the formulation of more sophisticated 
analytical techniques. The current expenditure restric­
tions on education and local government will, however, 
make it difficult to develop a closer dialogue between 
the educational and practical fields because they reduce 
opportunities to expand training and move between the 
two.
From my review of local economic initiatives across 
a number of agencies, and the detailed evaluation of the 
employment impact of small firms in public sector premises 
and also of community businesses, there are a number of 
suggestions which can be made as to how more effective 
local economic and employment projects might be developed. 
They call on the public sector to take the lead role 
and target policy priorities towards those groups of workers 
and communities who do less well, or are excluded altogether, 
under present policy arrangements.
As I have said, the resources devoted to economic 
policies are often spent for very specific purposes with 
very little overlap - building factories, training labour, 
helping small businessmen and so on. If these could be 
pulled together they could provide a more effective means 
of generating economic activity among the more disadvantaged 
sections of the labour market. There are several ways 
that "integrated local economic and employment strategies*
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could be developed. The training of new entrepreneurs, 
for example, which now caters mainly for those on the 
verge of self-employment, could be sensitively redesigned 
to popularise the concept of developing new enterprises 
among more of the unemployed. Given that depressed local 
economies, particularly those previously dominated by 
very large employers, often have low entrepreneurial 
capacities of a traditional kind, training people to 
start new businesses will probably require a strong 
community development dimension, the provision of hand- 
holding support, possibly for long periods, and new 
enterprises may be best developed around co-operative 
principles. Developmental programmes of this sort could 
be complemented with the support of income subsidies - 
possibly a more flexible EAS - and the new businesses 
tied into the provision of workshops and small factories.
Other training and job creation programmes, instead 
of merely increasing someone's 'employability' when in 
reality many will face a continued competitive disadvantage 
in the search for jobs, could also be integrated with the 
animation of potentially sustainable economic activity.
The difficulties surrounding the use of manpower programmes 
for such purposes have been discussed in Chapters 9 and 13 
and they depend on the structure of rules and procedures 
under which resources are released and the attitudes of 
public officials involved. The experience of some grass­
roots initiatives I visited suggests that the programmes 
of some agencies can be used more flexibly than others 
and that there may be ways to overcome some of the present 
difficulties by imaginative project design. It would 
appear that training money from the EEC's Social Fund 
can be used more innovatively than funding from domestic 
sources. The voluntary sector in Liverpool has been
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particularly successful in exploiting the Social Fund 
by striking up personal contacts in Brussels and 
emphasising those aspects of a proposed project which touch 
on the Fund's priorities when applying for support - 
such as ameliorating youth unemployment and expanding 
work opportunities for women. Social Fund monies have 
been used to bridge the gap between 'training* and 
'trading' by arguing that funds to provide working capital, 
invest in new equipment and pay the wages of employees in 
new community based enterprises are all essentially 
ingredients of a training package until the enterprise 
and the workers assisted reach a position of independent 
viability.^
The principal of integration could be developed 
further by linking the demand generated in a particular 
locality with the support or development of local enterprise 
and associated training programmes. In the placing of 
contract work public authorities could discriminate in 
favour of local firms. Glasgow District Council already 
do something like this for small firms across the city 
as a whole (see Chapter 10), but positive discrimination 
could be taken further to favour firms either located in 
an area subject to some form of priority treatment or 
closely tied to that area through having a large proportion 
of their workers living locally or because of the important 
local services they provide.
Where the existing enterprise and skills necessary 
to carry out the contract work required do not exist 
within the area a regeneration strategy is targetted on - 
particularly one involving a heavy construction package 
such as that in GEAR - then these capacities could be 
developed by applying an integrated package of training 
and support measures of the kind described above. With
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the greater demands this would place on the forward and 
complementary planning of physical, economic and manpower 
programmes and inter-agency collaboration, such an approach 
would involve additional delay and cost. But it would 
allow a variety of currently independent programmes to 
be pulled together and linked with jobs and incomes for 
local people and ensure that the local community gained 
more from resources spent on meeting its needs.
The revenue expenditure of local authorities offers 
similar opportunities to extend a deprived community's 
responsibility and gain from public services. The manage­
ment responsibility for certain local services like housing 
and environmental maintenance, nieals on wheels, community 
transport and so on, could be vested with community groups 
who would be paid by the local authority to take on 
board these tasks. Developments of this sort will provoke 
fierce opposition, being seen as moves to hive-off and 
privatise public services, undermine and reduce unionised 
labour, and lead to poorer and less accountable services- 
Criticisms of this sort have been voiced recently in 
Glasgow by NALGO and the city's tenant federation over 
the Council's 1984 plan to sell off groups of council 
houses to tenants who will manage these as community 
ownership co-operatives, purchasing the houses via a 
building society mortgage and repaying the mortgage by 
levying a rent from all its members. One of the attractions 
is that the houses would become eligible for a share of 
the £80 million of private sector improvement repair 
grants at the council's disposal. The union and the 
tenants' association have agreed to allow four pilot projects 
involving a total of 2,400 houses to go ahead, but many 
of their members retain strong reservations about the 
scheme and will oppose any further extension of it. Pears
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surrounding the contracting out of services previously- 
provided by local authorities are understandable in the 
present political climate. The principal, however, 
still retains progressive qualities and could be used to 
generate incomes and resources in deprived communities.
In many high unemployment areas it is unrealistic 
to assume that, even with more successful local economic 
policies, the formal economy can be sufficiently revived 
to provide adequate numbers of jobs for those excluded 
from work. Other strategies which raise incomes and 
generate local revenue will be needed. These will have 
to rely more heavily than hitherto on mobilising the 
indigenous potential of local communities, developing less- 
conventional forms of economic activity, and promoting 
informal exchange.
Even the most economically disadvantaged areas have 
an internal economy which provides opportunities for 
promoting economic development and raising local wealth. 
Numerous economic transactions take place and large 
amounts of money flow to points in the local economy 
like pubs, supermarkets, betting shops - points of high 
profit-making where large amounts of wealth are accumulated 
and *creamed-off* outside the area, providing little in 
the way of jobs and incomes to the local community in 
return. In the huge peripheral council housing estate 
of Easterhouse in Glasgow,, for example, local sources 
report that the local branch of a national bookmaker chain 
makes a profit of around £0.5 million each year; a 
significant drain on the wealth of a community which is 
both spatially and economically marginal to the conurba-
3
tion. New commercial structures could be developed - 
possibly around the priniples of community business - to
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retain and recycle more of this scarce local wealth 
towards other forms of activity which generate work and 
incomes for local residents or help fund the provision 
of facilities previously lacking in the community. The 
development of these enterprises will need strong public 
support of a kind which could be partly met by an integrated 
approach linking up community development, education and 
training, economic incentives and other forms of public 
subsidy. They could also be assisted by developing their 
demand side and linking these enterprises into the 
expenditure of public agencies in the ways described above.
Other approaches to stimulating the economies of 
local communities are open to public authorities in addition 
to targetting resources directly towards an 'enterprise* 
of whatever form. By providing land for the construction 
of private houses, more affluent groups could be attracted 
into these areas. Work will be generated by the construc­
tion programme from which local labour may benefit. 
Furthermore, demand will be generated by the new residents, 
some of which will be for services, like car repairs, 
hairdressers, the repair of household goods and so on; 
services which are normally provided locally thus leading 
to the support of local businesses and a boost in local 
incomes. The multiplier effects would be difficult to 
determine precisely, but the case serves to illustrate 
that there might be cheaper ways of raising local incomes, 
for roughly the same results, than by expensive strategies 
such as factory construction.
If raising the standard of living among poorer house­
holds is one of the main policy priorities, then there 
are ways to pursue the objective directly, and again 
possibly less expensively, than through more conventional
428.
approaches to local economic development. As Chapter 
6 showed,large amounts of money are lost in unclaimed 
social security benefits which could be realised given 
extra expenditure on welfare rights services. In 
Strathclyde Region, for example, it has been estimated 
that for the salary of one extra welfare rights worker 
(around £10,000) an additional £150,000 could be 
generated in unclaimed benefits.^ Alternatively, where 
a local authority spends money on repairing or improving 
an individual's home, the resident could be given the 
opportunity to administer and carry out this work himself. 
Through its Tenant's Grants Improvement Scheme Glasgow 
District Council has gone some way in pioneering the use 
of public expenditure to boost household income directly 
in this fashion.
It is unlikely that the informal economy will prosper 
in high unemployment areas without external stimuli.
Earlier chapters discussed how unemployed people participate 
less in informal exchange than those in employment do.
Partly this reflects their exclusion from the life of the 
community and the erosion of the personal contact networks 
through which people find out about work, but it is also 
to do with lack of resources. People need to be able 
to purchase the materials and equipment necessary to enter 
into informal exchange as well as strike up contacts with 
others able to reciprocate or pay for their services.
Public authorities could have an important pump-priming 
role in this process. By helping people purchase the 
necessary hardware (it could be wool for home production 
or tools for DIY activities), providing the physical 
facilities from which to run their activity (either a 
workshop or a piece of land), and assisting in the process 
of distribution and exchange (possibly by subsidising a
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shop or promoting their products in other areas), they '
could help construct the basis of a set of economic 
relationships through which unemployed workers could tap 
into the relative affluence of the formal economy upon 
which most informal exchange thrives. A rise in the 
level of social security benefit disregard alone would 
remove a major constraint on the role of the unemployed 
in the informal economy.
Many of the less conventional forms of economic
activity that could be developed bring together both 
,social and economic objectives and will call for the use f
of public resources in new ways. By keeping large 
numbers of workers unproductive the community bears a 
heavy cost in social security payments, the non-payment 
of tax and national insurance and in lost economic ' Ï'-
production (Chapter 7). There is, therefore, a strong 
argument that public authorities, when dealing with policies 
affecting people who would otherwise be unemployed, 
should adopt new accounting procedures which recognise 
the savings as well as the costs to the state. Some 
initiatives could, if given more support, generate work 
for marginal groups in the labour market, and operate
'■Ï'
showing a net surplus to the taxpayer when an alternative 
accounting approach is used and, therefore, justify a 
continuing subsidy in conventional terms. Other initiat­
ives might never be able to demonstrate a surplus or 
'cost-effectiveness', but support could still be justified 
on social grounds because of a reduction in poverty 
and despair and a rise in morale and confidence.
Public officials might be faced with the problem 
of deciding when an alternative assessment of public 
resources is needed. In some instances it should not 
be a difficult decision. In areas of high and long term
iV
.   _
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unemployment where there is little prospect of external 
investment there is a strong case for subsidising the 
development of new indigenous economic activities and 
services on the grounds that market disruptions will 
be small. In other areas the relationships will be 
less clear and decisions may have to be based more on 
complicated equity considerations. Spill-over and 
displacement effects might be tolerable if they lead 
to gains among the unemployed over more affluent 
workers with better prospects living in other communi­
ties. But they may not if the subsidy is supporting 
inefficient and wasteful production at the expense, and 
possible displacement, of more efficient enterprise. 
Delicate decisions of this sort will need sophisticated 
evaluative and social accounting techniques.
The development of new relationships between public 
authorities and the communities they serve raises 
delicate questions about 'scale* and 'accountability*.
If the resources deployed within local communities are 
to be integrated and administered more flexibly and 
sensitively at the local level, and local people given 
greater opportunity to determine priorities and manage 
resources, than we need to consider how best to organise 
new forms of community-based representative and 
responsible government at this level.
The choice of scale will need to take account of 
existing local loyalties and knowledge. The size of 
communities that any new devolved administrative 
structures are applied to should be selected on the 
basis that local people themselves orientate and identify 
with it. Such areas will not always correspond with 
the administrative boundaries used by public authorities.
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The GEAR area, for example, is an artifical community, 
an administrative creation suiting the convenience of 
the main agencies involved in the scheme. Local people 
in the east end of Glasgow continue to identify with 
the old traditional village centres around which the 
east end developed - localities much smaller than the 
GEAR area itself. While it will be valuable to tap 
the detailed local knowledge and commitment among resi­
dents at these levels, decisions about major public 
investment in industry, transport and manpower policy 
are probably best made - as Chapter 14 suggested for 
factory construction - at the level of the city or 
conurbation. These strategic decisions could be 
inproved and tailored more to local needs by the filter­
ing up of detailed information about capacities and 
problems at smaller scales. New structures are needed 
to link these different levels more effectively. They 
would also extend opportunities for community participa­
tion and debate throughout the urban policy making 
process. These new intermediate structures should be 
set at a scale which meets two important requirements. 
First, local people should be able to get involved in 
discussions about the allocation of resources and 
programmes which have sufficient leverage to make a 
noticable impact on their community. Second, the 
structure should be sufficiently broad-based so as to 
mobilise adequate numbers of residents, officials and 
politicians to ensure that main policy priorities are 
respected and protect against the exclusion and harrass- 
ment of unpopular neighbours or the misuse of public 
money.
Professor David Donnison has suggested that the 
best scale at which to conduct such a discussion about
432
the planning and allocation of public resources is 
at the level of the ward or the size of an area 
covered by a Community Council - areas of between 
10,000 and 20,000 people which are.
"small enough for a committee to know well, 
yet large enough to assemble one or two 
good staff and a sufficient budget to offer 
scope for real choices."5
The Priority Area Teams established by Newcastle City 
Council in a number of the city's most disadvantaged 
wards and which bring together local people, councillors 
and senior officials from Council Departments with 
devolved resources seem to offer a good exanple of the 
scale and balance of what is required. Similarly the 
Boards of Management of some community businesses which 
draw on the same types of participants, though usually 
in a voluntary capacity, could also provide bases 
from which to build new accountable community based 
structures.
5, Dilemmas and Reservations
While many of the opportunities identified above 
involve difficult choices for the groups involved, 
there are other more fundamental dilemmas to be faced 
by educationalists, policy makers, practitioners and 
activists involved in locally based initiatives. These 
are dilemmas which could be forgotten in the enthusiasm 
attached to devising innovative projects, winning small 
successes by ingeniously bending the rules attached to 
existing programmes and pressing for improvements to 
existing policy arrangements.
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Creating jobs for the unemployed or stimulating 
new economic activity in a disadvantaged community 
should not in themselves be regarded as hallmarks of 
success. The damaging effects of certain types of 
work complicated the assessment of the effects of 
unemployment on health in Chapter 7. Policies which 
return the unemployed to work which is low waged, 
insecure, sweated and ill-organised are a regressive 
step. At present this could be happening as a result 
of policies geared to propping up small firms and 
developing other enterprises which are expected to bear 
the risks without giving their workers the same rewards 
and security that larger firms used to give them.
Similarly some of the enterprises developed as radical 
alternatives to small scale capitalism, and which win 
support because of this aim, face the same dilemmas.
They may even be worse employers. Although I am optimistic 
about the potential benefits of community businesses 
if given certain support, two of the projects I visited 
were no more than squalid job creation schemes run on 
MSC money, providing services to the local community at 
very low cost to the public purse and managed in a 
strict and authoritarian fashion which gave the workers 
no control or stake in the operation. They were the 
exact opposite of what one might have expected given 
the radical and exciting aspirations of the movement 
they claimed to be part of.
Policies will have negative effects unless they 
increase the net welfare of disadvantaged workers. 
Furthermore, the effects will also be socially divisive 
unless the gap in living standards between those 
enjoying the security and rewards of the formal economy 
and the smaller, but increasing, number excluded from
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these benefits is reduced. Unless existing policies 
meet, or can be adapted to meet, these objectives, then 
those involved in supporting them may just be 'managing* 
the unemployed and keeping people docile who might do 
better if they became more demanding and militant.
Through their support, public officials could be acting 
more out of self-interest, and the interest of the 
organisations they work for, rather than looking after 
the needs of the unemployed.
An equally difficult dilemma confronts community 
activists working outside the statutory sector. If 
they chose to work alongside public agencies they will 
often have to adapt their demands in order to tap into 
the resources of that organisation. In return for its 
support ideals may have to be compromised, the project's 
objectives de-radicalised, or worse still, the initiative 
may be emasculated by the existing bureaucracy. Fears 
of this sort were expressed by some of the community 
activists I interviewed during my community business 
fieldwork. However the price for independence is often 
the loss of valuable resources. Some projects - like 
community businesses which insist on keeping the revenue 
generated, and unemployed worker centres where the 
jobless exercise their right to protest - have found this 
out and now struggle with limited funds, remaining 
isolated with only a marginal impact. Apart from the 
difficulties with resources, developing genuinely self­
managed initiatives will require a greater involvement 
of individuals in the community collectivity and the 
adoption of responsibilities they are not accustomed 
to fulfill - a more demanding role than surrendering 
social and managerial control to a bureaucratic and 
professional elite. These are tall orders for high
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unerrployment communities to meet, and most of the 
evidence available so far suggests that it is particularly 
difficult to mobilise large numbers of people around 
economic initiative at the local scale.
The locally based initiatives I have discussed in 
the main body of the Thesis owe the pace of their 
development largely to economic collapse and the steep 
rises in unemployment in recent years. However many 
of these developments would also represent worthwhile 
inprovements to social and economic policy at a more 
prosperous time. They therefore mirror not only the 
stresses of society responding to major social and 
economic upheaval, but the longer term struggle for 
more responsive and democratic government. The current 
irony is that the expectations attached to local 
initiatives are exaggerated because of lack of action 
to deal with unemployment at national and international 
scales. But without the commitment of Government and 
other powerful institutions operating at these higher 
levels to reduce unemployment, the scope for policies 
operating at an urban or smaller scale to achieve 
meaningful results is very limited. Innovative local 
initiatives may provide some guidelines to follow in 
a more favourable economic and political climate. There 
seems little else people of goodwill operating on an 
urban scale can do.
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Notes: Chapter Fifteen
1. From Merseyside County Council, Mersyside Advanced 
Factory Information Service (MAFIS) records.
2. From meetings with CDS Training Limited, Liverpool, 
and Centre for Employment Initiatives, Liverpool, 
February 1984.
3. Information supplied by Mr. Keiran Grant, Employment 
Development Worker with Easterhouse Festival Society, 
and Director of Provenhall Holdings Limited, January 
1984.
4. University of Glasgow (1982), 'GEAR Review, Social 
Aspects', Department of Town Planning and Housing 
Research Group, October.
5. Professor David Donnison (1983), 'Urban policies: a 
new approach', Fabian Tract 487, March.
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APPENDIX A; Principal Meetings and Conferences During 
Fieldwork for Section III (Local Responses 
 ______ _ to Unemployment) __________ _____________
During the fieldwork for Section III I travelled 
extensively within Britain interviewing officials within 
public, private and voluntary agencies and others involved 
in local projects. In addition I attended many other 
gatherings, such as seminars and conferences. I will not 
attempt to list all of these here, or the many more agencies 
with whom I corresponded or contacted by telephone, I identify 
here some of the main agencies and projects I visited and 
meetings I attended.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND 
DEPARTMENTS__________
Department of Employment
- Department of Environment
- Department of Health and Social Security
- Department of Trade and Industry (formerly Department
of Industry)
- Highland and Island Development Board
- Manpower Services Commission (Head Offices in Sheffield,
and Edinburgh and a number of local bodies, e.g.
Area Manpower Boards, Job Centres and Training Workshops).
- Merseyside Task Force
- Scottish Development Agency (various officials and parts
of organisation, e.g. Clydebank Task Force, Glengarnock 
Task Force, GEAR Team).
Scottish Development Department (Urban Renewal Unit)
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
- Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
Central Regional Council 
Clydebank District Council
- Glasgow District Council
- Greater London Council
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(Local Authorities continued)
- Liverpool City Council
- London Borough of Hackney 
Merseyside County Council
- Newcastle City Council
- Sheffield City Council
- Strathclyde Regional Council
- Swansea City Council
Tyne and Wear County Council
- West Lothian District Council
- West Midlands County Council
PRIVATE SECTOR AGENCIES AND 
INITIATIVES
Action Resource Centre, London and Merseyside
British American Tobacco New Enterprise Workshops, 
Toxteth'and Liverpool
British Steel (Industries) Ltd, Glasgow headquarters 
and workshops at Tollcross, Glasgow and Glengarnock, 
Ayrshire
Business in the Community, London 
Glasgow Opportunities, Glasgow
Islington Small Business Counselling Service, London 
Levis (Community Affairs Northern Division), London 
Marks and Spencer, London
Newcastle Upon Tyne, Small Business Unit, Newcastle
Project Full Employ, London and Bristol
Rainford Venture Capital, St. Helens
St. Helens Trust, St. Helens
Scottish Action Resource Centre, Glasgow
Scottish Business in the Community, Edinburgh
Shell Small Business Unit, London
Small Business Training Courses (Glasgow University, 
Paisley College of Technology, Clydebank College of 
Technology)
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TRADE UNION AND UNEMPLOYED 
INITIATIVES
Community Resource Unit, London 
Newcastle Trades Council, Newcastle 
Scottish Trade Union Congress, Glasgow
Unemployed Workers' Centres (at Sheffield, Clydebank, 
Newcastle, Liverpool and Stirling)
Unemployment Demonstration, Glasgow, organised by the 
Scottish TUC, March 1980
Unemployment Demonstration, Glasgow, organised by the 
Scottish Executive of the Labour Party, February 1981
COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANISATIONS AND 
PROJECTS
Bambee Products, Motherwell
Briech Enterprise Action Group, West Caulder 
Centre for Employment Initiatives, Liverpool 
Community Business Central 
Community Business Scotland
Community Development Services (Training) Ltd., 
Liverpool
Denny Employment Creation Group Ltd., Denny
Easterhouse Festival Society, Glasgow
Flagstone Enterprises, Paisley
Forgewood Enterprises, Motherwell
Glasgow Council of Voluntary Service
Goodwill Incorporated Ltd., Glasgow
Goodwill, Port Glasgow
Govan Enterprises Ltd., Govan
Govan Workspace Ltd., Govan
Grangemouth Enterprises Ltd., Grangemouth
Greater Springburn Enterprises Ltd., Glasgow
Home Production Sales Organisation, Glasgow
Local Enterprise Advisory Project
London Voluntary Service Council
Manor Employment Project, Sheffield
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(Community-based Organisations and Projects continued)
- 'Many Hands', Maryhill Community Business Ltd., Glasgow 
Merseyside Adult Training Unit, Liverpool
- Merseyside Innovation Centre, Liverpool
- Neo Industries Ltd., Liverpool
- Poldrait Service and Industry, Glasgow
- Port Glasgow Community Enterprises Ltd., Port Glasgow
- Provanhall Holdings, Easterhouse, Glasgow
- Scottish Council of Social Service, Glasgow
- Stoneyburn Workshops Ltd., Stoneyburn
CONFERENCES AND MAJOR SEMINARS
'Convention on Unemployment', University of Glasgow, STUC, 
November 1980
'Developing Unemployed Workers' Centres', Newcastle :
Polytechnic, Newcastle Trades Council, February 1981 j
'Employment Promotion and Economic Development', London |
School of Economics, Royal Town Planning Institute, j
March 1981 i
'Industry and the Inner City', University of Newcastle |
Upon Tyne, Social Science Research Council, May 1981.
'Recession, Redundancy and Redeployment in the Regions', ;
University of Manchester, Regional Studies Association,
July 1981
'Enterprise and Democracy in Urban Europe, Making the City 
Work', Mitchell Theatre, Glasgow, The First Conference 
of Project Turin International, October 1981
'Local Economic Development', Edinburgh College of Art, 
Department of Town and Country Planning, February 1982
'Industrial Improvement Areas', Duncan of Jordanstone College 
of Art, Dundee, The Planning Exchange, October 1982
'The Long Term Unemployed', DHSS Headquarters, London,
November 1982
'Area and Community Development', University of Glasgow,
Centre for Urban and Regional Research, January 1984
'Local Authorities and Industrial Promotion', Glasgow 
College of Technology, May 1984
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APPENDIX B: Details of Questionnaire Conducted among
__________  Community Business Workers______________
Name of Community Business:
1. What date did you start work in the business?
2. Please describe the type of work you do:
3. If you have been employed before what was your 
normal occupation?
4. Do you have any school, trade or other qualifications
Yes; No:
If you do please state which (eg number of O Levels):
5. How many different times have you been unemployed in 
the last 4 years?
6. What was your employment state immediately before taking 
up your present work?
Unemployed: Employed: Temporary MSC Scheme:
School Leaver: Housewife: Other (state):
If unemployed, how long had you been out of work?
7. What is the average number of hours you work each 
week?
8. What is your average top line pay each week?
9. Which of the following do you consider your present
job to be:
Permanent: Temporary: Unable to say:
10. If you were offered a similar job in a privately owned
firm would you prefer this to the one in your present
community business? (tick)
Yes: No: Don't Know:
If 'yes' or 'no' please give reasons for your answer:
11. Please give the following details about yourself:
Male: Female:
Number of adults, if any, who stay Age   Years
with you and are not in paid employment:
Number of children under 16, if any, 
who stay with you:
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APPENDIX C; Details of Questionnaire Conducted among 
 ______   Small Firms in GEAR and Clydebank
Name of Firm: 
Address:
Name of Respondent: 
Position in Firm: 
Telephone Number: 
Date of Interview:
* * * * * * * * * *
About the Firm
1. When was the firm established?
2. Date of moving into the premises:
3. What is the annual rental for the premises?
4. What is the total floorspace of the premises?
5. What business activity takes place within this 
establishment?
6. Is this establishment:
An independent firm? A subsidiary?
A branch plant? The headquarters of a
multi-plant organisation?
7. If the establishment is a branch plant or subsidiary, 
please give the name and address of the main plant
or head office.
8. Did the firm previously occupy any other premises?
Yes: No:
9. If so, please give the precise address of the last 
premises.
10. What is the current use of the previous premises, if 
known?
11. What were the main reasons for locating in your 
current premises?
12. Was this area the first to be offered by the SDA?
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13. Did the firm consider locating in any other area?
14. If so, what was the next best alternative?
15. From what area do you obtain the largest proportion 
of your supplies?
Local Scotland
Glasgow area UK
Strathclyde Other
16. If a major suppler/s can be identified, please state: 
name of supplier, address, % of total supplies.
17. In what area is the largest proportion of the establish­
ment's products sold/services rendered?
Local Scotland
Glasgow area UK
Strathclyde Other
18. If a major customer/s can be identified, please state:
name of customer, address, % of total supplies.
19. Does the establishment have any particular links with 
other firms in the local area?
About the Entrepreneur (NB. establish how many owners/
directors the establishment has, 
and who information is being 
received about.)
20. Where does the entrepreneur/s reside?
Local Strathclyde
Glasgow Area Other
21. Immediately before setting up in the present premises,
what was the employment state of the entrepreneur/s?
Unemployed Self-employed
Employed Other
Give details, e.g. if 'unemployed' - for how long?
if 'employed' - why go self-employed?
22. Before setting up in these premises, has the entrepreneur 
had any previous experience of self-employment?
23. Please give details about the general occupational 
background of the founder/s of the business, e.g. skills, 
previous employer, jobs and business positions held:
Ï
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About the Workforce
24. What is the total number of people employed in this 
establishment? (including owners)
25. Please give details about the composition of the labour 
force under the following categories:
Full-time Part-time
Male Female Male Female
Owners/Directors ......................................
Professional/Managerial/
Technical ................................ «..........
Clerical ...............................................
Skilled ................................................
Semi-skilled............ .................. ...........
Unskilled .............................................
TOTAL ..................................................
NB (i) part-time workers are classified as persons 
working for 30 hours or less a week:
(ii) include apprentices and YOP trainees in
’unskilled’ category
26. What proportion of your employees live in the following 
areas (excluding owners):
Local Strathclyde
Glasgow Area Other (specify)
27. Since setting up in the present premises, what change 
has there been in the establishment's workforce?
(give numbers)
NB whether firm is 'relocation' or 'new', establish 
size of workforce when setting up in premises
No change: Increase: Decrease:
28. If there has been a change in the total workforce, 
please give details according to the following skill/ 
sex categories:
Professional/Managerial/Technical
Clerical
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
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29. Has there been any shift in the balance between 
part-time and full-time, or temporary and permanent 
employment in the establishment's workforce? If so, 
give details:
30. How many vacancies, if any, do you currently have in 
each of the following categories?
Professional/Managerial/Technical
Clerical
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
31. What is your main method of labour recruitment?
32. What proportion of your employees were recruited by 
the following means:
Through local Job Centres 
Advertising in Press 
Application by employee 
Personal contact, e.g. applicant 
recommended or known to firm 
Other (specify)
33. If Job Centre has been the main method, what types 
of labour have been recruited, i.e. by sex, skill, 
and age.
34. If personal contact has been the main method, give 
details about how these people were known to you 
or put in contact with you,
35. If the firm has increased in employment bver the last 
two years, or since setting up in the premises, what 
was the previous employment position of those recruited 
during this period?
e.g. if 'unemployed' - for how long?; if 'employed', 
where and in what jobs?
36. What changes do you expect in the size of your 
workforce over the next few years?
(a) reasons for the change:
(b) numbers affected:
(c) types of labour lost or added:
37. What statutory authorities, if any, have you had 
contact with over the last few years?
(a) name/s of authority:
(b) what was it about?
(c) how satisfactory was the outcome?
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38. Has the firm experienced any theft or vandalism 
problems since setting up in these premises? If 
so, give details, e.g. extent of damage, loss to firm, 
suspected culprits, response from SDA and police, 
effect on stability of business in present location.
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APPENDIX D; List of Abbreviations
ARC
BAT
BIC
BSC(lnd)
CBI
CBS
CBVU
CCP
CDA
CDP
- Action Resource Centre
- British American Tobacco
- Business in the Community
- British Steel Corporation Industry Limited
- Confederation of British Industry 
Community Business Scotland
- Community Business Ventures Unit 
~ Comprehensive Community Programme
- Co-Operative Development Agency
- Community Development Project
CDS (Training) Limited
- Co-Operative Development Services (Training) 
Limited
- Community Enterprise Programme
- Community Programme
- Child Poverty Action Group
- Community Resource Unit
- Department of Employment
- Department of Employment Gazette
- Department of Health and Social Security 
Department of Industry (now DTI)
Department of Environment
CEP
CP
CPAG
CRU
DE
DEG
DHSS
DI
DoE
DTI
EAP
EE
EEC
EZ
ERS
FIS
GEAR
GHS
GLC
GLEB
Department of Trade and Industry (formerly 
DI)
Educational Priority Area 
English Estates 
European Economic Community 
Enterprise Zone 
Earnings Related Supplement 
Family Income Supplement 
Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal 
General Household Survey 
Greater London Council 
Greater London Enterprise Board
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GLTB — Greater London Training Board
GNP — Gross National Product
HIDE » Highlands and Islands Development Board
IAS — Inner Area Study
ICOF — Industrial Common Ownership Finance
IDC Industrial Development Certificate
IIA — Industrial Improvement Area
JCP — Job Creation Programme
LEAP — Local Enterprise Advisory Project
LEnta - London Enterprise Agency
MSC - Manpower Services Commission
NAB -, National Assistance Board
NEB - National Enterprise Board
NEP — New Enterprise Programme
NUPE - National Union of Public Employees
NUWM - National Unemployed Workers Movement
OECD — Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development
RDG — Regional Development Grant
( sa) seasonally adjusted
SB — Supplementary Benefit
SBC - Supplementary Benefits Commission
SBC - Scottish Business in the Community
SDA — Scottish Development Agency
SDD — Scottish Development Department
STEP - Special Temporary Employment Programme
TES - Temporary Employment Subsidy
TGWU — Transport and General Workers Union
TUC - Trades Union Congress
UAB - Unemployment Assistance Board
UDC Urban Development Corporation
UDG — Urban Development Grant
UIB - Unemployment Insurance Benefit
WDA — Welsh Development Agency
WEEP — Work Experience on Employers Premises
WEP — Work Experience Programme
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YOP - Youth Opportunities Programme
YTS - Youth Training Scheme
YWS - Young Workers Scheme
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